Latest news with #geopolitics
Washington Post
4 hours ago
- Politics
- Washington Post
Trump breaks with Putin. But will it last?
Read more from our columnists: Max Boot: Putin took Trump for granted. He's going to pay for his mistake. David Ignatius: In squeezing Putin, Trump 'escalates to de-escalate' Subscribe to The Washington Post here.
Arab News
4 hours ago
- Politics
- Arab News
Sykes-Picot and the new Middle East
Amid all the geopolitical upheavals witnessed by the region since Oct. 7, 2023, US President Donald Trump's ambassador to Turkiye and special envoy to Syria and Lebanon, Tom Barrack, has triggered a political storm by dismissing the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, saying it divided Syria and the broader Middle East region for imperial gain rather than peace — a mistake that cost generations and will not be repeated. He went further by warning Lebanon that, unless it gets its act together and disarms Hezbollah, Syria might consider annexing Lebanon, noting that Syrians view their smaller neighbor as a 'summer resort' and part of the broader Bilad Al-Sham, or Levant. However, he later sought to clarify his remarks, insisting that they 'praised Syria's impressive strides' and were 'not a threat to Lebanon.' No Western diplomat had ever echoed such sentiments about Sykes-Picot, and for good reason. It was the reigning colonial powers of the day, namely France and Britain, that decided to carve up Bilad Al-Sham into the political states that exist today following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. The denunciation of that colonial conspiracy has traditionally come from die-hard Arab nationalists, pan-Arabists, Nasserites, Baathists and Syrian nationalists — all of whom have disappeared from the Arab political stage today. To open that can of worms is dangerous. Israel was not happy with Barrack's statements, with an op-ed in The Times of Israel advising him to 'stick to the script.' Why? Because such talk will eventually bring us to the roots of the Zionist project in Palestine, the Balfour Declaration, the British mandate over Palestine, the Partition Plan and the Nakba. It will eventually bring us to the ongoing war in Gaza and the active annexation of the West Bank. This is, after all, what the Sykes-Picot 'mistake' delivered: the longest colonial occupation in modern times. But surely Barrack had no intention of drawing attention to the calamity that befell the Palestinians as a result of Sykes-Picot. He must have had something else in mind. The US State Department was quick to distance itself from Barrack's remarks. After all, Oct. 7 led to the defeat of Hezbollah and to the fall of Bashar Assad in Syria — and that in turn led to last month's 12-day war between Israel and Iran. The series of events that began on Oct. 7 now has a name, an Israeli one. It is called the 'new Middle East.' Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu sees himself as the anointed — albeit in the blood of tens of thousands of Palestinians — sheriff of the region. His new Middle East is one that the US and Israel are drawing up, with little daylight between them. Ironically, Netanyahu's new Middle East looks as evil, if not more so, than the old Sykes-Picot plot. Trump, who has found a new love for Netanyahu, also has his eyes on the new regime in Syria. Trump is pushing for an end to the hostilities between Damascus and Tel Aviv, which would culminate in adding a new Arab member to the Abraham Accords. For Israel to play the sectarian card in Syria, as it did in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, is testimony to a well-studied and well-planned scheme to divide and rule the region. Osama Al-Sharif He last month signed an executive order ending US economic sanctions on Syria and last week he removed Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham, formerly Al-Nusra Front, from the list of foreign terrorist organizations. He previously met with President Ahmad Al-Sharaa and praised him as the new leader of the Syrian people. Bringing Syria into the fold is key to both US and Israeli interests. But while Barrack is focused on both Lebanon and Syria, the common denominator is Israel and what Netanyahu wants to achieve. For Lebanon, the challenges include ending the Israeli occupation of the south, securing much-needed aid and disarming Hezbollah. The US wants President Joseph Aoun to deliver on the last issue first — a thorny and divisive problem. For war-torn Syria, the priority is to end Israeli aggression so that the rebuilding of the country can begin. Both Syria and Lebanon have clashed with Israel since last December and they have one common challenge: minorities. Israel has stepped in to play the minority card, declaring itself as guardian and protector of Syria's minorities, including the Druze. Its intervention has deepened sectarian frictions, especially after the collapse of the Assad regime and the bloody incidents in Jaramana. Israeli political strategists, especially on the right, have repeatedly talked about Israel being a lonely minority state, based on its ethnoreligious identity, surrounded by hostile nonhomogeneous central states that were the creation of Sykes-Picot. The only way for Israel to become normal in such an environment is to help create peers — a Levant that is divided along sectarian and ethnic lines. That started in the 1970s with the backing of the Kurds, who were left out of the redrawing of the colonial maps back in the early 1900s, leaving them scattered across Turkiye, Iran, Iraq and Syria. One can assume that Netanyahu's vision for the Levant is based on such a paradigm; small nation states not so different from Israel. Thus, the redrawing would extend from Iraq to the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean. It is a diabolical scheme in which the means, the motive and the opportunity have all come together. Perhaps Barrack, a real-estate mogul, may have learned about this by chance. What does the US, now moving closer to Damascus for the first time in more than half a century, want from the new government? Just as Israeli and Syrian officials were meeting in Baku — with another meeting planned for later this week in Brussels — violent clashes erupted between Druze and Bedouin tribes in Sweida in southern Syria. When Damascus sent troops and tanks to contain the violence, Israeli jets bombed the Syrian army, ostensibly to protect the Druze. For Israel to play the sectarian card in Syria, as it did in Lebanon in the 1970s and 1980s, is testimony to a well-studied and well-planned scheme to divide and rule the region. This is the new Middle East that Netanyahu espouses: a coalition of minority states. Such a coalition will ensure Israel's security and regional hegemony for generations. The new government in Syria must be wary of being pushed into becoming a tool or a spearhead in such a scheme. Yes, it has the right to negotiate with Israel in good faith to end the latter's assaults, occupation and interference. It has said it is committed to the 1974 disengagement agreement. But Israel is in no mood to give up the Golan Heights or Mount Hermon — not now, not ever. It is worth noting that, under such a scheme, the Palestinians get nothing: no state, no Jerusalem and no right of return. They will be pushed around and made to suffer until they leave or die where they stand. The new Middle East is an integral plan, just as the Sykes-Picot agreement was, and we may now have a hint as to the contents of its first chapter. • Osama Al-Sharif is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman. X: @plato010
Al Mayadeen
6 hours ago
- Politics
- Al Mayadeen
Jebraily: Iran strikes rewrote regional deterrence rules
As the dust settles on the 12-day Israeli war on Iran, few voices within the Islamic Republic offer as sweeping a perspective on its global implications as Dr. Seyyed Yasser Jebraily. A prominent political scientist, Jebraily is one of Iran's foremost intellectuals and analysts. Dr. Jebraily is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Institute for Humanities and Cultural Studies. He served for five years as the Head of the Center for Strategic Evaluation and Supervision of the Implementation of Macro-Policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Expediency Council. He is also the founder of the recently established New Islamic Civilization Party. In this exclusive interview with Al Mayadeen English, Dr. Jebraily contends that the Israeli assault on Iran was not merely a failed military operation, but a desperate and doomed bid to reshape the regional order in Tel Aviv's favor. He dissects the broader geopolitical architecture that underpinned the war, exposing what he calls a "strategic miscalculation rooted in despair." According to Jebraily, the war was not just a war between Iran and "Israel", it was a referendum on hegemony in a post-American West Asia. From deterrence theory and the symbolism of Iran's nuclear program, to the failed attempt at regime change and the deeper meanings of True Promise 3, Jebraily takes us through the war's visible and invisible fronts, and where he believes the Islamic Republic is heading next. *********************** Looking into the 12-day war on Iran in retrospect, doubtless, the outlook on things must now be in a much clearer place. With that in mind, how do you see the Israeli war on Iran? Was it a miscalculation by the Israelis or a logical step, considering their advances in the region over the past year? I believe war must be understood not merely as a military confrontation but fundamentally as a strategic phenomenon. To assess the recent 12-day war on Iran, one cannot restrict the analysis to battlefield outcomes or missile exchanges. We need to place it within its broader geopolitical architecture. What were "Israel's" strategic calculations? What regional and global shifts shaped the context in which this war unfolded? Just as the war in Ukraine must be seen as a symptom of a collapsing post-Cold War liberal order, the wars and conflicts in West Asia over the past years must also be interpreted in the context of a transitioning global system. There is a growing consensus among international scholars and analysts that we are entering a post-unipolar, multipolar world order. In such a world, naturally, every regional actor seeks hegemonic status within its respective sphere of influence. My assessment is that the United States, recognizing its declining capacity to maintain direct dominance over West Asia, had initiated a long-term strategy to elevate "Israel" as the regional hegemon in the emerging post-American order. This strategy operated across multiple dimensions. Militarily, Washington ensured that 'Israel' remained the most heavily armed power in the region. Politically, the "Abraham Accords" were launched to normalize relations between 'Israel' and several Arab states, effectively integrating "Israel" into the regional political architecture. Economically, the IMEC (India–Middle East–Europe Corridor) initiative aimed to place "Israel" at the heart of a new transregional trade route. However, the October 7 operation in 2023 by the Palestinian Resistance disrupted this entire design. It exposed the fragility of "Israel's" deterrence and severely undermined its bid for uncontested regional dominance. In response, "Israel" escalated to what it considered a total war, a war of survival, not only against the Palestinian Resistance but against the broader Axis of Resistance, with Iran as its central pillar. Now, to the core of your question: was the Israeli strike on Iran a miscalculation or a logical move? I would say it was a desperate gamble: a calculated step, perhaps, but one taken from a position of strategic despair. "Israel" viewed the elimination of the Resistance front and the toppling of the Islamic Republic as prerequisites for securing its regional hegemony. That was its strategic objective. Did the Resistance suffer? Of course. This was an existential war. And to think any side in such a war emerges unscathed is naive. But did "Israel" achieve its goals? Was the Resistance dismantled? Did the Islamic Republic collapse? The answer is categorically no. The outcome is thus clear: "Israel" lost the bet. Its regional stature is in decline. Public morale within Israeli society is fractured. Emigration from occupied Palestine, which had accelerated since October 7, has intensified further. And one must not overlook the internal socio-economic crisis: years of neoliberal policy have eroded "Israel's" social cohesion and generated staggering inequality. According to several indicators, the occupied territories are now among the most unequal regions in the world. When you combine this economic volatility with a declining sense of security, you get a society on the brink. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite being the target of a direct and high-stakes attack, has emerged more resilient. The Iranian people, even those who may have had critical views of their government, largely unified in defense of their sovereignty. In fact, "Israel's" aggression inadvertently reinforced domestic cohesion within Iran and triggered a rare moment of near-unanimous support for the state, especially for the leadership of the Islamic Revolution. How did the Iranian people take the war? There's much talk on social media and Western media of Iranians feeling frustrated with the Islamic Republic and the nuclear program, and that they've "just had enough". How were things like in reality on the ground? What does the nuclear program mean for the Iranian people? One of the great ironies of our time is how far Western media narratives often diverge from realities on the ground, especially in countries like Iran. I must say quite directly: what was witnessed inside Iran during the recent war was not disillusionment or disintegration, but a dramatic surge in national unity and collective defiance. Of course, like in any vibrant society, there are critical voices in Iran. We are not a monolith. Iranians debate, disagree, and protest, and they do so loudly. But when the homeland is attacked, and especially when it is attacked by a regime like 'Israel' that has committed egregious atrocities against civilians and enjoys uncritical Western backing, something profound happens: the differences become secondary, and the defense of sovereignty becomes paramount. This was exactly what happened during the war. The response of the Iranian people was not one of "frustration" with the Islamic Republic, as Western pundits often imagine in their echo chambers. It was one of dignity, clarity, and resolve. Millions across the country mobilized, through official institutions, civil society, and grassroots networks, to support the state in its defense posture. The Iranian flag flew higher, not lower. Let us speak about the nuclear program for a moment. In Western discourse, it is often framed as a source of fear or a burden on the Iranian people. But for many Iranians, the nuclear program is not about weapons. It is a symbol of national independence, technological sovereignty, and refusal to be bullied into scientific apartheid. The same nations that colonized the world, dropped atomic bombs on civilians, and supported brutal wars, now lecture others on "responsible science"? That hypocrisy is not lost on ordinary Iranians. You ask what the nuclear program means to the Iranian people. I can tell you: it means dignity. It means resistance against coercion. It means that Iran will not be treated as a second-class state in the global order. And this is not an elite perspective; it is shared widely across the political and social spectrum, especially when pressure mounts from the outside. So no, the war did not erode Iranian morale, and it did not turn the people against their government. On the contrary, it revealed the depth of national cohesion when sovereignty is threatened. And it reminded many observers around the world that despite all the pressures, sanctions, sabotage, and cyber attacks, Iran remains a state with a remarkably resilient population and a powerful sense of identity. Western media may continue to chase the illusion that "the people have had enough." But those who actually walked the streets of Iran during the war saw a very different picture: a nation that, while complex and plural, stands united in defense of its independence and future. How do you see Iran's True Promise 3? Many people have characterized Iran's response as being long overdue, with people citing delays in True Promise 1 and especially True Promise 2 as examples. So was it delayed or wasn't it? Let me be very clear: True Promise 3 was a strategic earthquake. It shattered not only "Israel's" illusions of invincibility but also the broader perception that Iran would remain in a posture of restraint while facing existential threats. The scale, precision, and audacity of the operation forced even those who had been calling for "unconditional surrender', like US President Donald Trump, to recalibrate their tone. As Grand Ayatollah Khamenei, the Leader of the Islamic Revolution, accurately stated, "Israel was crushed," and even Trump admitted: "Israel got hit hard." Was it late? That depends on your vantage point. From the outside, it's easy to critique timing. But from within the national security framework, decisions on the use of force are never merely reactive or emotional; they are multidimensional, calibrated, and deeply strategic. There are diplomatic, military, intelligence, and political layers involved, many of which the public may never fully see. Would I, if I were president and chair of the Supreme National Security Council, have made different choices about the timing? Perhaps, but that is not a conversation I am willing to have publicly at this point. What I will say is this: when Iran struck, it struck with such force and clarity that it not only restored deterrence but redefined the rules of engagement in the region. From Tel Aviv to Washington, everyone is now recalculating. True Promise 1 and True Promise 2 may have appeared restrained to some observers. But Iran has never been a country that fires impulsively. Each operation is part of a longer strategic chessboard. And as True Promise 3 demonstrated, when Iran does decide to move, it moves decisively. Why was Iran's destructive power showcased in this operation and not in the ones before? Would it not have been a better deterrent if Iran had used some of its more advanced missiles in the earlier operations as a message? That's an excellent question, and one that speaks to the deeper logic of Iran's defense doctrine. Why was this level of destructive capability showcased in True Promise 3 and not earlier? Let me clarify something crucial: what the world witnessed in this operation was not the full extent of Iran's power. It was a calibrated sample. As our late martyred commander General Hajizadeh had said clearly before: "What we have revealed is only a fraction of what we possess." The destructive power of the Islamic Republic is real, layered, and still largely concealed. Now, regarding the notion that earlier demonstrations of this power might have served as a more effective deterrent, I must respectfully disagree. In today's global system, conventional force projection alone is no longer sufficient to deter existential threats. The reality is that the only tool capable of deterring total war, the kind of war that seeks regime change or civilizational erasure, is nuclear capability. For over two decades, Iran has exercised immense strategic restraint. As a signatory to the NPT, Iran has remained committed to non-proliferation. We have opened our facilities to some of the most intrusive inspections in the history of the IAEA. We have declared repeatedly that our nuclear program is peaceful. And we have even codified this commitment through a fatwa by the Leader of the Islamic Revolution forbidding the development of nuclear weapons. But what has been the return on this restraint? Instead of being rewarded with security, Iran has faced constant military pressure, economic siege, cyber sabotage, and assassinations of its scientists. "Israel", armed with undeclared nuclear weapons and enjoying unconditional US support, has carried out repeated acts of aggression without consequence. The message this sends is unmistakable: the world respects power, not principle. In such a world, one where no central authority exists to uphold international law and where rules are selectively enforced, security becomes a self-help enterprise. Classical deterrence theory teaches us that only the credible threat of unacceptable retaliation can prevent war. This logic has protected states like Pakistan and North Korea, both of whom faced severe threats before achieving nuclear capability. This is not about glorifying armament; it is about securing peace through credible deterrence. Iran's experience with restraint has failed to yield stability, and the recent war has demonstrated that when push comes to shove, only power speaks. Thus, a strategic recalibration toward nuclear latency or even full weaponization is not an emotional escalation. It is a rational response to a structurally unjust and dangerous international order. This shift would involve three pillars: 1- Developing robust second-strike capabilities to ensure survivability and deterrence. 2- Establishing a clear declaratory policy that emphasizes the purely defensive posture of any future nuclear force. 3- Embracing controlled opacity, where strategic ambiguity itself becomes a stabilizing force. We understand the concerns about proliferation, but let us be honest: the region is already nuclear, it's just selectively nuclear. "Israel" has had such weapons for decades, yet faces no inspections, no sanctions, no global outrage. Iran's position has always been rooted in Islamic ethics. But Islamic jurisprudence is also realistic; it adapts to necessity. If the absence of a nuclear deterrent leaves tens of millions of Iranians vulnerable to unrestrained aggression, then the suspension of the fatwa becomes not a moral failure, but a moral necessity, a response rooted in the preservation of life, dignity, and national sovereignty. There's been much talk, not very substantiated, yet credible, that in the first hours of their aggression, "Israel" made an attempt at regime change that was thwarted by Iran. Is there any truth to this? Yes, there is certainly truth to that. As I've said earlier, the core objective of the Israeli aggression was not tactical or symbolic; it was strategic and fundamentally existential. This was not just about weakening Iran or 'punishing' the Islamic Republic; it was a direct attempt at regime change. And we have good reason to believe that the operation involved a planned coup scenario. Credible reports, including some from Israeli media itself, indicate that Tel Aviv had pinned its hopes on what can only be described as a delusional plan: the assassination of key political and military leaders in Iran, followed by an internal uprising led by supporters of the exiled Pahlavi monarch. The expectation was that, once the Iranian leadership was decapitated, "millions" would take to the streets to welcome back the Shah's son as a savior and symbol of a new Western-aligned order. What happened instead? Nothing even remotely close. As one Israeli outlet sarcastically admitted, "Not even 50 people showed up for him." Instead, what they witnessed was the opposite: millions poured into the streets not in support of regime change, but in defense of their sovereignty, their country, and yes, their government. Far from destabilizing the system, the war catalyzed unprecedented popular solidarity with the Islamic Republic, especially with the leadership of the Revolution. But even beyond the street response, what truly thwarted this regime change attempt was the overwhelming cooperation between the Iranian people and the country's security apparatus. Citizens helped identify infiltrators, exposed sabotage networks, and enabled swift countermeasures. The internal dimension of the war was met with one of the most powerful mobilizations of civil resistance and counter-intelligence in recent memory. And let's speak candidly: you cannot change a regime with airstrikes. Regime change, if it is to succeed militarily, requires boots on the ground. Neither "Israel" nor the United States is in any position to deploy ground forces in Iran. Their entire hope, therefore, rested on an internal uprising, on the idea that opponents of the Islamic Republic would serve as the domestic "infantry" to complete the job. That assumption was catastrophically wrong. So yes, there was an attempt, poorly planned, grossly miscalculated, and swiftly defeated. It may well be that one of the key factors pushing 'Israel' and the US toward a ceasefire was the realization that this internal gamble had not only failed but spectacularly backfired. The streets did not rise for regime change; they rose for national dignity. And that, more than any missile, was Iran's most powerful weapon.
CTV News
6 hours ago
- Business
- CTV News
Number of Canadians with favourable view of U.S. has fallen, poll suggests
U.S. President Donald Trump waves to reporters at the White House in Washington on July 13, 2025. (Jose Luis Magana / AP Photo) WASHINGTON — Amid months of tariffs and taunts from U.S. President Donald Trump, a new poll suggests the percentage of Canadians who have a favourable view of the United States has fallen and is now on par with the number who think positively about China. The survey by the Pew Research Center suggests one-third of Canadians — 34 per cent — now have a favourable view of the United States. It marks a 20 percentage point decrease from last year. The same percentage of Canadians had favourable views of China — a 13 point increase. 'For the last few years … many people have preferred the U.S. to China by a sizable margin,' said Laura Silver, associate director of global attitudes research at the Washington-based research centre. Now, she said, 'there's no daylight between the two.' Pew polled people in 25 countries and the survey found positive views of China increased in more than half the nations. There was also an increase in people who viewed Chinese President Xi Jinping favourably. 'This is the first real tick up that we've seen that we would describe as an increase across the board,' Silver said. Trump returned to the White House with an agenda to realign global trade and upend geopolitics by targeting friend and foe alike. Critics of Trump's tactics have said the ongoing instability will push countries to form closer ties with China. Canada was an early target with Trump repeatedly calling former prime minister Justin Trudeau 'governor' and insisting Canada should become a U.S. state. The president hit Canada and Mexico with duties he linked to fentanyl trafficking in March, only to walk back the tariffs for goods that comply with the Canada-U.S.-Mexico Agreement on trade a few days later. Trump took his trade war to the world in April with so-called 'reciprocal' tariffs but paused the devastating duties a few hours later saying it would give time for countries to make a deal with America. He kept in place a 10 per cent tariff for most countries. China was hit by the hardest duties, prompting a brief but escalated tariff standoff between the world's two largest economies. The U.S. president has been sending out letters to nations suggesting they will be hit with high duty rates if no deal is made by Aug. 1. Trump did go ahead with specific tariffs targeting steel, aluminum and automobile imports, with copper duties also set to come into place on Aug. 1. Pew, a non-partisan think tank, surveyed 28,333 adults across 24 countries – not including the United States – from Jan. 8 to April 26 by phone, online and in person. The centre also surveyed 3,605 Americans from March 24 to March 30 by phone, online and in person. The poll reports 26 per cent of all people surveyed said they had confidence in the Chinese president, while 22 per cent said the same for Trump. 'That reflects both a rising view of Xi and a quite dramatically negative view of Trump,' Silver said. The changing views were especially stark in Mexico, where 45 per cent of people said it's more important for their country to have strong economic ties with China than with the U.S. — up from 37 per cent in 2019 and 15 per cent in 2015. Canada's relationship with China was roiled during the first Trump administration when in 2018 Canadians Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig were taken into custody in China. It followed the arrest of Huawei's chief financial officer Meng Wanzhou in British Columbia at the request of the United States. Silver said the 2025 polling is the first time there hasn't been a wide gap in how Canadians view the world's two largest economies since the relationship with China took a 'nosedive.' The Pew Research Center survey found the share of Canadians who said the U.S. was more important for economic ties had dropped to 67 per cent from 87 per cent in 2019. 'Now, while it's still a majority, it's down more than 20 percentage points with a corresponding rise in the share who prefer China,' Silver said. This report by The Canadian Press was first published July 15, 2025. Kelly Geraldine Malone, The Canadian Press
Fox News
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Fox News
'Squad' members 'decide to lie and twist facts' about Israel's history, says prominent Arab activist
Members of the "Squad" are undermining coexistence between Arabs and Jews in the Middle East, Israeli-Arab activist Yoseph Haddad told Fox News Digital. "Representatives of the Squad are trying to harm the coexistence and partnership that exist in the region between Arabs and Jews," Haddad said. "I think it was [Alexandria] Ocasio-Cortez herself who said she had no idea about the geopolitics of this region—she's right. Ilhan Omar and Rashida Tlaib know exactly what's going on here, but they decide to lie and twist the facts." Haddad, the CEO of Together Vouch for Each Other — an organization founded in 2018 by young Israeli Arabs to bridge cultural and religious divides — has emerged as a prominent voice in Israel's public diplomacy efforts following Hamas' Oct. 7, 2023 massacre. Since the attack, Jewish communities across the United States and Europe have faced a sharp rise in antisemitic incidents, with pro-Hamas demonstrations appearing on college campuses as early as October 8. "The first group is what I call the useful idiots — people who have no idea what's going on but joined because it felt like the cool thing to do," Haddad said. "Then there are the paid protesters. You see the same faces at different rallies holding different signs — sometimes it's about LGBTQ issues, sometimes it's pro-Palestinian, sometimes it's about internal American problems." "It's always the same person, just a different outfit and a different sign," he continued. "And the third group — the most dangerous—are the extremists who've come from the Middle East. Those are the ones we should be most concerned about." Haddad traced the rise of extremist voices in the West to waves of immigration and population displacement from conflict zones in the Middle East. While the majority of Muslim immigrants fled persecution in search of a better life, he said, a vocal minority brought with them the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, effectively holding their communities hostage. "When you have so many immigrants all around the world, it's enough for 10 or 20 percent of them to be extremists — and suddenly, you're dealing with millions of extremists," he said. "Ostriches, when there is a danger and there is a problem, what they do is they stick their head in the sand thinking the problem will just pass because nobody will notice them," he added. "And this is what the weak governments are doing right now, becoming like an ostrich. The only problem is that no one will skip them over, it will make it easier to chop their heads off." Addressing accusations that Israel enforces an apartheid system between Jews and Arabs, Haddad rejected the comparison outright. "In real apartheid, like in South Africa, everything was segregated — transportation, hospitals, courts, sports, even walking on the sidewalks," Haddad said. "But if you actually come to Israel and see life here, it's the complete opposite — 180 degrees different." "Stop speaking from a place of emotion — that's exactly what The Squad is doing," he continued. "Start talking about facts. Then you'll realize that anyone who concludes Israel is an apartheid state is an imbecile." He also mentioned a run-in he had with a protester, who he refers to as "the useful idiots." They have no clue … One time, I read the charter of Hamas to some pro-Palestinian useful idiot, I read it to them, and I said you agree to this, and they said no, no, no I didn't know that. And I said yes, but this is what you are supporting, and he had the headband of Hamas on his head. You understand that this is what you are supporting. "He literally took the band off after that. Such useful idiots like this you have a lot, not just in the United States, you can see it in Europe as well." When asked what he believes the Palestinians ultimately want, Haddad pointed to slogans often heard at anti-Israel and antisemitic protests, such as "From the river to the sea, Palestine will be free" and "There is only one solution: Intifada revolution." "The majority of Palestinians do not want to live side by side with Israel," Haddad said. "So when people talk about a two-state solution and question Israel's commitment, I say: Don't ask the Israelis — ask the Palestinians. You'll be shocked to find that many of them aren't willing to accept it." Haddad pointed out that history can be approached in multiple ways — through religious texts like the Torah for Jews, the Bible for Christians and the Quran for Muslims. Even those who are atheists can look to history books for evidence of the deep-rooted connection of the Jewish people to the land of Israel. Haddad argued that the Torah explicitly mentions the presence of Jews in Israel, tracing their presence back thousands of years. He also highlighted the Biblical reference to the birthplace of Jesus in Jewish Bethlehem, challenging the notion that Palestinian Muslims have a historical claim to the land before the Jews. Haddad noted that while Jerusalem is never mentioned in the Quran, the term "sons of Israel" appears more than 43 times. He also emphasized that the name "Palestine" was imposed by the Romans as a punishment for the Bar Kokhba revolt. Haddad highlighted that in 1947, Arabs had the opportunity to establish a Palestinian state through the U.N. Partition Plan, which the Jews accepted despite receiving less land and fewer resources. However, the Arabs rejected the plan and opted to wage war. When the Jews emerged victorious, 156,000 Arabs remained within what became Israel. Sharing his personal connection to this history, Haddad explained that his grandfather was one of those Arabs who stayed and eventually became part of the Arab Israeli identity. "It's either you accept the fact that Israel exists and is here to stay, or you continue with this cycle of bloodshed and death that we are trying to escape," said Haddad. "But the ones who will suffer the most are you, the Palestinians, whether in the West Bank or Gaza." Several requests for comment sent to Reps. Ocasio-Cortez, Tlaib and Omar were not returned.
