Latest news with #influenceOperations
Japan Times
28-05-2025
- General
- Japan Times
Is Beijing engineering election wins for 'soft on China' politicians?
When Xi Jinping became chairman of everything in China's governing structure, one of the first things he did was significantly increase the funding of the United Front Work Department — which handles the Chinese Communist Party's intelligence and influence operations. Xi elevated its status within the party's hierarchy and expanded its mandate for the first time to include foreign operations. The UFWD became one of the key coordinators of the CCP's efforts to influence foreign governments through the use of elite capture, misinformation, illegal political funding and foreign media control. It also leverages the Chinese diaspora to influence elections and policies around the world and to counter voices from Tibet, Hong Kong, the Uyghurs in Western China, Taiwan and any other groups critical of the CCP. Beijing legally requires all citizens to support Communist Party policies and views ethnic Chinese everywhere as instruments for advancing its global goals. To be clear, some ethnic Chinese abroad willingly cooperate, others are tricked into it and some comply out of fear, especially after threats or retaliation against their families in China. Yet some bravely refuse. There are multiple documented cases of Chinese authorities detaining or threatening mainland-based relatives to pressure those overseas into silence or cooperation. A key objective of what Xi called the "magic weapon" is to support those politicians and political parties that take positions favorable to China. In recent national elections, parties seen as softer on China have won or gained ground in Taiwan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and most recently the Philippines. Is this a coincidence, a backlash against U.S. President Donald Trump's tariffs or the result of effective work by the UFWD? Let's examine the documented cases of election interference in the above democracies that go beyond what UFWD does elsewhere. In Taiwan, investigations by several external researchers, including one from Japan's Nakasone Peace Institute, confirmed that China intervened to influence the January 2024 presidential and legislative elections. Through UFWD operations, China deployed a cross-platform disinformation campaign known as "spamouflage" to discredit then–Democratic Progressive Party President Tsai Ing-wen and presidential candidate Lai Ching-te. It also conducted "hack and leak" operations, in which illegally obtained data was released to the public. These efforts focused on alleged breaches of public trust and exposing compromising information about high-value targets. The approach mirrored Russia's favored "kompromat"-style tactics, which involve leaking images and other damaging material to undermine politicians and leaders. Although Lai won the presidency, his ability to govern was significantly limited after the pro-China Kuomintang secured a majority in the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's national assembly. The KMT has moved to reduce Taiwan's defense budget despite rising Chinese aggression and has echoed Chinese Communist Party claims that portray Lai as a threat to peace. In South Korea, the extent of China's interference in the April 2024 National Assembly election remains unconfirmed, but the opposition Democratic Party won nearly two-thirds of the seats. Post election, the DP-controlled National Assembly and the National Election Commission (NEC), which oversees elections, have rejected all calls for an independent investigation. Nevertheless, disturbing revelations have since surfaced. South Korea's Board of Audit and Inspection confirmed widespread illegal hiring practices at the NEC going back to 2013. Two of its senior leaders resigned and 27 officials were charged with corruption, nepotism and abuse of power. The audit also recorded statements from NEC staff admitting: 'There have been Chinese people among the counting staff, but we don't know how many worked as counting staff nationwide.' The commission responded by proposing a law making any criticism of the legality of South Korean elections a criminal offense. They also brought a case to the Constitutional Court to block the audit and the court ruled in February that the audit was "unconstitutional." Odd, you might think, until one realizes that the chairman of the NEC is a sitting Supreme Court judge. Both High Court and district judges frequently lead NEC's regional and district branches. Four of the current eight Constitutional Court judges have previously chaired the NEC. So interlocking conflicts of interest between the commission and the judiciary are preventing full disclosure of the extent of Chinese election interference in South Korea. Their claims of zero interference are not credible. The June 3 presidential election is fast approaching and some fear the UFWD will pull out all the stops to see the pro-CCP Lee Jae-myung take over the Blue House. In the U.K., even before the July 2024 election, both parties were raising serious concerns over Chinese and Russian interference. China was implicated in a cyberattack that captured the personal data on millions of registered British voters. Using Chinese language social media is a favored way for the UFWD to reach the Chinese diaspora and spread disinformation to attack politicians critical of China. Ethnic Chinese comprise less than 1% of the U.K. population, or approximately 500,000. In Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service confirmed in 2024 that China had directly interfered in the previous two national elections in 2019 and 2021 to favor pro-China candidates and to discredit those candidates seen as critical. As with the U.K., the UFWD's favored way to reach the Chinese diaspora is through Chinese language social media and this approach remained the preferred method in the April 2025 election. Ethnic Chinese comprise 4.7% of the Canadian population, or approximately 1.7 million people. As for Australia, in this month's election, the Australia Hubei Association, a Chinese diaspora group with known links to UFWD, dispatched volunteers to assist various candidates, including independents perceived to be more pro-China. Ethnic Chinese comprise 5.5% of the Australian population, or approximately 1.4 million individuals. And in the Philippines, just before the midterm elections nearly two weeks ago, lawmakers filed multiple reports accusing China of interfering in the vote and trying to destabilize the country's democracy. The National Security Council told the Senate that the Chinese Embassy in Manila, working with a local public relations firm, ran a covert troll farm operation to manipulate Philippine institutions and sway public opinion. The NSC also accused China of using local proxies and fake online personas to spread pro-CCP messaging, attack U.S.-Japan-Philippine joint defense drills, discredit specific elected officials and sway public opinion toward pro-China candidates. The results were striking: The pro-China camp, led by former President Rodrigo Duterte, who is currently awaiting trial at The Hague, won five of the 12 open Senate seats. That could prove critical for his daughter, Vice President Sara Duterte, whose impeachment trial is set to begin in the Senate in July. Removing her from office and disqualifying her from running for president in the next election would require a two-thirds majority of the 24 senators to confirm her impeachment. But if just nine vote to acquit, she will stay in office. Before the election, public sentiment was largely against her due to threats made against President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. and allegations of misusing public funds. Now, however, the outcome is uncertain. Ethnic Chinese make up roughly 1.2% of the population, or about 1.4 million people. Japan has a national election coming up in July, but the risk of direct election interference is different from the cases above. Unlike those countries, Japan does not have a large Chinese diaspora with voting rights. What Japan does share with other democracies is that it is also targeted by the CCP's disinformation and influence operations, which focus on elites such as politicians, government officials, media, educators, research institutes and others who will support China's policies. Xi has the UFWD, his 'magic weapon' aimed at undermining global democracies, including here at home. Edo Naito is a commentator on Japanese politics, law and history. He is a retired international business attorney and has held board of director and executive positions at several U.S. and Japanese multinational companies.
Irish Times
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Irish Times
How the Kremlin's ‘soft power' agency supporting expats overseas skirts sanctions
Following its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it became increasingly difficult for Russia to continue its influence operations in Europe. For years, the Kremlin had operated a network of organisations designed to increase Russian soft power overseas. One of these organisations was the Fund for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad, known by its Russian acronym Pravfond. Since 2012 Pravfond had been paying for legal services for Russians living abroad, including in Ireland. However, according to various western intelligence agencies it was, in some countries, also funding influence operations and acting as an extension of Russian intelligence. Following the invasion, the EU placed extensive sanctions on Russia's banking sector, which made it increasingly difficult for Pravfond and similar organisations to move money overseas. READ MORE In 2023, the EU also specifically sanctioned Pravfond, accusing it of acting in the Kremlin's foreign policy interests. One person who was affected was Elena Berezhnaya, a 72-year-old Ukrainian who had risen to prominence by criticising Ukraine's pro-EU government and advocating pro-Russian positions. In 2022, Berezhnaya was arrested by the Ukrainian security service and accused of 'high treason'. Documents contained in a collection of more than 70,000 emails and records detailing the activities of Pravfond, show she started to receive help from Sergey Borisovich Zavorotny, who previously served as press secretary to Ukraine's pro-Russian prime minister Mykola Azarov. In 2014 Azarov fled to Russia following the Euromaiden protests that resulted in the ousting of the pro-Russian government in Kyiv. [ Investigation: The links between lawyers in Ireland and Putin's soft-power agency Opens in new window ] After her arrest, Pravfond agreed to provide Zavorotny with $3,000 (€2,644) for Berezhnaya's medical care in custody. The following year, as they discussed another payment, Zavorotny raised the problem of sanctions, which he said made it 'impossible' to receive Pravfond funds. This is where another Ukrainian woman came in, specifically a woman living in the northwest of Ireland. In April 2023, Zavorotny proposed a plan to Pravfond. The fund would give money to parents who had adult children living in the United States. These children would then transfer the money to the Ukrainian woman living in the northwest. This woman was a close associate of Berezhnaya and would ensure the money got to her legal team in Kyiv, Zavorotny said in a note. Later that month Zavorotny signed another contract with Pravfond for $3,000 for Berezhnaya. In 2024 there was another similar agreement. It was not the first time the Ukrainian woman living in the northwest had handled money linked to Pravfond. A Western Union receipt, which was found in the Pravfond records, shows she received just over $2,800 from a US account in November 2022. The Irish address on the receipt is the same as a location previously used to house Ukrainian refugees. It is not known if Berezhnaya continues to receive money from Pravfond or if this money is been funnelled through Ireland. In December 2024, according to international media reports, Berezhnaya was jailed for 14 years by a Ukrainian court. Records concerning operations in Ireland and other countries show Pravfond quickly adapted to the new reality of wartime sanctions. In fact, it appears they were little more than a speed bump. In March 2024 a draft annual report of the foundation's activities, sent to the Russian foreign ministry and included in the leaked communications, noted that sanctions had imposed 'certain difficulties for practical work'. 'Nevertheless,' the executive director of the foundation Aleksandr Udaltsov wrote in the report, 'so far it has been possible to resolve issues in each specific case, using, among other things, alternative and workaround options.' In response to queries, the Russian embassy in Dublin said it 'firmly rejects preposterous allegations' made against Pravfond, which it said acts in 'full accordance with universally recognised humanitarian principles and norms of international human rights law'. The embassy spokesman compared its activity to Ireland's Emigrant Support Programme, which provides assistance to the Irish diaspora. The spokesman dismissed the queries from The Irish Times, saying they had 'nothing to do with journalism and amounts to libel and open Russophobia', he said.
