Fire every GNU Minister who is not doing their job! How citizens would channel their inner Madiba
Sphesihle H on, a fourth-year student at the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT).
'If I was Nelson Mandela today, I would call GNU leaders for a hard talk, draft a new national plan, launch a truth commission to expose corruption and push community policing,'
'In essence, I would take action to tackle and resolve internal conflicts, dishonest practices by those in authority and a high incidence of crime.' — Lisakhanya Venna
Entle Mcasi, a student at CPUT
'I would call for unity among GNU parties to prioritise the nation's welfare over political differences. Act decisively against corruption in politics and policing. To combat crime, I'd strengthen community partnerships and ensure justice is fair and swift. I'd make sure that we invest in rebuilding our cities for all citizens.' — Lisakhanya Venna
Lerato Bashing, Cape Town
'The best way to fix South Africa is not by having lots of conversations about what's wrong, or lots of meetings, or court cases back and forth — we need the people who are in the roles in government to do their jobs. In the same way [as] corporate, [where] you have your five metrics that you need to meet to get promoted — we need the same thing for government.'
'For example, Minister X would need to do tasks A, B, C and D to stay as Minister X for the next year. And those performance metrics need to be available to the public, so that we can track them.'
'There needs to be decisive action … for those who are underperforming, so that the people can trust them again — so that when we vote, we vote for a government that cares, because right now it doesn't feel like they care.' — Victoria O'Regan
Megan Bobotyane, leader of the community living in Ahmed Kathrada House, an occupied building in Green Point, Cape Town
On the GNU
'I think I would take a completely different direction. I think I would remove every single minister, especially ministers that have served more than one term, and based on [their] performance, I would look at what they've done.
'[For example], has the crime rate gone down? Has it gone up? What has happened in terms of their portfolio? And if nothing significant has come about, then I would remove them,' Bobotyane said.
'Clear out that Cabinet completely. Let's start afresh. Change the culture within government to one of 'excellence'. 'What is the point of promoting a culture of sloth?'
'Hold people accountable. I think that would sort out corruption.'
On Crime
'The bottom people [are] just the end part, but the real problem lies in the heads of power. Hold everybody accountable. The law should treat everybody equally.'
On Unemployment
'Change the schooling system.We are teaching kids things that are irrelevant to them.'
'Start classes in entrepreneurship and coding from an early age.'
'Financial literacy should be one of the biggest modules in school – you shouldn't have to wait until you get to university to be introduced to such a thing.' — Victoria O'Regan
Angelina Siphalali, Midrand
GNU infighting
'If I was Nelson Mandela I would sort out the infighting in the government of national unity (GNU) by not having a GNU at all. The problem is that there are too many parties in government right now that don't see eye to eye. If I was Mandela I would hold a meeting with all the parties and make an arrangement that they all become one party because it's clear all these different parties cannot work together.'
Ministers not doing their jobs
'In terms of ministers not doing their work, I would just fire them all. If they cannot do the job they are hired to do, then why must they be earning a salary? You know, we actually have too many ministers, so after I fire them, I won't even replace them because some of them are just there to have a title.'
Corruption
'Corrupt police and ministers must be fired and sent to jail. Simple as that.'
Unemployment
'The problem with unemployment is that there are a lot of people from outside working for little money, which means South Africans don't get jobs. I will make a policy where South Africans are hired first before anyone else.' — Lerato Mutsila
Ipeleng Tlholoe 35, Midrand
GNU infighting
'It's a difficult question because the GNU was formed to create stability within government. But because there is no unity, I would revert back to the old system of having one party or even change the Constitution so that you vote for the president and not the party.'
Ministers not doing their jobs
'Performance management is important to make sure ministers are doing their jobs. People must be held accountable and there must be regular reviews like we have in corporate. In government, people are just not doing their work and they are not held accountable for their actions.'
GNU infighting
'I'd tell the GNU leaders: stop the circus. Mandela would've demanded focus.'
'I'd establish a national coalition charter that all parties must sign – stick to the mandate or leave. You can't govern a country while fighting among yourselves. That's not leadership.'
Ministers not doing their jobs
'Back when I was a cop, if you didn't perform, you were out. Ministers should sign clear performance contracts with timelines. If there's no progress in six months, show them the door. Mandela didn't tolerate dead weight.'
Corruption of politicians and police
'I'd strengthen the Hawks and make an example of one high-profile case — a true arrest with consequences. I'd also overhaul the police recruitment system and bring back community-based policing. We don't need more cops; we need better ones, with discipline and honour.'
Crime out of control
'We need joint operations between the South African Police Service (SAPS) and communities. I'd also fund and train neighbourhood watches again – properly. Mandela would promote a shared responsibility. Tackling crime can't just be the job of the SAPS. Families, schools, the justice system – all must work together.'
Cities falling apart
'I'd bring in skilled retirees like engineers, project managers and contractors to advise municipalities. Mandela valued wisdom. We have the knowledge – we're just not using it. Maintenance teams must be deployed daily. Clean cities bring dignity and reduce crime too.'
Unemployment
'We must get practical. I'd revive public works programmes – not temporary ones, but sustainable, skills-based ones. Mandela believed in dignity through work. Fixing roads, housing, parks – those are jobs. Also, get local businesses to commit to hiring from their own communities.' – Nkosazana Ngwadla
GNU infighting
'Mandela would say: enough!'
'I'd bring party leaders to a mediation process led by civil society elders – respected people, not politicians. If they continue fighting, I'd dissolve positions and invite fresh elections. The nation must come before party politics.'
Ministers not doing their jobs
'As a teacher, I know what it means to be held accountable. I'd introduce monthly community scorecards for ministers. If they're not delivering, they must step down. Mandela would lead by example — and expect others to do the same.'
Corruption of politicians and police
'This is where we've lost our way. Mandela would be heartbroken. I'd launch a 'Justice for All' campaign — zero tolerance, lifetime bans from public office for the corrupt.
'I'd start with cleaning up the police. Teachers and police are the heart of a community – both must have integrity.'
Crime out of control
'It starts at home and school. I'd build after-school programmes in every area – sports, reading, arts. Young people need structure and hope. Mandela was all about prevention. I'd also hold community policing forums monthly and ensure neighbourhoods are empowered to help keep themselves safe.'
Cities falling apart
'I'd mobilise schools, NGOs and businesses to 'adopt' parts of the city – parks, libraries, clinics. Everyone must play a role. Mandela inspired civic pride. Let's rekindle that. And yes, let's fire the municipal officials who don't deliver basic services.'
Unemployment
'Mandela would double down on education. I'd link every school leaver to a skill programme and mentorship pipeline. I'd work with businesses to ensure training leads to actual jobs.
We must stop giving young people theory and give them opportunity.' — Nkosazana Ngwadla DM
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While significant for individual mobility, these gains often benefited those already positioned to seize opportunities, creating a stratified black society rather than broad-based economic upliftment. As beneficiaries of elite pact-making, Black Diamonds reflect the tragic evolution of the Black Englishmen of the early 20th century. Their lifestyles mirror white consumption while their politics maintain the status quo. Many are disconnected from township and rural realities, reproducing the very inequalities their predecessors sought to dismantle. This insulated black elite has become both beneficiary and buffer of post-apartheid exclusion. Genuine asset redistribution and the transfer of productive capacity were sidelined. The outcome was a disastrous failure of the promised 'double transition'. Political democracy flourished in appearance, but economic inclusion came to a halt. Wealth inequality worsened. By 2022, the top 10% owned over 85% of wealth, with racialised patterns continuing. Unemployment skyrocketed, especially among black youth. Land reform made little progress. The structural exclusion created by apartheid was replicated, not dismantled, under the new regime. This elite pact-making produces what Thomas Carothers diagnosed as 'feckless pluralism'. Vibrant elections and a laudable constitution mask a system where real power resides with interconnected economic and political elites. Post-1994, grassroots movements and trade unions, the engines of apartheid's downfall, were systematically marginalised or co-opted into elite power-sharing arrangements, through the ANC/SACP/Cosatu tripartite alliance. Decision-making is centralised within party structures, substituting elite consensus for popular participation. The state's potential as a development engine was hampered by its adherence to market orthodoxy and the safeguarding of historically accumulated privilege. Public services declined, affecting black townships and rural areas most severely. The social wage promised by liberation rhetoric failed to be realised on a large scale, unable to address deep-rooted inequalities. The core principle of the pact — stability through elite accommodation — actively obstructed transformative state action. The ANC's 2024 electoral collapse, resulting in its loss of majority, led to the formation of a new GNU. Presented as 'stability' and 'national interest', it eerily reflects the dynamics of the 1994 pact. The ANC partnered with the DA, the main defender of white capital interests, explicitly excluding parties advocating radical economic change, such as the EFF and MKP. That is not to say the latter is least interested in ascending to the exclusive elite club that runs the 'new' South Africa. This new GNU, like its predecessor, was imposed without meaningful public consultation. Its stated priorities — 'economic growth', 'investor confidence', 'fiscal discipline' — directly echo the Gear-era mantra, signalling continuity over change. DA demands focus on protecting existing economic structures and constraining state intervention, rather than redistribution. Land reform and national health insurance face renewed opposition. Furthermore, the GNU embodies self-preservation. DA leader Helen Zille's swift pledge to shield President Ramaphosa from accountability over the Phala Phala scandal clearly illustrates its core function: protecting elite interests across the political divide. Once again, the pact serves the powerful, not the populace. It prioritises managing the status quo over transforming it. Thirty years after apartheid's formal end, elite pact-making continues to be South Africa's core governance process. The 2024 GNU is not unusual, but the latest version of a system formed in the Codesa backrooms. It aligns with Frantz Fanon's insightful warning in The Wretched of the Earth: post-colonial elites often become a 'new bureaucratic aristocracy', perpetuating exclusion under new banners. Liberation remains sadly limited to the ballot box. The DA, backed by settler capital and a rhetoric of colour-blind liberalism, has long resisted redistribution. That the ANC — founded to resist white settler unity — now governs in alliance with it, is a bitter historical irony. As the DA's foreign policy posture shows, white privilege continues to shape South Africa's role in the world, often against the interests of the black majority. Yet resistance has not vanished. Movements like Abahlali baseMjondolo, the Amadiba Crisis Committee, and landless rural women's networks are reviving mass-based, participatory politics outside elite pacts. Their democratic imaginations challenge both the procedural limits of electoralism and the material violence of dispossession. A different future remains possible. But it requires rupturing elite continuity, rejecting symbolic inclusion and forging a mass, redistributive democracy where dignity is not aspirational, but lived. Siyayibanga le economy! * Siyabonga Hadebe is an independent commentator based in Geneva on socio-economic, political and global matters. ** The views expressed here do not reflect those of the Sunday Independent, Independent Media, or IOL. Get the real story on the go: Follow the Sunday Independent on WhatsApp.
