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How Trump could subvert the Constitution and stay in office for a third term
How Trump could subvert the Constitution and stay in office for a third term

The Independent

time14-05-2025

  • Politics
  • The Independent

How Trump could subvert the Constitution and stay in office for a third term

United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of remaining in office after his second term ends in 2029. Since the 22nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1951, no U.S. president has challenged the two-term limit it established. However, attempts to circumvent constitutional term limits are not unprecedented elsewhere. Virtually every country in Latin America has enshrined constitutional term limits as a safeguard against tyranny. These rules vary: some allow only a single term, some permit two, while others enable non-consecutive re-election. Yet several presidents have managed to defy these provisions. Recent examples include Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Although the institutional norms and political cultures of these countries differ from those of the U.S., examining how term limits have been dismantled offers valuable insights into how any similar efforts by Trump might unfold. How presidents have overstayed their term The most common tactic is for presidents to first ensure their political party in the legislature is fully subservient to them, and then leverage a loyal majority to amend the constitution — a move that has already been initiated in the U.S. Ortega and Correa successfully used their legislative majorities to pass constitutional amendments that eliminated term limits in Nicaragua and Ecuador. Whether Trump has achieved the same level of unwavering loyalty among Republicans is debatable, but getting amendments through the U.S. Congress is significantly more difficult. The process requires a two-thirds majority vote in both houses, followed by ratification from three-quarters of state legislatures. In contrast, Nicaragua's constitution can be amended with a 60 per cent majority and, as in Ecuador, sub-national jurisdictions have no say in the matter. Another crucial step involves co-opting or capturing the judiciary. In Bolivia, Morales achieved a controversial third term in 2014 supported by a partisan Constitutional Tribunal. More recently, El Salvador's Bukele secured a 2021 Supreme Court ruling (from judges he appointed) allowing him to seek immediate re-election in 2024, despite a constitutional prohibition on consecutive terms. We have seen a worrying pattern of subservience to Trump by the U.S. Supreme Court. The limits of this deference are increasingly uncertain. Securing popular support Some presidents have turned to plebiscites to legitimize constitutional tampering by appealing directly to the electorate and framing the move as a democratic exercise. Chávez employed this strategy in Venezuela, winning a 2009 referendum to abolish term limits. The absence of a national referendum mechanism in the U.S. — where popular consultations are organized at the sub-national (state) level — limits the options available to a president seeking to remove term limits through this type of populist ploy. Related to this, populist presidents who have successfully circumvented term limits have typically done so while enjoying extraordinarily high levels of public support. Correa maintained approval ratings near 70 per cent during much of his presidency, while independent polls have put Bukele's support at well over 80 per cent. Both, along with Morales and Chávez, leveraged their popularity to justify constitutional changes through legislative and judicial channels, framing their actions as carrying out the will of the people. In contrast, Trump's approval ratings have consistently remained far lower. Currently, his favorability sits in the low 40s, making any attempt to claim a broad popular mandate for a third term both dubious and precarious. The military matters Due to inevitable opposition, military support is central to any leader's attempt to defy the constitution. In much of Latin America, the military is highly politicized, and armed forces have historically been shaped by doctrines of internal control rather than external defence. Rooted in Cold War-era national security ideologies, this orientation casts domestic dissenters ('socialists,' Indigenous movements, unionists) as internal enemies, legitimizing repression as a patriotic duty. In some countries, military oaths reflect this politicization. In both Nicaragua and Venezuela, these oaths increasingly emphasize loyalty to the president or ruling party and their revolutionary legacy, undermining institutional neutrality. By contrast, in the U.S., military personnel swear an oath to defend the Constitution, not the president. While they must follow orders, these must align with constitutional and legal boundaries. The absence of a tradition of using soldiers against American citizens and an institutional culture of constitutional loyalty and political neutrality may, at least in principle, provide some protection against the authoritarian overreach that has allowed certain Latin American presidents to remain in power indefinitely. But a substantial portion of the U.S. armed forces leans politically to the right, like their counterparts in Latin America, raising concerns that partisan sympathies within the military could influence its response to a constitutional crisis. Furthermore, the increasing use of non-military security forces — such as local police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — against civilians demonstrates that the state has a range of instruments at its disposal for exercising control. The U.S. government's use of ICE is reminiscent of how governments in countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua have used police and paramilitary units loyal to the president with impunity to suppress dissent. The perils of complacency Many in the West still hold on to the belief that constitutional erosion is something that only happens in the Global South. Some believe that American institutions are uniquely resilient and therefore capable of withstanding any attempt to subvert the constitution. For much of U.S. history, this confidence may have been justified, but today, it's not only complacent but dangerous. The strength of democratic institutions depends on the political will to defend them. Time will tell if the barriers that exist in the U.S. are strong enough to withstand the pressures now being placed upon them. What is clear is that relying on increasingly tenuous institutional resilience or historical exceptionalism is no substitute for vigilance and active defence of democratic norms.

Donald Trump could remain in office after his term ends. Here's how
Donald Trump could remain in office after his term ends. Here's how

The Independent

time12-05-2025

  • Politics
  • The Independent

Donald Trump could remain in office after his term ends. Here's how

United States President Donald Trump has repeatedly floated the idea of remaining in office after his second term ends in 2029. Since the 22nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was ratified in 1951, no U.S. president has challenged the two-term limit it established. However, attempts to circumvent constitutional term limits are not unprecedented elsewhere. Virtually every country in Latin America has enshrined constitutional term limits as a safeguard against tyranny. These rules vary: some allow only a single term, some permit two, while others enable non-consecutive re-election. Yet several presidents have managed to defy these provisions. Recent examples include Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia, Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Nayib Bukele in El Salvador. Although the institutional norms and political cultures of these countries differ from those of the U.S., examining how term limits have been dismantled offers valuable insights into how any similar efforts by Trump might unfold. How presidents have overstayed their term The most common tactic is for presidents to first ensure their political party in the legislature is fully subservient to them, and then leverage a loyal majority to amend the constitution — a move that has already been initiated in the U.S. Ortega and Correa successfully used their legislative majorities to pass constitutional amendments that eliminated term limits in Nicaragua and Ecuador. Whether Trump has achieved the same level of unwavering loyalty among Republicans is debatable, but getting amendments through the U.S. Congress is significantly more difficult. The process requires a two-thirds majority vote in both houses, followed by ratification from three-quarters of state legislatures. In contrast, Nicaragua's constitution can be amended with a 60 per cent majority and, as in Ecuador, sub-national jurisdictions have no say in the matter. Another crucial step involves co-opting or capturing the judiciary. In Bolivia, Morales achieved a controversial third term in 2014 supported by a partisan Constitutional Tribunal. More recently, El Salvador's Bukele secured a 2021 Supreme Court ruling (from judges he appointed) allowing him to seek immediate re-election in 2024, despite a constitutional prohibition on consecutive terms. We have seen a worrying pattern of subservience to Trump by the U.S. Supreme Court. The limits of this deference are increasingly uncertain. Securing popular support Some presidents have turned to plebiscites to legitimize constitutional tampering by appealing directly to the electorate and framing the move as a democratic exercise. Chávez employed this strategy in Venezuela, winning a 2009 referendum to abolish term limits. The absence of a national referendum mechanism in the U.S. — where popular consultations are organized at the sub-national (state) level — limits the options available to a president seeking to remove term limits through this type of populist ploy. Related to this, populist presidents who have successfully circumvented term limits have typically done so while enjoying extraordinarily high levels of public support. Correa maintained approval ratings near 70 per cent during much of his presidency, while independent polls have put Bukele's support at well over 80 per cent. Both, along with Morales and Chávez, leveraged their popularity to justify constitutional changes through legislative and judicial channels, framing their actions as carrying out the will of the people. In contrast, Trump's approval ratings have consistently remained far lower. Currently, his favorability sits in the low 40s, making any attempt to claim a broad popular mandate for a third term both dubious and precarious. The military matters Due to inevitable opposition, military support is central to any leader's attempt to defy the constitution. In much of Latin America, the military is highly politicized, and armed forces have historically been shaped by doctrines of internal control rather than external defence. Rooted in Cold War-era national security ideologies, this orientation casts domestic dissenters ('socialists,' Indigenous movements, unionists) as internal enemies, legitimizing repression as a patriotic duty. In some countries, military oaths reflect this politicization. In both Nicaragua and Venezuela, these oaths increasingly emphasize loyalty to the president or ruling party and their revolutionary legacy, undermining institutional neutrality. By contrast, in the U.S., military personnel swear an oath to defend the Constitution, not the president. While they must follow orders, these must align with constitutional and legal boundaries. The absence of a tradition of using soldiers against American citizens and an institutional culture of constitutional loyalty and political neutrality may, at least in principle, provide some protection against the authoritarian overreach that has allowed certain Latin American presidents to remain in power indefinitely. But a substantial portion of the U.S. armed forces leans politically to the right, like their counterparts in Latin America, raising concerns that partisan sympathies within the military could influence its response to a constitutional crisis. Furthermore, the increasing use of non-military security forces — such as local police and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) — against civilians demonstrates that the state has a range of instruments at its disposal for exercising control. The U.S. government's use of ICE is reminiscent of how governments in countries like Venezuela and Nicaragua have used police and paramilitary units loyal to the president with impunity to suppress dissent. The perils of complacency Many in the West still hold on to the belief that constitutional erosion is something that only happens in the Global South. Some believe that American institutions are uniquely resilient and therefore capable of withstanding any attempt to subvert the constitution. For much of U.S. history, this confidence may have been justified, but today, it's not only complacent but dangerous. The strength of democratic institutions depends on the political will to defend them. Time will tell if the barriers that exist in the U.S. are strong enough to withstand the pressures now being placed upon them. What is clear is that relying on increasingly tenuous institutional resilience or historical exceptionalism is no substitute for vigilance and active defence of democratic norms.

Miami commissioners could give themselves and the mayor an extra year in office
Miami commissioners could give themselves and the mayor an extra year in office

Yahoo

time09-05-2025

  • Politics
  • Yahoo

Miami commissioners could give themselves and the mayor an extra year in office

As early as next month, Miami city commissioners could vote to give themselves and Mayor Francis Suarez an extra year in office. The idea circulating Miami City Hall — to move city elections from odd years to even years, in line with national elections — could push the upcoming November 2025 election to 2026. City Attorney George Wysong confirmed to the Miami Herald that the City Commission has the authority to move the election back one year, rather than ask voters for approval. The change would mean Suarez and Commissioners Christine King and Joe Carollo would stay in office until 2026. Commissioners Damian Pardo and Miguel Angel Gabela's terms would also extend one year, until 2028. As it stands now, Suarez is term-limited and set to leave office at the end of the year, and a few high-profile candidates have already filed to replace him in the election planned for this fall. But if the city pushes the election to 2026, Suarez — a former city commissioner — will get a 17th consecutive year as an elected official in Miami. The idea has not yet been placed on an upcoming meeting agenda, but Gabela told the Herald his understanding was that it would be linked to a separate proposal from Pardo to create lifetime term limits for elected officials. The term limits proposal, which would limit elected officials to two terms as mayor and two terms as commissioner during their lifetime, would ultimately need voter approval. The commission is expected to take an initial vote on it June 12. While Pardo said there was no connection between his term limits proposal and moving the city's elections to even years, he expressed support for aligning with national elections. In an interview Thursday, Pardo said moving elections to even years would increase voter turnout, which typically hovers around 10% to 15% in Miami. He also said aligning with the national election cycle could save the city money. 'Residents, if they can see the bigger picture, would understand that you're changing the landscape of a city going forward,' Pardo said. 'And there's always going to be a cost to that, whether it's [elected officials] losing a year, gaining a year.' Pardo added that he wouldn't oppose shortening elected officials' terms rather than lengthening them in order to switch to even-year elections. However, doing so by 2026 could create a situation where the winners of the November 2025 election need to run again in just one year. 'What I'm looking at is the long-term impact on the city of Miami and changing the structures so that we would double our [voter] participation,' Pardo added. Asked Thursday if he would be interested in having an extra year in office, Suarez did not give a direct answer. He did, however, bring up Pardo's proposal for term limits. 'I've enjoyed being the mayor, and I've been very blessed to have the confidence of my residents, who reelected me by close to 80%,' Suarez said in a short interview at City Hall. However, he added that since there is not yet a formal agenda item related to moving the election to 2026, 'there's really nothing to speculate or comment about related to that.' 'There is a proposal, however, on the agenda, related to closing the term limit loophole,' Suarez said. 'So that, at the appropriate moment, if it gets to my desk, I'll weigh in on that. But other than that, I'm looking forward to my 188 days left of service.' It is unclear what Suarez meant when he said he'll 'weigh in' on that proposal, and he declined to elaborate. The mayor does not have a vote on the commission, but he has veto power — something he's exercised sparingly during his tenure. Suarez has previously supported the idea of moving elections to even years, saying so in his 2024 State of the City address to residents. Gabela expressed staunch opposition on Thursday to the prospect of moving elections to even years. Gabela said his understanding is that the term limits proposal would be 'coupled' with the proposal of pushing the upcoming November election to 2026. 'I don't want the extra year, nor will I be voting for this,' Gabela said. He added that while he supports the term limits proposal, he won't vote for it if it contains something 'to give us an extra year.' 'There's a hitch there, you know, and I don't want to be associated with that hitch,' Gabela said. 'I want to be associated with the first original idea. That was term limits, period. End of story. That I will do.' Gabela also said that switching elections from odd to even years will make it harder for grassroots candidates to raise money because they'd be competing with the noise of national politics. Carollo, who is termed out of his District 3 seat in November under the city's current rules, said Thursday that he is not interested in adding an extra year onto his term. Carollo is considering running for mayor, although he hasn't formally filed for the race yet. King, the commission's chairwoman, is up for reelection as District 5 commissioner in November, although she hasn't officially filed for the race yet. A spokesperson for King did not respond to a request for comment Thursday about whether she supports the proposal and if she's interested in having an extra year added to her term. King was a vocal opponent to Pardo's term limits proposal when the commission discussed it last month, saying lifetime term limits were 'too rigid' and 'too inflexible.' 'It takes away choice from my constituents,' King said at the meeting.

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