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New Statesman
09-08-2025
- Politics
- New Statesman
Israel and Benjamin Netanyahu are trapped
An Israeli army infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) leaves a cloud of dust as it moves at a position along the border with the Gaza Strip and southern Israel. Photo by Jack Guez/AFP Israel faces one of its most difficult dilemmas since the beginning of its war with Hamas. The occupation of Gaza City, announced by prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Friday (8 August) marks a major expansion of a war that has already gone on for almost two years. But it only replicates the binds that Israel has faced since this war began: waging a conflict that is existential for the Israeli nation, with no national consensus around its prosecution. After 7 October, Israel has sought to achieve two goals, each one entirely reasonable on its own. First, it has sought to eliminate Hamas in Gaza, ending its 18-year rule of the enclave. And second, it has sought to liberate the 251 Israelis abducted into Gaza on the morning of the 7 October attack. The problem all along has been that it is nearly impossible to achieve both of those ends. While some hostages have been recovered, mostly in two ceasefire deals that were effected in November 2023 and January 2025, Hamas will not give away the last ones without a guarantee that it can hold on to its weapons and some measure of political power in the Strip. This would leave it in a position to claim victory, bide its time and prepare for the next enormity in five or ten years, a shock to all that will instantly be remembered as inevitable in retrospect. On the other hand, destroying Hamas by moving forces into its last redoubt in the centre of the Gaza Strip would be a death sentence on the 20 living Israelis still held in Hamas tunnels for nearly 700 days, starved and abused by their captors. To that end Israel has pursued a series of ground offensives, wearing down and destroying Hamas battalions along the Strip's perimeter and along key corridors. Early in the war it ordered an evacuation of the northern part of the Gaza Strip and conducted a massive offensive there – and then left. After the first ceasefire, it extended its perimeter deeper into Gaza, and in May 2024 the IDF moved into Rafah and captured the strip of land where Gaza borders Egypt. Israeli forces vacated much of this land too during the second ceasefire earlier this year. After that ceasefire ended, the IDF moved even deeper into Gaza, facing off against a Hamas fighting force that was able to marshal only a small fraction of the firepower that was at its disposal in 2023 when the war began. Hamas' territorial losses this time around are greater than at any point in the war so far. The IDF holds more than 75 per cent of the Strip's land. Most of Gaza's civilian population is concentrated in the remaining 25 per cent, including in Gaza City and the camps around Deir al-Balah. With them, or below them, are the 20 Israeli hostages believed to still be among the living – and their captors. From May to July this year, officials from both sides engaged in intensive talks around the proposal of US envoy Steve Witkoff for a 60-day ceasefire. The Witkoff plan would have seen a significant withdrawal of Israeli forces and a release of ten of the 20 living hostages in exchange for over a thousand Palestinian prisoners and detainees held by Israel, including convicted terrorists, as well as a ramping up of aid provisions into Gaza. Subscribe to The New Statesman today from only £8.99 per month Subscribe Just before the deal was due to be inked in Doha on July 23, a flurry of international initiatives directed against Israel, convinced Hamas that it could get for free what it nearly paid for with ten of its captives. The deal fell apart, with the Israelis and Americans convinced that Hamas has no intention on releasing the hostages anytime soon – and even the Egyptians and Qataris quietly hinting that they have reached the same conclusion. If there is no way to liberate the hostages by negotiations, then Israel's biggest reason for forbearance outside the gates of Gaza becomes considerably less forceful, and the temptation to move in grows larger. The risks are still enormous. Any military operation in Gaza City would incur losses for Israeli forces and risk soldiers being taken hostage themselves. Forces would be moving into a dense urban environment that they either haven't operated in at all or that they vacated months ago in the previous ceasefire. Either way, booby traps and mines are a guaranteed danger. It's impossible to assess what the capabilities of the IDF to operate in such an environment are, especially after nearly two years of nonstop combat, though there are reasons for concern. It is even more difficult to assess what the defensive capacities of Hamas are after two years of attrition. This was equally true on the other fronts where Israel fought. Anyone could have pontificated in advance about the wisdom of an Israeli strike on Iran or on Hezbollah, but without clear intelligence about the degraded state of Iran's anti-aircraft capabilities or prior knowledge of the Israeli beeper operation in Lebanon, it would have been impossible to make a coherent cost-benefit analysis of Israel's decision to launch an offensive. There was one big difference, however, between Israel's military operations in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen on the one hand and its war in Gaza on the other. Israel could nowhere afford embarking on a military adventure where it might lose or where its soldiers or civilians would be killed in numbers so high as to render any gains wasted. But in Iran and Lebanon and Yemen and Syria, Israel could make do with efforts that brought about significant strategic gains and call it day. In Gaza, this option simply doesn't exist. Anything that leaves Hamas in power will be a victory for Hamas and a vindication for its gamble that the invasion and killing spree of 7 October would benefit the Palestinian cause. An end to the war that not only leaves Hamas in power but leaves it still holding some of the Israelis it took hostage that Saturday morning nearly two years ago would be a double victory. This would seem to indicate a straightforward path for Israel, even in light of international opposition. If after 22 months of attrition in Gaza, and after campaigns and operations elsewhere in the Middle East have shattered the regional axis that Hamas might have needed as a deterrent reserve, Israel can actually carry its campaign into Hamas's lair in the Gaza Strip's centre and bring about the comprehensive defeat of the militia that initiated this war at a bearable cost to itself, then it should. That at least, would be the obvious strategic consideration. But, of course, there are more than strategic considerations at stake here. There is also a domestic political consideration. In fact, there are two. But they are so different from each other in their claims, their goals, their methods, their moral valence and their electoral impacts that it can be hard to make sense of them. First is the dependence of Netanyahu on far-right coalition partners who are committed to Israel's West Bank settler movement. For them, 7 October was both a tragedy and an opportunity. For 20 years, they have nursed the bitter pain of Israel's 'disengagement' from Gaza, when Israel withdrew all its armed forces and dismantled all 21 settlements inside the Gaza Strip. Settler leaders fantasise about restoring Jewish settlement to the Strip and, more importantly, definitively winning the argument against any future withdrawals in the West Bank. In normal coalition politics, a prime minister has to take into account the priorities of his more extreme flank, but can always play them off the demands of potential partners from the centre. Netanyahu is no normal prime minister, however. His criminal indictments have meant that centrist parties have effectively boycotted him (except conditionally in two emergency situations), meaning that the far right, despite holding only about 10 per cent of the seats in Parliament, can exercise a veto on policy. This isn't just a rhetorical burden, though it is that too. Each time a middling MP from a far-right faction makes an inflammatory statement about the Gaza war or the push to resettle Israelis in the Strip, it becomes a propaganda victory for Israel's enemies. But the problem is more than rhetorical. The government has refused in the last 22 months to formulate any plan for governing Gaza after the war, rendering even impressive military achievements hollow. It hasn't refused to do so because it is lazy. It has refused to do so because any credible plan for post-war Gaza that doesn't involve Hamas will necessarily prefigure a post-war plan for the West Bank as well, and this is something the radical settler movement cannot tolerate. With no alternative partners to replace the far right in his coalition, and no credible threat to them to find a replacement if they don't grant him some space on the issue they care about most, Netanyahu can't risk alienating them. Then there is the issue of the hostages. Entrenching the settlement enterprise doesn't inspire any overriding moral commitments outside the religious right, but securing the release of the hostages is a paramount moral imperative as far as nearly all Israelis are concerned. Israelis struggle to make sense of the comparative indifference of Western governments to the fate of hostages taken by ISIS in the previous decade. The ransom demands ISIS made were much less onerous than those that Hamas has sought impose on Israel, but Western and allied governments only rarely gave in, and their hostages were gruesomely tortured in captivity and beheaded or immolated on camera. But the sociological profile of the hostages couldn't be further from the current coalition's electoral base. The men and women and children abducted on 7 October and their families look nothing like this government's supporters. People taken from their homes after watching their family members murdered were overwhelmingly kidnapped on a kibbutz, where voting preferences lean heavily to the left. Not many religious conservatives were to be found at an outdoor rave on a Saturday morning, not just because of the music or the drugs, but because an observant Jew wouldn't be out on shabbat. And soldiers can have all sorts of political leanings, but Netanyahu's cabinet comprises a large number of religious ministers who avoided the draft for religious reasons and seek to entrench in legislation draft exemptions for the growing ultra-Orthodox minority. This is the opposite kind of political problem which Netanyahu's dependence on the far-right settlers presents. He can't openly place any military needs above the release of the hostages because he has no moral authority to do so. Not just because they do not come from his public or his political partners' publics, but because he spent the months leading up to the massacre in 2023 pursuing a constitutional reform that alienated the liberal Israeli public from him to an extreme degree. And because the very failure to protect those who were taken hostage and the failure to recover them so far stand as the ultimate symbols of his overall failures on 7 October. And just as his bargaining position with his coalition partners is weakened because they know he has nowhere else to go, so too is his bargaining position with Hamas over a hostage release weakened because they know that he can't take Israel into an offensive that could see the hostages sacrificed without tearing Israeli society apart. This then is the dilemma Israel faces as it stands outside the gates of Gaza preparing to move in for a final offensive. The dilemma could be attenuated somewhat if international actors applied pressure on Hamas and on the states which support and protect it, not least Turkey and Qatar, to release the hostages. But at present they seem more inclined to indulge inflamed publics at home and take actions which only harden Hamas' position. And it could be attenuated somewhat if Israel's government made some minimal steps to achieve a consensus at home before taking any broad action, especially one that could put hostages and soldiers at risk. But the domestic political machinations of the past week, with the government seeking to oust an attorney general leading investigations into its own corruption and its parliamentary faction ousting a committee chair who had blocked legislation to protect ultra-Orthodox draft deferments, only achieved the opposite. In the meantime, the Israeli cabinet has approved the new offensive into Gaza. It will take some time before such an operation gets underway. Only a comprehensive deal that sees the release of all Israeli hostages can stop it before it starts. [See also: Israel's calculus on Syria] Related
Miami Herald
12-05-2025
- Politics
- Miami Herald
Russia loses $4 million worth of tanks, IFVs in Ukraine strike
Russian military equipment worth millions of dollars was destroyed in a Ukrainian drone strike, according to Kyiv. Ukraine's defense ministry said on Monday that Kyiv's forces had targeted a hangar in an unspecified area of Ukraine and posted a video it said was of the strike. Newsweek has contacted the Russian Defense Ministry for comment. Ukraine continues to use domestically-produced drones on the battlefield, and the latest reported strike on a Russia target comes as Moscow continues to lose high amounts of equipment and troops. Ukraine's defense ministry said its 225th Assault Regiment had managed to track down a Russian tank hiding in a hangar thanks to aerial reconnaissance. The post said that the troops had destroyed the site containing Russian armored equipment worth $4 million, with a T-72 tank and a BMD-2 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) among the targets. Drone footage appears to show the targets being hit and the aftermath of the strikes.. Newsweek has been unable to independently verify the footage. 'A Ukrainian kamikaze drone hit the tank which was finished off by another drone,' said Ukrainian news outlet Defense Express. As of Monday, Russian forces had lost 1,710 T-72 tanks of various types over the course of the war, according to the website Oryx, which uses video and stills to tally losses. It comes as Ukraine made advances in the Toretsk direction in the Donetsk region on Sunday, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), while Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Chasiv Yar direction. Ivan Petrychak, spokesperson for Ukraine's 24th Separate Mechanized Brigade said that Russian forces trying to take Chasiv Yar, a strategic location, have been bolstered by the elite FSB Presidential Regiment, according to Suspilne media. Meanwhile, Ukraine's Air Force said Monday Russia had launched dozens of drone attacks across Ukraine overnight despite a proposal for a 30-day ceasefire starting Monday made by Kyiv. Ukraine defense ministry: 'Ukrainian warriors destroyed a hangar with russian armored equipment worth $4 million. Among the burned targets—a T-72 tank and a BMD-2 IFV.' Putin called for direct peace talks to be held on Thursday in Istanbul and Zelensky has said he would be in the Turkish city. This adds to anticipation over the prospect of direct talks between Vladimir Putin and Volodymr Zelensky, which have been backed by President Donald Trump. 2025 NEWSWEEK DIGITAL LLC.
Yahoo
20-03-2025
- Automotive
- Yahoo
Curtiss-Wright Awarded Contracts by Rheinmetall to Provide Turret Drive Stabilization Systems for Boxer Heavy Weapon Carriers and Lynx Infantry Fighting Vehicles
DAVIDSON, N.C., March 20, 2025--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Curtiss-Wright Corporation (NYSE: CW) today announced that it has been awarded multiple contracts to provide its turret drive aiming and stabilization technology to Rheinmetall for use on the German Army's Boxer Heavy Weapon Carrier and the Hungarian Ministry of Defence (MoD's) Lynx infantry fighting vehicles (IFV). Under the agreements, Curtiss-Wright will supply Rheinmetall's Vehicle Systems Europe and Vehicle Systems International divisions with its cost-effective, scalable Turret Drive Stabilization System (TDSS) and other system components in support of these programs. Curtiss-Wright's TDSS will enable these ground vehicles to maintain target location accuracy and precise turret stabilization, even while moving at full speed. Further, it uniquely enables system designers to upgrade and add stabilization functionality as mission requirements change, allowing system integrators to choose the right level of motion control and stability for the platform. "We are proud to have been selected by Rheinmetall to provide our turret drive stabilization solution supporting the German Army's Heavy Weapon Carrier and the Hungarian Defence Forces' Zrínyi 2026 military modernization and rearmament program," said Lynn M. Bamford, Chair and Chief Executive Officer of Curtiss-Wright Corporation. "These contracts demonstrate the growing demand for our turret drive aiming and stabilization technology in support of vital European combat vehicles. In addition, these awards highlight our strong opportunity to grow Curtiss-Wright's international defense revenues, given the targeted increases in NATO spending and a global rising threat environment." Curtiss-Wright's facility, located in Neuhausen am Rheinfall, Switzerland, will provide Rheinmetall with state-of-the-art modular TDSS, associated hand controllers, and equipment to control the medium caliber LANCE turret on the Boxer Heavy Weapon Carrier to be supplied to the German Army. Shipments are scheduled to run through 2029. Curtiss-Wright will also deliver its state-of-the-art TDSS and associated controllers to Rheinmetall for use on the Hungarian MoD's Lynx IFV. During Phase 1 of the contract, Curtiss-Wright will deliver TDSS systems solely manufactured in Switzerland. During Phase 2, additional TDSS systems will be manufactured in Switzerland and Australia. In support of both phases, Curtiss-Wright will leverage its global partner network for the manufacture of the TDSS system gyroscopes, building on the preferred supplier network that the Company has established to support Rheinmetall ground vehicle programs globally. Under the contract, shipments are scheduled to run through 2027. To learn more about Curtiss-Wright's turret drive stabilization system solutions, please click here. For additional information, please visit and LinkedIn. About Curtiss-Wright Corporation Curtiss-Wright Corporation (NYSE: CW) is a global integrated business that provides highly engineered products, solutions and services mainly to Aerospace & Defense markets, as well as critical technologies in demanding Commercial Power, Process and Industrial markets. We leverage a workforce of approximately 8,800 highly skilled employees who develop, design and build what we believe are the best engineered solutions to the markets we serve. Building on the heritage of Glenn Curtiss and the Wright brothers, Curtiss-Wright has a long tradition of providing innovative solutions through trusted customer relationships. For more information, visit Note: Trademarks are property of their respective owners. This press release contains forward-looking statements made pursuant to the Safe Harbor provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Such statements, including statements relating to Curtiss-Wright's expectations of a continued relationship with an existing customer, the continued funding and success of these ground vehicle programs, and the performance of its products in these programs, are not considered historical facts and are considered forward-looking statements under the federal securities laws. Such forward-looking statements are subject to certain risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied. Readers are cautioned not to place undue reliance on these forward-looking statements, which speak only as of the date hereof. Such risks and uncertainties include, but are not limited to: a reduction in anticipated orders; an economic downturn; changes in competitive marketplace and/or customer requirements; a change in US and Foreign government spending; an inability to perform customer contracts at anticipated cost levels; and other factors that generally affect the business of aerospace, defense contracting, marine, electronics and industrial companies. Please refer to the Company's current SEC filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, for further information. View source version on Contacts Investors: Jim Ryan(704)
Yahoo
31-01-2025
- Automotive
- Yahoo
XM-30: US Army's biggest combat overhaul in a century is finally rolling
The US Army is moving forward with the development of the XM-30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle. This ambitious project aims to create an advanced platform that will significantly enhance operational capabilities on the battlefield. This development comes after two aborted programs that sought to replace the aging M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV), which has been in service since 1981. Previously referred to as the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV), the XM-30 is currently in its detailed design phase, expecting to reach Milestone B by the second quarter of fiscal year 2025. The XM-30 is positioned as a next-generation military platform capable of operating with either a full crew or autonomously, depending on mission requirements. Designed to engage in close combat while delivering decisive lethality, the XM-30 will feature a modular open system architecture. This design will allow quicker updates and adaptations as technologies evolve, positioning the Army to maintain a strategic edge over adversaries. According to a recent report by the Congressional Research Service, the XM-30 is being developed as the Army's first ground combat vehicle, leveraging advanced digital engineering tools and techniques. This innovation aims to ensure that the Army can rapidly respond to the evolving nature of modern warfare and threats. The XM-30 project faces a challenging history of canceled programs to replace the M2 Bradley. Two significant initiatives—the Future Combat System (FCS) and the Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV)—were shelved due to budget overruns and program management issues. The Bradley has undergone numerous updates since its introduction. Still, it has reached its technological limits, making the need for a new platform more urgent than ever. The M2 Bradley was designed to transport infantry, provide fire support, and engage enemy vehicles on the battlefield. However, evolving warfare demands have highlighted the need for a more modern solution. The Army is committed to addressing these challenges with the XM-30, emphasizing that this new vehicle will ensure troops are better equipped to engage with near-peer adversaries. The XM-30 project is classified as a Middle Tier Acquisition Rapid Prototyping (MTA-RP) program, reflecting the Army's shift towards more agile and responsive procurement methodologies. Designed to adopt a Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA), the XM-30 aims to facilitate rapid upgrades and integrations as technology and operational needs evolve. This open standard approach encourages innovation and enhances competition among contractors, potentially leading to better solutions at lower costs. The Army has developed a five-phase acquisition strategy to streamline the process of bringing new capabilities to the field. The first phase focuses on Market Research and Requirement Development. This phase is critical for understanding the needs and expectations of the end users and ensuring that the resulting products are aligned with operational requirements. Following this, the strategy moves into the Concept Design Phase. During this phase, modeling, simulation, and analysis refine the initial requirements. This helps to explore various design alternatives and assess their feasibility, setting the foundation for a robust project. The third phase, the Detailed Design Phase, culminates in a Critical Design Review (CDR). This review is an important milestone that evaluates the detailed designs against the established requirements, ensuring that all necessary specifications are met before moving forward. Next, the process enters the Prototype Build and Test Phase. In this phase, prototypes are constructed, and their performance is rigorously assessed through a Limited User Test (LUT). This testing phase is essential for identifying potential issues and validating the design before production. Finally, the strategy concludes with the Production and Fielding Phase. This phase results in a Low-Rate Initial Production (LRIP) contract, enabling the transition from prototype to production while ensuring that the capabilities developed meet the necessary field deployment standards. On July 23, 2021, the Army awarded five firm-fixed-price contracts for the XM-30's Concept Design Phase to contractors, including industry leaders like BAE Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems, totaling approximately $299.4 million. Currently, the XM-30 is in its detailed design phase as it progresses toward Milestone B. However, there are pressing concerns that could impact the program's timeline. The necessity for robust testing and evaluation, coupled with the inherent complexities of integrating advanced technologies, presents significant hurdles. Moreover, the Pentagon is under increasing scrutiny regarding budget constraints and program management after previous setbacks in defense modernization efforts. As the Army moves forward with the XM-30, it faces the dual challenge of fulfilling operational requirements while maintaining fiscal responsibility. Stakeholders are monitoring the progress closely, as this new vehicle represents a replacement for the M2 Bradley and a pivotal development in the Army's future combat readiness. The successful realization of the XM-30 could redefine the US Army's ground combat capabilities in the face of contemporary threats and rival forces.
Yahoo
31-01-2025
- Yahoo
Ukrainian troops take out Russian assault group at business premises in Toretsk
Ukrainian troops destroyed a Russian assault group in Toretsk that broke into the territory of one of the city's businesses and stayed in the building. Source: 100th Mechanised Brigade; Khortytskyi Viter, official Telegram channel of Khortytsia Operational Strategic Group Quote: "A group of occupiers broke into the territory of one of the businesses in Toretsk and set up camp in the buildings. An armoured group consisting of a tank crew, an M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) crew and a mopping-up group of fighters from the Rapid Operational Response Unit of the National Police of Ukraine (assisted by a Senator MRAP armoured vehicle) had to deal with the Russian invaders. Together, the task was completed quickly and efficiently. The group of occupants was taken out." Support UP or become our patron!
