Debate opens door for farmers to stop ‘Kill the Boer' song
The singing of 'Kill the Boer' and farm murders are now on the world stage, say Afrikaner lobbyists, who warn the ANC government to stop denialism and rebuild trust.
President Cyril Ramaphosa and US President Donald Trump will put a stop to the singing of Kill the Boer, Kill the Farmer.
Ramaphosa and his ANC-led government now face a serious choice, said AfriForum CEO Kallie Kriel.
'They can either continue to deny SA's pressing problems – which will have negative implications for the country – or they can try to lead the country out of this crisis by, among other things, acknowledging and helping to resolve the human rights violations to which Afrikaners and other minorities are subjected.'
'Where to now'
Southern African Agri Initiative (Saai) director Theo de Jager said the question shouldn't be who won the debate but, rather, what now and where to now?
'What was clear from the debate was no matter what the Human Rights Commission of South Africa says about it, no matter what the judges in the Constitutional Court say about it, for the rest of the world and, especially for the West, it was not okay to sing Kill the Boer. It is not okay for our government to overlook it. There should be consequences,' he said.
ALSO READ: AfriForum's bid to have 'Kill the boer' declared hate speech fails at ConCourt
Taking the fight to global platforms
'The doors of justice have been closed to our case against singing this song, but we've learned from this debate that the opportunity is still there to take it to the international platforms.
'We will stop the singing, whether it is in United Nations or the International Court of Justice. We can stop this thing on an international level, because the world now has its attention on this issue,' he said.
De Jager said there was no use in saying farm murders were only a small portion of the murders in SA, or that more women, children and gangsters were murdered annually.
'The fact is the farmers are less than 0.1% of the population and if you look at the proportionality of it and the number of farm murders per thousand farmers, it is by far the highest,' he said.
Threat to 'survival of Afrikaans'
Kriel said the introduction of the Basic Education Laws Amendment Act and the Expropriation Act, as well as the application of a range of racially based regulations, contribute to the alienation of Afrikaners and other minority communities in the country.
'The ANC-led government's act of aggression against Afrikaans people by threatening the survival of Afrikaans schools and, consequently, that of Afrikaans cultural communities has caused a serious breach of trust.
'This breach of trust has been exacerbated by the publication of draconian racial regulations that enforce strict racial quotas in the workplace and economy, the denial of human rights violations, as seen in farm murders, and legislation that allows for expropriation without compensation,' he said.
Kriel warned that the persistent attempts by ANC leaders and their allies to falsely dismiss concerns about the country's problems as the result of misinformation will fail.
NOW READ: Will Trump go after Malema and Zuma? IRR says 'Kill the Boer' chant created problems for SA
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