South Korea's Indo-Pacific Role Under Discussion in US Trade Talks

The Diplomat

3 days ago

U.S. Army Command Sgt. Maj. Jack Love, U.S. Forces Korea Senior Enlisted Advisor (right), along with U.S and ROK senior leaders pose inside an AAVP-7A1 Amphibious Assault Vehicle during the Ulchi Freedom Shield Battlefield Circulation, Aug. 22, 2024.
Last week, Chosun Ilbo reported that the United States had formally asked South Korea to broaden the scope of the United States-Republic of Korea (ROK) Mutual Defense Treaty's Article III to cover the wider Indo-Pacific region. Today, Hankook Ilbo reported that the push to expand the role of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) across the Indo-Pacific under the so-called 'alliance modernization' framework is now a part of the bilateral tariff talks between the two countries.
The request to reframe the South Korea-U.S. alliance as a 'comprehensive strategic partnership for the future' was made by U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau in Tokyo on July 18. This would presumably include a role for South Korea in a China-U.S. conflict, such as a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Landau also raised issues such as increasing South Korean defense spending (reportedly from 2.3 percent of GDP to 5 percent of GDP) and greater cost-sharing for deployment of U.S. strategic assets in the region. These discussions echo meetings that U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Kevin Kim held in Seoul on July 10-11.
Such developments align with the Pentagon's Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance from March, and what is expected from the full National Defense Strategy (NDS) and Global Posture Review (GPR) later this year: an assertion that deterring a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is the United States' top priority. The United States has also pressed Japan and Australia for clarity on what they would do in a Taiwan Strait contingency and clarified with the Philippines that their mutual defense pact 'extends to armed attacks on our armed forces, aircraft or public vessels, including our Coast Guard, anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea.'
While all countries prefer to maintain strategic ambiguity over Taiwan to not upset China (South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has previously expressed reluctance to involve South Korea in a Taiwan-related security issue), South Korea is different from Japan and Australia. South Korea faces a direct threat from a different source: North Korea.
For Seoul, USFK has always been about addressing the threat from North Korea. Thus, South Korea has been reluctant to embrace the 'one theater' concept that Japan champions, which integrates the Korean Peninsula with the East and South China Seas. The United States, Australia, and the Philippines reportedly support this concept, while South Korea understands the risk that such a structure could take away U.S. resources from deterring and if needed, defeating North Korea.
However, with the deadline for trade talks looming on August 1, South Korea has sought trade concessions, including on tariffs and non-trade barriers, in return for accepting the U.S. request to recalibrate the USFK's strategic posture. Alliance modernization is a broader issue that also encompasses increased defense spending and expanded cooperation in the defense industry; the topic cannot be fully settled in the current round of trade talks. Still, a senior official from South Korea stated, 'We're asking the U.S. to show flexibility in trade in proportion to our security contributions.'
The purpose of the South Korea-U.S. alliance in an era of increasing China-U.S. competition has already been under debate, and the ongoing deliberations will affect topics such as wartime operational control and extended nuclear deterrence. Throughout this, it is important not to antagonize China. It is also vital for U.S. officials to '[bring] South Korea into the process early and often' to not politicize the changes.
As the deadline for the trade talks fast approaches, it will be interesting to see whether tying economics and security will make it easier or more difficult for Lee to sell the changes in the nature of the alliance to the South Korean public. Lee's success will, of course, hinge on the U.S. reception of the South Korean overture.