5 days ago
Role of Indonesian military in counter-terrorism under Prabowo administration
In March 2025, Indonesia's parliament amended the country's military law to allow military personnel to hold more civilian posts.
The move was criticised by rights groups, who feared it could once again reaffirm military impunity, reminiscent of former President Suharto's New Order era when the military permeated national politics and many spheres of domestic affairs.
After Suharto's fall in May 1998, largely for political rather than operational-security reasons, the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia – TNI) was denied a role in counter-terrorism, as reflected in the 2004 Military Law.
This stemmed from widespread backlash against the military's abuse of power at the time and the belief that in a democratising Indonesia, counter-terrorism should be the domain of the police, while the military focused on external security.
Government officials now argue that the 2004 law is outdated and ill-suited to the country's present-day challenges. These include tackling a complex security environment in which competing cost pressures on law enforcement and other government agencies mean the military could play a larger role in assisting the police to protect the country from terrorism.
Indonesian military's residual counter-terrorism role
In recent years, the military has already played a part in domestic security affairs. This began with the establishment of the National Anti-Terrorism Agency (Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme – BNPT) in September 2010, which formally brought the military into a counter-terrorism role.
In September 2013, the military and BNPT signed a Memorandum of Understanding, allowing the former to gather information on terrorist activities domestically.
Following an agreement in March 2015, the police began training young military personnel in counter-terrorism.
On June 9, the military's Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) was formally launched, extending the military's reach into a field that had been the police's preserve since 2002.
Police-dominated counter-terrorism
Since the October 2002 Bali bombings, counter-terrorism has largely been the responsibility of the police. Indonesia established various police-led counter-terrorism agencies such as Densus 88 and the BNPT to deal with terrorist threats.
The police have largely succeeded in containing terrorism and dismantling networks, killing more than 200 terrorists and detaining over 1,500.
Pressure for larger military role in counter-terrorism
Although post-Suharto political conditions relegated the military's role in domestic security, pressures have grown for the TNI to take on a larger counter-terrorism role.
First, some observers argue that police operations have not always been effective. The ability of terrorists such as Abu Dujana to return to Indonesia undetected from the Philippines, and the killing of nearly 40 police personnel by terrorists by 2015, highlighted gaps in police capabilities.
Despite Densus 88's significant successes, its operational tactics have also become increasingly controversial, with criticism that it was more inclined to kill terrorists than capture them.
Second, as Indonesian terrorists are largely home-grown and target domestic objectives – the so-called 'near enemy' – some argue the military is well-placed to assist the police. This is due to its territorial presence throughout the country, down to the village-level command or Babinsa (village sergeants), which provide invaluable local intelligence.
Finally, the military is well-resourced to support the police in counter-terrorism. In addition to its historical experience, it has highly trained Special Forces that can be deployed to neutralise armed terrorists.
Recent counter-terrorism operations involving the military
The TNI has recently featured in counter-terrorism operations. The first notable example is Operation Madago Raya, previously known as Operation Tinombala.
Launched in 2016, it was a joint military-police operation to neutralise members of the East Indonesia Mujahideen (MIT) terrorist group in Poso, Sulawesi. The operation was successful, with all known members of the group killed.
In West Papua province, the military has taken a proactive role since 2019 in countering insurgents linked to the Free Papua Movement (OPM), which was designated a terrorist group in 2021.
As Indonesia's population grows, with new provinces formed amid emerging security challenges, the TNI has also expanded its territorial command. Plans are in place to add 22 new regional military commands (Kodam), up from the current 15.
This expansion is driven by factors such as the ongoing separatist challenge in Papua, tensions in the South China Sea involving the Indonesian Natuna Islands, and the persistent threat of extremism and terrorism.
Critics of the military's counter-terrorism role
The military's involvement in counter-terrorism is not without its critics. The TNI's past human rights abuses in domestic operations, and concerns over its lack of familiarity with the current terrorist landscape, are significant objections.
Despite shortcomings, many argue that the police have performed relatively well in a democratising Indonesia, where terrorists have been comprehensively eliminated, apprehended, or prosecuted.
As terrorism is considered a crime rather than an external threat, the police are seen as better placed to manage it. There are also concerns that military involvement could lead to inter-service competition for resources and jurisdictional disputes, undermining Indonesia's counter-terrorism effectiveness.
Some allege that the military is motivated by access to the large financial resources allocated for counter-terrorism, previously controlled by the police.
Despite these concerns, the government does not appear to be replacing the police's role in counter-terrorism. Rather, amid a rapidly evolving security environment and cost constraints, it seeks a larger military role in neutralising armed terrorists.
This is most evident in the continued military-police cooperation since Operation Tinombala.
Since the 2002 Bali bombings, Indonesia has recognised the need for a whole-of-government approach, including addressing the root causes of terrorism and violent radicalism. This involves oversight of educational institutions, ideological deradicalisation, management of religious institutions, monitoring of mass and social media, tackling socio-economic issues such as poverty, and preventing prison radicalisation – all beyond the military's remit.
A combined military-police approach is thus the most viable way to contain terrorism, particularly given the evolving threat from pro-IS groups in the country.
Jasminder Singh is an Associate Research Fellow with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.
The views expressed here are the personal opinion of the writer and do not necessarily represent that of Twentytwo13. Main image by TNI.
