‘Indian Missiles Can Wipe Out Our Airbases': Pakistan Journalist Exposes Islamabad's Hollow Claims On Operation Sindoor
Najam Sethi, a veteran journalist and political commentator, made the remarks on Samaa TV. He said the truth lies in Pakistan's lack of missile defence.
'As of now, you don't have any S-400-type missile defence system, no Iron Dome, there is nothing to protect yourself against Indian missiles. India has demonstrated that the missile technology and missile accuracy they possess is capable of targeting both your airbases and your so-called offices of freedom fighters. So, your biggest problem is that if they launch missiles on your airbases, where your planes are parked, then there can be a lot of damage,' he said.
Hard TRUTHS of #OperationSindoor - Former Punjab CM & Journo Ruins Munir's Pakistan Party India had a field (Marshal) day!
Najam Sethi rips apart Pakistan's flaws in terms of India's precision missile strikes & its capabilities of striking with little or no defence system to… pic.twitter.com/SM7VkZY9Nf — RT_India (@RT_India_news) August 18, 2025
His comments directly challenge Islamabad's official line. The government had claimed that Operation Sindoor was largely symbolic. Propaganda outlets dismissed the Indian strikes as ineffective. Sethi's words revealed otherwise. He confirmed that Indian forces, during their May 7-10 strikes, hit planes parked inside Pakistani airbases with precision.
The admission cuts to the core of Pakistan's defence posture. India's strikes proved that its missiles can hit critical airbases, aircraft hangars and command facilities at will. Pakistan has no operational system to protect its jets or secure its strategic installations.
The narrative from Islamabad began to crumble further once independent evidence emerged. High-resolution satellite imagery from global firms and defence analysts confirmed widespread destruction. The images displayed direct hits on runways, visible craters on tarmac and wrecked hangars. Storage facilities and adjoining compounds associated with terror groups were seen flattened.
The visual proof backed India's official statements. The satellite data showed the reach and accuracy of the Indian strikes. The damage included military-linked facilities in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir as well as terror safe havens inside Pakistan.
The impact of Operation Sindoor has now been validated from two directions. First, through international satellite confirmation. Second, through the candid words of Pakistan's own senior journalist. The combination has left Islamabad with little space to defend its earlier claims.
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