Temasek, Asian state funds to grow their assets by 34% to US$25 trillion by 2030
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These sovereign investors, which include 146 central banks, sovereign wealth funds and public pension funds, could grow their assets to US$25 trillion by 2030 from an estimated US$18.7 trillion currently, the US-based organisation said in a report on Tuesday. The sum would collectively represent one-third of the global total, it added.
'As countries and their citizens reap the rewards of the integration with the global economy, policymakers hope to capitalise on their position to continue their growth stories, buoyed by favourable demographics and geographic position,' the report said. To meet ambitious development goals, policymakers must raise additional revenue while reining in public spending, it added.
Asia contributed roughly US$35 trillion to global gross domestic product and represented 60 per cent of economic growth last year, it said. It is also home to 46 sovereign wealth funds with US$4.8 trillion of assets as of April 2025.
Ma Xingrui, party secretary for the Xinjiang Uygur autonomous region, meets with top Temasek executives in Urumqi in August 2024. Photo: Handout
The report highlighted the prolific deal-making of Singapore's Government Investment Corp or GIC and Temasek, among the world's top spenders. Between January 2020 and April 2025, the Singaporean duo accounted for almost three-quarters of all capital deployed by Asian sovereign investors to top destinations like the US, India, UK and China.
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AllAfrica
3 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Vingroup's debt-driven empire on shaky global ground
Recent reports reveal a troubling reality behind Vingroup's aggressive expansion: the conglomerate is operating under a perilous level of debt. The company, owned by Vietnam's wealthiest man, Pham Nhat Vuong, is burdened with liabilities totaling US$31 billion. This figure requires $3.2 million in daily interest payments on its international credit loans. This financial strain suggests that the glittering image polished by domestic media may be concealing a bleak and uncertain future, as Vingroup's own Q2/2025 financial report and business results sketch a portrait of a high-profile conglomerate whose foundation appears to be riddled with risk. Vingroup's debt surged by approximately $4.7 billion in the first six months of the year, bringing its total liabilities to a staggering $31 billion by the end of Q2/2025. This figure represents 86% of the company's total assets. The immediate pressure comes from short-term liabilities, which comprise over $19.5 billion (63%) of the total debt and are approaching maturity. The cost of servicing this debt is substantial, with interest payments exceeding $295 million in the second quarter alone—equivalent to $3.2 million per day across Vingroup's ecosystem. The company faces significant deadlines next year, including $860 million in credit loans and $1.14 billion in bond interest coming due. To manage these obligations with just over $3 billion in cash on hand, Vingroup has been actively raising capital. The company recently generated $1.6 billion by selling 41.5% of its shares in Vincom Retail. Vingroup chairman Vuong also secured over $1 billion in new credit from international lenders like Deutsche Bank AG and the Asian Development Bank, with $510 million of that amount designated for the subsidiary VinFast. VinGroup chairman Pham Nhat Vuong. Photo: VIC Despite immense daily interest payments, Vingroup's recent business reports project an image of resilience, enabling the conglomerate to secure new loans for ambitious projects. The foundation for this confidence, however, appears to be highly irregular figures in its financial statements. The Q2/2025 report provides a stark example. While it records a post-tax profit of 2.265 trillion dong ($85.5 million), this positive figure is entirely manufactured by a single line item: an 'other income' entry of 18.516 trillion dong, which Vingroup vaguely attributes to 'sponsorship funds.' Without this unexplained infusion, the conglomerate's core business operations would have posted a massive loss of more than 13.9 trillion dong. This reliance on non-business cash is a recurring theme. The only clarified major inflow came from chairman Vuong himself, who injected 23 trillion dong in the past quarter, just three months after a similar 5 trillion dong transfer. Likewise, in 2024, a personal cash injection of around 10 trillion dong from Vuong was what allowed Vingroup to report a profit. This pattern of financial irregularities is not confined to the company's domestic operations. In July 2024, its subsidiary VinFast was rebuked by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for inflating revenues in a filing. The SEC rejected the report, forcing VinFast to admit that 'accounting errors' had caused it to overstate sales by $33.9 million. (See Vingroup's cash flow statement in Q2 of 2025 here.) The red flags surrounding Vingroup's financial health are not a recent development. The warnings began as early as 2019, when the credit agency Fitch Ratings downgraded the conglomerate's outlook from 'Stable' to 'Negative,' citing the 'cash-burning' investments in its subsidiary VinFast. Instead of adjusting its strategy, chairman Vuong withdrew Vingroup from Fitch's rating program, effectively removing a key mechanism for monitoring its soaring debt. As the conglomerate's debt continued to climb, the warnings have grown louder. Financial platforms like Alpha Spread now classify Vingroup as a high-risk company, while the German assessment firm Simply Wall estimates its business profits can cover only 40% of its interest expenses. Consequently, major foreign investors have begun to flee, dumping their Vingroup shares. Recent filings with the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reveal the severity of the current situation. Vingroup is acting as a guarantor for VinFast's $2.54 billion debt and is obligated to settle over $1.6 billion of that amount in 2025. This debt is made even more precarious by a significant currency mismatch: 41% of the interest on Vingroup's total debt is in US dollars, while 92% of VinFast's revenue comes from the domestic market, where the Vietnamese dong continues to depreciate. To secure these massive loans, Vuong has pledged a vast portfolio of assets, including production lines in Haiphong, the VinES battery factory in Ha Tinh, and even the under-construction EV plant in North Carolina in the United States. Since its founding in 2017, VinFast has never made a profit, acting instead as a massive financial drain on its parent company. This cash burn is the primary driver of Vingroup's deteriorating financial health, which began in 2021 when the conglomerate posted its first major loss, after many years of steady profitability. In the first half of 2025 alone, VinFast's automotive business lost over 37 trillion dong—a deficit that Vingroup's core real estate profits failed to cover. This situation is the direct result of Vuong's ambition to expand electric vehicle sales into the US and European markets. 'We regard the US as the key market, a test to measure effectiveness. […] If we succeed in America, conquering other markets will be much easier,' Vuong stated in a May 2020 shareholders meeting. The venture launched in late 2022 with a shipment of 999 VF8 vehicles and the groundbreaking of a factory in North Carolina. However, instead of 'securing Vietnam's place on the global automotive map,' VinFast's American dream quickly soured. By May 2023, the entire initial shipment was returned for failing to meet safety standards. Despite this, VinFast listed on the Nasdaq in August 2023 with a market capitalization of over $23 billion. The stock collapsed by more than 90% within two months. This implosion led to a class-action lawsuit by shareholders in May 2024, alleging the company had exaggerated its prospects, which in turn prompted an SEC investigation. As of August 15, 2025, VinFast's market cap has dwindled to $8.35 billion. VinFast market cap surged after its August 15, 2023 listing. Source: Stock Analysis. Operationally, VinFast has shuttered its US showrooms and postponed its factory construction. Financially, the net losses have been staggering at $2.4 billion in 2023 and nearly $3.2 billion in 2024. Yet, Vuong remains defiant, vowing in April 2024 to 'never give up on VinFast' with plans to make the company break even by the end of 2026. However, this would require recouping a cumulative investment of over $20 billion and settling over $10 billion in debt. This raises an important question: given the financial realities detailed in Vingroup's own reports, is Vuong's plan to bring VinFast to break-even truly realistic? This article was published in English by The Vietnamese and originally published in Vietnamese by Luat Khoa Magazine. It is republished here with kind permission.
HKFP
3 hours ago
- HKFP
Hong Kong exchange posts record revenue on listing boom
Hong Kong's stock exchange operator reported its best-ever half-year revenue on Wednesday, bolstered by a surge in initial public offerings and trading activity. The Chinese finance hub has weathered a prolonged slump in IPOs since 2020, with many major firms putting their listing plans on hold in light of a regulatory crackdown by Beijing. But analysts are expecting Hong Kong to reclaim the crown this year as more and more Chinese companies pivot to list in the city amid broader geopolitical tensions. Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing (HKEX) on Wednesday reported a revenue record of HK$14.1 billion ($1.8 billion) for the first half of 2025, up 33 percent from the same period last year. Profit attributable to shareholders rose 39 percent to HK$8.52 billion, the statement said. It added that the average daily turnover from trading of equity products during the period was HK$222.8 billion, up 122 percent on-year. The bourse attributed the strong results to renewed investor interest in China-related assets, which is driven by optimism in the country's economic outlook and supportive policies, as well as developments in artificial intelligence. In a statement, HKEX chairman Carlson Tong warned that despite 'tariffs, geopolitical risks and interest rate fluctuations', he was 'cautiously optimistic about the outlook for the second half of the year'. This year's surge in IPOs was 'reinforcing Hong Kong as a listing venue of choice for issuers seeking to raise funds from both Mainland and international investors', Tong said. Contributing to the buzz in Hong Kong's capital markets have been several blockbuster listings by Chinese companies, including battery giant CATL, pharmaceutical firm Jiangsu Hengrui and soy sauce maker Foshan Haitian. The exchange saw 44 new listings during the first half of the year that raised a total of HK$109.4 billion, up 716 percent year-on-year, Wednesday's statement said. And HKEX is processing more than 200 listing applications, its database shows, a sign of further momentum. In early August, HKEX eased some of its IPO rules for China-listed companies seeking to raise overseas capital in Hong Kong, including by lowering the minimum public float requirement. Singapore-based e-commerce titan Shein has considered moving back to China to boost a Hong Kong listing bid, Bloomberg reported Tuesday, after the firm's other IPO plans in New York and London stalled. HKEX shares have risen nearly 50 percent this year.
AllAfrica
11 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Why President Lee Jae Myung will stop in Tokyo before Washington
Great attention in South Korea is rightfully focused on the high-stakes visit later this month of President Lee Jae Myung to Washington, DC. Worries about the future of alliance relations with the United States are growing, fed by the apparent readiness of President Donald Trump to abandon Ukraine and subordinate relations with Europe to those with Russian President Vladimir Putin. All this, however, also serves to underscore the strategic importance of President Lee's decision to stop in Tokyo on his way to Washington. Aside from the unprecedented decision to visit Japan before the United States, the August 23–24 visit allows the two Asian neighbors and allies of the United States to tightly coordinate their response to the Trump administration. South Korea and Japan face an overlapping set of challenges in managing relations with the United States under the second Trump administration. Both are under pressure to vastly increase defense spending, fork over much larger amounts of money to support US force presence, deal with high tariffs on vital exports such as automobiles and electronics, and subordinate their handling of economic and diplomatic ties with China to the Trump administration's policy. The South Korean government has closely followed the progress – and lack thereof – of Japan's trade and diplomatic talks with the United States. And to a large extent, South Korea's policy responses, from increasing direct investment to easing non-tariff barriers, have mirrored those of Japan. But Lee's upcoming meeting with Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba in Tokyo implies more than just policy coordination. As the South Korean leader indicated in his Liberation Day speech on August 15, there is a growing emphasis on deepening the bilateral partnership to effectively hedge against the United States' retreat from global leadership and security commitments. Lee avoided the anti-Japanese rhetoric often pushed by previous South Korean progressive administrations. Instead, his sophisticated address took note of the 'polycrisis' facing South Korea – from realigned supply chains, the collapse of the global trade order, industrial and technological transformation and climate change. In that context, he gave special emphasis to the role of the South Korea-Japan relationship: Korea and Japan have achieved industrial development in tandem. As such, we will be able to overcome the challenges of the artificial intelligence era, which is marked by competition to secure a commanding lead, when our two countries pursue future-oriented cooperation based on mutual trust. Guided by the principle of pragmatic, national interest-focused diplomacy, we will seek forward-looking, mutually beneficial cooperation with Japan while holding frequent meetings and frank dialogues through shuttle diplomacy. The stronger the trust, the higher the quality of cooperation. Unlike last year's address by then-President Yoon Suk Yeol, President Lee's speech confronted the thorny issue of history – the painful past of Japanese colonialism and ongoing issues over wartime justice and acknowledgement of South Korean victims of Japanese rule. 'I hope that the Japanese government will squarely face up to our painful history and strive to maintain trust between our two countries,' Lee added in his speech. 'I believe that such efforts will bring greater shared benefits and a brighter future for both sides.' South Korean reactions were broadly supportive, from both conservative and progressive circles, reflecting the popular support for improving South Korea-Japan relations. Ishiba's willingness to acknowledge Japan's wartime past and responsibility is widely known, particularly in contrast to the views of the right-wing faction in his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). He signaled a desire to utilize the eightieth anniversary of the end of World War II to issue his own statement on the nature and lessons of the war. But leading up to August 15, the Japanese leader was under great pressure from within his own party, particularly following their loss in the July election for Japan's legislative upper house. The right-wing Japanese daily Sankei Shimbun issued a warning to Ishiba on August 11 that he should not express his 'one-sided, masochistic view of history, viewing Japan as the aggressor in the conflict. If the prime minister goes ahead and expresses such views, regardless of the timing or format, it could lend momentum to anti-Japan propaganda by China, South Korea and North Korea and risk injury to Japanese citizens.' Ishiba has tried to maneuver between these pressures and his own desire to draw lessons from Japan's mistakes that led to war. He issued a short address on August 15 at an official memorial ceremony for the war dead. 'Eighty years have now passed since the war ended,' Ishiba said in his address. 'Today, generations with no firsthand experience of war make up the great majority. We must never again repeat the horrors of war. We must never again lose our way. We must now take deeply into our hearts once again our remorse and also the lessons learned from that war.' It marked the first time in thirteen years that a Japanese leader used the word hansei , which is sometimes translated as remorse but can also be understood as self-reflection. In its Japanese usage, it implies not just acknowledging one's mistakes but also pledging to avoid such mistakes in the future. Importantly, it was first used by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama, the Socialist leader who issued the standard-setting statement in 1994 on the fiftieth anniversary of the war's end, expressing not only 'deep remorse' but also referring to Japan's responsibility for 'aggression and colonial rule.' Ishiba, however, stopped short of repeating those words. While praising his nod toward facing the past, both South Korean and liberal Japanese media faulted him for bowing to pressures and not explicitly confronting history. The Asahi Shimbun pointed to the prime minister's failure to confront the strong opposition within the LDP that seeks to draw a line on any further expressions of 'apology diplomacy.' The contrast between Ishiba and the powerful right-wing LDP elements was made clear on August 15, when prominent leaders of the party, including some vying to replace Ishiba as prime minister, honored Japan's war dead at Yasukuni Shrine. The visitors included members of the Ishiba cabinet, notably Minister of Finance Katsunobu Kato and Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Shinjiro Koizumi. Also visiting were close followers of former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, such as Sanae Takaichi, Takayuki Kobayashi and Koichi Hagiuda. Visits by senior officials and political leaders to the shrine evoke memories of Japanese imperialism. In particular, the visit of Koizumi, considered to be the leader of reformist elements of the ruling party, drew comments. His visit 'appeared to reaffirm his alignment with Japan's nationalist right,' said the Korea Times . 'The move drew inevitable comparisons to his father, whose frequent shrine visits during his premiership strained Tokyo's relations with Seoul and Beijing.' The Lee administration was clearly encouraged by Ishiba's statement but also concerned by the Yasukuni visits. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a pro forma statement that 'strongly urges the leaders of Japan to squarely face history and demonstrate through action their humble reflection and sincere remorse for Japan's past history, and stresses that this is an important foundation for the development of future-oriented relations between the two countries based on mutual trust.' Ishiba has opened the possibility that he may issue a fuller and franker statement of his views on September 2, the eightieth anniversary of the signing of Japan's surrender. The right wing continues to raise alarms about this option. But 'Lee's first visit to Tokyo might create a more interesting opportunity' for Ishiba to make his views clear, a senior correspondent at the Asahi Shimbun told this writer. 'Tokyo and Seoul share so much in common in coping with Trump,' the veteran Japanese journalist observed. 'Lee has sealed off his populist approach, and is sending Tokyo multiple signals that the Korean progressive president is ready for a pragmatic and future-oriented relationship. Let's see how it plays out.' It is unlikely the Trump administration is even aware of these developments or understands the importance of this 'Japan First' stopover. It will be watched closely, however, not only in South Korea and Japan but in the broader region. Daniel C. Sneider is a non-resident distinguished fellow at the Korea Economic Institute of America and a lecturer in East Asian Studies at Stanford University. This article, first published by KEI, is republished with permission.
