Latest news with #tacticalapproach
New York Times
2 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
How Manchester City play: High possession, increased off-ball running and an Achilles' heel
This is part of a series from The Athletic breaking down the tactical approach of Premier League teams for the 2025-26 season. Read about other clubs below: It's been a year and five days since Manchester City last got their hands on a trophy, lifting the Community Shield after a penalty shootout win over local rivals Manchester United at Wembley. In recent times, that constitutes a drought. On the surface, a third-place finish in the Premier League last season — having won the title in each of the previous four campaigns — may not seem such an alarming dip. Advertisement But there were a number of glaring structural issues that Pep Guardiola struggled to address throughout a turbulent season, as he posted the lowest points-per-game average of his managerial career. Were it not for a mini revival after a much-needed January refresh, as City went 10 games unbeaten in the Premier League to end the season, those figures might have been much worse. Despite their quarter-final exit to Al-Hilal at the Club World Cup this summer, the mood feels better in the City camp, with exciting new recruits all looking to have hit the ground running. Tijjani Reijnders scored twice in their final pre-season game against Palermo on Saturday, while Rayan Ait-Nouri and Rayan Cherki have slotted seamlessly into a swirling build-up shape, clearly possessing the technical ability to elevate City's patient approach. Question marks remain, however, over what happens when they lose the ball. The Athletic casts an eye over pre-season performances and underlying trends to assess how it could all unfold. Problem No 1 for Guardiola throughout the 2024-25 season was an inability to deal with opposition counter-attacks. His City team always aims to dominate the ball and squeeze up the pitch — they have led the rankings for possession in all nine of his Premier League seasons in charge — but they were unusually loose and disorganised in moments of uncertainty last year, leaving themselves open to swift, decisive breaks. The graphic below compares the cumulative expected goals (xG) of chances conceded via fast breaks, showing a huge spike from previous seasons. Only relegated Leicester City allowed more in domestic league football, while their 15 shots conceded from such situations in the Champions League were the highest of any team in the competition. A serious injury to Ballon d'Or winner Rodri went a long way to explaining City's troubles in transition, a midfielder who possesses an innate sense of positioning to snuff out attacks early, but who is also strong in defensive duels, and excellent in retaining possession to help his team avoid conceding such breakaways in the first place. Advertisement But the Spaniard's absence was just one part of a perfect storm, with a lack of athleticism in his replacements — and an overambitious pressing structure — only amplifying City's lack of control after losing the ball. Below against Fulham, for example, we can see how both Mateo Kovacic and Ilkay Gundogan are left behind after a quick turnover and incisive pass forward. In frame two, both midfielders are within distance of their midfield runners, but are far from able to support an exposed defensive line just six seconds later, with both Emile Smith Rowe and Adama Traore having broken free with ease. On other occasions, it was a lack of physicality from the likes of Rico Lewis and Bernardo Silva — both often caught in the midfield pivot positions — that allowed the opposition to bulldoze through. Here, the former loses out in three 50-50 duels to allow Crystal Palace to attack down the flank, one of many counter-attacking sequences conceded in an error-strewn team performance at Selhurst Park. Despite those deficiencies, City stuck with an ambitious 4-2-4 pressing scheme, one that often left their midfield two exposed if the opposition could progress past the front line. In this sequence against Tottenham, we can see just how much space it leaves to the side of Nico O'Reilly. It often requires a City full-back to step forward to help out, but the timing has to be right. As Tottenham progress down the opposite side later in the same move, Nathan Ake can't block Archie Gray's pass down the line, exposing the midfield pivot once more. Gundogan can't keep up with Kulusevski's forward run, and with a flick down the line, the Swede is bearing down on goal, able to square across for Timo Werner to finish. City's defeat at the Club World Cup showed that there are still gaps to plug defensively, with Guardiola's side often struggling to apply pressure on the ball quickly enough after a turnover. Al-Hilal's second goal was particularly alarming, with City hit straight from an attacking corner. Ruben Dias should probably foul former team-mate Joao Cancelo to stop the transition, while the last line is caught inexplicably high up the pitch, allowing too much space for the speedy Malcom to attack. The addition of Pep Ljinders to the coaching staff suggests that City are looking to tighten up without the ball. The Dutchman was assistant to Jurgen Klopp at Liverpool, and has championed the importance of counter-pressing — winning the ball back immediately after losing it — throughout his career. Expect to see more focus on the out-of-possession shape at City next season, a team that will aim to collapse on the ball with speed and intensity after giving it away. Though with Rodri's injury woes continuing, teething issues are likely to continue throughout the opening weeks. If anything, City's summer recruitment drive suggests that Guardiola is planning to fight fire with fire, adding more firepower to the front line to help them break down low blocks and put opponents away before their defensive troubles can come back to bite them at the opposite end. At their lowest ebb last season, City's reluctance to make threatening forward runs was visible to the eye, favouring more measured build-up and perhaps reluctant to open up too much with opposition counter-attacks in mind. Against Everton in late December, Guardiola pleaded with his fans after they voiced their frustrations at a pass down the line that was turned down. Away at Aston Villa, too, City struggled to break down their hosts with a lack of overlapping runs from full-backs, often leaving Jack Grealish facing a two-on-one out wide. The visit of Chelsea a month later, however, notable for the debuts of both Abdukodir Khusanov and Omar Marmoush, seemed to represent a turning point. The Egyptian forward brought real zip and dynamism on his first start, linking up well with Josko Gvardiol, now given freedom to push on from his high-and-wide left-back role. As the season continued, O'Reilly and Matheus Nunes stepped in at full-back, giving City width and powerful forward running that they lacked to pull apart deeper defences earlier in the campaign. Advertisement Using SkillCorner, we can see the drastic drop-off and subsequent recovery in the number of runs in behind that City made throughout the season. Taking a 10-game rolling average, it shows that City were particularly tentative to attack the space behind opposition lines throughout a difficult November period, coinciding with their lowest dip in expected goals across the year. Excitingly for City fans — and neutrals — the uptick in direct running continued into the Club World Cup. They completed 52 runs in behind against Al-Ain, while defeat to Al-Hilal at least showed that new signing Cherki can help them to make the most of such attacking movement, even against lower defensive lines. In the space of minutes, Cherki digs out two crosses, with each foot, over the top that drop perfectly into the path of City runs in behind, first assisting Phil Foden, and second creating a big chance for Marmoush. His supreme technical quality, finding clinical finishers close to goal, will provide more creative attacking solutions that, over the course of a season, Guardiola will hope outweigh their frailties on the break. Aside from Cherki, the flexible profile of Ait-Nouri at left-back already looks to have added lots of potential for positional rotations down his flank, a player equally happy running the flanks at wing-back and drifting into midfield. City's most fluent display of pre-season came against Juventus, as they again looked to stretch the pitch with width from their full-backs. With Rodri briefly restored to the starting XI, Bernardo Silva often found himself dropping into the defensive line during build-up, allowing team-mates to push on and form a 3-2-5 shape that looked to open up gaps in the press. For City's opening goal, Ait-Nouri is incredibly sharp in a more central position, playing a reverse pass to slide the ball through to Jeremy Doku, who cuts inside and scores… … while the Algerian is integral to the build-up of their third, exchanging three passes in the centre of midfield, before helping to release Reijnders down the opposite side. He slips the ball through to a storming Nunes, who cuts back for Erling Haaland to score, illustrating the value of City's varying profiles at full-back. Such interchangeability within City's in-possession structure helps to lure defenders out of shape, while incisive forward running from Nunes, O'Reilly and Gvardiol down the flanks helps to exploit those spaces. Their left-hand side could be particularly difficult to contain, with the possibility of using Gvardiol as a left-sided centre-back in build-up, who can switch out with Ait-Nouri and link up with a tricky winger like Doku further up the pitch. City's trip to take on Palermo last weekend also helped to underline the potential for Cherki to help in the build-up. In addition to his ability to find those perfectly pitched passes into the box, the most creative player in Europe's top five leagues last season per the expected assists (xA) metric, he is capable of an incredible range of flicks and tricks to evade pressure and keep his team moving up the pitch. It's a simple move, but here is the Frenchman dropping out from between the lines to play a one-two with Lewis, taking two midfielders out of the game. When he can feel the rhythm of the game, few players are quite as fluent as Cherki, so inventive and unpredictable in the way he handles possession. There are ball rolls, drag-backs and sharp-angled passes, all designed to manipulate opposition defenders and thread the ball through the spaces his movement creates. See below in another example, drawing defenders in with the initial short pass, before ducking onto his opposite foot and sliding the ball through for Nico Gonzalez to attack. The Palermo game also underlined a key facet of Reijnders' game, an athletic box-to-box midfielder who is excellent at timing his runs into the box. No team created more chances from cut-backs in the Premier League last season, and Reijnders could be the prime beneficiary with his late arrivals into goalscoring positions. Advertisement Without Rodri, it may be down to him, alongside Gonzalez, to retain more structure in the transition, while centre-back Khusanov brings pace and strength to help with more end-to-end encounters. With extra firepower comes increased potential to get hit the other way, but it looks like a risk City are willing to take this time around, with a fluid, flexible front line capable of overwhelming any defence before they can muster a counter-charge. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle
New York Times
3 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
How Liverpool play: Relentless full-backs, a reshaped midfield and a set-piece reboot
This is part of a series from The Athletic breaking down the tactical approach of Premier League teams for the 2025-26 season. Read about other clubs below: Liverpool have gone from the hunters to the hunted. After the success they achieved under Jurgen Klopp, Liverpool evolved from a team that played with their heart to one that played with their head under Arne Slot. Last season, the Dutchman largely operated with the tools that he inherited, but this campaign has seen a significant overhaul in the squad, with six new faces coming through the door this summer. The key question is how Liverpool's head coach can fit his star players into a coherent starting XI. Here, The Athletic outlines some key tactical questions that Slot might face as they look to defend their Premier League title. The early weeks of pre-season suggest that Slot is keen to evolve Liverpool's build-up structure. Fans grew accustomed to watching Virgil van Dijk fizz in passes to Ryan Gravenberch as Liverpool worked the ball through the centre of the pitch more often under Slot. Commonly with Gravenberch as a single pivot, or alongside Alexis Mac Allister. On the defensive line, Andrew Robertson would often shuffle across to build from a back three in possession, forming a 3-1 build-up shape as shown below. But with the arrival of Milos Kerkez and Jeremie Frimpong as full-backs, the early clues from pre-season suggest that Liverpool have made subtle tweaks to their build-up approach this season. Rather than receive from the defensive line, Gravenberch dropped between Liverpool's centre-backs in their friendly against Athletic Club at Anfield, with Kerkez staying closer to his defensive line while Frimpong pushed higher or tucked in to a narrow position. The pattern was similar in last Sunday's Community Shield clash with Crystal Palace. This time, it was Curtis Jones or Dominik Szoboszlai dropping in to form a situational back three, which allows Kerkez and Frimpong to have a higher starting position. When it was not a midfielder dropping between the centre-backs, there were occasions when Szoboszlai or Gravenberch would pull to the half-spaces to continue the back-three set-up to help with quicker circulation across the back line and more passing angles during the first phase of Liverpool's build-up. Advertisement It was not uncommon to see this on occasion last season, but the pattern was notable by its frequency during this summer's pre-season. Gravenberch's form faded in the latter stages of Liverpool's title-winning campaign — partly due to fatigue but also due to opposition midfielders targeting him as a key catalyst for Slot's attack. That did, however, allow his midfield partner Mac Allister to flourish. As well as the new profiles they have in the squad, Slot will be acutely aware that he needs to keep his side as unpredictable as possible. It might not be used every time, but a new tweak to their build-up approach will help them to be flexible in working the ball through the thirds. Last season, Slot settled on a preferred midfield three of Gravenberch, Mac Allister and Szoboszlai. All were technically proficient in progressing the ball, but also operated as a strong unit out of possession. From the No 10 spot, Szoboszlai was the engine, leading the press and covering the space behind Mohamed Salah. Behind him, Mac Allister and Gravenberch were a well-oiled unit at the top of the square involving centre-backs Van Dijk and Ibrahima Konate, which held Liverpool's compact shape to deal with counter-attacks. As the new designated No 10, Wirtz has disrupted that unit. This is not to suggest the 22-year-old's arrival is an issue, but a recalibration of Liverpool's midfield balance is required. This was on display against Crystal Palace as both of Palace's goals came from Oliver Glasner's side playing through the heart of the pitch — the caveat being Slot's double pivot was Curtis Jones and Szoboszlai rather than Gravenberch and Mac Allister. The first goal came from Adam Wharton bypassing Wirtz and Szoboszlai. With Jones too deep, Daichi Kamada was then able to release Jean-Philippe Mateta in behind. Alisson's heroics did not prevent Palace from winning a penalty moments later. For the second, Wharton was again the instigator, bypassing three Liverpool midfielders to find Ismaila Sarr after Cody Gakpo was dispossessed. It was a rare off-day for Van Dijk, and the growing pains of a back four with two new full-backs were noticeable in their disjointed line, as shown below for the second goal. Conceding goals has been a theme throughout pre-season. Gravenberch has obtained the undroppable tag in the No 6 position, so the No 8 feels crucial in making the midfield tick. Mac Allister's start to pre-season was delayed as he recovered from the injury he picked up towards the end of last season. That has allowed Szoboszlai the opportunity to stake his claim for that role. His performance against Palace did him few favours, but alongside Gravenberch and Wirtz, he was excellent against Athletic Club. The general setup will remain the same, but it is unlikely Wirtz will be asked to replicate Szoboszlai's running. They will want him in the final third as much as possible to knit the attack together, but Liverpool need to ensure the balance is right. Szoboszlai offers the type of athleticism Mac Allister lacks, but is unable to control the tempo of a match like the Argentina international can. The latter's off-ball work is often underrated, so there is no doubt about his ability to stop counter-attacks; it's more about the ground that may be required to be covered at speed. Mac Allister's recovery has denied Slot the opportunity to look at a midfield of Gravenberch, Mac Allister and Wirtz together. Only then will we see how functional that is, and whether that compact structure returns and remains. Moving further up the pitch, Liverpool were exciting in attack last season — but they may be even better to watch heading into the new campaign. Wirtz and Ekitike have reshaped the front four, adding a technical and creative wizard and an all-round No 9 that Slot was lacking last season. It's a change from the often-used Szoboszlai-Diaz combination from last season, who were excellent pressers and effective in possession, but not as creative or natural goalscorers compared to the new arrivals. Advertisement Both first halves against Athletic Club and Crystal Palace were a joy to watch for Liverpool supporters, with Salah and Gakpo either side of the new Wirtz-Ekitike dynamic. Relationships are building, and the speed and patterns of play offer plenty of encouragement for what is to come. Wirtz has already become the central creative figure. He has a roaming role, which allows him to drift from pocket to pocket of space and appear across the pitch to influence proceedings. It was noticeable against Palace how tilted the front four was to the left side of the pitch. With Gakpo on the left, both Ekitike and Wirtz showed the tendency to drift to the left – the latter often operated as a left-sided No 10 for Leverkusen, whereas last season Liverpool played with a right-sided No 10. It was evident in Liverpool's opening goal against Palace where the pair linked up, and was similar for another Ekitike chance in the second half after shooting over the bar from a low cross from Wirtz. The first goal against Athletic Club also demonstrated this as Ekitike positioned himself in the left channel, which led to his assist. Slot built Liverpool's attack around Salah last season — and with good reason, considering the 33-year-old's record-breaking goal contributions. With this summer's additions, that no longer appears to be the case. In theory, the tilt to the left should give both Salah and Frimpong more space. Against Athletic, the system looked fluid, with Wirtz's influence balanced across the pitch. Against Palace, the Egypt international felt anonymous for large periods, but this should not be a huge concern yet. Salah has gone from being surrounded by Trent Alexander-Arnold, Szoboszlai and Diaz last season to Frimpong, Wirtz and Ekitike. It takes time to develop a new understanding. Advertisement The bigger worry is depth. The sales of Diaz and Darwin Nunez have left Slot with fewer senior forwards. Last season, Liverpool's bench was a weapon, allowing fresh attackers to alter games after the break. On Sunday, though, Slot replaced Ekitike by switching to a dual No 10 system, leaving Federico Chiesa, Ben Doak and 16-year-old pre-season standout Rio Ngumoha unused. Interest remains in Newcastle's Alexander Isak, but for now, the lack of depth means the narrative is changing slightly — where Liverpool's margin for error is arguably tighter this season than last. Reinforcements would change that. While much of Liverpool's transfer window has been dominated by changes across the forward line, it is important to discuss how Kerkez and Frimpong's arrival will influence the wider attacking unit. Slot has signed two of the most attacking full-backs in Europe, which is highlighted below when looking at their off-ball run types per 30 minutes in possession compared with their positional peers across Europe's top seven leagues. Underlapping runs were a key theme of Slot's title win last season, and there is arguably no player more suited to such a style than Kerkez — whose lung-busting runs can drag opposition defenders away or offer a passing option to cross into the box. Albeit from a wing-back position at Bayer Leverkusen, Frimpong's direct runs forward (Runs in behind, 99 out of 99) and tendency to get into the box (Cross receiver, 98 out of 99) were a feature of his time in Germany — and have already been on show during pre-season. Slot was keen to emphasise that the Dutch international can also deputise for Salah on the right wing when he is away during the Africa Cup of Nations in December and January. 'We brought in Jeremie Frimpong because we think he can play as a right full-back, but I also feel that he can play as a right winger. We will miss Mo for a maximum of six games, but that's quite a lot in the Premier League, especially when you see how well he did last season. Advertisement 'Signing Jeremie was for multiple reasons, but one of them was that he could replace Mo if Mo is not there. There are other options as well, but Jeremie is definitely one of them.' Slot will likely encourage his full-backs to engage in an approach that is similar to the example below: as one tucks in while the other pushes on. This is seen against Athletic Club, with Frimpong taking up a higher, inside starting position before underlapping Salah to get beyond the defensive line. Both Frimpong and Kerkez are relentless when given the opportunity to go forward, but Slot will be aware of the threat on the counter-attack if both are pushed too high when Liverpool lose the ball. The early signs suggest that the wider balance in and out of possession still needs refining, but with the profiles that the duo offer, you can expect a newfound energy on both flanks this season. A key area that Liverpool could improve next season is their set-piece prowess, particularly offensively. Slot's side were well-rounded in most phases last season, but even he admitted that this is a part of their game that they need to work on. 'I think, even more, how big of an accomplishment it is to be on top of the league if we all know how important set pieces have become in general in football, let alone in this league,' he told Jamie Carragher in an interview with Sky Sports last season. 'If you lose the battle of set pieces, it's hardly impossible to win a game of football, and the good thing for us is defensively we do well — maybe we do well — but offensively a team like us that has so many set pieces has to score more.' Strength in dead-ball situations was a key feature of Liverpool's play under Klopp, with assistant Peter Krawietz — nicknamed 'The Eye' — responsible for a lot of the analysis. However, the lack of potency was one of the few blots on the page for Slot last season. When accounting for opportunity, only four Premier League teams had a lower output than Liverpool's 3.3 goals per 100 set pieces in 2024-25, conceding at a rate that was close to league average. A switch to more inswinging corners was a notable feature under Slot, but the changes did not bear fruit as much as many had hoped. It was telling that Liverpool advertised for a specialist set-piece coach last summer, only to put their search on hold after being unable to find a suitable candidate. Instead, first-team individual development coach Aaron Briggs assumed the role last season in addition to his existing position. Advertisement Losing one of Europe's best set-piece takers in Alexander-Arnold has not helped, but there have been some quirky features of pre-season emerging. During their tour of Asia, Gravenberch, Kerkez, Wataru Endo and Conor Bradley were spotted practising long throw-ins in attacking phases, which was a feature of their play under Klopp with the help of throw-in specialist Thomas Gronnemark. Against stubborn defences that sit in a low block, improving Liverpool's set-piece threat could be the key to unlocking a game. It is an area they will undoubtedly be keen to improve this season. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle
New York Times
3 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
How Newcastle United play: Tonali's vital role, picking when to press and the sweepiest of ‘keepers
This is part of a series from The Athletic breaking down the tactical approach of Premier League teams for the 2025-26 season. You can read about the other teams we've covered so far via the links below. In outlining how Newcastle have played under Eddie Howe, a certain wantaway Swedish centre-forward has been pivotal. The question mark over Alexander Isak's future means that, should he depart before September, Newcastle's overall game plan will need to alter. But the overarching blueprint will not be discarded. Newcastle's head coach will not deviate from his defined principles — front-foot defending, aggression and high intensity are key traits of 'Howe-ball'. Here, The Athletic breaks down Newcastle's approach under Howe — and the changes that may occur in the 2025-26 season. Howe will hate reading this, but his team selection has been mostly predictable, at least in its formation. For 113 matches straight from November 2021 to March 2024, Howe sent out his Newcastle side in a 4-3-3. Since then, any occasional deviation has always been followed by a reversion. To the untrained eye, it may appear as if Howe sticks to the same tactical approach for every game. Yet meticulous planning means that there is always a nuanced plan — 4-3-3 is his nominal starting formation, but individual roles are tweaked depending on the opposition. Advertisement Towards the end of 2024-25, Howe even shifted to a back three. That three-man defence was occasionally seen during pre-season but it is more likely that Howe will save that setup when facing European-qualification rivals. Sven Botman, Dan Burn and Fabian Schar have operated well as a trio, while defender Malick Thiaw, who last night completed his move from Milan, is adept at playing in any centre-back position. The predominance of 4-3-3 is evident in the graphic below, which shows the average position of Newcastle's players during the 'build-up' and 'creation' phases. During the creation phase — when a side builds out from the back — Newcastle try to use greater width, with the full-backs often closest to the touchlines and the wingers pushing outwards. Once Newcastle advance into the creation phase — which starts once they have moved the ball into attacking areas — their shape narrows. The gaps between players close and the midfield three push to join the forwards, with Howe keen to flood the box with runners. Newcastle are still evolving, especially in possession. Just as it will take time for the club to compete against the elite clubs within the bounds of profit and sustainability rules (PSR), their territorial dominance does not yet mirror the traditionally successful sides. Whereas Chelsea, Arsenal, Manchester City and Liverpool are dominant across the pitch, Newcastle's focus is directed towards wide attacking areas and then centrally inside their own half. Athleticism and physicality are hallmarks of Howe's Newcastle. Energy and intensity are central, too. In the Premier League last season, Newcastle players produced the most high-speed sprints per minute of build-up play. Newcastle generated 8.6 xG (expected goals, a measure of the quality of their chances) from Opta-defined 'fast breaks', second only to Liverpool. The pace of Anthony Gordon, Harvey Barnes, Jacob Murphy, Tino Livramento and Isak — and the newly acquired speedster Anthony Elanga (who showed glimpses of what he can do against Atletico Madrid on Saturday, as shown below) — means Newcastle can attack with rapid ferocity. Unsurprisingly, Newcastle ranked highly across Europe for overlapping and underlapping runs, as well as for runners attacking crosses, throughout 2024-25. As the graphic below shows, Newcastle rarely build up laterally or by coming short — instead, there is a verticality about their approach. They rely upon runners getting beyond the ball carrier, through underlapping or overlapping runs, or on players arriving late into the box to meet crosses. Barnes and Livramento developed an understanding down the left last season and regularly overlapped and underlapped one another. Their connection led to Newcastle's second goal in the Carabao Cup final against Liverpool in March (shown below). Newcastle have become adept at delivering open-play crosses to the back post. Last season, they scored the most goals (11) from these chances and generated the highest xG (11), from the third-most chances (38). When one of Newcastle's wingers stays wide, the other tends to head into the area, ready to get on the end of crosses. Livramento, Lewis Hall and Kieran Trippier look to advance from full-back and pepper the area with crosses. Great combination play, with Barnes and Livramento dovetailing once more, led to Murphy's back-post goal against Leicester in April (shown below). As inverted left-wingers, Gordon and Barnes naturally cut inside onto their right foot. They regularly dart in from their flank, desperate to create an angle to shoot. As they do so, the full-backs overlap or underlap, presenting a passing option or attracting defenders away to create more space for the winger (as shown below against Brentford in April). The graphic below shows how Newcastle entered the box across 2024-25. Bruno Guimaraes (133), Murphy (128) and Gordon (109) provided the most passes into the area, while Gordon (47), Barnes (37) and Isak (33) carried the ball into the box most frequently. There is a fairly even split between passes and carries into the area from the right and the left, yet Newcastle rarely run with possession from central positions into the box. Murphy developed a healthy knack for finding Isak in goalscoring positions last year. The winger laid on seven goals for the striker in 2024-25, the most provided for an individual team-mate in the Premier League. Whether that lethal combination continues moving forward, time will tell. When it comes to attacking set pieces, Newcastle were decidedly mid-table last season. Only 17.7 per cent (12) of their 68 league goals came from dead-ball situations, while they generated an xG of 11.7 from 145 shots. Advertisement Martin Mark's arrival as the club's first dedicated set-piece coach feels timely, then. Jason Tindall, the assistant head coach, Stephen Purches, the first-team coach, and Kieran Taylor, the set-piece analyst, previously oversaw dead balls. While their involvement will continue, Mark specialised in set pieces at Midtjylland and his innovative ideas were already evident during pre-season, when Newcastle attempted new corner and free-kick routines. Whether Mark alters Newcastle's throw-in blueprint will be intriguing to see. Last season, Newcastle only took one long throw, the fewest attempted in the Premier League, and even that was Dan Burn trying to quickly send his team clear down the wing, rather than a classic launch into the box. In 2024-25, there were two very different versions of Newcastle: pre- and post-December. Or, to single out one specific tactical tweak, pre- and post-Sandro Tonali's shift to the deep-lying No 6 position. As critical as Isak's successive 20-goal-plus Premier League campaigns have been, Tonali was arguably their most influential player once he had been repurposed. During his first 18 months on Tyneside (when he was available to play, either side of his ban for gambling offences), Tonali usually operated as a right-sided No 8 (central midfielder). The graphic below shows how the areas in which he touched the ball in open play changed once he was moved to deep-lying midfielder for most of 2024-25. Tonali is not an archetypal holding No 6, he is so much more. He can cover ground defensively, thwart potential counters and start attacks with his magnificent passing range, yet he also has the licence (and engine) to advance and create overloads around the box. So much of what Newcastle did well en route to winning the Carabao Cup and qualifying for the Champions League stemmed directly from Tonali and the balance he provides. When Newcastle qualified for the Champions League in 2022-23, they swarmed opponents — pressing high, forcing high turnovers and being aggressive in almost every off-the-ball phase. That marked a dramatic change from the Rafa Benitez and Steve Bruce days, when Newcastle sat deep and tried to counter. Howe took over in November 2021 and focused on solidifying the defence. Across that first campaign, Newcastle's average defensive line was 22m from their own goal. The following season, when Newcastle finished fourth, their defensive line had moved 7m higher up the field to 29m. That distance remained almost identical for 2023-24 (28m) yet rather surprisingly, it dropped to 25m last season (as shown below). Dropping back slightly appears to be a deliberate evolution. Newcastle conceded 62 goals across 2023-24, but that was cut to 47 as they became far more rigid defensively. Rather than press high all the time, Newcastle pick and choose their moments (and games). They did so late on against Manchester United in April, with six players positioned in the final third, leading to Guimaraes scoring. Against some opponents, Newcastle will sit deeper. Against others, they will harry the goalkeeper and defenders whenever they pass it across the back line. In certain games, such as against Tottenham Hotspur and Arsenal last season, Newcastle will go man-for-man and players will literally follow their opposite number wherever they roam. Usually, Newcastle switch between all of these (especially the first two) within matches. Yet, even though Newcastle's defensive line has moved deeper, they are still reliant on Nick Pope's willingness and ability to come out of his box and involve himself in the game (as shown below against Crystal Palace in April). Last season, Pope's figure of 2.4 sweeper-keeper actions per 90 minutes was the highest in the Premier League by a significant margin. In December 2023, Pope was sidelined through injury and deputy Martin Dubravka is not as comfortable coming out of his box, exposing Newcastle's high defensive line. The decision to drop slightly deeper last season aimed to compensate for Newcastle's lack of pace at centre-back — although Thiaw's arrival should add speed to the back line, perhaps making Howe's side less reliant on Pope's sweeping. Advertisement Aaron Ramsdale has arrived on an initial loan from Southampton and will compete with Pope. He made only 0.7 keeper-sweepings per 90 last season, so he offers different strengths, although that figure is skewed downwards by Southampton's out-of-possession style. One of Ramsdale's strengths is his comfort with the ball at his feet. While Pope can distribute excellently out of hand, he often appears awkward when kicking from the floor. Against Espanyol on Friday, Ramsdale often played simple passes, but always scanned the pitch and tried to break the lines when he could (as shown below). In open play, Ramsdale went long more often than Pope (35 per cent to 16 per cent), as the graphic below illustrates. Ramsdale does not just launch the ball, however — he gets involved in build-up play and looks to beat the first line of the opposition press by floating passes into the middle third of the pitch. So we return to where we started. It is difficult to say how efficiently Newcastle would continue to operate if Isak, the central goalscoring cog in their machine, was sold. That hypothetical scenario also depends upon who would replace him. Newcastle failed to win any of their final six pre-season friendlies and have struggled for goals without Isak. He missed four Premier League matches last season, and Newcastle's record was not pretty — two draws and two defeats. Howe is an astute and forward-thinking coach, however, and he will undoubtedly inject some fresh innovations into this Newcastle side. (Top photos: Getty Images) Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle
New York Times
4 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
How Burnley play: A safety-first foundation that has yielded astonishing defensive numbers
This is part of a series from The Athletic breaking down the tactical approach of Premier League teams for the 2025-26 season. Read about other clubs below: Burnley's last campaign as a promoted club in 2023-24 was a chastening lesson in life at the top and one that has drastically reshaped their tactical approach this time around. Under Vincent Kompany — now at Bayern Munich — they stormed to promotion playing a daring, swashbuckling brand of football, setting a Championship record with an average of 64 per cent possession. But the adventurous ball-dominant approach that thrived in the second tier was brutally exposed and cut down by superior Premier League opposition. Suddenly, loose touches were ruthlessly pounced upon, while stray passes triggered rapid, clinical counter-attacks. Imposing their style became impossible as they were relegated back down to the Championship with a paltry 24 points. In came former Bournemouth and Fulham manager Scott Parker, bringing with him a healthy dose of pragmatism. Under his guidance, Burnley returned to the Premier League at the first time of asking, but this time their promotion was built firmly on defence-first foundations. They shipped just 16 goals across the course of the season, an astonishing feat even if it did come at the expense of entertainment. Josh Brownhill's joke that they 'bored their way to the Premier League' contained more than a kernel of truth as they played out 12 goalless draws. To survive this season, Burnley are massively up against it again. They remain dauntingly out-resourced in terms of playing talent, but the hope is that their more attritional tactics will prove more robust at a higher level, where they expect to spend the majority of matches without the ball. But Parker hasn't simply reverted to the direct, rugged, no-nonsense football Burnley were known for under Sean Dyche to shore up their defence. Stylistically, many of the tactical principles set out by Kompany remain, albeit employed with more caution. Short, considered build-up from the back is still a cornerstone of their play. As the graph below shows, Burnley's direct speed — how quickly they move the ball upfield — and passes per sequence have only shifted slightly last season compared to their previous promotion campaign. Structurally too, their in-possession formation mirrors Kompany's, lining up with the same 4-2-3-1 that morphs into a 4-3-3 in more advanced areas. But while formations and ball circulation appear similar, dig beneath the surface and the difference in approach is stark. For Kompany, formations were more of a loose framework than fixed positional rules. Players were encouraged to rotate fluidly, making Burnley's attacks unpredictable and potent. Under Parker, formations are far more literal, with his side rigidly adhering to the areas and responsibilities tied to their positions. Advertisement In 2022-23, 13 of the 15 outfield players registered 10 or more shots on goal, a reflection of the freewheeling rotation in attack. Last season, only six players reached that mark. Player roles are now much simpler: defenders defend, attackers attack. The intent behind their possession-based approach also differs in subtle ways. Now it leans towards caution, with players preferring to retain the ball through a safe pass rather than risk losing it in a dangerous area. Leeds boss Daniel Farke summed it up after a drab 0-0 draw in January: 'They take pretty little risk with the ball, so if they lose it, it's only in areas where they can't be hurt on the counter-attack… you have to prepare to create a chance, more or less, against a compact block.' The data backs this up. In their 2022-23 Championship campaign, Burnley conceded an average of 13.2 counter-attacks per game; last season, that figure dropped to 10.7. In a Premier League increasingly defined by transitions — a record number of goals were scored on the break last season — it's prudent to play cautiously and maintain a steady shape in possession to limit those potent opportunities. But given their record-breaking defensive efforts, it's off the ball where Burnley really came to the fore last season. It's first worth noting that while Burnley were undoubtedly well-organised, a big part of their defensive record owed to last-ditch heroics. Leading the way here was James Trafford, who put in one of the greatest shot-stopping performances in Championship history. His goals prevented — the number of goals saved above expectation based on the quality of shots faced — finished at an extraordinary +12.7 for the season. Ahead of him, centre-back Maxime Esteve embodied the art of last-ditch defending, blocking a league-high 3.64 expected goals. Advertisement It's unlikely Burnley can sustainably rely on this kind of defending, but their disciplined organisation and compact shape are qualities they can reproduce. They remained aggressive in the press last season, posting a PPDA of 11.7 — the seventh-best rate in the division — but chose their moments to engage more selectively. Typically, when losing the ball high up the pitch, Burnley's front line press in unison to win it back immediately, but quickly drop into a 4-2-4 mid-block if bypassed. Below is one example from their April match against Swansea, where they shift as a unit to close space and cut off passing lanes rather than aggressively chase the ball. 'I get it's not fashionable, but it's nothing short of remarkable what we've done defensively as a group and as a team,' said Parker last season. Their dogged discipline in plugging gaps and condensing the pitch should at least make them more competitive in games this season. But to paint them as one-dimensionally focused on defending would be a disservice to a side that finished as the third-highest scorers last season. As first-team coach Mike Jackson — who was involved in both promotion campaigns — put it: 'It might have been a bit more flamboyant the first time around, but there's still been a lot of really good stuff this year.' Parker took over a side undergoing significant transfer churn after relegation, with key players such as Sander Berge, Wilson Odobert and Zeki Amdouni among those to leave. That it took time to build attacking cohesion was understandable, but things improved towards the tail end of the season — particularly after right-winger Marcus Edwards joined on loan from Sporting CP in January — with goals per game rising from 1.3 in the first half of the campaign to 1.7 in the second. Much of their business this summer has focused on making loan players like Edwards, Jaidon Anthony and Zion Flemming permanent, but the addition of Armando Broja from Chelsea is a potential boost to their attacking firepower. Their other major signing from Stamford Bridge, defensive midfielder Lesley Ugochukwu, goes some way towards offsetting the losses of Trafford and centre-back CJ Egan-Riley. Advertisement Ultimately, Burnley's squad on paper doesn't scream Premier League quality. Tactics can only do so much. Their more street-smart, defensive approach might help, but last season's success was still built on controlled possession, which will be far harder to sustain against elite opposition. Instead, they'll need to call upon every ounce of the grit and determination Parker has instilled in this squad. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle
New York Times
5 days ago
- Sport
- New York Times
How Leeds United play: Transitions, narrow wingers and plenty of back-post crosses
This is part of a series from The Athletic breaking down the tactical approach of Premier League teams for the 2025-26 season. You can also read about Arsenal's approach. One of the toughest aspects of transitioning from the Championship to the Premier League is balancing the attacking approach that brought promotion with the required caution against stronger opponents. Last season, Leeds United won the Championship with a ball-dominant style but adapting that approach against Premier League teams who control possession, press high and are lethal on the break is harder than it sounds. Advertisement Daniel Farke's side are not going to transform completely. 'We spoke about the way we want to play, how we want to approach the season and how we are not going to change our approach,' Wilfried Gnonto told The Athletic last month. 'The level is high, but we want to be aggressive, we want to be dictating games. Hopefully, that's what is going to happen. When you play against top teams, it's not always going to be possible, but it's good to have this type of approach and mentality.' The 4-3-3 adopted in pre-season is a slight change from Leeds' regular 4-2-3-1, resulting in tweaks to the build-up and defensive shape, and extra physicality in midfield. Yet Farke's team haven't moved away from the attacking and defensive principles that led them back to the Premier League. In the Championship, Leeds built up in a 3-1 shape, with one of the two deeper midfielders dropping into the first line to help progress the ball to the wide areas where Farke's side mainly focused their attacks. In front of them, full-backs pushed forward to support the front four, who were usually in narrow positions, apart from Daniel James, who had the freedom to stick to the touchline to exploit his one-v-one abilities (below). The narrow front three behind Joel Piroe or Mateo Joseph allowed Leeds to attack multiple vertical channels, with the full-backs, Jayden Bogle and Junior Firpo, who has since left, supporting them, as seen in the below example from October's 2-0 victory against Sheffield United. Firpo and Bogle often occupied the width as the wingers roamed inside, but Leeds' approach was flexible, allowing the full-backs to interchange positions with the narrow forwards. When they operated more centrally, Brenden Aaronson, Manor Solomon and James helped knit together passing combinations in the final third. In this example, in the 2-0 win at Stoke City in December, Aaronson, Solomon and left-back Sam Byram are overloading the opponent's right centre-back and wing-back. Solomon's movement prevents Ben Wilmot from tracking Aaronson as Joe Rothwell finds the United States forward between the lines. Aaronson then immediately puts Piroe through on goal, before the centre-forward tries to round the goalkeeper and strikes the ball into the back of the net. In another example, from the 1-0 victory against Derby County three days later, Solomon attracts the opposing centre-back as Aaronson dashes forward when Byram plays the ball to Leeds' left-winger. Aaronson then continues his movement to attack the space between the centre-backs, while Solomon's pass to Piroe grabs their attention. Leeds' centre-forward then threads the ball through the defence… … to find the third-man run of Aaronson, who slots the ball into the bottom corner to score the winner. Piroe's link-up play is instrumental to Leeds' attacking combinations. The Dutch forward regularly drops into midfield to aid these moves, either by dragging centre-backs out of position or linking the play. The heatmap of the open-play passes he received in the Championship last season shows an inclination to roam towards the right side of the pitch. Towards that side, James' inside dribbles and his team-mates' off-ball movement are the initiating moves that allow Leeds to combine and play through the opponent, as illustrated in Piroe's offside 'goal' against Millwall in March. Even if Piroe isn't central to the move, Leeds' right-sided combinations were an essential part of their attack in 2024-25. Starting as an attacking midfielder, Aaronson would roam to the right to help Bogle and James, who smartly positioned themselves to enable these combinations. Their first-minute goal in the 2-0 win against Norwich City in January is an example of Leeds' right flank operating fluently. The dynamics of Leeds' attack are interlinked. The narrow positioning of the wingers plays an important role in attacking the wide areas while placing them in threatening positions to attack the crosses. In this example, from the 1-0 win against Oxford United in April, it's the usual approach from Farke's side with a 3-1 build-up shape, narrow forwards and Bogle in an advanced position. As Joe Rodon searches for a passing option, Piroe drops deeper… … and Gnonto's similar action means that Oxford's left-back and centre-back are stretched and dragged out of position. Meanwhile, Bogle complements that with a run behind the defence, which is found by Rodon. The right-back then plays the ball across goal, and Solomon's initial narrow position makes him a goalscoring option at the back post. Another feature of Leeds' attack is their focus on crosses towards the back post, which is helped by the narrow positioning of the forwards — such as in the above example — or the full-backs' dashes into the half-space when the wingers stay wide. Last season, Leeds scored 15 goals from crosses towards the back post, which was the second-most in the Championship after Coventry City (16). Meanwhile, an accumulated 13.1 expected goals (xG) — which was the highest in the division — from 39 chances shows that they were creating high-quality opportunities from these situations. The profiles of Leeds' wingers and Aaronson suit the Premier League's transitional nature, as their pace and one-v-one ability make them threatening in these situations. Additionally, Leeds are expected to have less possession this season, which adds to the importance of their transitional threat once they win the ball. Advertisement The data illustrates their focus on getting it forward. 'Direct attacks' are defined as possessions that start in a team's own half and result in a shot or a touch inside the opposition penalty area within 15 seconds — in other words, a counter-attack. Leeds' rate of 2.8 direct attacks per 90 minutes in the Championship last season was level with Middlesbrough as the joint third-highest in the league, behind Sunderland (3.3) and Watford (3.1). Plenty of these attacking transitions originated from the midfield's ability to win possession and play the ball forward. Rothwell, Ethan Ampadu, Ilia Gruev and Ao Tanaka protected the space in front of the back four and consistently broke the opponent's attacks. The deeper midfield duo had another role that helped Leeds' defence. One of the centre midfielders would drop to defend the area between the full-back and centre-backs, keeping the rest of the defensive line compact, while his partner protected the area in front of them. Tanaka's out-of-possession role in midfield was instrumental in Leeds' promotion. Last season, his 4.8 'true' interceptions — denoting interceptions plus blocked passes — per 1,000 opponent touches was the fourth-highest in the Championship among all defensive and central midfielders who played at least 900 minutes. The Japan midfielder is adept at sweeping up the ball in midfield, whether counter-pressing to regain possession after Leeds lose it or hoovering up loose balls in that area. His rate of 11.1 ball recoveries per 1,000 opponent touches was the fifth-highest in the same pool of midfielders. Defensively, Leeds conceded the second-fewest goals (30) in the 2024-25 Championship after Burnley's extraordinary total of 16. However, they conceded the lowest non-penalty xG per game in the division (0.6). Considering the amount of time they will be defending in the Premier League, building on that defensive solidity will be important. Improving their set pieces could be crucial, too. Across the last two Premier League seasons, all six promoted teams have been relegated. Leeds' mission is to buck that trend. Spot the pattern. Connect the terms Find the hidden link between sports terms Play today's puzzle
