Teen behind Air India crash viral video thought plane ‘was going to land'
Police treated the teen as an eyewitness to the tragedy and recorded his statement on Saturday. The Ahmedabad Crime Branch said he came with his father to give the statement.
Air India's AI171 Boeing 787-7 Dreamliner crashed into the hostel complex of BJ Medical College in Meghani Nagar within minutes of its takeoff from Ahmedabad's Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel International Airport.
The tragedy claimed the lives of 241 aboard the aircraft, leaving just one survivor. Additionally, more than 20 persons present on the ground at the time of the incident also lost their lives. A total of 270 persons were killed in the plane crash.
Aryan Asari's video gave the initial perspective of the incident. Speaking to news agency ANI, he said that as the plane was passing from a very close range, he thought of shooting a video to show to his friends.
He had gone up to the terrace to witness the low-flying aircraft.
"The plane went downwards, and I thought it was going to land as the airport was nearby. But when it went down, flames started coming up, and we saw that it had exploded," Asari said.
The teen recalled how "scared" he felt in that moment, and said he showed the video to his sister, and told his father about the same.
Earlier, his sister told news agency PTI how Asari expressed his wish not to live in the area anymore as "it is dangerous".
Asari on Sunday returned to his native village in Aravalli district to resume his class 12 studies.
The teenager arrived in Ahmedabad on Thursday, June 12, the same day as the plane crash, to purchase textbooks.
"I cleared the class 11 exam last month and secured admission in class 12. I came to Ahmedabad on June 12 to purchase textbooks. I reached my father's rented house at around 12:30 pm," Asari said.
Aryan Asari's father, a retired Army personnel, had recently taken up a job as a security guard with the Ahmedabad Metro and was living at a rented accommodation in the Meghani Nagar area.
The owner of the rented home, Kailashba, also commented on Asari's experience and said, "He had come to Ahmedabad for the first time and within hours of his arrival, he ended up witnessing such a horrific event. The video he captured was initially sent to his father and later went viral".
Meanwhile, an official on Sunday said that the identities of 47 victims have been matched through DNA testing, and bodies of 24 have been handed over to their respective families.
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Hindustan Times
10 hours ago
- Hindustan Times
Air India must tackle its inner demons first to regain public trust
June 2025 was a tough month for Air India. The horrifying plane crash in Ahmedabad made a massive dent in its public image at a time when the airline was building its public perception after the takeover by Tata Group. Since the incident, even the tiniest transgression or issue has acquired mammoth proportions and attention because of the AI171 Ahmedabad crash and the unrelenting media gaze on the airline post it. In July, a few weeks after the crash on June 12 that killed 260 people, two incidents involving Air India flights created more alarm among the flying public although neither led to any casualties. In one case, the aircraft veered off the runway on account of heavy rain while landing in Mumbai and was grounded for checks and in the other, the aircraft's rear end caught fire after landing, grounding yet another aircraft of the airline's fleet. This was followed by a series of show cause notices issued by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA), which seemed to have intensified scrutiny post the accident across airlines but on Air India in particular. The show cause notices highlighted 29 violations over a one-year period (June 2024 to June 2025) and were disclosed voluntarily by the airline. DGCA also pointed out that repeated warnings had been issued in the past and the recurrence of such violations suggests a failure to establish effective control mechanisms. A notice issued to the Director of Cabin Safety referred to four instances of non-compliance of cabin crew requirements in 2025 for ultra long-haul range flights. Another one to the Director of Flight Operations referred to weekly rest violations in the case of three specific crew members. Two such violations happened on June 24 last year and one on June 13 this year. 'These violations reflect serious deficiencies in crew scheduling, operational planning and regulatory oversight within the flight operations function,' a DGCA notice pointed out. A further notice was issued to the Cabin Safety Training Manager of Air India for breach of regulatory requirements in case of flight operations – the crew operated flights with a lapsed competency card on numerous occasions. Then, the Director (Training) of Air India was issued a show cause notice in connection with violations committed by 19 crew members. These highlighted lapses found in training norms and protocols. By the end of July, a DGCA audit into level one (more serious) and level two findings across airlines found a total of 19 level one findings with Tata Group airlines in the last year, the only one with level one findings among the Indian carriers audited. The DGCA classifies audit findings into two levels; Level 1 involves direct safety hazards, including improper aircraft maintenance, documentation of expired parts, or serious crew training deficiencies, while Level 2 typically refers to procedural violations or administrative oversights. It, therefore, comes as no surprise that passengers are beginning to question when and if Air India will get its act together, not just in terms of the service on offer but also the airline's safety record, which has come under intense public gaze post the June crash. Towards the end of June, the Tata chairman decided to get more involved in the running of the airline, a development that was met with much relief by both industry sources and airline insiders. The aviation industry, rival airline senior management and even those watching the events play out from a great distance in Europe and the US, have a host of (unsolicited) yet free advice although a large proportion of insiders (cynical and disheartened) argue that whatever the Tatas now do is 'too little, too late'. However, many in the sector and outside believe that while Air India might have a mountain of troubles before it, there is nothing that cannot be surmounted, especially now that the Tata chairman himself has taken a deeper dive into the airline's affairs. This below is an attempt to sift through the numerous suggestions and ideas and to pinpoint some of the key issues that need attention. Proactive versus Reactive Perhaps the biggest problem identified by outsiders and certain company insiders is the proclivity of top management members to brush uncomfortable issues under the carpet instead of tackling them head on. This has been evident in the airline's handling of whistleblowers and anomalies in the airline's operations, engineering, training and overall management, often pointed out by DGCA and other observers. 'Over the last three years, whenever someone is found lacking, they are removed as post holders and take the fall but the actual problem is left unaddressed and very little corrective action has been taken,' argues a former senior DGCA source. He says that the airline has taken reactive steps and has never been proactive in this aspect, something he firmly argues needs to change right away. An airline insider said that post the accident, this matter is being looked into. 'Those who are taking the decisions will increasingly be held directly accountable instead of letting someone else take the fall, when a problem is encountered,' he says, adding that there is a realisation within the airline that warnings issued over the last three years have consistently been overlooked right from the Tata top brass onwards. Whether this accident could have been prevented had such warnings been taken seriously remains a moot and uncomfortable point of discussion. Another area that has taken a severe beating post the sale is the engineering division, which after the split from government owned AIESL (Air India Engineering Services Limited) is yet to find its feet. Sources say that the present Air India engineering set up lacks capability, infrastructure and the required skills set. 'When the sale happened, the new engineering infrastructure and qualified engineers needed to have been put in place. This didn't happen,' says an airline source, adding that while there is now a realisation, beefing up the airline's engineering capabilities will require both time and resources and cannot be done in a jiffy. Let some heads roll Ever since June 13, there has been a growing clamour for the resignation of CEO Campbell Wilson and some of the team members he brought in. While many had been doubtful of the abilities of Campbell to pull off the massive transformation required at Air India, the accident totally eroded the faith people were willing to place in his abilities. From September, some changes – and new faces – are expected at Air India, after Tata Sons chairman N Chandreasekharan took a deeper interest into the affairs post the crash. Sources said that partner Singapore Airlines (SIA) is expected to play a bigger role in the running of the airline although most expect the CEO to continue till his current term ends in 2027. New inductions are expected from SIA at a senior level, although the news has been greeted by scepticism by some senior management members, who argued that the airline already has a chain of command in place and this could end up creating more confusion by creating an alternate powercentre within. Resentment within Air India has been building up internally against specific individuals holding certain key positions but this has reached its peak post the crash. Overall, the bigger complaint is that the Tatas have brought in too many people who are unfamiliar with the key tenets of an aviation business – be it in finance, HR or commercial functions. Bring crew on board The single biggest failure identified by industry professionals, insiders, old Air India hands and many present ones is the failure to handle human resources. A paradigm shift needs to take place in the way management and crew engage, according to sources in the airline, where crew and commanders feel free to express their discontent and their views. 'There is a quiet rebellion brewing within the different camps of crew and while the management has managed to get most of the union post holders on their side, mass discontent simmers just under the surface,' says a senior airline commander. He says that many differences in service terms between Vistara and Air India have led to bad blood developing and points to the recent extension of the retirement age to 65 for Air India captains as one of the niggling issues, which has only recently been tackled. What has been particularly worrying is that the Tatas' handling of the airline has managed to alienate even the senior commanders and airline loyalists who welcomed and were extremely happy about the private sector buyout as they were tired of the public sector way of management. In its bid to weed out the 'old and cynical' Air India hands, the airline has ended up culling out valuable experience and in some cases lost the loyalty and faith of the more experienced crew. 'The fact that the average age within the airline has dropped so sharply can be a double-edged sword,' says a rival airline top management member. The TCS effect: Life is not one big app Several airline insiders complain that the Tata takeover has led to every little interaction between the employee and the company, being conducted through an app, which is proving counter productive. Labelled by naysayers as a 'tech-obsession' and with support from sister firm Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), the Tatas have introduced close to a dozen odd apps and portals internally for smoother processes to cater to a range of employee-related services — right from online training, foreign exchange cards, and payslip retrieval to medical and leave applications and employee support, which has been labelled by some as 'digital red tape' and by some in more dramatic terms as 'digital terrorism'. They argue that the airline has been 'dehumanised' to an extent that is proving counter productive. Management sources justify the use of digital systems and the numerous apps on the grounds that it removes the discretionary powers of individuals as a lot of the employee-related benefits and perks were earlier determined or settled based on who knew whom, currying favours and a sort of tacit understanding. Organisational culture To sum it up, there are no quick fixes and almost everyone, from the Tata chairman onwards, is aware of the fact that the airline needs a full cultural revolution, which takes time, commitment and a concerted effort to build. To win back the trust of the Indian flying public before it can dream of take-off stage in its transformational journey is the reality that faces the erstwhile national carrier. Anjuli Bhargava writes on governance, infrastructure and the social sector. The views expressed are personal.
The Print
2 days ago
- The Print
67% aircraft accident reports cite pilot action, but show human error often last straw in flawed system
These references are mentioned either in the findings under conclusions or under probable causes in both fatal and non-fatal accidents involving fixed winged aircraft. New Delhi: Pilot actions find mention in at least 67 percent of the 68 final reports the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has put out on aircraft accidents since 2012, an analysis by ThePrint has shown. Notably, the reports highlighting inflight erroneous actions, judgements of pilots or lapses don't necessarily attribute all of these accidents to just errors by persons inside the cockpit. The topic of pilot error recently took centrestage soon after the AAIB came out with its interim probe report on the tragic 12 June Air India plane crash in Ahmedabad that claimed the lives of all those on board barring one. According to the report, soon after the aircraft took off, the fuel switches to both engines turned off one after the other, just one second apart. As the engines stopped getting fuel, their speeds began dropping from take-off levels. According to the cockpit audio, one pilot asked the other why he turned the fuel off, and the other pilot replied that he didn't do it. While global headlines pinned the crash on one of the pilots, the AAIB slammed these reports. In its interim report, it did not point to any error or deliberate action by the pilots as the reason for the 12 June crash. In Part 2 of a three-part series on AAIB's final reports on aircraft accidents, ThePrint looks at some of the cases where fingers have been raised at pilots for lapses. The AAIB, India's primary agency for investigating aviation accidents and incidents, was established on 30 July 2012 in compliance with ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organisation) Annex 13 guidelines. It functions under the Ministry of Civil Aviation, but works independently from the aviation watchdog Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). According to the 'Aircraft (Investigation of Accidents and Incidents) Rules', the DG AAIB has to institute an investigation into the circumstances of accidents, and shall be responsible for conducting the probe. Also Read: Considered quitting Air India job to look after father—family, friends remember Capt Sumeet Sabharwal 'Last line of defence' Lack of coordination in the cockpit and disagreements between pilots, poor decision-making, lapses in judgement, failure to adhere to SOPs among others are mentioned as factors contributing to human error and complacency in as many as 46 final reports. Moreover, the Bureau highlights issues such as lack of assertiveness among co-pilots, refusal of one pilot to hand over controls to the other, inadequate experience of the pilot-in-command (PIC), inappropriate handling, procedural violations, flying into severe weather despite awareness of its deterioration, and failure to monitor fuel levels and conduct proper pre-flight inspection leading to engine starvation. 'We aren't denying or refuting that there are pilot errors. However it is important to understand that pilots are the last line of defense,' Captain Anil Rao, general secretary, Air Line Pilots Association, told ThePrint. 'The bigger question should be how did we reach that last line? It is a multitude of factors—mechanical, environmental, and even manufacturers' defects. A pilot isn't a robot. If they missed 1 out of the 100 things in the book, they are grounded and blamed. Sometimes pilots have less than a minute or just a couple of seconds to take a call.' 'One has to also understand that aircraft accidents involve multiple stakeholders and only when multiple errors align that it leads to a disaster,' Rao added. 'Faulty HR policy' The AAIB maintains that the sole objective of investigation is only the prevention of such accidents or incidents. In the 2020 Air India Express crash in which 21 people, including both pilots, were killed in Kozhikode, the report attributes the probable cause to the pilot not adhering to SOPs, with contributing systemic failures including faulty HR policy that added pressure on the person sitting in the cockpit, among others. Apart from 'overconfidence', the AAIB repeatedly cited poor decision-making by the PIC and noted his use of unprescribed drugs, which could have caused cognitive deficits. The final report also points towards lack of coordination between the pilots. 'The first officer (FO) had correctly identified that the approach for runway 10 was an 'unstabilised approach'. After making two unassertive attempts to attract the PIC's attention towards the unstabilised approach, using non-standard vocabulary, he asked the PIC to 'Go Around' just before touchdown,' it mentions. 'In spite of knowing full well that the approach was unstabilised and the PIC was not responding, the FO did not take over the controls as per the company SOP and initiate a 'Go Around'.' In another 2014 accident of a Deccan charter operating from Delhi to Guwahati, the more qualified pilot was found to be the co-pilot. Incidentally, the PIC had denied giving the controls to the co-pilot after the second bounce of the aircraft, which landed on its nose landing gear. 'The co-pilot asked PIC for the controls after the second bounce which was denied by the PIC,' the report mentions. Systemic failures such as lapses by the aircraft operators, aerodrome operators, regulatory oversight among others were mentioned in at least 32 of the 46 cases. Additionally, in at least six of these cases, the AAIB reports identify mechanical failures such as the failure of the pilot's seat back recliner mechanism and suboptimal performance of the PIC's windshield wiper in rain in addition to some sort of erroneous pilot judgement or decision. Moreover, at least four of these cases were a combination of mechanical and system failures in addition to erroneous pilot judgements. The systemic failures should be seen from the perspective of the AAIB repeatedly flagging violations and lapses of both airline operators, and Flight Training Organisations in at least 47 percent of the 68 reports for one reason or the other. These violations, as reported in Part 1 of the series, were cited as either contributory factors or probable causes or in the conclusion findings, highlighting deeper issues with the overall safety culture. Of the 68 aircraft accidents of which the AAIB has published its final reports, 23 are of training flights operated by trainee pilots either in solo sorties or with a flying instructor. Seventeen of these accidents were fatal, claiming one or more lives. There are 101 AAIB accidents reports in public domain, including 27 helicopter reports (both preliminary and final) and six preliminary reports of aircraft accidents. 'There can be errors, lapses in judgement. No one is denying that. But it's time, we look at what is leading up to these errors and fix that. It's easy to blame the cockpit crew because that way the accountability doesn't fall upon other stakeholders and even if some accountability is put on them, it can be brushed off, simply blaming it on the pilots,' a pilot told ThePrint. Fatigue, another pilot asserted, has always been overlooked. 'Pilots are under tremendous pressure all the time. Most of this pressure is unwarranted, and both operators and authorities must look into making things a tad bit easy for the pilots.' Given the overall scenario, it comes as no surprise that the DGCA warned Air India in July over crew fatigue management and training including lack of adequate rest for the pilots, insufficient crew for long haul flights, among others. The airline has been under immense scrutiny after the 12 June crash in Ahmedabad. Also Read: Air India crash preliminary report: A look at what fuel switches are designed to do & built-in safeguards Recurring pattern Many of the AAIB final reports reveal a recurring pattern of poor decision-making, inappropriate aircraft handling, and inadequate crew coordination across airlines. In the 2021 accident involving an InterGlobe Aviation (IndiGo) aircraft with seven passengers and four crew, the AAIB attributed the probable cause to 'inappropriate aircraft landing technique and not following the bounced landing recovery procedure.' A similar pattern is evident in the 2022 episode involving a SpiceJet 737-800 that met with severe turbulence leading to three serious injuries and one fatality. The AAIB attributed the probable cause to 'poor CRM (Crew Resource Management) and decision making on part of the crew to penetrate bad weather and not maintaining specified separation from turbulence prone weather'. 'Procedures for recurring defect monitoring and control were not being followed meticulously in the organisation,' it said, flagging lapses in the airline's internal processes. The passengers, the report said, had also failed to comply with the seatbelt sign. At times, both human and mechanical lapses are at fault—as seen in the 2021 force landing of a Pinnacle Air Pvt Ltd's non-scheduled flight in which the PIC sustained serious injuries while the co-pilot and the passenger escaped with minor injuries in Madhya Pradesh. While the probable cause of the accident is listed a mechanical failure—oil leak from an engine during flight, the report does mention that 'the crew did not follow the emergency procedures for single engine operation and took a decision to come for landing with single engine'. Likewise, both fuel valves were found closed and left unnoticed leading to fuel starvation in a joyride sortie that ended in a crash in March 2023 and injured both pilot and 14-year passenger in Jharkhand. The AAIB found that the pre-flight inspection wasn't carried out as the sortie was initiated in a hurry. Apart from the other systemic failures, it notes that the pilot lacked 'situational awareness' and didn't respond as per protocol in an engine failure situation. Other similar instances include a September 2021 episode involving an InterGlobeAviation (IndiGo) aircraft and an October 2018 accident in which the Air India Express hit the boundary wall of the airport in Tiruchirappalli. The PIC, according to the AAIB report in the first case, 'busy with his paperwork failed to inform the cabin crew of an anticipated turbulent weather ahead'. It also mentions probable causes about 'serious communication failure' between the cockpit and the cabin crew and that they didn't follow SOPs. A cabin crew, as a result, fractured her leg when the plane carrying 52 passengers from Tiruchirapalli to Bengaluru flew into turbulent weather. It also mentions probable causes about 'serious communication failure' between the cockpit and the cabin crew and that they didn't follow SOPs. As for the Air India Express plane, the AAIB noted that both pilots 'failed to capture drop in engine thrust during the critical phase of operation and therefore no timely corrective action was initiated by either of the crew members to increase the thrust for continuation of the flight.' The PIC's seat recline mechanism had also malfunctioned during takeoff, it added. Though no injuries were reported, the aircraft belly was severely damaged among others. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Air India crash spotlights 2018 advisory on Boeing switches installed with locking feature disengaged
The Print
3 days ago
- The Print
Indian aviation has a ‘safety culture' problem. Airline carriers, training institutes share blame
SpiceJet, the inquiry found, had not 'meticulously' followed procedures for monitoring and controlling recurring defects. Sixty such defects were reported in its Boeing 737 fleet equipped with the Honeywell RDR-4B weather radar system, 15 of which occurred prior to the 1 May incident. Three years later, the Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) in its final report put out in May pointed at poor crew coordination, erroneous decision-making by pilots and passengers ignoring seat belt signs among other factors for the episode. But, it also flagged deeper issues—recurring maintenance lapses and non-compliance with basic reporting protocol. New Delhi: On 1 May 2022, a regular flight from Mumbai to Durgapur turned into a mid-air nightmare for the passengers and crew of the SpiceJet plane as it flew into a storm while landing. The severe turbulence jolted several passengers who were not wearing seat belts. One passenger succumbed to a spinal injury later, while three others too were grievously hurt. Notably, three defects involving the weather radar system were reported just days before, between 14 and 30 April, although none of them officially pertained to that particular aircraft. Several media reports suggested that pilots had raised doubts on the dependability of the weather radar system of this fleet. Moreover, post the May incident, SpiceJet had returned the aircraft to its lessor without obtaining the necessary clearance from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) or AAIB, and before complete information from the airline could be obtained regarding repeated weather radar related snags, the final report said. Such lapses and violations are not one-offs. Oversight failures by aircraft operators, glider clubs, etc are as endemic as they are persistent. And the picture is no better in the training ecosystem. The 12 June crash of Air India flight 171—one of the worst civil aviation disasters in the country in decades—has put an uneasy spotlight on the airline industry. After the AAIB released its preliminary report—which put both Air India and Boeing in the clear for now—questions about safety, protocol, pilot and crew training, maintenance of aircraft and previously reported snags, etc took centrestage. Last month, the AAIB drew flak over its preliminary findings. A particular point of contention was a brief mention about a conversation between the two Air India pilots on the fuel switches, wherein one of them asks the other on why he cut off fuel supply to the engines, and the latter denies doing so. After the report was released, there have been many takes on what exactly happened, including several questions on Boeing and Air India. The AAIB had slammed several Western media reports suggesting pilot error or deliberate action by one pilot. ThePrint has analysed 68 AAIB final reports on aircraft accidents since 2012. Part 1 of this three-part series looks at how the investigating body has repeatedly flagged violations by both airline operators and Flight Training Organisations (FTOs). 'AAIB does not classify occurrences immediately unless there are casualties. The first responders which may comprise DGCA and/or AAIB officials, tasked by the DG AAIB, then reach the spot and an initial report is prepared in case there is no clarity on the nature of the occurrence. The DG, AAIB has the final say in which classification the occurrence will fall under and that is binding. If there are casualties, then the AAIB team reaches the spot directly,' Group Captain Aurobindo Handa (retired), a former director general of the AAIB, told The Print. 'The responsibility of cobbling up the investigating team rests with the DG, AAIB. Aviation crash investigators are a scarce resource not just in India but also across the world. The DG, AAIB decides the composition of the team and is empowered to pick people—domain experts from different domains as deemed necessary. The investigator in charge may also be called from outside the investigating body,' he added. Overall, 101 AAIB investigation reports, including 27 of helicopters (both preliminary and final reports) and six preliminary reports of fixed aircraft accidents, are in the public domain. An analysis of the final reports show that in at least 47 percent of the cases, the AAIB has found out violations or lapses by operators and made remarks about them. These, however, may or may not have been found to be directly linked to aircraft accidents. In at least a dozen accidents, mechanical failures were reported even if they weren't cited as direct causes and in at least five of them, the AAIB couldn't even conclude what led to the failure or the chain of events. Some form of pilot action or decision leading up to the accident are mentioned in nearly 67 percent of these final reports by the AAIB. Even though these reports put some spotlight on inflight erroneous actions or judgements by pilots, they don't necessarily attribute or directly link all of these accidents to pilot errors. A detailed report on this aspect will be taken up in Part 2 of this series. ThePrint's analysis of the AAIB findings point to a broader pattern of not just irregular oversight by aircraft operators, but also of them often neglecting SOPs and guidelines. Other issues that find mention are ambiguous tech logs, maintenance issues, serious lapses in procedures such as maintaining fuel and oil consumption records, outdated regulations, non-adherence to safety recommendations cited in earlier accidents, lack of discipline, poor safety culture, and even inefficient training of pilots. A similar pattern is seen with FTOs—DGCA-approved institutes that impart training to those looking to secure pilot licences. This pertains to oversight including improper briefing procedures, vague tech logs, substandard training, lack of weather monitoring mechanisms, faulty maintenance, flying instructors not sticking to SOPs, not incorporating night flying SOP, non-existent SOPs for radio telephony communications between ground and flight staff, lack of CCTV inside FTO premises, etc. Take for example the 2016 accident of a glider aircraft during a routine flight: the AAIB had flagged various concerns about the Hadapsar Gliding Centre, that was run by the DGCA till December last year. The centre didn't have SOPs in place for emergency situations, the Bureau said in its report, adding that the DGCA hadn't uploaded its own glider circulars on the website to be readily accessed by glider training institutes. ThePrint reached AAIB, DGCA, and airlines—Air India Express, Air India, SpiceJet, and IndiGo—via email and messages for comments. This report will be updated as and when responses are received. Also Read: 'No mechanical, maintenance issues with aircraft'—Air India CEO tells employees post prelim crash probe Pressure, poor training & safety warnings ignored 'Safety culture' finds mention multiple times in the AAIB inquiry report of the Air India Express plane crash at Kozhikode in August 2020. Nineteen passengers as well as both pilots were killed after the Boeing 737 skidded off the wet runway, fell down an embankment, and broke into three sections. Though pilot errors were listed as the probable cause, the AAIB also observed that Air India Express had a 'faulty' HR policy, which it said placed undue pressure on the pilots. Originally on standby, the pilot in command (PIC) was reassigned last-minute due to shortage of captains. His flight next morning was delayed to fit duty hours, putting pressure on him to land in Kozhikode on time. The captain has the final say over aircraft operation, while the first officer assists throughout all phases of the journey. Air India Express's HR policy failed to align crew base assignments with operational needs, leaving just one captain against 26 first officers at Kozhikode. The PIC's decision to return to Kozhikode was driven by a misplaced urgency to operate the next morning's flight, the AAIB report said. 'In case of diversion of flight AXB 1344, the PIC would have exceeded his Flight Duty Time Limitations (FDTL) and would not have been available for the following day morning flight. This would have resulted in shortage of PIC at Kozhikode for operating the three scheduled flights ex-Kozhikode the next day.' 'AIXL (Air India Express Limited) policies of upper level management have led to a lack of supervision in training, operations and safety practices, resulting in deficiencies at various levels causing repeated human error accidents,' it further noted, adding that although poor crew resource management had emerged as a major contributor in a previous major accident and serious incidents involving Air India Express, CRM training failed to generate its desired results and continued to be the causal factor in this crash as well. Data from cockpit voice recorder (CVR) revealed that the plane's windshield wiper wasn't working properly and that the crew was aware of it but the malfunction wasn't mentioned in the technical log. The report notes probably a verbal briefing about it could have taken place which highlights the non-standard practice of reporting on snags. Training standards were also flagged: simulator maintenance was substandard, and mandatory exercises weren't always checked. Pilots lacked access to Onboard Performance Tool (OPT) for quick landing calculations. Despite Civil Aviation Requirements (CARs) and repeated DGCA audits, Air India Express also failed to fully monitor Digital Flight Data Recorder (DFDR) data—a crucial factor to avoid accidents. Issued by the DGCA, CARs are a set of mandatory standards and procedures laid down for aviation operations which include flight data monitoring, maintenance, safety management, training among other things. While probing an accident reported at Mumbai airport in July 2019, the AAIB noted that SpiceJet hadn't adhered to the safety recommendations in spite of incidents and accidents under similar conditions including similar errors by the flight crew. The plane had overshot the main runway while landing amid heavy rains. 'In the past, there have been occurrences (incidents and accidents) to the aircraft operated by the organisation under similar circumstances and more or less due to the same inactions/errors by the flight crew,' the AAIB said. 'The investigation of these occurrences and those to the aircraft operated by other organisations had given recommendations to obviate these occurrences in future. It was observed that the majority of the safety recommendations were either not implemented in true letter and spirit or the action taken has withered away with passage of time.' SpiceJet, the Bureau found, also didn't have an active flight watch or monitoring programme. 'It is vital that AAIB closes the loop with critical recommendations and directives post incident and accident investigation to all operators and such directives enforced with stringent regulations by the DGCA so as to ensure minimal compromise in safety in aviation. Safety culture, which is reporting culture, is virtually non-existent in India. Aircraft operators along with helicopter operators are the worst offenders of safety and airworthiness norms,' said Mark D. Martin, CEO of Martin Consulting, an aviation advisory and risk firm. Also Read: Too much traffic & too little control, why Char Dham route is a hotbed for chopper crashes Faulty fuel checks & on-paper maintenance In another instance reported in May 2021, an uninsured aircraft operated by the Directorate of Aviation (DoA), Madhya Pradesh, had incorrect CAR references in the operator's Operations Manual. The DoA had also not sought exemption from the DCGA to carry a passenger in cargo and not in the cabin of the Beechcraft King Air 250 aircraft that crash-landed at Gwalior airport and injured all three occupants, including the two pilots. Another violation of basic protocols was reported in a case from June 2020 in which an IndiGo aircraft flying from Dammam, Saudi Arabia encountered turbulence during descent to Cochin. A cabin crew member had sustained serious injuries. IndiGo, the AAIB noted, hadn't preserved the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, which is crucial to analyse the causes behind accidents. In March 2023, a 'joy ride sortie' conducted by the Jharkhand Flying Institute ended in a crash after engine failure due to fuel starvation. Joy ride sorties can be conducted either on smaller aircraft or helicopters for sightseeing or recreational purposes. Both fuel valves located inside the cockpit were found unnoticed, left in closed positions. Both the pilot and the 14-year-old passenger suffered injuries after the Sinus 912 motor glider crashed-landed at a residential area in Dhanbad. While the AAIB noted that the flight was initiated in haste, with no pre-flight inspection, it also mentions that there was a lack of safety culture in the organisation, among other things. Fuel starvation leading to engine starvation isn't really uncommon, the AAIB investigation reports show. Such a situation refers to the engines not being fed with fuel, leading them to either shut down or go into some sort of mechanical failure. This can have catastrophic consequences. In its final report on a February 2019 accident in Baramati during a solo training sortie of a Cessna 172S aircraft, the AAIB mentioned that fuel and oil records were not maintained according to the CAR guideline, and that the pilot was not imparted adequate training in fuel assessment. Fuel assessment is the process of calculating the amount of fuel required to complete the trip, the quantity on board and then accessing it with the route vis-à-vis how much will be needed to complete the flight. The process includes checking the fuel quantity as well as quality (for contamination), functioning of the fuel system for checks on any leaks, fuel pumps, routing of the fuel without any blockades to the engines and proper valve positions. For modern commercial aircraft, there are fuel quantity indication systems and pilots also check cross-check dispatch fuel slips. This is a critical task done not just before but also during the flight, as part of routine checks/monitoring during intervals. The FTO in this case was Academy of Carver Aviation. A similar case was reported in May 2016 when an air ambulance with five people on board, crash-landed at Delhi's Najafgarh area. The operator, Alchemist Air Pvt. Ltd, had not followed established procedures in assessing fuel consumption of aircraft, the AAIB found. Last year, the DGCA cancelled the FTO approval of Alchemist after audits revealed serious lapses in compliance of regulatory provisions. The action came after an instructor and a trainee pilot were killed in an air crash near Jamshedpur in August, 2024. Another accident involving an air ambulance was reported at Mumbai airport in May 2021. The inquiry revealed that the positions of quality manager and the chief of flight safety have been at a 'higher attrition rate than the others within the company — Jet Serve Aviation'. 'The chief of flight safety post has been inconsistent since 2019 and was lying vacant as on the date of the accident,' the AAIB noted. Jet Serve Aviation also had approval to operate as an FTO. While the AAIB noted that the aircraft suffered a mechanical failure, it couldn't ascertain the root cause of this failure. Both cases involved Beechcraft King Air C90 A aircraft. In January 2023, Falcon Aviation Academy lost a chief flight instructor in a crash at Rewa while the trainee pilot was grievously injured. Investigators found the Cessna 152 aircraft had taken off in night conditions in spite of the stipulated visuality. Falcon had no local visibility arrangements in Rewa and didn't follow set protocols for coordination with ATC in Varanasi. Notably, in an accident in February 2022 wherein a trainee pilot lost his life in Nalgonda, the AAIB found out that the FTO—Flytech Aviation Academy—during maintenance and inspections failed to detect the deteriorated conditions of control cables and other instruments of the Cessna 152 aircraft. But the operator's records showed all scheduled inspections had been completed, the inspection of the wreckage showed that the aircraft was not maintained as those records claimed. The AAIB couldn't fully ascertain the exact cause of the accident, but suggested that it was due to technical faults with the aircraft. 'While no snag was documented pending on the aircraft prior to the accident flight, the investigation team found a number of deficiencies in maintenance,' the report said. 'As per the documents maintained by the operator, all Inspection Schedules (Operations) were compiled on the aircraft. However, wreckage examination revealed that aircraft condition prior to the accident was not in line with work completed under those schedules. Conditions of a few control cables and associated components were found beyond the limits. Lack of lubrication, corrosion and groove marks were noticed on a few pulleys,' the AAIB said. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Recurring aircraft defects to faded runway lines, DGCA check reveals safety lapses at key airports
