Latest from JAMnews
JAMnews
7 hours ago
- Politics
- JAMnews
‘No third-party control' – Armenian foreign minister on the 'Trump Route' programme
Armenian foreign minister on the Washington declaration 'The operation of infrastructure – including that to be built in Armenia under the US partnership – will take place within the territorial integrity, sovereignty and jurisdiction of the countries involved, and will ensure mutual benefit. Whatever the technical solutions, still to be discussed, they cannot go beyond these principles,' Armenian foreign minister Ararat Mirzoyan said, speaking about the 'Trump Route' programme. The Trump Route (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity – TRIPP) is a planned road linking mainland Azerbaijan with its exclave Nakhchivan. Armenia and Azerbaijan have agreed to reopen it with the participation of an Armenian–US consortium. Mirzoyan stressed that the Washington declaration does not envisage any third-party control over the road. He was responding to the Armenian parliamentary opposition and some experts who use the term 'corridor', amid claims that Armenia had supposedly agreed to grant Azerbaijan an extraterritorial road. 'With the persistence of a mule, some 'independent experts' or 'dependent party figures' keep spreading terms that have always been unacceptable to Yerevan and are absent from the Washington declaration,' he said. In an interview with Armenpress, Mirzoyan said such interpretations were 'either a product of their imagination or an attempt to mislead people'. Details – what the declaration says, and Mirzoyan's comments. The provisions of the declaration on the 'reciprocity' of benefits in reopening transport links The Washington declaration, signed on 8 August following the Trump–Pashinyan–Aliyev meeting, contains seven points. It covers: the initialling of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan the affirmation of the inviolability of international borders the inadmissibility of using force to seize territory the rejection of any acts of retaliation now or in the future the dissolution of the OSCE Minsk Group and related structures On the 'Trump Route' programme, the declaration states: 'Armenia will work with the United States and mutually agreed third parties to define the framework for implementing the programme on Armenian territory.' After the signing, Armenia's prime minister told reporters that the US intends to be the main investor in the Trump Route, but that Armenia is also ready to work with third parties, including other investors. Pashinyan thanked the US president for showing flexibility on the issue. 'Our goal is for this project to bring involvement, and to attract other partners wherever possible, rather than creating tension or confrontation. No one should think that the Trump Route project is aimed against them, because it truly is not,' he said. The declaration says the sides confirmed the importance of reopening transport links between the two countries for domestic, bilateral and international traffic, while stressing respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction of states: 'These efforts will include unimpeded communications between the main part of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic through the territory of the Republic of Armenia, with mutual benefits for Armenia from international and domestic communications.' At the press conference following the Washington meeting, journalists asked the prime minister whether this reference to mutual benefits also meant unimpeded communications for Armenia. '[The document] sets out one benefit, and says that Armenia should have the same benefit. Reciprocity means that if roads are opened for Azerbaijan, they are opened for Armenia too. If they are not opened for Azerbaijan, they are not opened for Armenia either. Although that option is no longer on the table now,' he replied. Armenia gains access to Azerbaijan's railway infrastructure Armenia's foreign minister said that with the agreement on reopening transport links, a 'very important and decisive' stage had been completed – talks on the general principles for operating the infrastructure. 'But this is only one stage. Now we face huge work to clarify and agree on more specific conditions and technical solutions,' he said. Ararat Mirzoyan stressed that, under the Washington declaration, a major development was taking place – Armenia's transport links are being reopened. 'This is what Armenia has been striving for over the past 35 years. From now on, Armenia gains access to, and can use, Azerbaijan's railway infrastructure for international trade. […] The agreements in the Washington declaration clearly carry even more weight thanks to the participation of the US side and the US president's signature as a witness.' Yerevan to begin talks on Trump Route details Foreign minister Ararat Mirzoyan said the US president had signed an order to set up a working group to implement the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' programme. 'In the near future, we expect high-level discussions in Yerevan on this issue. We should use this important moment to leave future generations a more connected South Caucasus,' he said. He described his visit to Washington as important also for advancing the Armenia–US strategic partnership agenda. Following bilateral talks, the two sides signed three memorandums: Memorandum on Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' regional reopening project: The US expressed support for the 'Crossroads of Peace' project, emphasising Armenia's role as a regional transport hub. It highlighted the need to ensure Armenia's infrastructure and border security, including with the participation of private investors. Memorandum on artificial intelligence and semiconductor innovation: Aimed at deepening cooperation in high-tech, with a focus on developing a semiconductor ecosystem and applying artificial intelligence. Memorandum on energy security: Intended to support Armenia's energy resilience and modernisation of its energy system, encourage private investment, and develop civilian nuclear power. According to Mirzoyan, there is an agreement with US secretary of state Marco Rubio to step up joint work on implementing the components of the strategic partnership. Initialling of peace treaty a 'historic event' The Armenian foreign minister called the initialling of the peace agreement at the White House a 'historic event.' 'It has become a major milestone in the process of resolving Armenian–Azerbaijani relations. The initialling and the subsequent public statements showed that peace – in the sense of no escalation on the border – has already been established. In essence, a stage of institutionalising peace is now beginning,' he said. Mirzoyan also addressed the text of the peace treaty itself, saying he was convinced that once it is published, 'with a rational approach, all speculation will stop from that moment.' Armenian foreign minister on the Washington declaration
JAMnews
9 hours ago
- Politics
- JAMnews
Text of peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia published
Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement text The text of the Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and Interstate Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia has been published. Under the peace agreement, Azerbaijan and Armenia may sign separate deals in areas of mutual interest to foster cooperation in fields including the economy, transit and transport, the environment, humanitarian issues and culture. The agreement commits both sides to condemn all forms of intolerance, racial hatred and discrimination, separatism, violent extremism and terrorism, and to combat these within their respective jurisdictions in line with their international obligations. Neither side may invoke its domestic legislation to justify non-compliance with the agreement. They also pledge not to take hostile actions against each other in diplomatic, informational or other spheres, nor to encourage or engage in such activities, and to hold regular consultations to this end. The peace deal contains 17 articles, and no changes will be made to the text. Full text of the agreement The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia (hereinafter, the Parties), Realizing the urgent necessity of the establishment of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace in the region; Desiring to contribute to that end through the establishment of inter-state relations; Being guided by the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (1970), the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (1975), and the Almaty Declaration of 21 December 1991, and aiming to develop relations on the basis of norms and principles enshrined therein; Expressing their mutual will to establish good-neighborliness between them; Have agreed to establish peace and inter-state relations between them on the basis of the following: ARTICLE I Having confirmed that the boundaries between the Soviet Socialist Republics of the former USSR became the international borders of the respective independent states and have been recognised as such by the international community, the Parties recognise and shall respect each other's sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of international borders and political independence. ARTICLE II In full compliance with Article I, the Parties confirm that they do not have any territorial claims against each other and shall not raise any such claims in the future. The Parties shall not undertake any act – including planning, preparing, encouraging or supporting such acts – that aims to dismember or impair, in whole or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of the other Party. ARTICLE III In their mutual relations, the Parties shall refrain from the use of force or the threat of the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of the other Party, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. They shall not allow any third party to use their respective territories for the use of force against the other Party in a way inconsistent with the UN Charter. ARTICLE IV The Parties shall refrain from intervening in each other's internal affairs. ARTICLE V Within _ days after the exchange of instruments of ratification of this Agreement by both Parties, they shall establish diplomatic relations in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations (1961 and 1963, respectively). ARTICLE VI In full compliance with their obligations under Article I of this Agreement, the Parties shall conduct good faith negotiations between their respective border commissions, in accordance with the agreed regulations of the commissions, to conclude the Agreement on the delimitation and demarcation of the state border between them. ARTICLE VII The Parties shall not deploy along their mutual border the forces of any third party. Pending the delimitation and subsequent demarcation of their mutual border, they shall implement mutually agreed security and confidence-building measures, including in the military field, with a view to ensuring security and stability in the border regions. ARTICLE VIII The Parties condemn and shall combat intolerance, racial hatred and discrimination, separatism, violent extremism and terrorism in all their forms within their respective jurisdictions, and shall uphold their applicable international obligations. ARTICLE IX The Parties undertake to address cases of missing persons and enforced disappearances that occurred during the armed conflict involving both Parties, including through the exchange of all available information about these persons, directly or in cooperation with relevant international organisations, as appropriate. They acknowledge the importance of investigating the fate of these persons – including searching for and returning remains where appropriate – and ensuring that justice is served through proper investigations, as a means of reconciliation and building confidence. The corresponding modalities shall be negotiated and agreed upon in detail in a separate agreement. ARTICLE X In order to establish cooperation in various fields, including economic, transit and transport, environmental, humanitarian and cultural, the Parties may conclude agreements in areas of mutual interest. ARTICLE XI This Agreement does not infringe upon the rights and obligations of the Parties under international law and treaties concluded by each of them with other UN member states. Each Party shall ensure that none of its existing international engagements with third parties undermine its obligations under this Agreement. ARTICLE XII In their bilateral relations, the Parties shall be guided by international law and this Agreement. Neither Party may invoke the provisions of its internal legislation as justification for failing to comply with this Agreement. In accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), the Parties shall refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of this Agreement prior to its entry into force. ARTICLE XIII The Parties guarantee the full implementation of this Agreement and shall establish a bilateral commission to oversee its implementation. The Commission shall operate on the basis of modalities to be agreed upon by the Parties. ARTICLE XIV Without prejudice to their rights and obligations under international law and other treaties binding them in their mutual relations, the Parties shall strive to settle any dispute regarding the interpretation or application of this Agreement through direct consultations, including within the Commission referred to in Article XIII. Should such consultations fail to produce a result acceptable to both Parties within six months, they shall seek other means of peaceful dispute settlement. ARTICLE XV Without prejudice to Article XIV, the Parties shall withdraw, dismiss or otherwise settle all interstate claims, complaints, protests, objections, proceedings and disputes related to issues existing between them before the signing of this Agreement in any legal forum within one month from its entry into force, and shall not initiate such claims, complaints, protests, objections or proceedings thereafter. They shall also refrain from involvement in any way in such actions brought against the other Party by any third party. The Parties shall not take, encourage or participate in any hostile action against each other contrary to this Agreement in diplomatic, informational or other fields, and shall conduct regular consultations to this end. ARTICLE XVI This Agreement shall enter into force following the exchange of instruments notifying the completion of internal procedures in accordance with the national legislation of each Party. It shall be registered in conformity with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. ARTICLE XVII This Agreement is concluded in the Azerbaijani, Armenian and English languages, all three texts being equally authentic. In the event of a divergence in the interpretation of any provision among the authentic texts, the English text shall prevail. Context In autumn 2020, a 44-day war broke out between the armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia, known as the second Karabakh war. As a result, Azerbaijan regained control over part of Karabakh and seven adjacent districts. On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan carried out a local military operation in Karabakh. On 28 September, the president of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Samvel Shahramanyan, signed a decree dissolving the republic. On 15 October 2023, president Ilham Aliyev declared in a speech in Khankendi that Azerbaijan had fully restored its sovereignty, resolved the Karabakh issue and ended the conflict. Fourteen people are currently in custody in Azerbaijan, including former presidents of the self-proclaimed Nagorno-Karabakh Republic Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan and Arayik Harutyunyan; former foreign minister David Babayan; parliamentary speaker Davit Ishkhanyan; and generals Levon Mnatsakanyan and Davit Manukyan. Trials are under way in Baku. The peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia has not yet been signed. Azerbaijan–Armenia peace agreement text News in Azerbaijan
JAMnews
9 hours ago
- Politics
- JAMnews
‘Ilham Aliyev, how about making peace with your own citizens?' – journalist writes from prison
Fatima Movlamli's letter from prison Azerbaijani journalist Fatima Movlamli, detained as part of the Meydan TV case, wrote from prison about her reflections on the recent 'historical peace meeting' in Washington. Last December, the Khatai District Court in Baku ordered four-month pre-trial detention for several Meydan TV staff, including editor-in-chief Aynur Elgunesh (Ganbarova), Aytaj Ahmadova (Tapdyg), Khayala Aghayeva, Aysel Umudova, Natiq Javadli, freelance reporter Ramin Deko (Jabrayilzadeh) and civil society activist Ulvi Tahirov. They are charged under article 206.3.2 of the Criminal Code (smuggling committed by a group with prior agreement). This case has become known as the Meydan TV case. This year, journalists Shamshad Aghayev, Nurlan Gahramanli (Libre), Fatima Movlamli and Ulviyya Ali (Guliyeva) were also arrested on the same charge as part of the same case. Here is the full text of Fatima Movlamli's letter from prison. Journalist Fatima Movlamli | photo: Let me say from the outset that any step towards peace makes me happy. The war, used for years as a tool of pressure against both peoples, should have ended long ago – and those who said so should never have been branded 'traitors to the homeland'. On 8 August, I followed closely the ceremony attended by all three presidents, and especially the press conference. Beyond the event's content, I was curious about something else: who would speak there on behalf of the Azerbaijani media, and what question would they ask? As a journalist from a country where independent reporters are jailed on trumped-up charges, I wondered what would be at the heart of a question from someone who had the means to attend. Soon the reporter from the Report news agency took the floor – but their 'question' simply wasn't there. It seemed that, unlike other times, they hadn't been sent a pre-written text from the administration to recite and circulate, as pro-government outlets usually do. After the journalist spoke, my cellmate asked: 'What is he even talking about?' I replied: 'We're not alone – even Trump didn't understand what he said.' The most telling moment came when Ilham Aliyev intervened. Like a parent speaking for a stammering child, he took over and tried to 'translate' his aide's 'question'. But there was no question in the first place. So the best he could manage was: 'He's saying, will you visit us?' It was like falling into a pit you've dug yourself. When you jail independent journalists who speak with weight and authority, and instead hand the stage to those who need permission for every word, who angle for free apartments, titles and praise from the government – what else can you expect? Of course that journalist would stumble. And of course it had to happen at that very meeting. (I enjoy life's little ironies like that.) Did you notice how one journalist asked whether one side might back down – and got an answer from all three leaders? The curiosity and tension that question created laid bare the difference between an independent journalist and a subservient scribe. As for me, I sadly couldn't be there. First, because the road from Kurdakhani to Washington is rather long – and besides, I don't have a visa. But I can still ask my question from here: So, what about making peace with your own citizens? You and those around you plunder the nation's wealth, your police beat people, your investigators work to order, and citizens live in fear of a baton crashing down on their heads. Journalists who expose these truths are jailed as 'smugglers'. So, Aliyev – will there be peace, real peace? Fatima Movlamli Baku Pretrial Detention Centre News in Azerbaijan
JAMnews
17 hours ago
- Health
- JAMnews
South Ossetia broke its promise to raise nurses' pay
South Ossetia nurses pay rise The authorities in South Ossetia have failed to deliver on their promise to raise nurses' pay, a demand that led to a strike at the end of July. Around 100 nurses took part, addressing their demands directly to president Alan Gagloev. Nurses in South Ossetia earn half as much as hospital assistants – a gap that opened after assistants' salaries were raised by 60%, while nurses received only a 25% increase. The protest was fuelled by the fact that they had originally been promised a 40% rise. Another grievance was the acute shortage of medicines, dressings and even basic conditions for treating patients. Alan Gagloev came to meet the protesters, but the talks went nowhere. According to participants, the president, in an aggressive mood, insulted them before calling a few nurses for a private conversation and promising to resolve the pay issue within a week. That deadline has long passed, yet the problem remains. Instead, labour and social affairs minister Oleg Gagloev shifted the responsibility to Russia. He cited an agreement under which South Ossetia pledged to gradually raise public-sector salaries, including for healthcare workers, to the level in North Ossetia. But it is clear the authorities have been unable to do so. How this acknowledgment was supposed to absolve them of responsibility or help solve the problem is unclear. Anonymous sources in Tskhinvali told JAMnews that the president had involved the security services to put pressure on the nurses – prosecutors allegedly used threats and blackmail to extract 'guarantees not to destabilise the situation'. The protesters, however, found a more willing audience among MPs from the opposition United Ossetia faction. Or at least they tried to listen, until pro-government lawmakers intervened. The dispute has now deepened not only between healthcare workers and the government, but also within parliament. After pro-presidential parties complained that United Ossetia was receiving 'excess' public funds, a court froze the opposition's accounts, curbing its political activity. Toponyms, terminology, views and opinions expressed by the author are theirs alone and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of JAMnews or any employees thereof. JAMnews reserves the right to delete comments it considers to be offensive, inflammatory, threatening or otherwise unacceptable.
JAMnews
4 days ago
- Politics
- JAMnews
Could Azerbaijan join the Abraham Accords?
Azerbaijan and the Abraham Accords The diplomatic initiative known as the Abraham Accords, launched by the United States in 2020, has not yet been signed by Azerbaijan, despite its close ties with Israel. Ilham Aliyev and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 13 December 2016 | Photo: The Abraham Accords, a diplomatic initiative launched by the United States in 2020, were framed by the Trump administration as a historic peace effort. Donald Trump emphasised that the inclusion of more Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries would bring greater peace and stability to the region. One of the administration's key goals was to ease tensions in the Middle East (or Western Asia) by promoting the normalisation of relations between Israel and what it called 'moderate' Arab states. As part of the initiative, countries that join are promised access to advanced technologies and new trade opportunities. The main factor bringing the sides together is their shared perception of Iran as a common threat in the region. In this context, Trump's initiative aimed to bring Israel and Arab countries closer together through common interests — primarily countering Iran — and to reshape the regional balance of power. Although Azerbaijan is one of the few Muslim-majority countries with strong ties to Israel, it has so far stayed out of the Abraham Accords. So why does official Baku remain on the sidelines? What political and strategic considerations are behind this decision? It's these questions that Azerbaijani political analyst and head of the Atlas Research Centre, Elkhan Shahinoglu, seeks to answer. Shahinoglu breaks down why Azerbaijan hasn't joined the Abraham Accords and what's really driving that decision. Azerbaijan's position and Shahinoglu's analysis Azerbaijan has pursued an independent foreign policy for years, maintaining a strategic partnership with Israel while also keeping strong ties with the Islamic world. Its cooperation with Israel spans defence, energy, and security, but at the same time, Baku has remained an active member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and consistently backs Palestinian rights. Relations with neighbouring Iran, rooted in historical and cultural ties, also remain a priority. Within this delicate diplomatic balance, the question of joining the Abraham Accords requires careful consideration. When the accords were signed in 2020, there was speculation that Azerbaijan might be next. Reports suggested that US officials held talks with Baku at the time, but the government avoided public commitments and stayed cautious. So why this reluctance? Elkhan Shahinoglu | Photo: Teleqraf According to Elkhan Shahinoglu, Azerbaijan currently sees no practical need or political advantage in joining the accords. According to Shahinoglu, Azerbaijan already has extensive ties with Israel, so signing up to a separate agreement would be little more than a symbolic step. 'Azerbaijan has diplomatic relations with Israel. And beyond that, there are deep connections across multiple areas,' he says. 'In this context, does Azerbaijan really need the Abraham Accords?' In fact, Azerbaijan recognised Israel back in 1992, and official ties have only grown stronger since. In 2023, Baku opened an embassy in Tel Aviv. The two countries trade billions of dollars' worth of goods each year — mainly oil exports from Azerbaijan to Israel — and Baku purchases advanced weaponry from Israel for its defence sector. Senior officials from both sides regularly exchange visits. In practical terms, Azerbaijan is already benefiting from everything the Abraham Accords offer, on a bilateral basis. Shahinoglu underlines this point, arguing that with such a close partnership already in place, joining a broader framework agreement would be largely symbolic. What are the Abraham Accords? The term refers to a series of diplomatic agreements signed in 2020. On 15 September that year, at a formal ceremony in Washington, Israel signed official normalisation deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These Gulf states became the first Arab countries since Egypt and Jordan to recognise Israel and establish diplomatic ties. The name 'Abraham Accords' refers to the prophet Abraham, a shared patriarch in Judaism, Islam and Christianity, symbolising peace and common heritage. At the heart of the agreements is the establishment of official diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Israel and the signatory Muslim-majority countries, marking an end to decades of hostile rhetoric. Under the accords: Israel and the Arab signatories recognise each other and agree to open embassies; deals are signed to expand cooperation in trade, investment, tourism, aviation, security and technology; the US acts as a mediator, offering incentives such as lifting sanctions on Sudan or recognising Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara. The accords signalled a shift in the region, with some Islamic countries effectively recognising Israel and opening a new chapter in regional diplomacy. The move was widely seen as a landmark achievement. The Trump administration described it as a 'new dawn' for the Middle East (or West Asia) and framed it as a major step towards peace. Since mid-2025, the US has been pushing to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are now being floated as potential next participants. But joining is not straightforward — each country has its own political landscape and strategic interests to consider. Trump's initiative and goals US president Donald Trump, the architect of the Abraham Accords, introduced a new approach to the Middle East during his first term in office (2017–2021), breaking from traditional peace negotiation models. His son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, led the development of an economic plan called Peace to Prosperity, which was presented at an international conference in Bahrain in 2019. The plan was built on the idea that geopolitical conflicts could be eased through geo-economic incentives. In other words, even with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a stalemate, countries in the region could still normalise ties with Israel in exchange for economic benefits. Trump argued that the more countries in the Middle East (or West Asia) establish official relations with Israel, the better the chances of lasting peace in the region. He went further, calling on all Muslim-majority countries to join the initiative. In a 2025 statement, Trump declared that the Iranian nuclear threat had been eliminated and said: 'It's very important to me right now that all countries in the Middle East join the Abraham Accords.' He claimed this would be the key to lasting peace in the region. By mid-2025, Trump had renewed his push, aiming to bring more Muslim-majority states, including Saudi Arabia, into the fold. But there are also key factors making it harder for Azerbaijan to sign up. Elkhan Shahinoglu points to several geopolitical issues Baku needs to weigh carefully. The Turkey factor 'Azerbaijan's strategic ally, Turkey, isn't likely to join the Abraham Accords under current conditions,' says Shahinoglu. While Turkey has taken steps to rebuild ties with Israel — including military cooperation until the late 2000s and the restoration of diplomatic relations in 2022 — the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has stopped short of forming a deeper alliance. Since the 2023 war in Gaza, Ankara's stance towards Israel has become increasingly critical, both politically and across Turkish society. In this context, Turkey's decision to stay out of the Abraham Accords gives Azerbaijan further reason to hold back. Ankara and Baku tend to move in step on key regional issues, and Shahinoglu points out that taking part in an initiative that excludes Turkey could create a sense of imbalance. He adds that coordination between the two countries is essential in any regional framework — and when it comes to the Abraham Accords, Baku prefers to remain aligned with Ankara. The Palestinian issue and the war in Gaza Another major factor, Shahinoglu says, is the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. 'As long as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues and Israel refuses to recognise Palestinian statehood, it will be difficult for Azerbaijan to join the accords,' he explains. The 2023 war in Gaza, which killed thousands of civilians and devastated local infrastructure, sparked strong reactions around the world — including in Azerbaijan. While some in the country voiced support for Israel, many were deeply angered by the scale of the destruction. Officially, Baku condemned attacks on civilians and reaffirmed its support for resolving the Palestinian issue through a two-state solution based on UN resolutions. In this climate, forming a formal alliance with Israel — especially under US sponsorship — risks provoking domestic backlash and damaging Azerbaijan's standing in the broader Islamic world. Shahinoglu argues that Baku is right to be cautious. Taking such a step without progress on Palestinian statehood or an end to the crisis in Gaza could be widely misinterpreted and harm the country's image. Azerbaijan has also consistently emphasised Islamic solidarity — partly due to longstanding support from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation over the Khojaly tragedy. As a result, the Palestinian question remains especially sensitive, making it politically difficult for Baku to sign a new multilateral deal with Israel while the conflict remains unresolved. The Iran factor While Shahinoglu doesn't mention Iran directly, it's clear from the context that Tehran is a major geopolitical consideration for Azerbaijan. The two countries share more than 700 kilometres of border and deep historical and cultural ties. Although tensions have flared in recent years — particularly between 2021 and 2022 — Baku has tried to avoid open confrontation with Iran. At the same time, the Abraham Accords are widely seen as forming the basis for a regional bloc aimed at containing Iran. Both the US and Israel have made no secret of their intention to isolate Tehran through these agreements. Against this backdrop, any move by Azerbaijan to join the accords would almost certainly trigger a hostile response from Iran. Even now, Iranian officials and state media regularly criticise Azerbaijan's close ties with Israel, accusing Baku of cooperating with the 'Zionist regime.' If Azerbaijan were to formally sign on, tensions with Tehran could escalate sharply, with the risk of retaliation. This uneasy neighbourhood makes Iran a major factor in Baku's cautious approach. Shahinoglu also points out that while Washington is keen to bring Azerbaijan into the fold, joining simply to please the US would be a mistake — especially if the potential fallout outweighs the benefits. In this case, the costs would likely include a serious deterioration in relations with Iran and greater risks to national security. Central Asia and the Turkic world Elkhan Shahinoglu notes that Azerbaijan is not alone in its cautious stance. Other countries, such as Kazakhstan, are in a similar position. 'Astana is also taking a wait-and-see approach to the Abraham Accords,' he says. Several Turkic and Muslim-majority countries — including Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan — maintain good relations with Israel but remain wary of joining the initiative. Despite this, Washington is applying similar pressure on them, aiming to bring Central Asian republics into the fold. The broader goal is to expand the ring of containment around Iran while keeping these states within the US sphere of influence and away from Russia and China. But so far, neither Astana nor Baku is rushing in. This suggests that Turkic states are broadly aligned in their approach. As a member of the Organisation of Turkic States, Azerbaijan is aware of its geostrategic weight and prefers not to act alone. On the contrary, it has been strengthening its ties with Central Asia, seeing the region as a political bridge. If a decision is made, Shahinoglu suggests, it's likely to be a coordinated one. Israel's position Israel, for its part, is not pressuring Azerbaijan to join the Abraham Accords. As Elkhan Shahinoglu puts it, 'Tel Aviv is primarily focused on bringing in Arab countries and hasn't made any specific demands of Azerbaijan.' This is reflected in public statements by Israeli officials. In one interview, a former Israeli ambassador to Azerbaijan described the country as a strategic partner and said that there was no need for Baku to sign a multilateral agreement to prove it. Azerbaijan is already considered a close friend of Israel, and Tel Aviv sees no reason to push Baku into a move that could expose it to unnecessary risk. The current bilateral arrangement works well for both sides, and that cooperation is valued. Shahinoglu echoes this view: 'Azerbaijan and Israel don't need anything more than continued bilateral partnership.' In other words, even without joining the Abraham Accords, the relationship is already strong — and doesn't require an additional framework. At the same time, Shahinoglu suggests that Azerbaijan isn't closing the door completely. If circumstances change — for example, if there's real progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or if key allies like Turkey shift their position — Baku may reassess. In fact, it appears Azerbaijan is even trying to play a quiet role in facilitating reconciliation between Tel Aviv and Ankara, which could help lower regional tensions. For now, though, a cautious wait-and-see approach remains the most pragmatic option. Azerbaijan continues to send friendly signals to both Washington and Tel Aviv while maintaining a delicate regional balance. This strategy allows Baku to sustain its strategic partnership with Israel while preserving its credibility in the Islamic world.
