Trump says US to 'substantially' raise trade tariffs on India
Trump has set a Friday deadline for Russia to agree to a ceasefire with Ukraine.
Trump said in a social media post on Monday that India is buying massive amounts of Russian oil and selling much of it on the open market "for big profits."
He wrote, "They don't care how many people in Ukraine are being killed by the Russian War Machine."
India rejected the charges, calling them "unjustified and unreasonable."
A statement by India's external affairs ministry said the imports are "a necessity" to ensure predicable and affordable energy to the Indian consumer.
"India will take all necessary measures to safeguard its national interests and economic security," the statement added.
Indian government figures show imports of Russian oil have significantly increased. They made up about 2 percent of the country's supply before the invasion of Ukraine, but now account for more than 30 percent.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
The Diplomat
7 minutes ago
- The Diplomat
As Trump Lifts Sanctions on Myanmar Elites, Is the US Eyeing Rare Earth Reserves?
As Myanmar's military pushes forward with its plan to consolidate power through sham elections, the Trump administration may be looking to bring the junta in from the cold. The military junta that overthrew Myanmar's democratically elected government in 2021 is preparing the ground for national elections in December and January. The junta's hope is these deeply flawed elections would consolidate its power and provide it with a fig leaf of legitimacy. Helping its cause are moves by the Trump administration indicating it may be looking to bring the Myanmar junta in from the cold. A week ago, U.S. President Donald Trump removed sanctions on some allies of Myanmar's generals and their military-linked companies, a move condemned by the United Nations special rapporteur on human rights in Myanmar. Then came reports the Trump administration was exploring opportunities to access Myanmar's rare earth minerals in an effort to sideline its strategic rival, China. On July 31, Myanmar's military regime canceled the nationwide state of emergency it had kept in place since the coup, a necessary precondition for holding elections under the military-authored constitution of 2008. Hours later, however, it reimposed a state of emergency in dozens of townships where opposition forces are either in control or gaining ground. It then declared martial law in these areas. This underlined the junta's lack of control over much of the country, which would make holding a free and fair election virtually impossible. Last year, the military was unable to conduct a full census to be used to compile voter rolls. It was only able to count 32 million people in just over half the country's townships; it had to estimate another 19 million people in areas outside its control. The July 31 order also handed power from the commander-in-chief of the military to a head of state, which was presented as a return to civilian governance. However, power didn't actually change hands – Min Aung Hlaing, the leader of the coup and military, remains in control as acting president. Opposition groups have said they will boycott the election, which the U.N. special rapporteur for Myanmar called a 'fraud.' Myanmar's generals may try to use Trump's apparent interest in the country's rare earths as leverage in their attempt to normalize relations with the United States ahead of a poll. Rare earths have emerged as a critical source of leverage for Beijing in the China-U.S. trade war. China is not only a large miner of rare earths; it dominates the processing required to use them, accounting for around 90 percent of global refining. In recent years, China has begun reducing its own mining and increasing its extractions from neighboring Myanmar, the third-largest producer in the world. Since the coup, rare earth mining has exploded in northern Kachin State, much of which is controlled by the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), an ethnic armed group that opposes the junta. Late last year, the KIO seized two important rare earth mining towns from the military and demanded a greater role in taxing exports to China. Beijing initially closed the border in response. However, trade soon resumed after the two sides reached a deal on export taxes. Two different proposals have reportedly been put to Trump for ways to access Myanmar's rare earth deposits. One would entail opening talks with the junta; the other talking directly with the KIO. Part of this effort could entail Trump reducing the punitive 40 percent tariffs his administration imposed on Myanmar to sweeten the deal. Yet, challenges remain to making this a reality. The mines are located in the contested war-torn mountains of northern Myanmar bordering China, which are controlled by the KIO. There is no real infrastructure capable of transporting exports to India's remote northeastern states. The only other export route is south through territory controlled by the junta or other ethnic armed groups. In addition, any attempt by the United States and its allies to extract thousands of tons of rare earth material away from China's borders would likely anger Beijing. It could pressure the KIO by reducing fuel and food imports coming from China. The group's independence and ability to fight the junta relies on trade with China. It would not take long for such an agreement to fall apart. Finally, rare earths mining is extremely polluting and dangerous. Even under Trump, it is unlikely U.S. companies would gamble on the inevitable reputational and legal risks that would accompany such a project, especially in a war zone. In essence, any attempt by the Trump administration to secure rare earths from Myanmar through any intermediary will not go anywhere. There is therefore no justification, on any grounds, for the Trump administration to reduce sanctions on Myanmar's generals or their cronies. Likewise, although the junta is attempting to legitimize its brutal rule by offering a patina of constitutional processes, its elections will not bring real change to the country. Myanmar's people have repeatedly demonstrated over the past four decades, in every remotely free and fair election, that they do not want the military involved in the governance on their country. If the junta does go ahead with this election, the world's governments should call it out for the farcical charade of democracy it will represent. This includes the administration in Washington. This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
The Diplomat
an hour ago
- The Diplomat
The Strategic Ripples of China's Mega-Dam for Bangladesh
When Chinese Premier Li Qiang broke ground on the world's most ambitious dam – the Medog Hydropower Station on the Yarlung Tsangpo River in Tibet – global headlines fixated on its scale and scope. With a projected cost of $167 billion and an expected capacity triple that of the Three Gorges Dam, the project is a technological marvel. But it's also a geopolitical flashpoint. As the Yarlung Tsangpo becomes the Brahmaputra in India and the Jamuna in Bangladesh, control over its headwaters bestows tremendous leverage. The Medog dam is thus a bellwether for future negotiations on water-sharing – and a potential harbinger of regional water insecurity. For Bangladesh, far downstream yet acutely affected, the stakes are existential. The project raises serious questions regarding water security, riverine ecology, and diplomatic leverage – especially in the context of Bangladesh's long-stalled water-sharing deal with India over the Teesta River. As Dhaka cautiously monitors China's plans, the broader implications for regional water agreements, particularly Bangladesh-India negotiations, are beginning to crystallize. China maintains that the Medog project will be a 'run-of-the-river' project that neither diverts nor withdraws water, but Bangladesh remains cautious. In January 2025, during a bilateral meeting in Beijing, Dhaka voiced concern about the dam and formally requested detailed technical information. In response, Chinese officials and diplomats have reached out to assure Dhaka that its hydropower project is intended solely for electricity generation and will not affect the flow of water to downstream countries. Six months later, Bangladesh now appears to have accepted Beijing's verbal assurances and explanation, with Foreign Adviser Touhid Hossain stating that Bangladesh currently sees no 'reason for concern.' The rationale behind Bangladesh's shift in stance was reflected in Hossain's remarks: 'We cannot stop it… We have to see that we are not harmed.' The realist tone of this statement reflects Bangladesh's limited leverage in this geopolitical equation. Nevertheless, Dhaka insists on transparency and access to hydrological data as a baseline requirement for trust-building. The situation is further complicated by India's position. Since the river flows through Indian territory before reaching Bangladesh, India is also closely monitoring China's activities. Hossain confirmed that India has 'interests here' and is 'looking into the matter.' This triangulation of interests brings to light the fragile web of interdependencies in the region's river systems and complicates existing bilateral dynamics. The concern lies not just in what is being built but how. Water, traditionally a source of life, increasingly resembles a strategic tool – even a 'weapon' – in South Asia. Arunachal Pradesh Chief Minister Pema Khandu likened the Medog dam to a 'water bomb' that poses an existential threat to tribal populations and riverine ecosystems. A 2020 report by the Lowy Institute even argued that China's control over Tibetan rivers gives it a 'chokehold on India's economy.' In 2024, Chinese authorities arrested hundreds of Tibetans protesting hydropower development, reinforcing concerns over top-down, opaque decision-making. In Bangladesh, Malik Fida Khan, the executive director of the Center for Environmental and Geographic Information Services, warned that 70 percent of the dry-season flow in the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna river basin comes via the Brahmaputra. If upstream interventions destabilize this flow, Bangladesh's already climate-stressed water security could collapse. Sharif Jamil of Riverkeeper Bangladesh called China's plan for the Medog project 'unilateral and geographically sensitive,' emphasizing that without transparent consultation, Bangladesh risks compounded ecological, hydrological, and socio-economic shocks. The project has added urgency and a new layer of complexity to the India-Bangladesh Teesta River water-sharing negotiations. For over a decade, Dhaka has awaited New Delhi's approval of a long-pending agreement to ensure equitable distribution of Teesta waters. However, domestic political opposition in India – particularly from the state of West Bengal – has delayed the deal. Now, with China entering the regional hydrological calculus, Bangladesh might find both risks and opportunities. On one hand, the growing strategic importance of transboundary rivers may compel India to be more forthcoming in its negotiations with Bangladesh, lest Dhaka turn increasingly toward Beijing for cooperation on water issues. On the other hand, India's own security and ecological concerns vis-à-vis China may lead it to further entrench its positions on all water-sharing matters, including the Teesta River. From a broader perspective, the situation presents an opportunity for Dhaka to push for a more institutionalized, basin-wide approach to water governance involving all five riparian states: China, India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Experts like Sharif Jamil argued that Bangladesh should ratify the 1997 U.N. Watercourses Convention and spearhead a joint framework to manage the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna basin as a whole. This multilateral vision offers two-fold benefits: it would build a norms-based framework for regional water governance and shield Bangladesh from being caught in a Sino-Indian tug-of-war. In an era where rivers are becoming instruments of diplomacy and conflict alike, Dhaka must flow with the current but steer its own course. Bangladesh faces considerable obstacles in navigating this complex hydro-political landscape. Its draft Teesta agreement with India, proposed in 2011, still faces resistance from the West Bengal government, highlighting the challenge of balancing federal-state interests even within bilateral frameworks. China's increasing footprint in the Teesta Master Plan also positions Bangladesh delicately between two powerful neighbors. This necessitates technical foresight and diplomatic agility to prevent backlash from New Delhi while ensuring cooperation from Beijing.
Japan Today
an hour ago
- Japan Today
Japan's offer to take in foreign students from U.S. universities faces major stumbling blocks
The administration of President Donald Trump has been cracking down on the issuance of student visas to U.S. institutes of higher learning. It has been particularly keen on refusing entry to those supporting the Palestinian cause or who engage in acts of antisemitism. In addition, those with links to the communist party of China have come under greater scrutiny. Writing in Shukan Post (Aug 8), business consultant Kenichi Ohmae observes that major national universities in Japan, including the University of Tokyo, Kyoto University, Osaka University and other institutions have announced temporary provisions for taking in such students. According to the Ministry of Education, as of June 5, some 90 universities in Japan have decided to fast-track the students' admission as well as offer them scholarships and other forms of support. A survey of foreign students found that as of May 1, 2024, Japan had 336,708 students from abroad, a year-over-year increase of 57,434. Broken down by nationality, China led the list with 123,458 students, followed by Nepal (64,816), and Vietnam (40,323). More students have also been coming from other Asian countries, including Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia and others. Nevertheless among these numbers not very many could be regarded as "outstanding students." "There are a number of factors for this," writes Ohmae, "but the greatest barrier to matriculating at Japanese institutions is that they do not provide instruction in English, the global language. And acquiring the Japanese language is extremely difficult for foreigners." If the University of Tokyo is to accept students from the U.S., Ohmae doubts that top-level students and researchers (other than Japanese nationals) will take up Japan on its offer to study here. "Most of the students that Trump has forced out of the U.S. are likely to transfer to other English-speaking countries such as the UK, Australia and Canada." he writes. "Other candidates will be universities in the European Union, Singapore, Hong Kong and elsewhere." Singapore is a small country with a high standard of living, but living costs there represent a high hurdle. Hong Kong on the other hand has become a "control society" dominated by China, with heavier restrictions on academic freedom, discouraging applicants. In a nutshell, Japan's greatest handicap is its communications ability. "Once when I was involved in negotiating a merger involving an Indian IT company, I was told by many Indian technicians, 'Sorry, but I don't want to work in Japan,' their reason being the poor English environment and high Japanese language barrier," Ohmae relates. The language problem also works in reverse. In a recent survey of 400 male and female Japanese members of Gen Z (the 19-to-25 year age group) conducted by the Japan Tourism Agency, nearly 60% of respondents stated they had no desire to travel abroad. One of the reasons given for their lack of interest was their inability to speak English. In Ohmae's view, until we move so far as to "teach in English" -- rather than just "teaching English" -- no cure for Japanese people's complex over English will be forthcoming. However, money is not the problem. The government has allocated ample funds to fix the situation. With the aim of becoming a "excellent internationalized research university," Tohoku University announced it would devote 30 billion yen over the next five years, with plans to attract 500 high-paid researchers. But it's not a matter of funding, says Ohmae. As long as the right environment for English is not created, top-notch human resources will not come to Japan. If Japan doesn't change its policy toward English and treat familiarity of English as a natural component of education -- perhaps through adoption of a system similar to Malaysia's, in which from primary school to university Japanese would be the language of instruction for the humanities, and English the language of instruction for math and science -- even efforts to attract outstanding human resources will fail. © Japan Today
