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No single power should control the world
No single power should control the world

Russia Today

time17-05-2025

  • Politics
  • Russia Today

No single power should control the world

The world should not be controlled by a single power, Myanmar Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing has said in an exclusive interview with RT. A multipolar system is the best approach to avoid conflict, he believes. In the interview aired on Saturday, the prime minister stressed that developing countries such as Myanmar have especially suffered 'under a unipolar system.' 'That is why transitioning to a multipolar world works best for us. It is better to share global resources, to act fairly, to distribute things more evenly. Conflicts arise from inequality, so if we want to avoid conflicts, I believe a multipolar system is the best approach,' he said. 'The US and Western bloc controlled the world through unipolarity. Then it became bipolar, and from bipolarity it returned to unipolarity. This made the West stronger,' Hlaing said. However, 'in this era, Russia, China and India have made tremendous progress militarily, economically and scientifically,' the prime minister noted. 'As they have advanced, we have moved towards multipolarity and that is how it should be. No single power should control the world,' he said. If Moscow, Beijing and New Delhi, which are 'three equally important global powers,' collaborate and 'act in unison, multipolarity will become a global reality. No one will accept this unipolarity anymore,' the Myanmar leader emphasized. In order to succeed in the multipolar world, smaller countries 'must try to cooperate' with Russia, China, and India, he said. 'Making that attempt is absolutely worthwhile. We need to develop our own economic capabilities, while simultaneously increasing cooperation with each other,' he added. Hlaing was among the high-ranking foreign guests who visited Moscow for the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the victory over Nazi Germany on May 9. Earlier this year, Russian President Vladimir Putin said that relations between Moscow and Naypyidaw have been developing steadily and had 'good potential.' In 2024 alone, trade turnover between the two nations increased by 40%, he noted. Putin also expressed gratitude to the leadership of Myanmar for facilitating Russia's cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

No rules, no rulers: The unraveling of the old world order and the role of Russia
No rules, no rulers: The unraveling of the old world order and the role of Russia

Russia Today

time14-05-2025

  • Politics
  • Russia Today

No rules, no rulers: The unraveling of the old world order and the role of Russia

The day is not far off when the very notion of 'international order' will lose its former meaning – just as happened with the once-theoretical concept of 'multipolarity.' Originally conceived in the mid-20th century as a way to balance power among great states, multipolarity now bears little resemblance to what its originators had in mind. The same is increasingly true of international order. In recent years, it has become commonplace to say that the global balance of power is shifting and that previous leaders are no longer able to maintain their dominant positions. This much is obvious. No group of states today is capable of enforcing its vision of justice or order upon the rest of the world. Traditional international institutions are weakening, and their functions are being re-evaluated or hollowed out. Western Europe, once a central pillar of global diplomacy, appears to be in the final phase of its strategic decline – a region now better known for procedure than power. But before we join the chorus, lamenting or celebrating the end of one era and the start of another, it is worth asking: what exactly is 'international order'? Too often, this concept is treated as a given, when in fact it has always been a tool – one used primarily by states with both the means and the will to coerce others into accepting certain rules of the game. Historically, 'international order' has been imposed by dominant powers capable of enforcing it. But today, emerging players outside the Western sphere – nations like China and India – may not be particularly interested in taking up that role. Why should they invest their resources in a vague, abstract idea that primarily served the interests of others? The second traditional purpose of international order has been to prevent revolutionary upheaval. In the current strategic environment, this function is largely fulfilled not by institutions or diplomacy but by the simple fact of mutual nuclear deterrence. The handful of states with major nuclear capabilities – Russia, the United States, China, and a few others – are enough to keep general war at bay. No other powers are capable of truly challenging them in an existential way. For better or worse, that is what guarantees relative global stability. It is therefore naive to expect new great powers to be enthusiastic participants in building a new international order in the traditional sense. All past orders, including the current UN-centered one, emerged from intra-Western conflicts. Russia, while not a Western country in the cultural or institutional sense, played a decisive role in those conflicts – especially the Second World War – and was central to the global architecture that followed. In fact, one could argue that the current international order, such as it is, was a product of Russia's intervention in a Western civil war. It's no coincidence that at the 1815 Congress of Vienna, Tsar Alexander I behaved not as one of many European leaders, but as a figure set apart – an 'arbiter of Europe.' Russia has always seen itself this way: too large, too sovereign, and too independent to be just another node in someone else's system. This is a key distinction. For Russia, participation in international order has never been an end in itself, but a means to preserve its own unique position in world affairs. That is something it has pursued with remarkable persistence for over two centuries. As for today's great powers – China, India, and others – it is far from clear that they view 'international order' as an instrument of survival or control. For many, the phrase remains a Western invention, a theoretical construct that served to legitimize power imbalances under the guise of shared rules. At the same time, the concept retains appeal for many medium-sized states, especially those in the so-called Global Majority. For them, international law and the UN system – however flawed – offer a semblance of protection from the arbitrary power of the strongest. Despite their limitations, these institutions give smaller countries a seat at the table, a platform from which to bargain, and sometimes a shield against the worst abuses of power. But even this minimal order is under strain. Its legitimacy was once based on mutual recognition by the powers capable of upending it. Today, however, former leaders are losing their grip, and no new actors are rushing to take their place. Without legitimacy or coercive backing, the very idea of a shared order becomes difficult to sustain. That leads us to a paradox: we may be entering a world in which the West's vision of international order is no longer accepted or relevant – yet no one is particularly eager to replace it with something new. What we may see instead is a gradual emergence of equilibrium, a new arrangement that scholars might label a 'new international order,' though in practice it will have little in common with the frameworks of the past. In sum, the category of 'international order' may soon follow 'multipolarity' into conceptual obscurity. It will be talked about, invoked in speeches, and cited in academic papers – but it will no longer describe how the world truly works. We are moving into an age where power is distributed differently, where the mechanisms of control are less formalized, and where legitimacy is negotiated in real time rather than bestowed by inherited institutions. In such a world, stability will not depend on abstract rules or formal alliances, but on the raw calculations of capable states – above all, those that have the resources and resilience to shape events rather than be shaped by article was first published by Valdai Discussion Club, translated and edited by the RT team.

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stand side-by-side and proclaim new world order
Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stand side-by-side and proclaim new world order

News.com.au

time11-05-2025

  • Politics
  • News.com.au

Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping stand side-by-side and proclaim new world order

Jackbooted soldiers. Polished guns. Smiles on every face. As the Russian tanks rolled through Red Square to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin stood side-by-side in an open proclamation of a new world order. But the 'friends without limits' were not celebrating the war as we know it. And their commitment to 'adhere to fairness and justice, and be defenders of the international order' rang somewhat hollow. Moscow may be 1200km north of the embattled region of Donetsk. But it's not beyond the reach of Ukrainian missiles and drones. And Putin's anticipated three-day invasion of the breakaway former Soviet Republic is now well into its third year. But such details were swept under the plush red carpets as Chairman Xi engaged in his 11th official visit to Russia after taking China's top job in 2013. The Communist Party chief is now enjoying a constitution-breaking third term. President Putin has also sidestepped, then sidelined, Russia's constitution to maintain his grip on power since 2000. But that didn't stop him from signing a joint statement with Xi yesterday, vowing to 'promote the development of the world toward justice, democracy, and multipolarity'. It's a message being deafened by Russia's ongoing armed assault against Ukraine. And one masked by China's island fortresses and fleet elbowing their way to dominance over the East and South China Seas. But the pair have once again joined forces to dictate on the global stage that they're simply misunderstood. And here's what they said. 'Facing the changes in the world, the changes of the times, and the changes in history, China and Russia must firmly grasp the forward direction of bilateral relations and the general trend of human society's development, step forward courageously, collaborate comprehensively, and make new and greater contributions to promoting the development and revitalisation of both countries and maintaining international fairness and justice.' 'Friends of steel' In 2022, Chairman Xi told President Putin during a flying visit to Beijing that the pair were 'friends without limits'. Two days later, Russia invaded Ukraine. Now Xi has proclaimed the two nations to be 'true friends of steel that have been through a hundred trials by fire'. He promised the 27 other world leaders at the parade that Moscow and Beijing would stand together to counter global 'unilateralism and bullying'. Putin's Russia is under heavy international sanctions for its unprovoked war of aggression against Ukraine. Xi's China is also under pressure, being the primary target of US President Donald Trump's global tariff campaign. That has created the strategic necessity for the two powers to strengthen their ties, argues Centre for Asia Policy Studies analyst Patricia Kim. Trade between Beijing and Moscow has soared more than 66 per cent since the invasion of Ukraine began in 2021. That's set to grow further, with Xi and Putin expected to sign several agreements this week. This includes establishing a new gas pipeline link from Siberia to deliver about 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually. 'As competition with the United States intensifies, Beijing views Moscow as an essential, if risky, partner,' Kim writes for the Brookings Institution. 'Still, Xi isn't inclined to make new concessions to Putin. Russia's economy is faltering, its military is overstretched, and its diplomatic leverage with the West remains limited. China continues to dominate the economic relationship, and that imbalance isn't likely to change soon — though it's increasingly a source of the Kremlin's resentment.' The two leaders have issued several joint and individual statements since getting together on Friday. For the most part, the messaging has been strictly co-ordinated. But the world has been left no doubt about who wears the pants in this relationship. 'I am willing to maintain close contact with President Putin, to steer and guide China-Russia relations, and to make a positive contribution to promoting global governance,' Chairman Xi asserted Friday. President Putin was more demure. 'I am willing to maintain close strategic communication with President Xi Jinping to provide strategic guidance for the development of bilateral relations, jointly respond to the challenges of complex international situations, deepen comprehensive strategic co-operation, (and) safeguard the common interests of the two countries …' Eliminating alliances 'Xi Jinping pointed out that the world has entered a new period of turbulence and transformation,' President Putin says in the joint statement. 'As long as China and Russia maintain strategic determination and strategic co-operation, then no force can stop the two countries from achieving their respective development and rejuvenation …' This vision of a shared future has been reinforced with a freshly reconstructed view of the past. 'China and Russia, as main theatres of Asia and Europe in WWII, have made decisive contributions to the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and laid a solid foundation for the establishment of the post-war international order,' Xi proclaimed. The Allies (of which Republican China and Soviet Russia were a part) didn't get a mention. Nor were they represented at the Red Square parade – on the ground or in the VIP pews. However, the lack of mention of the WWII Allied forces has an interesting counterpoint. The Xi-Putin joint declaration took aim at the growing alignment of nations against them. 'Both sides point out that one of the strategic risks urgently needing elimination is the expansion of military alliances by certain nuclear-weapon states in sensitive regions surrounding other nuclear-weapon states,' it reads. This non-China-Russia bloc is 'exerting military pressure or implementing hostile actions that threaten the fundamental security interests of other countries'. Such alliances include the strengthening of ties between India, Australia and Japan. Not to mention growing international support for the Philippines and Taiwan. And allies, while not directly involved in the fighting, have supplied Ukraine with financial aid, ammunition, training and equipment. And that's an affront to Putin. 'Trials by fire' Putin insists Ukraine is the successor to Nazi Germany. That's despite President Volodymyr Zelenskyy being a Jew … 'Despite an almost complete lack of evidence to support these absurd and obscene claims, the 'Nazi Ukraine' narrative continues to resonate among a Russia population that has been utterly saturated in an extreme form of World War II mythology that often borders on religious fanaticism,' says Atlantic Council analyst Peter Dickinson. Putin has spent the past two decades embedding the Soviet Union's World War II struggle at the heart of Russia's national identity. It seeks to embed the notion of ultimate triumph following intense hardship. 'It has proved a highly effective strategy, helping to rebuild Russia's battered national pride and giving new meaning to the country's twentieth-century totalitarian trauma,' Dickinson adds. It's a glorified, nationalistic reinterpretation of history closely followed by China. Chairman Xi is resolute in restoring China's pride after 'a century of humiliation', 'The country endured intense humiliation, the people were subjected to great pain, and the Chinese civilisation was plunged into darkness,' he said at the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party in 2021. 'Since that time, national rejuvenation has been the greatest dream of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation.' In September, Putin will return the favour by visiting Beijing to celebrate its victory over Japan.

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