
Zelensky's end goal is in sight, and so is his end
It is much less than a decade ago that the former media entrepreneur and comedian – often crude instead of witty – advanced from being a pet protégé of one of Ukraine's most corrupt oligarchs to capturing the country's presidency. As it turned out, never to let go of it: Zelensky has used the war, which was provoked by the West and escalated in February 2022, not only to make himself an indispensable if very expensive and often obstreperous American puppet but also as a pretext to evade elections.
And yet, now signs are multiplying that his days of being indispensable may be over. For one thing, Seymour Hersh, living legend of American investigative journalism, is reporting that Zelensky is very unpopular where it matters most, in US President Donald Trump's White House. This is not surprising: Trump's recent turn against Russia – whatever its real substance or marital reasons – does not mean a turn in favor of Ukraine and even less so in favor of Zelensky, as attentive observers have noted. According to the Financial Times, 'Western allies of Ukraine' still believe that Trump keeps seeing Russian President Vladimir Putin 'as his main negotiating partner and Zelensky as the primary obstacle to a workable peace deal.'
And according to 'knowledgeable officials in Washington' who have talked to Hersh, the US leadership is ready to act on that problem by getting rid of Zelensky. And urgently: Some American officials consider removing the Ukrainian president 'feet first' in case he refuses to go. Their reason, according to Hersh's confidants: to make room for a deal with Russia.
Hersh has to make do with publishing anonymous sources. It is even conceivable that the Trump administration is leaking this threat against Zelensky to pressure him. Yet even if so, that doesn't mean the threat is empty. Judging by past US behavior, using and then discarding other countries' leaders is always an option.
Another, also plausible, possibility is that Zelensky will be discarded to facilitate not ending, but continuing the war, so as to keep draining Russian resources. In this scenario, the US would prolong the war by handing it over to its loyally self-harming European vassals. After, that is, seeing to the installation of a new leader in Kiev, one it has under even better control than Zelensky. Just to make sure the Europeans and the Ukrainians do not start understanding each other too well and end up slipping from US control. The Ukrainian replacement candidate everyone whispers about, old Zelensky nemesis General Valery Zaluzhny – currently in de facto exile as ambassador to the UK – might well be available for both options, depending on his marching orders from Washington.
Meanwhile, as if on cue, Western mainstream media have started to notice the obvious: The Financial Times has found out that critics accuse Zelensky of an 'authoritarian slide,' which is still putting it very mildly but closer to the truth than past daft hero worship. The Spectator – in fairness, a magazine with a tradition of being somewhat more realistic about Ukraine – has fired a broadside under the title 'Ukraine has lost faith in Zelensky.' The Economist has detected an 'outrage' in Zelensky's moves and, more tellingly, used a picture of him making him look like a cross between a Bond villain and Saddam Hussein. Even Deutsche Welle, a German state propaganda outlet, is now reporting on massive human rights infringements under Zelensky, with the impaired systematically targeted for forced mobilization.
Full disclosure: Knowing Ukrainian and Russian – Ukraine's two languages – well and having written about the realities of Zelensky's misrule for years already, my immediate response to these sudden revelations is 'what took you so long?' My first articles explaining Zelensky's obvious authoritarian tendencies – and practices, too – date back to 2021, and I have repeatedly pointed out that his popularity was slipping. All it took was to pay attention to Ukrainian polling.
But then, I know the reason for the mainstream's delay: The bias induced by Western information warfare and media career conformism, which only weakens a little – or is redirected – when the geopolitics of the powerful change. In that sense, the increasingly sharp public criticism of Zelensky is yet another sign that he has fallen – and remains – out of favor with the American leadership that rules the West.
Zelensky's recent actions may well indicate, as Hersh also suspects, that he knows he is in great danger – and not from Russia but his 'friends' in the West. Just over the course of the last two weeks, Zelensky has reshuffled his government and, at the same time, started a devastating campaign against institutions and individuals that have two things in common: the mission to combat corruption and a well-deserved reputation for being particularly open to US influence.
Indeed, it is when Zelensky escalated his attacks on the latter that the Financial Times woke up from years of sweet slumber to discover there's something authoritarian about the West's top man in Ukraine. By now, things have only gotten worse: The domestic intelligence – and, of course, repression – service SBU has raided key anti-corruption organizations and made arrests. Simultaneously, Zelensky's absolutely obedient majority in the Ukrainian parliament has passed a law to completely neuter these institutions by putting them under the president's control, which the president then signed rapidly. By now, Ukraine is witnessing widespread protests against Zelensky's attempt to combine maximum greed with unfettered if petty despotism.
For the Ukrainian news site Strana.ua – a media rarity, as it has managed to resist the Zelensky regime's aggressive attempts to subdue and streamline it – the SBU raids on the anti-corruption agencies alone were a powerplay, designed to consolidate Zelensky's one-man rule. That is correct, and he wasn't even done.
At the same time, it is, obviously, also very convenient to remove the last feeble restraints on Ukraine's fabulously pervasive graft, since whatever the West – that is, the Europeans – will now spend on Ukraine will be misappropriated even more wildly than before. That could come in handy especially if there should be a need to stay rich in exile.
This gangster-economic aspect of Zelensky's fresh power grab has not escaped even his Western friends: the OECD has already warned the Ukrainian regime that the stifling of the anti-corruption agencies will harm Western investment in Ukraine's reconstruction in general and its arms industry in particular. Likewise, the International Renaissance Foundation, a Soros power structure that has been all too active in Ukraine for more than three decades now, has also called for a repeal of the new law.
In essence, these and similar Western complaints all mean the same: We know you are robbing us blind already but we've made our peace with that because you serve our geopolitics. But if you try to take an even larger cut, we may reconsider.
Taken together, Zelensky's government reshuffle and his assault on the anti-corruption agencies seem to reflect a double strategy: On one side, the endangered puppet is signaling submission to the US in at least some of his recent personnel moves, but on the other, he is also consolidating his power at home by insulating it from too much direct American influence. It is as if he were sending a message to Washington: 'I really am your man. But if you try to choose another, I'll fight.'
The historic irony is that, with Zelensky succeeding in finally razing the last pitiful remnants of pluralism in Ukraine, he – the once hysterically idolized darling of the 'value-based' West – will be the president achieving a complete authoritarianism like no Ukrainian leader before him. And all that while propped up with hundreds of billions from the West.
Any displays of surprise or shock by Ukrainian and Western politicians or mainstream media betray either that they have been dozing under a rock for years or that they are being disingenuous. Because today's Zelensky is not 'turning' to authoritarianism. On the contrary, authoritarianism has always been his default disposition and his aim. Zelensky has been working on his personal assent to unchecked power – and, of course, its material spoils as well – since he became Ukraine's president. That means, long before the conflict between Russia and Ukraine (and behind and through it the West) escalated in early 2022.
How do we know? Because it was already obvious, including to many Ukrainians, by 2021 at the very latest. It was then that Zelensky's Ukrainian critics – not Russians or those with sympathy for Russia – attacked him and his political party 'Servant of the People' for erecting a 'mono-vlada,' that is, in essence, an authoritarian political machine to control not only the state but the public sphere as well.
By 2021, Zelensky had already engaged in all of the following: vicious lawfare against Ukraine's opposition and his personal political rivals, such as former president Petro Poroshenko; massive media censorship and streamlining, while targeting with repression and chicanery any outlets, editors, and journalists daring to resist, for instance Strana.ua; systematically and illegally abusing emergency powers and unaccountable but powerful institutions (most of all, the National Security Council) to stifle criticism; and, last but not least, the fostering of a dictatorial personality cult which was boosted by the West.
Since then, things have only gotten worse. Zelensky has steadily fastened his hold over Ukraine, while prolonging and losing an avoidable and catastrophic war for a Western strategy to demote Russia. Ukraine has been bled dry for a cynical and (predictably) failing Western scheme; Russia, meanwhile is not only winning but has greatly increased its autonomy from the West.
The war may end soon or it may drag on. For the sake of Ukraine we have to hope it will be over soon. Zelensky, if he were a decent man, would then have to hand himself over to postwar Ukrainian justice or be his own judge, the old-fashioned way. But Zelensky is no decent man. If rumors now swirling are not only plausible but truthful, then his masters in Washington may be the ones preparing an appropriately indecent end for him. If the protests against him accelerate, Zelensky may even end up 'color-revolution-ed.' How ironic.
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