US fires hot shot in hypersonic sea race with China
The US Navy fired a major shot in the race for sea-based hypersonic dominance, aiming to turn a long-troubled stealth destroyer into tomorrow's fastest naval strike platform.
This month, the US Navy successfully conducted an end-to-end flight test of a conventional hypersonic missile, marking a pivotal step toward its first sea-based hypersonic capability.
The test, conducted at Florida's Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, validated the US Navy's cold-gas launch system, designed to eject missiles before ignition safely.
It advances the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) program, developed in partnership with the US Army's Rapid Capabilities Office, which had completed two prior flight tests in 2024.
Vice Admiral Johnny R Wolfe Jr, head of Strategic Systems Programs, said the milestone brings the US Navy closer to deploying CPS aboard the USS Zumwalt.
The hypersonic system, offering high speed, range and survivability, enhances US deterrence and strike capabilities amid growing strategic competition. Insights from the test will inform the refinement of the common All Up Round (AUR) missile, reinforcing the ability to counter high-end adversary threats.
The War Zone (TWZ) reported in January 2025 that the Zumwalt-class can carry up to 12 missiles triple-packed into Advanced Payload Module (APM) canisters.
TWZ says that the Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) missiles to be installed aboard the ships will have an unpowered boost-glide vehicle payload capable of maneuvering unpredictably toward their targets.
Delving into the tactical advantages of sea-based hypersonic weapons, Francis Mahon and Punch Moulton mention in a January 2025 article for Real Clear Defense that such weapons can be effective against time-sensitive targets, often fleeting, high-value, and high-payoff.
Mahon and Punch note that such targets are often beyond the reach or responsiveness of current strike capabilities, but hypersonic weapons can change that.
Illustrating that capability difference, the Atlantic Council mentions in a March 2025 report that traditional subsonic cruise missiles, such as the Tomahawk or Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile (JASSM), would take an hour to hit a target 800 kilometers away, while a hypersonic cruise missile could hit the mark in less than ten minutes.
The report also says that a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) can cover the distance between Guam and the Taiwan Strait in less than 30 minutes.
To underscore the scale of hitting time-sensitive targets, Thomas MacDonald mentions in a January 2025 article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Strategic Studies that the operators of ground-based mobile missiles could deploy multiple transporter-erector-launchers (TEL) across different locations simultaneously, ensuring a survivable capability.
MacDonald says that TEL operators could choose to move their missiles if gaps exist in an adversary's remote sensing coverage. He notes that TEL operators could keep their missiles hidden if an adversary loses track of the projectiles, forcing them to keep track of them continuously and nullifying the advantages of sensor technologies that rely on stealth or have limited endurance.
In addition, MacDonald states that TEL operators would likely deploy countermeasures against an adversary's tracking capabilities, which range from satellite-blinding lasers to decoys.
To further illustrate the threat, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has approximately 1,500 TEL units, presenting a formidable targeting challenge. The PLARF, as noted by the report, plays a critical role in China's counter-intervention strategy against Taiwan and strategic nuclear deterrence.
Discussing the advantages of deploying hypersonic weapons at sea, former US Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday mentions in an April 2021 USNI News article that such deployment could enable multi-vector attacks.
In addition, Gilday points out that deploying hypersonic weapons at sea gives a mobility advantage, which can substantially increase survivability, given that adversaries may have access to ubiquitous satellite imagery of the Pacific.
Contextualizing the possible deployment of hypersonic-armed Zumwalt-class destroyers at the operational level, such ships may play a critical role as part of a two-level force described by Thomas Mahnken in a February 2022 Proceedings article.
Of that dual force, Mahnken mentions that an 'inside force' composed of mobile, dispersed ground and expeditionary forces would transform the First Island Chain spanning Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines into defensive bastions armed with missiles, sensors and electronic warfare systems to prevent China from projecting power beyond that region.
That force, Mahnken says, would be supported by an 'outside force' primarily consisting of air and naval forces employing standoff or penetrating capabilities that could exploit gaps in China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems created by inside forces to support defensive operations with mass and conduct offensive operations, including strikes on the Chinese mainland.
As a hypersonic weapon launcher, the Zumwalt class could be a critical asset in an envisioned outside force. However, rising costs and delays could once again derail the platform's relevance, echoing the cost-death spiral of its previously equipped Advanced Gun System (AGS) intended initially for naval gunfire support (NGFS).
A US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from April 2025 says that due to high costs, the US may only have a small number of hypersonic weapons. It also mentions that the US may need large numbers of such weapons to defeat high-end targets.
A January 2023 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report illustrates these likely prohibitive costs, mentioning that intermediate-range hypersonic boost-glide missiles of the type to be installed in the Zumwalt class could cost up to US$41 million per unit.
The effectiveness of the Zumwalt class is also in question. A US CRS report from December 2024 mentions insufficient data to determine the class's effectiveness in anti-air warfare (AAW), torpedo defense and undersea warfare.
The report states that the Zumwalt-class surface strike capabilities have yet to be evaluated following the completion of live missile events in 2027. It also says that existing data is insufficient to assess the type's survivability against threat weapons.
Meanwhile, as the US continues retrofitting a previously sidelined destroyer platform to accommodate hypersonic weapons, China may already have the upper hand in ship-based hypersonic firepower.
In April 2022, Naval News reported that China test-fired the YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) from one of its Type 055 cruisers.
According to Naval News, launch footage may imply that the YJ-21 might be a cold-launched, two-stage missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)—similar to the type of weapon the US plans to install on its Zumwalt-class destroyers.
The report also points out that China has eight Type 055 cruisers in service and additional units planned, in contrast to the three-ship Zumwalt-class, with its DDG(X) successor still in development.
Whether the rearmed Zumwalt class signals the dawn of a new strike era or represents a last-ditch revival of the platform, the hypersonic race at sea is accelerating and the US cannot afford complacency.
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The hypersonic system, offering high speed, range and survivability, enhances US deterrence and strike capabilities amid growing strategic competition. Insights from the test will inform the refinement of the common All Up Round (AUR) missile, reinforcing the ability to counter high-end adversary threats. The War Zone (TWZ) reported in January 2025 that the Zumwalt-class can carry up to 12 missiles triple-packed into Advanced Payload Module (APM) canisters. TWZ says that the Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike (IRCPS) missiles to be installed aboard the ships will have an unpowered boost-glide vehicle payload capable of maneuvering unpredictably toward their targets. Delving into the tactical advantages of sea-based hypersonic weapons, Francis Mahon and Punch Moulton mention in a January 2025 article for Real Clear Defense that such weapons can be effective against time-sensitive targets, often fleeting, high-value, and high-payoff. 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MacDonald says that TEL operators could choose to move their missiles if gaps exist in an adversary's remote sensing coverage. He notes that TEL operators could keep their missiles hidden if an adversary loses track of the projectiles, forcing them to keep track of them continuously and nullifying the advantages of sensor technologies that rely on stealth or have limited endurance. In addition, MacDonald states that TEL operators would likely deploy countermeasures against an adversary's tracking capabilities, which range from satellite-blinding lasers to decoys. To further illustrate the threat, the US Department of Defense's (DOD) 2024 China Military Power Report (CMPR) mentions that China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) has approximately 1,500 TEL units, presenting a formidable targeting challenge. The PLARF, as noted by the report, plays a critical role in China's counter-intervention strategy against Taiwan and strategic nuclear deterrence. Discussing the advantages of deploying hypersonic weapons at sea, former US Navy Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Michael Gilday mentions in an April 2021 USNI News article that such deployment could enable multi-vector attacks. In addition, Gilday points out that deploying hypersonic weapons at sea gives a mobility advantage, which can substantially increase survivability, given that adversaries may have access to ubiquitous satellite imagery of the Pacific. Contextualizing the possible deployment of hypersonic-armed Zumwalt-class destroyers at the operational level, such ships may play a critical role as part of a two-level force described by Thomas Mahnken in a February 2022 Proceedings article. Of that dual force, Mahnken mentions that an 'inside force' composed of mobile, dispersed ground and expeditionary forces would transform the First Island Chain spanning Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines into defensive bastions armed with missiles, sensors and electronic warfare systems to prevent China from projecting power beyond that region. That force, Mahnken says, would be supported by an 'outside force' primarily consisting of air and naval forces employing standoff or penetrating capabilities that could exploit gaps in China's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems created by inside forces to support defensive operations with mass and conduct offensive operations, including strikes on the Chinese mainland. As a hypersonic weapon launcher, the Zumwalt class could be a critical asset in an envisioned outside force. However, rising costs and delays could once again derail the platform's relevance, echoing the cost-death spiral of its previously equipped Advanced Gun System (AGS) intended initially for naval gunfire support (NGFS). A US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from April 2025 says that due to high costs, the US may only have a small number of hypersonic weapons. It also mentions that the US may need large numbers of such weapons to defeat high-end targets. A January 2023 US Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report illustrates these likely prohibitive costs, mentioning that intermediate-range hypersonic boost-glide missiles of the type to be installed in the Zumwalt class could cost up to US$41 million per unit. The effectiveness of the Zumwalt class is also in question. A US CRS report from December 2024 mentions insufficient data to determine the class's effectiveness in anti-air warfare (AAW), torpedo defense and undersea warfare. The report states that the Zumwalt-class surface strike capabilities have yet to be evaluated following the completion of live missile events in 2027. It also says that existing data is insufficient to assess the type's survivability against threat weapons. Meanwhile, as the US continues retrofitting a previously sidelined destroyer platform to accommodate hypersonic weapons, China may already have the upper hand in ship-based hypersonic firepower. In April 2022, Naval News reported that China test-fired the YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) from one of its Type 055 cruisers. According to Naval News, launch footage may imply that the YJ-21 might be a cold-launched, two-stage missile equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)—similar to the type of weapon the US plans to install on its Zumwalt-class destroyers. The report also points out that China has eight Type 055 cruisers in service and additional units planned, in contrast to the three-ship Zumwalt-class, with its DDG(X) successor still in development. Whether the rearmed Zumwalt class signals the dawn of a new strike era or represents a last-ditch revival of the platform, the hypersonic race at sea is accelerating and the US cannot afford complacency.
