PM Modi To Meet Argentina President Milei For Bilateral Talks
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New Indian Express
22 minutes ago
- New Indian Express
BRICS Summit: Focus on India-Brazil strategic partnership for a multipolar world
With the arrival of Prime Minister Modi in Rio de Janeiro to take part in the 2025 BRICS Summit & Brasilia for a bilateral State visit, a first by an Indian PM in nearly six decades, the gaze is now on the India-Brazil Strategic Partnership. Far too long viewed essentially as South-South solidarity or symbolic multilateralism, this axis of rising power has in recent years achieved bolder geopolitical recognition. While India enhances its international footprint and Brazil restores its regional leadership, the convergences between the two democracies are no longer rhetorical; they increasingly become strategic driven by the shared vision of an equitable multipolar world order. In the midst of an expanded BRICS and rising challenges to the international system, Brazil has proved an invaluable interlocutor of India in the BRICS and the UN and in voicing the hopes and ambitions of the Global South. Brazil today matters to India not only as the largest economy of Latin America but also as a like-minded democratic country with whom India wishes to 'co-write' the rules of international governance. This convergence has been reflected also in the growing frequency and intensity of high-level interaction between the two countries. President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Prime Minister Modi have also been spotted several times since Lula's 2023 re-election as the two leaders have committed to upgrading the Strategic Partnership to the next level. But the current era of geopolitics gives special meaning to their convergence. The Rio BRICS Summit, its first since the grouping expanded in 2024, occurs against the backdrop of a fracturing international order where the return of multilateralism is increasingly questioned. Western institutions increasingly appear self-absorbed and the global South is speaking out more vocally than before. In this fluid world, India and Brazil offer the world a development-focused and democratic alternative. Their collaboration in BRICS seeks to turn the grouping into more than the symbol of rising power solidarity that it is today. India and Brazil aim to make it the forum for offering tangible deliverables for the Global South in the form of alternate sources of finance like the New Development Bank or new models of trade, digital connectivity, and climate finance. Indeed, the current Brazilian presidency of BRICS this year and the upcoming Indian chairmanship in 2026 is a rare diplomatic relay. Under Lula's administration, Brazil has emphasized a more politically integrated BRICS, one advocating for democratic values and challenging the imbalances of the current world order. Modi has echoed this priority, arguing that BRICS must induce international institutional change. The two leaders ratify the idea that the Global South should no longer only be the target of international decision, but the co-author of international rules. This convergence is not limited to BRICS. The two countries are equally committed to restructuring the UN Security Council and are the most vocal members of the G4 grouping (India, Brazil, Germany, Japan) pushing for permanent representation for emergent powers. Both find the present configuration of the UNSC as archaic and unrepresentative. In their latest bilateral, Modi and Lula renewed their backing for each other's candidacies and called for time-bound negotiations in the UN. Brazil has used its presidency of the G20 in 2024 to showcase global governance reform and India has been forthright in its support of this agenda. Together, they have been able to give new impulse to what has thus been an extremely stalled process of reform. Another area of great geopolitical convergence is in their approach towards the Global South. India and Brazil have been voices of Southern solidarity, with one difference: they offer pragmatic implementable solutions. India's 2023 and Brazil's 2024 G20 presidencies were built around development agendas, of inclusive finance and food security to digital public goods and climate justice. Lula openly acknowledged the reality of the fact several of Brazil's G20 agendas borrowed from India's G20 Presidency. Modi himself has praised Brazil for continuing the momentum and ensuring continuity in the upholding of voices of the developed world. As the baton comes up to South Africa to preside over the G20 presidency next year, the IBSA trio (India-Brazil-South Africa) would have achieved the rare distinction of back-to-back leadership of the world's most powerful economic forum and offer a unique moment of Southern convergence. The bilateral is also expanding with new content. Commerce between India and Brazil has exceeded $12 billion, and complementarities in energy, agro-products, and pharma are driving the push. Indian companies like UPL, Wipro, and Tata Motors have increasingly expanded operations in Brazil, and Brazilian enterprises in mining and airlines are considering Indian marketplaces. Modi's visit is expected to deliver new deals in green energy, food processing, and defence cooperation. These steps are the bigger picture: India no longer regards Latin America as the faraway theatre of power politics and Brazil increasingly regards India as the gateway to the Indo-Pacific and the hub of the economic rise of Asia. In the coming years, India and Brazil could really transcend being co-passengers of the multilateral system and turn out to be co-designers of a new equilibrium of power internationally. As bridge-builders between the Global South and the North, between the world of the democracies and the world of the developing nations, between development and growth, their bilateral ties are now a global good. For India, Brazil is as big of a partner of BRICS as it is a center-piece of a larger diplomatic offensive aimed at democratizing international institutions and transferring normative power. When PM Modi and President Lula get together side by side at the Rio Summit, the conversation must be bold: the India-Brazil relationship is no longer peripheral but at the very core of the way the two countries see the future of world order. The strength of the relationship will be less in terms of common desire and more in terms of collaborative action, from G4 to BRICS, from the UN to the G20. In a world as desperately in need of new coalitions for reform as for peace and inclusive growth, the coming together of Delhi and Brasilia gives the world a strong, democratic, and developmental vision of the multipolar world to come. (Manish Dabhade is an Associate Professor of Diplomacy in the School of International Studies, JNU& founded The Indian Futures, an independent think tank in New Delhi; X: @imanishdabhade)
The Hindu
28 minutes ago
- The Hindu
Modi in Argentina LIVE: PM to meet Argentina President Milei
Prime Minister Narendra Modi today (July 5, 2025) will hold wide-ranging talks with Argentina President Milei as he kicks off the third leg of a five-nation tour. According to the MEA, the bilateral engagement will focus on further boosting India-Argentina partnership in key areas including defence, agriculture, mining, oil and gas, renewable energy, trade and investment. Mr. Modi will also pay homage to Jose de San Martin, widely regarded as the Father of the Argentine Nation, at the Plaza de San Martin in Buenos Aires. This is the first Indian bilateral visit at the Prime Ministerial level to Argentina in 57 years. It is Modi's second visit to the country as prime minister; he had visited in 2018 for the G20 Summit. In the fourth leg of his visit, Modi will travel to Brazil to attend the 17th BRICS Summit, followed by a state visit. In the final leg of his visit, Modi will travel to Namibia. Follow live updates here:
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First Post
29 minutes ago
- First Post
Trade, terror and the trust trap: Can India afford a reset with China?
As the Brics+ summit approaches, India's fragile reset with China faces fresh strain amid Chinese support for Pakistan and financial flows that could shape regional stability read more The timing of the Pahalgam attack—during an India-China rapprochement—reignited India's security calculus and raised doubts over whether such diplomatic efforts could be meaningfully sustained. Image: Reuters File On 6–7 July 2025, the expanded Brics+ leaders will convene in Rio de Janeiro; however, the summit's choreography has already been disrupted. Beijing has confirmed that Premier Li Qiang—not President Xi Jinping—will lead the Chinese delegation, while Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi will attend in person. Xi's absence throws a spotlight on the still-delicate reset that New Delhi and Beijing began in late 2024. Whether the Rio summit can consolidate that tentative détente—or expose its limits—will shape both the tone of the meeting and the broader credibility of Brics as a platform for emerging-power coordination. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Between late 2024, India and China began cautiously resetting their strained relationship, marked by a partial border agreement and a renewed focus on diplomatic and economic engagement. It aimed to de-escalate military tensions stemming from the deadly 2020 Galwan Valley clash, with both sides agreeing to reduce troop presence at select friction points. This was followed by foreign minister-level talks, working-level dialogues, and backchannel efforts to revive economic ties, under pressure from regional actors to avoid further escalation. Trade and investment re-emerged as key areas of re-engagement, highlighting deep but asymmetric interdependence. Bilateral trade remained high, with Indian imports of Chinese intermediate goods dominating the market, while India's trade deficit with China widened significantly. India's vulnerability to supply chain dependencies has become increasingly evident, particularly in sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and solar equipment. India also voiced its long-standing concerns over limited market access in China. It responded by selectively reopening its economy to targeted Chinese investments, especially in the electronics and infrastructure sectors. However, strategic mistrust persisted. On April 22, 2025, India was struck by a major terrorist attack in Kashmir's Pahalgam, killing 26 civilians. India accused Pakistan-based militants of responsibility and, within two weeks, launched 'Operation Sindoor' on May 7, 2025 – strikes on nine terrorist camps across the Line of Control in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The ceasefire on May 10 ended the immediate violence, but tensions have remained high since then. The timing of the attack—during an India-China rapprochement—reignited India's security calculus and raised doubts over whether such diplomatic efforts could be meaningfully sustained. Blood and Bailouts: Chinese Dollars, Deadly Dividends? Amid the India-Pakistan flare-up, Beijing has been overt in its backing of Islamabad. In a high-profile visit to Beijing in May 2025, Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who publicly reaffirmed China's 'ironclad' support for Pakistan's security. China simultaneously urged both sides to dialogue, but its message was clear: Pakistan is a close ally. For New Delhi, this duality—preaching restraint while funding and shielding Pakistan—undermines China's credibility as a stabilising actor. This diplomatic posture reinforces China's 'all-weather' friendship, even as India views Pakistan as a security threat. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD At the United Nations and other forums, China has also shielded Pakistan. For example, a March 2025 report noted that Beijing blocked India's UNSC proposal to sanction five Pakistan-based terrorists, including a key Lashkar-e-Taiba figure, and similarly blocked India's call to designate the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)'s proxy 'The Resistance Front' (behind the Pahalgam attack) as global terrorists. The consistent veto of counter-terror measures at multilateral platforms adds another layer to India's frustration with the international rules-based order. China's economic investment in Pakistan underscores its strategic bond. Beijing is now Pakistan's largest bilateral creditor, with roughly US$29 billion in loans (~22 per cent of Pakistan's external debt). The flagship China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) project, channels tens of billions more into Pakistani infrastructure; the latest figures top $60 billion in investment commitments. Chinese spending on power plants, railways, and the Gwadar port has become a mainstay of Pakistan's fragile economy. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD In key sectors such as energy, logistics, and telecom, Chinese capital has translated into strategic leverage, blurring the lines between commercial partnership and geopolitical patronage. In fact, in February 2025, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari's visit to China culminated in new agreements to expand trade and investment, accelerate China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) projects, and deepen security cooperation, including in the areas of technology and education. These developments further anchor the China–Pakistan alliance at a time of rising India–Pakistan tensions. Subsidising Instability: IMF, Investments, and Islamabad's Asymmetry Pakistan's stability now depends heavily on Chinese financing and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) bailouts more than ever. This pattern of external financing is not limited to China. Just a day before the Pahalgam ceasefire, the IMF approved a $2.4 billion bailout for Pakistan—$1 billion under the Extended Fund Facility and $1.4 billion via its climate-focused Resilience and Sustainability Trust. While framed as support for macroeconomic stability and climate resilience, the timing raised serious questions in India. It reinforced a perception that Pakistan, despite its sponsorship of terrorism, continues to receive lifelines from global institutions without accountability or behavioural change. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD The sequence—from terror attack to retaliatory strikes and then IMF disbursement—seemed to reward belligerence rather than deter it. Critics argue that even if the IMF or Chinese funds are not directly used for military purposes, they ease budgetary pressure and free up resources that could be redirected toward defence and potentially militant infrastructure - in 2025, Pakistan's defence budget was set to rise by 18 per cent, even as it secured international financial support ostensibly for economic recovery. The IMF's long-standing technical neutrality in its engagements with Pakistan has become increasingly controversial. Despite 24 bailouts since 1958, meaningful reform remains elusive, mainly due to entrenched elite resistance, military dominance, and weak civilian oversight. Repeated IMF programmes have focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, while structural dysfunction has been left unaddressed. For India, the implications are grave: international financial institutions may be inadvertently subsidising a security threat. Pakistan's chronic crisis-response cycle—backed by both Chinese investment and Western liquidity—has not reduced its reliance on strategic proxies, but instead, risks sustaining them under the guise of economic stabilisation. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Finally, Brics+ risks mirroring South Asia's own 'weaponised-bailout' paradox, where development rhetoric co-exists with permissive financing that enables destabilising proxies. The convergence of capital, conflict, and geopolitics in South Asia presents a dangerous paradox. As Pakistan leverages its strategic location to court both Chinese money and Western aid, India faces an increasingly asymmetric security landscape—one where conventional deterrence is undermined by financial impunity. The author is a research fellow at Observer Research Foundation. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
