Latest news with #TWZ
AllAfrica
08-07-2025
- Science
- AllAfrica
China's sea-skimming 'monster' surfaces with stealth
China's 'Bohai Sea Monster' just surfaced – an experimental sea-skimming aircraft that blurs the line between ship and plane, promising stealthy speed but raising strategic questions. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that the first full image of China's experimental wing-in-ground effect (WIG) craft, unofficially dubbed the 'Bohai Sea Monster,' surfaced this week, providing unprecedented insight into its design and potential applications. Initially observed in obscured imagery on a Bohai Sea pier, the aircraft exhibits characteristics reminiscent of the AG600 amphibious flying boat and the US Liberty Lifter, both designed for high-speed, low-altitude transport across littoral zones. Equipped with a joined v-tail, wingtip sponsons, amidships floats, composite structure, and a stepped hull, the WIG's configuration favors cargo delivery and personnel recovery while minimizing radar exposure and vulnerability to naval threats. Propulsion remains uncertain; while jet-engine exhausts are suggested, visual inconsistencies raise the possibility of turboprop or hybrid-electric systems. The aircraft's potential roles span logistics, search and rescue, anti-submarine warfare, and contested combat zone recovery missions, particularly within China's immediate maritime vicinity. Given China's geographic advantage and increasing focus on maritime power projection, this platform may serve as either a technology demonstrator or precursor to scaled production. Analysts expect further imagery and technical data to emerge, enhancing clarity on China's ambitions in leveraging ground-effect technologies for strategic mobility and survivability in near-sea operations. The main tactical advantage of WIG craft is that they are designed to fly just above the water's surface, allowing them to be much faster and more efficient than ships while staying below the radar horizon. However, Anil Chopra notes in a July 2022 article for the Center of Air Power Studies (CAPS) that WIG aircraft face notable limitations, including maneuverability constraints in congested environments, susceptibility to obstacle interference and vulnerability under severe weather conditions. Chopra adds that while advantageous in low-altitude flight for radar evasion, their reliance on stable sea states – especially during amphibious operations – may impair mission continuity. He further explains that despite improved endurance and payload over vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) systems, WIG platforms require extensive infrastructure, such as large hangars, and offer limited altitude flexibility for tactical repositioning. Chopra notes that adverse conditions may necessitate a diversion to higher altitudes, which reduces stealth benefits. He also highlights that radar detection remains feasible at ultra-low altitudes, potentially compromising survivability against integrated air defenses. Production viability may also be in question. As Justin Katz observes in a November 2022 article for Breaking Defense, the Soviet Union built several WIG craft, such as the Lun-class, but failed to produce a design viable for mass production. The implication for China is that despite technological advances, moving from prototype to fleet-scale deployment remains a formidable challenge. At the operational level, China's WIG craft may play critical roles in the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and possibly beyond the First Island Chain. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported in April 2023 that a WIG based in Hainan could reach any point in the disputed South China Sea within four hours and transport passengers or cargo between Chinese-controlled islands in the region. SCMP notes that WIGs could be critical assets for a fast transport network between China and its occupied islands in the South China Sea. In a Taiwan Strait conflict, H.I. Sutton notes in a June 2025 Naval News article, China's new WIG would be particularly suited for amphibious landing operations. The author points out that some Soviet designs were intended to deliver troops and armored vehicles directly onto enemy beaches. Supporting this notion, Walker Mills and other writers in a September 2020 Proceedings article describe how a fleet of 10 Soviet Lun-class WIGs could cross the Baltic Sea with minimal radar signature in just 12 minutes and land 5,000 troops without warning. However, the Taiwan Strait presents environmental challenges that could limit WIG use during an invasion. In a November 2024 report for the US Naval War College, Andrew Erickson and other authors note that China faces numerous obstacles in executing an amphibious assault across the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Strait presents environmental challenges that could limit WIG use during an invasion They point out that the strait's 130-kilometer-wide waters are prone to rough sea states, limiting viable landing days to about 10 per month during favorable seasons. They add that the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) amphibious sealift capability is insufficient to sustain a large-scale, multi-wave landing force. Moreover, they state that Taiwan's coastal topography – characterized by cliffs, narrow beaches and urban sprawl – further constrains viable landing zones. They also mention that Taiwan's precision strike capabilities, layered coastal defenses and early warning systems would likely disrupt cross-strait logistics and troop buildup. Beyond transport roles, China may consider constructing a combat variant of its WIG. Michael Knickerbocker notes in a March 2022 article for the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) that wing-in-ground maritime attack craft (WMACs) offer disruptive tactical advantages by exploiting radar limitations with low-elevation, sea-skimming profiles and unpredictable flight patterns. Knickerbocker explains that WMACs – capable of exceeding 250 knots within surface ducting zones – can evade radar filters by mimicking false tracks, stress-testing watch stander training and radar logic. Their small crew requirements, short launch distances, and integration of countermeasures enhance survivability while executing off-axis anti-ship missile strikes. H.I. Sutton illustrates Knickerbocker's ideas in an August 2020 article, noting that the Soviet Lun-class WIG was built to attack US Navy warships in a coastal defense role, operating as a missile boat capable of covering a much larger area. Sutton adds that a three-ship formation of Lun-class WIGs could close in to within 35 kilometers of a target vessel—nearly point-blank range for their Moskit supersonic anti-ship missiles, leaving minimal reaction time for defenses. He notes that a single Moskit missile has a range of 96 kilometers, and three Lun-class WIGs could collectively fire 18 such missiles at Mach 3. Yet Sutton points out that the Lun-class WIG was vastly inferior to the Tu-22 bomber in maritime strike roles, rendering it a costly and limited alternative to conventional airpower. Similarly, China now fields the KD-21 air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM), which can be deployed from H-6K strategic bombers, possibly rendering a future combat WIG redundant. Whether it becomes a game-changer or an expensive curiosity, China's sea-skimming 'monster' is making waves, above and below the radar.
AllAfrica
02-07-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
Japan's railgun strikes at China's hypersonic shadow
Japan's prototype ship-mounted railgun marks a bold step toward fast, affordable missile defense as it works to fill crucial gaps revealed by China's hypersonic weapons and limited interceptor supplies. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that Japan has fitted the test warship JS Asuka with a prototype electromagnetic railgun, marking a significant step toward deploying this advanced weapon system, as confirmed by recent online photos. In June, observers spotted the railgun – similar to a previous land-based prototype developed by the Japanese Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) – in port with its protective shroud removed, revealing internal work underway. Maritime testing is expected before the end of July. Japan's progress contrasts with the US Navy's discontinued efforts in the early 2020s following sustained technical setbacks. The 6,200-ton Asuka accommodates containerized power systems to manage the energy demands of the railgun, which reportedly propels projectiles at Mach 6.5 using five megajoules of charge. ATLA aims to reduce power requirements while improving barrel longevity beyond the current 120-round lifespan. The initiative aligns with future deployment plans aboard 13DDX destroyers and Maya-class vessels to bolster defenses against hypersonic threats. Officials at the DSEI Japan 2025 defense and security equipment international forum cited continued collaboration with US counterparts and noted growing interest from France, Germany, China and Turkey in similar technologies. Japan's railgun ambitions reflect a strategic pivot to cost-effective, rapid-fire capabilities amid intensifying regional competition. Asia Times previously noted that the railgun's cost-effective ability to engage lower-tier threats helps reduce dependency on high-value interceptors, enabling sustained defenses against saturation missile attacks. Underscoring China's growing missile capabilities, Maki Nakagawa notes in a March 2025 article for the Japan Institute for National Fundamentals (JINF) that China has expanded five conventional brigades equipped with DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) and CJ-10/100 cruise missiles capable of striking Japan. Nakagawa highlights that the DF-17's unpredictable trajectory and the CJ-100's low-altitude, supersonic profile challenge Japan's ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems. She adds that satellite imagery has confirmed construction at brigade-size facilities since 2018, with the 655th Brigade converted to a DF-17 unit in 2024. She states that the DF-26 intermediate-range missile, now fielded by four nuclear-capable brigades, has replaced older DF-21A units. Japan currently employs a two-tier missile defense system, with Aegis-equipped destroyers providing midcourse interception and Patriot batteries handling terminal defense. However, Kyodo News reported in October 2022 that Japan had only 60% of the necessary interceptor missiles for its Aegis and Patriot systems to counter threats from North Korea and China. To address the shortfall, Stars and Stripes reported in February 2025 that Japan purchased 150 SM-6 missiles worth USD 900 million from the US. Naval News reported in April 2025 that Japan proposed co-producing SM-6 interceptors for Aegis destroyers during talks with the United States, expanding on an earlier agreement to co-produce Patriot PAC-3 missiles. Yet, SM-6 production remains uncertain. Naval News reported in June 2025 that the US Navy's FY2026 missile procurement depended on passing a Republican-led reconciliation budget bill. The report said a funding shortfall in the proposed $817.4 million budget would trigger a contract breach, halting production after only 10 units. It added that disruption would jeopardize foreign orders from Japan, Australia, and South Korea. The bill, which had originated in the House of Representatives, passed the Senate on Tuesday. The report warned that such a scenario would undercut allied deterrence and expose vulnerabilities in integrated air and missile defense architectures. Former US Missile Defense Agency (MDA) director John Hill, cited by TWZ in February 2022, said that while the SM-6 is the only US interceptor theoretically capable of defeating hypersonic missiles, its capability remains 'nascent.' Meanwhile, the successor Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI) program faces delays. Defense News reported in March 2025 that the GPI, initially scheduled for deployment by 2032, now faces a three-year delay due to early program down-selection and reduced funding, pushing delivery to at least 2035. Andreas Schmidt, writing in Military Review in 2024, added that most hypersonic threats fly at altitudes between 20 and 60 kilometers above the reach of traditional surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and below the coverage of exo-atmospheric interceptors like the SM-3. He argued that terminal defense systems such as Patriot are better suited for intercepting hypersonics in their terminal phase, where the weapons slow below Mach 5 and become more predictable. However, even Patriot systems face production bottlenecks. Reuters reported in July 2024 that Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) could take years to scale up PAC-3 production due to a shortage of missile seekers supplied by Boeing. Although the report said Boeing aimed to increase output by 30% by building new production lines in the US, those lines were not expected to be operational until 2027. Guy McCardle noted in a November 2024 SOFREP article that the limited number of Patriot interceptors per battery and their high cost – $3.7 million per missile with a production lead time of nearly 20 months – constrain their operational use. He emphasized that PAC-3 missiles must be deployed strategically to maximize their effectiveness against saturation attacks. Given the limitations of SM-6 and Patriot systems, Japan's railgun may alleviate concerns over magazine depth and cost. Japan's Aegis warships – including four Kongo-class, two Atago-class, and two Maya-class destroyers – each carries 90 to 96 vertical launch system (VLS) cells. Yet, these may prove insufficient during a saturation attack involving hypersonic, cruise, and ballistic missiles, alongside kamikaze drones. A railgun, integrated onto these platforms or future Aegis System Equipped Vessels (ASEVs), could significantly enhance magazine capacity. According to a 2021 conference paper by Shreyas Maitreya and others, a 450-millimeter railgun projectile costs around $25,000, compared with missiles priced between $500,000 and $1.5 million. Unlike missiles, they note railgun rounds are inert and pose no risk of accidental detonation, easing transport and storage constraints. Nevertheless, ATLA equipment policy division principal director Kazumi Ito acknowledged in a June 2025 National Defense Magazine article that the railgun project still faces considerable technical challenges. In the same piece, Stew Magnuson notes unresolved issues including barrel wear, energy supply, heat dissipation and development of a high-speed targeting system. Despite these hurdles, Japan's push to operationalize railgun technology reflects a pragmatic response to a regional threat environment shaped by hypersonic proliferation, interceptor shortages and constrained missile defense capacity.
Yahoo
01-07-2025
- Science
- Yahoo
Railgun Installed On Japanese Warship Seen In New Photos
New pictures have emerged showing work being done on the Japan Self-Defense Forces' prototype electromagnetic railgun currently installed on the test warship JS Asuka. An at-sea test of the weapon in this configuration is expected to come before the end of the month, if it has not occurred already. Japan's continued developments in this realm stand in notable contrast to the U.S. Navy's shelving of its promising pursuit of this category of weapons in the early 2020s after major technical hurdles emerged. The images of Asuka and its railgun in port in Yokosuka, seen at the top of this story and below, come from @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM on X who originally posted online. All of the images were taken on June 30. Additional photos of the ship taken recently are also circulating online. Asuka, a 6,200-ton-displacement dedicated testbed with a warship-like design, first emerged with the turreted railgun on its stern flight deck in April. The pictures show the shroud around the railgun removed so that work can be performed on the weapon inside. This confirms that the railgun installed in the turret on Asuka is extremely similar, if not identical, to a prototype that the Japanese Ministry of Defense's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA) has been testing on land and sea for a number of years now. TWZ had posited that this was likely the case based on what was visible in previous available imagery. How exactly the design may have evolved over the years is unclear. Also visible are what look to be several containerized generators and/or capacitors, as well as other shipping containers that could contain additional systems or workspaces. Railguns, which use electromagnets instead of chemical propellants to fire projectiles at very high velocities, have historically had significant power generation and cooling requirements. These demands mean that complete railgun weapon systems are typically physically very bulky. 06/30/2025 試験艦 あすか 搭載しているレールガン整備中でした。砲身カバーも外して砲身本体も見えました — (´･(ｪ)･｀) (@Gov_Vessel_fan) June 30, 2025 With all this in mind, TWZ previously noted that installing the railgun turret Asuka's flight deck made good sense from a testing perspective, given the ample open space it offered. Integrating the weapon onto an operational warship in a traditional manner would require meeting the power and cooling demands, as well as finding sufficient space below deck for the various components, in addition to the time and resources for those more extensive modifications. Railguns present additional challenges when it comes to the wear and tear of sustained firing of projectiles at very high speeds. As barrels quickly wear out from extreme friction, the weapon's range and accuracy are degraded, and the potential risk of a catastrophic failure can emerge. In past testing, ATLA has reportedly demonstrated the ability to fire rounds at a velocity of around 4,988 miles per hour (2,230 meters per second; Mach 6.5) while using five megajoules (MJ), or 5 million joules (J), of charge energy. As of April, prior testing goals had included a muzzle velocity of at least 4,473 miles-per-hour (2,000 meters-per-second) and a barrel life of 120 rounds, according to Naval News. Reports say that ATLA has also been working to reduce the weapon's power requirements. In May, Aviation Week reported that at least one at-sea test of Asuka's railgun installation was set to occur sometime in June. Yahoo Japan subsequently published a story saying that the testing window would span from June 9 to July 25. That same piece said that the test ship had been observed departing Yokosuka on June 9, but it is unclear whether or not any live-fire testing has yet taken place. Speaking through an interpreter at a panel discussion at DSEI Japan 2025, Kazumi Ito, principal director of the equipment policy division at ATLA, said Japan's railgun efforts were 'progressing,' but acknowledged 'various challenges,' according to National Defense Magazine. Despite the challenges, Japanese authorities have made clear they are looking toward an operational naval railgun capability in the future. Starting at the DSEI Japan 2025 exposition earlier this year, the Japanese Ministry of Defense has been publicly showing a model of a railgun in a turret with a much more streamlined design than the one currently on Asuka. Railgun GUNDAMのビームライフルみたいなモノらしい！やべー #防衛省#防衛省・自衛隊#レールガン — TAC✩FIGHTER. NJ 7/6札幌SGGM (@Tacforce_japan) July 1, 2025 In a public presentation in 2024, JMSDF Vice Adm. Imayoshi Shinichi, ATLA's director general of Naval Systems, had also highlighted plans to integrate a railgun on future 13DDX destroyers, which are expected to begin entering service in 2024. ATLA has previously shown an artist's conception of a Maya class destroyer, also known as the 27DDG class, armed with a railgun, as well. Japan's future Destroyers and Submarines at CNE 2024 @YouTubeより 13DDX！！！！！！！！レーザー！A-SAM！レールガン！あとなにげにFutureAEGISがASEVに近くない！？ — Yasuおすぎ @C106 日曜 東キ-05b (@yasu_osugi) May 28, 2024 The video below, which ATLA put out last year, also depicts ground-based railguns mounted on trucks. As terms of potential operational applications of either naval or ground-based railguns, these weapons hold the promise of being potent anti-air assets, in addition to being able to engage targets at sea and on land. As TWZ has previously written: 'In principle, a practical electromagnetic railgun would offer a highly capable and flexible weapon system that can rapidly engage a wide array of targets at sea, on land, and even in the air, and at considerable ranges. Japan has previously expressed interest in this capability explicitly to help protect against incoming hypersonic threats. Such a weapon would also offer benefits in terms of magazine depth and cost compared to traditional surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, given the small size and lower unit price of the individual rounds.' 'When it comes to warships, in particular, where physical space is at a premium and where options for reloading missiles at sea can be at best extremely limited, having a weapon system firing lower-cost munitions from a large magazine and that can engage a broad swath of target sets would be a clear boon.' Japan is certainly not alone in trying to turn the capabilities that a railgun could offer into a reality. The U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army have experimented with railgun designs in the past two decades or so. The Navy was particularly active on this front from 2005 to 2022, but ultimately shelved that work in the face of persistent technical issues. Planned at-sea testing was never conducted after being repeatedly set back. Interestingly, ATLA has reportedly met with U.S. Navy representatives about potentially leveraging the service's past railgun work. 'In getting closer to the deployment, I believe the scope of collaboration [with the United States] will be expanded,' ATLA's Ito had also said during the DSEI Japan 2025 panel discussion, per National Defense Magazine. In the meantime, the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army have already continued to leverage hypervelocity projectiles previously developed for the railgun for use in conventional naval and ground-based guns. Using the fast-flying projectiles for air defense applications, including knocking down incoming cruise missiles and drones, remains a particular area of interest. China, a major competitor for Japan on both regional and global levels, has been notably active in developing naval railguns, as well. A turreted railgun first emerged on a People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) ship back in 2018. How that development of that design or other Chinese railguns has progressed since then is unclear. Other countries, most notably Turkey, are also now actively pursuing railguns, including for naval use. In 2024, Japanese authorities themselves signed a deal to cooperate on future railgun developments with their counterparts in France and Germany. New details about Japan's progress toward fielding an operational naval railgun may begin to emerge soon based on the results of the testing of the prototype installed on Asuka. Special thanks again to @HNlEHupY4Nr6hRM for sharing the pictures of Asuka with its railgun with us. Howard Altman contributed to this story. Contact the author: joe@
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First Post
26-06-2025
- Politics
- First Post
US to make new 'bunker buster' bombs 4 times more powerful than the ones dropped on Iran
The United States is developing 'bunker buster' bombs that could be four times more powerful than the ones dropped on Iranian nuclear sites last week. read more A GBU-57, or the Massive Ordnance Penetrator bomb, at Whiteman Air Base in Missouri. The US used six of these bunker-busters to target Iran's Fordow nuclear site on Sunday. File image/AP The United States is developing new 'bunker buster' bombs that are expected to be almost four times more powerful than those dropped on Iran. Last week, the United States struck Iran's Natanz and Fordow nuclear sites with 30,000-pound GBU-57/B Mass Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bombs and the Isfahan site with submarine-launched Tomahawk missiles. The MOP is the largest conventional bomb with the United States. The working name for MOP's successor is Next Generation Penetrator (NGP). It is expected to work on the same premise as MOP. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD ALSO READ: Here's how 'bunker buster' bombs work that Trump used to hit Iran's nuclear sites Unlike most munitions, MOP does not explode upon impact. It first penetrates the target and explodes inside the target. This maximises the damage and expands the blast radius inside the targeted structure. It is believed that the bomb can hit targets as deep as 60 metres underground. New bombs to be 4 times more powerful — and possibly faster The NGP is expected to be around four times more powerful than MOP, according to information released by the US Air Force (USAF) and analysis carried by The War Zone. Out of the 30,000 pounds that MOP carries, the warhead weighs just around 6,000 pounds and the rest of the weight is of the metallic bomb that carries the warhead inside it, as per TWZ. The USAF said last year that the NGP's warhead could weigh much as 22,000 pounds — almost four times the warhead of MOP. ALSO READ: Inside Netanyahu's campaign to destroy Iran's nuclear sites with 'bunker busters' If the NGP would have the same warhead to overall weight ratio as of the MOP, the overall NGP could weigh as much as 110,000 pounds. If the 30,000-pound MOP could breach through 60 metres of concrete to hit the target, the depth to which NGP could breach through would be much more. The USAF has also said in its notional renderings that the NGP would have its own propulsion system, which means it would have its own power. On the other hand, the MOP is a gravity bomb, which means that it does not have its own power and it cannot fly towards its target like regular rockets or missiles. Its flight path based on the height and angle it was dropped from can only be altered in a limited manner. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Separately, the USAF is also seeking a smaller bunker buster bomb that could be dropped by F-35 fighter planes, according to TWZ. It has been dubbed as Global Precision Attack Weapon (GPAW). The specifications have not been made public.
AllAfrica
23-06-2025
- Business
- AllAfrica
North Korea overtakes Iran as Russia's partner of choice
North Korea is no longer just supplying Russia with manpower and missiles. It is embedding itself deep within Russia's war economy, sending thousands of workers to the heart of its drone industry and reshaping the balance of power in Eurasia. This month, The War Zone (TWZ) reported that 25,000 North Korean workers are being sent to Russia's Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Tatarstan to assist with the manufacturing of Shahed drones, part of a deal reportedly brokered during Russian Security Council Secretary Sergey Shoigu's visit to Pyongyang. Satellite imagery reveals new dormitory construction at the Alabuga site, indicating Russia's intention to increase drone production from 2,000 to 5,000 units per month. Ukrainian intelligence chief Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov confirmed this development, citing the growing cooperation between Russia and North Korea and warning of the strategic implications for both Ukraine and South Korea. He added that some North Korean workers may be contracted into the Russian defense service. The Alabuga plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, remains a critical node in Russia's standoff strike capability, particularly amid high attrition from its war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, Russia is reportedly assisting North Korea in enhancing the accuracy of KN-23 missiles, long-range air-to-air munitions, and submarine-launched systems. The transfer of labor and technology underscores tightening bilateral military ties as both regimes confront isolation and intensifying global scrutiny. Russia may be shifting its partnership of convenience from Iran to North Korea. As Iran falters under Israeli and US airstrikes and unfulfilled Russian arms deals, North Korea pulls ahead, embedding itself in Russia's war machine and Far Eastern strategy. While Russia and Iran have a long history of distrust and conflict, their mutual disdain for the Western-dominated international order, autocratic governments and heavily sanctioned economies in the aftermath of the former's invasion of Ukraine has placed them in the same boat. Iran has sought to make itself indispensable to Russia's war effort by supplying Shahed drones, tactical gear, and artillery in exchange for revenue and to avoid diplomatic isolation. It may have also sought Russian investment in the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Yet as Russia transitioned to a war economy and began producing Shahed drones locally, Iran's leverage may have declined, undercutting the latter's efforts to extract security guarantees or financial backing from the former. Furthermore, while Iran has consistently requested advanced Russian equipment, such as Su-35 fighter jets, these deliveries have not yet materialized, as Russia may need those fighters more urgently in its conflict with Ukraine. In October 2024, Israel destroyed Iran's prized S-300 surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers, leaving the latter exposed to current air attacks. While Iran has downplayed the need to purchase the more advanced S-400 from Russia, citing the superior capabilities of its domestic systems, this could be a cover-up for Russia's refusal to provide such systems for the same reason it has withheld Su-35 fighters. However, Israeli strikes on Iran present mixed implications for Russia. For one, while such strikes may have undermined Russia as a credible partner, strikes on Iranian oil and gas infrastructure may have eliminated Iran as a competitor to Russian energy exports. Yet, these gains may be short-lived. Israel admits that its strikes are not sufficient to destroy Iran's nuclear program and that the goal is to pressure Iran back into negotiations. Furthermore, it is unknown how Iran would respond in the aftermath. A nuclear-armed Iran may ultimately undermine Russia's influence. Russia may have less leverage over a nuclear-armed Iran, potentially triggering a Middle East nuclear arms race, with Saudi Arabia stressing that it will develop nuclear weapons if Iran gets the bomb. Despite that possible long-term setback, Israeli strikes may distract the US from Ukraine, drawing attention and resources away from confronting Russia. It also allows Russia to point out US 'double standards,' with the US distancing itself from Israeli combat operations in Gaza while supporting Israeli strikes on Iran that have caused civilian casualties. As Iran buckles under sustained Israeli and now US strikes, North Korea is stepping into the breach, presenting an entirely different set of nuances. North Korea and Russia share deep ties dating back to the Korean War, and the former's nuclear arsenal arguably makes it a safer long-term investment for the latter. North Korea has deepened its role in Russia's war effort, providing matériel and manpower while reaping combat insights, hard currency, and access to advanced systems. North Korea's interest in supporting Russia in Ukraine may be to reduce its overdependence on China, its main political and economic lifeline, to maintain strategic autonomy and regime survival. These aims may clash with China's goal of maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula. Arguably, North Korean missile tests pose a threat to China just as much as they are to Japan and South Korea, prompting China to threaten to scale down political and economic ties with North Korea. To those ends, North Korea is actively developing nuclear delivery systems with possible Russian assistance, such as intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) that could reach the US mainland and nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) that ensure a second-strike capability. While a belligerent North Korea serves China and Russia's mutual interest of undermining the Western-dominated international order, it remains uncertain whether this wartime alignment will evolve into a lasting partnership once the guns fall silent in Ukraine. Despite Russia being heavily sanctioned, it still seeks to resume trade with the US, raising doubts about the long-term growth of Russia-North Korea relations. However, beyond the Russia-Ukraine War, Russia may use North Korea as leverage against China's growing presence, economic influence, and territorial ambitions in the Russian Far East, strengthening economic, political, and military ties to form a buffer state. In turn, North Korea maintains its autonomy by balancing ties between Russia and China, with its nuclear arsenal providing a strategic backstop against regime change. With Iran sidelined and China's shadow growing, North Korea is fast becoming Russia's most dangerous and dependable ally, fueling its war machine, fortifying its eastern flank, and tilting Eurasia's strategic balance in Russia's favor.
