Why Trump can't stop the Ukraine and Gaza wars

AllAfrica

5 days ago

In yet another twist in his unpredictable decision-making, US President Donald Trump has dramatically shortened his original 50-day ultimatum to Vladimir Putin to call a ceasefire in Ukraine to a mere ten days. It's an unmistakable sign of Trump's frustration with the Russian leader, whom he now appears to view as the main obstacle to ending the war.
Progress has been similarly limited on another of Trump's flagship foreign policy projects: ending the war in Gaza. As a humanitarian catastrophe engulfs the territory, Trump and some of his MAGA base are finally challenging Israel's denials that, after almost two years of war, many Gazans now face a real risk of starvation.
In neither case have his efforts to mediate and bring an end to the violence borne any fruit. But not all of Trump's efforts to stop violence in conflicts elsewhere in the world have been similarly futile. The administration brokered a ceasefire between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which the two countries' foreign ministers signed in Washington on June 27.
The US president has also claimed to be behind the ceasefire between India and Pakistan in May after the two sides had engaged in several days of fierce combat following a terror attack in Indian-administered Kashmir by a Pakistan-backed rebel group.
And, drawing a clear parallel between this conflict and the border clashes between Cambodia and Thailand in July, Trump announced he had pushed both countries' leaders to negotiate a ceasefire.
All of these ceasefires, so far, have held. By contrast, the ceasefire in the war between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, to which Trump contributed in January, even before he was inaugurated for his second term, broke down in March and fighting has escalated ever since. A short-lived ceasefire in Ukraine in April was barely worth its name given the countless violations.
Three factors can explain Trump's mixed record of peacemaking to date.
First, the US president is more likely to succeed in stopping the fighting where he has leverage and is willing to use it to force foreign leaders to bend to his will. For example, Trump was very clear that there would be no trade negotiations with Thailand or Cambodia 'until such time as the fighting STOPS.'
The crucial difference, so far, with the situation in the war against Ukraine is that Trump has, and has used, similar leverage only with the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky. This led to a US-Ukraine agreement on a 30-day ceasefire proposal just two weeks after the now-notorious row between Trump and Zelensky in the Oval Office.
The mere threat of sanctions against Russia, by contrast, has done little to persuade Putin to accept whatever deal might Trump offer him. Trump's threats – which he has never followed through on – did not work in January or May. The Kremlin's initial reactions to the latest ultimatum from the White House do not indicate a change in Putin's attitude.
A second factor that may explain why Trump has had peacemaking success in some cases but not others is the level of complexity of US interests involved. When it comes to US relations with Russia and Israel, there is a lot more at stake for Trump.
The US president still appears keen to strike a grand bargain with Russia and China under which Washington, Beijing and Moscow would agree to recognize, and not interfere in, their respective spheres of influence. This could explain his hesitation so far to follow through on his threats to Putin.
Similarly, US interests in the Middle East – whether it's over Iran's nuclear program or relations with America's Gulf allies – have put strains on the alliance with Israel. Trump also needs to weigh carefully the impact of any move against, or in support of, Israel on his domestic support base.
In the deal Trump brokered between Rwanda and the DRC, the issues at stake were much simpler: access for US investors to the mineral riches of the eastern DRC. Just days into his second term, Trump acknowledged that the conflict was a 'very serious problem.'
Congo's president, Felix Tshisekedi, responded by offering the US access to minerals in exchange for pushing Rwanda to a deal to end the invasion and stop supporting proxy forces in the DRC.
This leads to the third factor that has enabled Trump's peace-making success so far: simpler solutions are easier to achieve. Thailand and Cambodia and India and Pakistan can go back to the situation before their recent fighting. That does not resolve any of the underlying issues in their conflicts, but returns their relations to some form of non-violent stability.
It is ultimately also in the interests of the conflict parties. They have had a chance to make their violent statements and reinforce what they will and won't tolerate from the other side. The required investment by an external mediator to end battles that have achieved what the warring sides want anyway – to avoid further escalation – is consequently quite limited.
Getting to any kind of stability in Ukraine or the Middle East, by contrast, requires prolonged engagement and attention to detail.
These conflicts are at a stage in which a return to how things were before is not in the interests of the parties or their external backers. Nudging warring parties along on the path to agreement under such conditions requires a well-designed process, which is absent in Ukraine and failing in Gaza.
Thanks to funding and personnel cuts, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio is now required to perform multiple roles. Trump relies on personal envoys with at best limited foreign policy expertise, while insisting he makes all the decisions.
This ultimately suggests that the White House simply may not have the bandwidth for the level of engagement that would be necessary to get to a deal in Ukraine and the Middle East.
This is a self-inflicted opportunity lost, not only for the United States but also for the long-suffering people of Ukraine and the Middle East.
Stefan Wolff is professor of international security, University of Birmingham
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.