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Arab News
08-08-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Can Turkish-European collaboration thrive in Africa?
In 2009, Ahmet Davutoglu, top adviser to Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkiye's prime minister at the time and now president, said that 'the road to Paris passes through Africa,' emphasizing that Ankara's decision to deepen ties with Africa would strengthen, rather than undermine, its European ambitions. Since then, Turkiye has significantly expanded its presence in Africa with a combination of soft and hard power, incorporating defense, economic, cultural, and political engagement. There were concerns that Turkiye might leverage its growing influence to counter the policies of EU member states. However, given Turkiye's improved relations with Brussels in recent years, especially since the Ukraine war, its policies in Africa may be viewed differently, perhaps in a more collaborative way. However, to achieve this, it is important to understand the characteristics of Turkiye's involvement in Africa, and explore how the EU could potentially leverage these to its advantage. Turkiye's outreach to Africa is three dimensional. First, it is politically driven, supporting its status as a middle power on the global stage. As Davutoglu said in 2009: 'Africa is on the verge of a new era, and Turkiye must embrace the new realities on the ground. A country that undermines Africa cannot have an international standing.' Second, Turkiye's involvement is economically motivated. There is increasing demand from African states to partner with Turkiye, a shift that the EU should be keen to recognize and leverage. Third, Turkiye's growing influence in Africa is supported through soft-power elements, such as mediation, that some EU member states lack — and, again, could leverage. Finally, it is security oriented, with Turkiye's expanding defense ties with the African states. At a time when Turkiye and EU states are aiming to strengthen their position in Africa, it is important to explore potential areas where Brussels can collaborate with Turkiye or benefit from its growing role in Africa. The first area is security. Turkiye has established significant defense cooperation with African states, including drone sales and military training. Today, it is seen by African countries as a preferable security provider. EU member states also seek stability on the continent for their interests. A stable continent will not only benefit the people of Africa, but also have implications from the Middle East to Europe. Turkiye's growing security presence is a strength the EU can look to leverage in order to achieve shared goals. Second, Turkiye's engagement through development projects should not necessarily be seen as a challenge to European interests. Turkish companies are actively involved in high-risk regions of Africa, with visible infrastructure projects that could align with European interests. Humanitarian aid is another area for potential collaboration. For example, two Turkish scientists are leading efforts to combat hunger in Africa as part of a food project funded by the EU. More projects in this domain could be supported by Brussels, with Turkiye taking an active role on the ground. At a time when Turkiye and EU states are aiming to strengthen their position in Africa, it is important to explore potential areas where Brussels can collaborate with Turkiye or benefit from its growing role in Africa. Dr. Sinem Cengiz Third, Turkiye is trying to build trust across the African continent through its mediation efforts between conflicting parties. Some EU countries' historical influence and colonial legacy in Africa complicates their potential mediating role, so Turkiye could indirectly serve the EU interests in this aspect. Fourth, China has emerged as a serious actor in Africa. Turkiye, as an EU candidate country, could be viewed by Brussels as a less threatening force than China. Africa was a competitive region for both Turkiye and the Gulf states. However, as Turkiye has reconciled its relations with the Gulf countries, the nature of this competition has changed, with both sides compartmentalizing their engagements. Some EU states and Turkiye could take a similar approach, managing their respective relationships with Africa in a way that becomes mutually beneficial. In June, Faruk Kaymakcı, Turkiye's permanent delegate to the EU, highlighted the growing momentum in Turkiye-Africa relations at the Brussels-Africa Hub, saying on X: 'The EU and EU candidate Turkiye can achieve a lot together in and for Africa, leveraging their comparative advantages.' However, EU states diverge in their perceptions on various issues, and the question of Turkiye's role in Africa is no exception. France, which views Africa as a 'backyard,' and a region of critical defense, economic, and development interest, is unlikely to welcome the growing Turkish presence. When Niger decided to expel French and US military personnel and revoke mining contracts held by French and Canadian companies, Turkiye stepped in. Ankara secured a series of agreements in infrastructure, defense, and mining with Niger, and supplied Bayraktar TB2 drones to the country. For African countries, Turkiye is a good alternative to EU states when it comes to arms sales and defense cooperation. This approach also shows greater flexibility on the part of African countries seeking to diversify their defense capabilities. On the other hand, some EU states, such as Italy, are keen to find common ground with Turkiye in Africa, especially as France's traditional influence on the continent begins to wane. Germany, too, is adjusting its Africa strategy in response to shifting dynamics. For Germany and Italy, and even other countries such as Spain, key areas of cooperation with Turkiye could be migration, energy, and the economic development of African nations. EU countries are already cooperating with Turkiye in areas such as trade, migration, and counter-terrorism, and could expand this in Africa. The response to my question in the headline is, yes. Turkish and European collaboration can thrive in Africa if both manage to compartmentalize their relations in a way that leverages their comparative advantages, strengths, and weaknesses. • Dr. Sinem Cengiz is a Turkish political analyst who specializes in Turkiye's relations with the Middle East. X: @SinemCngz
Washington Post
15-07-2025
- Politics
- Washington Post
Soft power for a tough world
William H. McRaven, a retired Navy admiral, was commander of the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command from 2011 to 2014. The Defense Department is our hard power; the carriers, the jets, the bombers, the tanks, the infantry, the use of direct action and kinetic power are there to deter, defend and defeat our adversaries. The State Department is always depicted as soft power — as if to imply that the work it does is somehow less demanding, less effective and less critical than that done by those of us in uniform.
The Guardian
26-06-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Note to Starmer and the other sabre-rattlers. Why spend billions on weapons – soft power would keep us safe
'Toadying', 'slavish', 'cringe-worthy' were the words hurled at Nato's Mark Rutte for the praise he heaped on Donald Trump. But words cost nothing. Keir Starmer went further. He dug into his pocket and gave Trump $1.3bn for just 12 aeroplanes. He promised never to use them, or put any bombs in them, without orders from Washington. He might as well have enrolled in the United States Air Force. Starmer is engaged in a strategic shift in Britain's global stance – from soft power to hard. He has clearly received the notorious initial briefing that so moved Tony Blair and led him eventually to war in Iraq. It induced David Cameron to spend billions on aircraft carriers that he had intended to cancel. Now the government warns in its strategic review that Britain needs to prepare for the possibility of being attacked on its own soil. Perhaps Starmer agrees with Nato's Rutte that the British people 'better learn to speak Russian'. Russia has never, in its entire existence, tried to invade Britain. Yet to protect its interest a defence industry of vast public expense has sustained this belief. It has demanded we go to war if Russia so much as inches over its border, as if it abutted Norfolk. Clearly Britain needs to defend its cables and its electronic airwaves. It needs to guard its banks and its businesses from mischief. But no one is threatening it with invasion. With the end of the cold war in 1989, soft power should have been unleashed. Every conceivable tool should have been deployed to introduce Russia into the European community of nations. I was one of many westerners in the 1990s who would go to seminars and meetings with eager figures in Moscow's hierarchy. They were open-minded and democratic and desperate to open dialogues with the west. They sent their children to English schools and universities. Cultural exchange was intense. The same was happening, less openly, with China. It was a time of real hope. Yet the old dog-eared briefings were still being used. We were told we cannot be 'too safe'. Nato's belligerents declared their muscle by advancing to Russia's border. Barrier after barrier went up, as Russia reverted to its old conflicts with its bordering states. You could sense the west's defence pundits sinking thankfully back into their old ways. In his definition of soft power, the American academic Joseph Nye suggested that cooperation 'is always more effective than coercion … Values like democracy, human rights and individual opportunities are deeply seductive.' Soft power is about building friends and finding allies, rather than creating enemies. Britain, poised between Europe and the US and with English as a global language, was uniquely positioned for this task. Thirteen years ago, a global soft power index from the Institute for Government placed Britain as number one, above even that citadel of soft (as well as hard) power, the US. More recently, another index put it third after Germany and Japan. These are not trivial statistics. They measure the influence a country can be expected to exert in any conflict short of war. Today, the primary east-west power struggle beyond the Ukraine war is essentially soft. It illustrates the west's poor use of it. The isolation of Russia – economically, culturally and diplomatically – has not altered its aggression in Ukraine. What is has done is push Russia closer to China and the non-aligned Brics-plus nations across Asia, Africa and Latin America. China's soft power projection is enormous, from its belt-and-braces investment outreach to 50 cultural institutes due to open around the world. Starmer's response has been unbelievable. He wants to outbid Trump in slashing his chief soft power resource, overseas aid. He is making the biggest cut ever in Britain's aid programme, from 0.5 to 0.3% of gross national income. % He has continued to slash the BBC's World Service, the nation's outstanding global presence. With 320 million listeners in English and 41 other languages, it has been shrunk by 500 posts since 2022. I shall never forget a group of Chinese girls crowded, freezing, round a radio in the border city of Harbin, eagerly practising their English with the aid of the BBC. This outreach is equalled by England's education system. Since the turn of the century, it has become the start in life for millions, not just from Russia and China but from around the globe. About 390,000 non-EU students came to Britain last year, 19% down on 2023 and a level that is forecast to plunge in future. It must be in Britain's interest for them to keep coming. Soft power lies in contact – cultural, financial, academic and diplomatic. Opposition to a hostile regime emerges if not from its military then from its commercial and professional class. Ostracism merely drives that class into silence or exile. In Russia, opposition from those who used to influence Vladimir Putin and might restrain him has collapsed. In their place are the sabre-rattlers. Starmer appears to be one of them. Simon Jenkins is a Guardian columnist Do you have an opinion on the issues raised in this article? If you would like to submit a response of up to 300 words by email to be considered for publication in our letters section, please click here.
