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The great growth sprint: How India must reinvent to become world's second-largest economy

The great growth sprint: How India must reinvent to become world's second-largest economy

India Today6 days ago

At the turn of the 20th century, the United States sprinted ahead of the United Kingdom to become the world's largest economy—a position it still holds. A hundred years later, China stunned the world by pulling hundreds of millions out of poverty and displacing Japan to claim the No. 2 spot.Today, India stands at a similar inflection point. The country has already surged past Japan to become the world's third-largest economy (behind China and US) in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. Recent International Monetary Fund (IMF) data shows that in all probability, India will cross $4.19 trillion in nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the later half of the current fiscal, overtaking Japan in absolute dollar terms. If these trends continue, it will likely surpass Germany in another 18 months. But that's where the easy gains end—and the real race begins.advertisementTo close the yawning gap with China, whose nominal GDP exceeds $17 trillion, and eventually catch up with the US, now at over $27 trillion, India will have to do what no democracy has ever done: grow at a nominal rate of 8-9 per cent every year for the next 25 years, while remaining socially cohesive, environmentally sustainable and politically stable. That will require more than reforms. It demands reinvention—of India's economic model, its state capacity, global ambition and social contract.For now, India is warming up well. It remains the world's fastest-growing large economy, averaging over 7 per cent real GDP growth in recent years, with a stable macroeconomic framework. Its expanding middle class is powering consumption, its start-ups are reshaping services, and digital governance is being hailed globally. But the leap from $4 trillion to $10 trillion and beyond will not be a linear stretch of what India is already doing. It will need bold shifts in structure, strategy and statecraft.advertisement
The rise of China created space for a global factory. India must now write a different story—not a replica but a reinvention. And the first pillar of that reinvention lies in India's ability to tap into a moment of global flux. Rising wages in China, intensifying geopolitical tensions and the West's 'China + 1' strategy have created a unique but limited opening. Multinational corporations are looking to diversify their supply chains, and India is clearly in the mix. But being in the mix is not enough. India cannot settle for being the back-up option; it must lead with a new narrative—'India Plus Many'.This strategy calls for India to not just be a cost-effective manufacturing base but to become the anchor of a broader economic ecosystem—one that connects value chains through Africa, Southeast Asia, West Asia and Eastern Europe. With strategic initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and the India-UAE trade pact, India is beginning to lay the infrastructure for this vision. But execution will be key. Logistics, customs, compliance norms, power reliability and judicial speed must match the ambition.At home, the reinvention must begin with a sector that remains the biggest paradox in India's economy—agriculture. Employing over 43 per cent of the population but contributing just 16 per cent to the GDP, Indian agriculture has been growing at a modest 3-4 per cent annually. If India is to unlock rural purchasing power, reduce disguised unemployment and rebalance its lopsided development, agriculture must transform—from subsistence to surplus, from grain-centricity to high-value crops, and from fragmented holdings to digital cooperatives.advertisementThis means investing heavily in irrigation, soil health, market linkages, food processing, agri-logistics and climate-resilient practices. India must build farmer-producer organisations at scale, digitise land records, and integrate smallholders into the formal economy. Schemes like eNAM and PM-Kisan are a start, but much more is needed to drive a rural resurgence.In FY25, India's real GDP was around at Rs 185 lakh crore, while nominal GDP stands at Rs 324 lakh crore. The difference reflects inflation's impact—nominal GDP accounts for current prices, whereas real GDP adjusts for inflation to reflect actual economic growth. With real GDP projected to grow at 6.4 per cent and nominal GDP at 9.7 per cent, the gap underscores the role of price level changes in economic measurement, offering a clearer distinction between value-driven growth and price-driven expansion.It also indicates that a significant portion of this increase is due to rising prices rather than increased productivity or output. If inflation remains unchecked, it can erode purchasing power, raise interest rates and complicate fiscal planning. This inflation-growth gap also poses a dilemma for policymakers.advertisementTo sustain long-term economic momentum and achieve India's aspiration of becoming the world's second-largest economy, the focus must shift to productivity-enhancing reforms, efficient public spending, and improving supply-side bottlenecks. Otherwise, high nominal growth without real depth could mask structural weaknesses and lead to overheating or inequality.The urgency is underlined by a stark statistic: the differential between urban and rural GDP per capita is now 1:12.5. This growing gap, despite unprecedented rural spending by the present government, reflects the limits of redistribution without transformation. Direct transfers help cushion poverty, but only structural productivity gains can ensure enduring prosperity. Rural India must become a production powerhouse—not just a consumption recipient.In this context, the rise of a new tier of digital-native, regional entrepreneurs from non-metro India is promising. If supported by infrastructure, credit and skilling, they can be catalysts for inclusive growth. The JAM trinity (Jan Dhan-Aadhaar-Mobile), ONDC (Open Network for Digital Commerce), and Account Aggregator frameworks offer the scaffolding. What's needed now is acceleration and integration—turning scattered pilots into a national movement.advertisementBut while agriculture and rural transformation are foundational, India's economic leap will ultimately be powered by urban manufacturing, services exports, infrastructure, energy security, and innovation. The target must be to double manufacturing's share of GDP from the current ~14 per cent to at least 25 per cent. This requires sustained policy consistency, capital inflows, and deep skilling—especially in clean tech, semiconductors, defence manufacturing and pharmaceuticals.The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) schemes are a step in the right direction, but India must move beyond assembly to high-value innovation. Export competitiveness cannot rely solely on subsidies; it needs a full-stack approach: easier land access, judicial clarity, world-class logistics, and sectoral R&D. By 2035, India must aspire to be a $2 trillion export economy—not just in goods, but in services, education, health tech and entertainment.Energy is another hinge point. No large economy can grow without energy security. India's green transition—solar, wind, green hydrogen, EVs—must be matched by robust grid infrastructure and domestic critical mineral value chains. If the country succeeds, it could turn its climate challenge into a competitive edge.All of this will require a dramatically stronger human capital base. India must increase education spending to at least 6 per cent of GDP and shift focus from input metrics to outcomes—especially in government schools. Vocational training needs to become aspirational, digitally enabled, and demand-aligned. Tier 2 and 3 cities must become new hubs of bilingual, digital-savvy, skilled professionals.advertisementFinancial deepening is equally vital. With private credit penetration still under 60 per cent of GDP and corporate bond markets underdeveloped, India must turbocharge its financial system—by empowering NBFCs (non-banking financial companies), expanding retail participation and enabling large-scale pension and insurance penetration. Mumbai must aim to become a true global financial centre.At the apex of this entire architecture must be a competent, reform-oriented state. India will need to build institutional capacity at scale: faster courts, smarter regulators, empowered municipal governments, and data-driven public service delivery. Reforms must move beyond laws to implementation. The Centre and states must align on investment priorities, tax rationalisation and job creation. Cooperative federalism cannot just be a slogan; it has to be the engine of execution.In parallel, India must wield its geopolitical heft to build economic muscle. It must secure fair trade deals with the EU, US, Australia and East Asian blocs. It must expand its presence in Africa, West Asia, and ASEAN. Institutions like IPEF, BIMSTEC, BRICS, the Quad, and the SCO must become levers of geoeconomic influence, not mere talk shops. India's scale—1.4 billion people, rising incomes, digital governance—gives it leverage, but only if used strategically.Yet, the road ahead is strewn with pitfalls. The risks are real and complex. Geopolitical flashpoints with China or Pakistan could disrupt capital flows. New Delhi's acceptance of Islambad's request for ceasefire after Operation Sindoor was also deep from this philosophy that India wants to focus on building the economic might along with keeping a notorious Pakistan in check.Climate shocks could derail consumption. The middle-income trap looms large; India must find a pathway to productivity-led, inclusive growth at around $10,000 per capita. Western protectionism in digital services or data localisation could limit India's export potential. And fragmented federal politics could slow down reform momentum.But the biggest risk is complacency—the illusion that demographic advantage and incremental growth will somehow carry India forward. The truth is, India's demographic dividend is time-bound. By 2040, the country will begin to age. The next 15 years are not just an opportunity; they are a deadline.India's rise will not look like America's consumer capitalism. It won't mirror China's state-led authoritarianism. It must chart its own path—grounded in self-reliance, competitive markets, empowered citizens, and an inclusive Swadeshi globalism. This means investing in resilience, not just growth; in equity, not just efficiency; and in innovation, not imitation.On May 27, on his visit to Gujarat, Prime Minister Narendra Modi issued a compelling call for 'Swadeshi'—urging citizens to boycott foreign goods and embrace locally made products. He emphasised that building a developed India by 2047 requires collective effort, stating, 'If we have to make this resolve... we will not use any foreign goods.'This appeal aligns with his government's 'Atmanirbhar Bharat' initiative, aiming to reduce dependency on imports and bolster domestic industries. The prime minister's message resonated with attendees, many of whom pledged to promote 'Made in India' products within their communities.Modi is pointing towards same trajectory. This is not a sprint. It is an epic marathon, made harder by global volatility and domestic complexity. But if India gets it right, it could become the world's second-largest economy by mid-century—and, more importantly, a model for democratic development in the 21st century. The baton is now with the policymakers, entrepreneurs, farmers, teachers, engineers and workers. The next chapter of the world economy may well be written in India.Subscribe to India Today MagazineMust Watch

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Defence equipment, oil, cars: Where India could lower tariffs to reach deal with US
Defence equipment, oil, cars: Where India could lower tariffs to reach deal with US

Indian Express

time2 hours ago

  • Indian Express

Defence equipment, oil, cars: Where India could lower tariffs to reach deal with US

With US trade negotiators set to reach India Thursday for a two-day visit, the India-US trade deal negotiations are entering their final stage and could soon see Delhi opening its market and lowering tariffs on a range of American products – from select agricultural goods to defence equipment. This is in exchange for concessions on reciprocal tariffs and improved access to the US market for India's labour-intensive sectors such as textile and leather products. The White House said Tuesday that the US had asked countries to make their best offers on trade negotiations by Wednesday, as the July 8 deadline for reciprocal tariffs is just five weeks away. 'I can confirm the merits and the content of the letter. The United States Trade Representative (USTR) sent this letter to all of our trading partners just to give them a friendly reminder that the deadline is coming up,' White House spokesperson Karoline Leavitt said. Improving market access for US exports such as oil, armaments, soybeans, corn, whisky and automobiles could help address Washington's concerns over its goods trade deficit with India and high tariff barriers. US Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick said Tuesday that the US aimed to bring back advanced manufacturing and bridge the trade deficit by increasing exports to India, adding that both sides had 'found a place that really works' for them. Indian officials have indicated that diversifying oil and defence procurement is in the country's strategic interest and sourcing more from the US could also significantly help bridge the goods trade gap, as India's refining capacity has been increasing alongside oil import dependency, which surged to 90 per cent in April 2025. India's oil import mix has already undergone a significant shift since the Ukraine war, with Russia emerging as the top supplier, replacing Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Official trade data showed that India had already stepped up oil purchases from the US. India's import of crude oil from the US jumped 11.49 per cent to $63 billion in March 2025 compared to the previous year. India has had long standing defence ties with Russia, owing to its reliability during times when Western countries imposed sanctions. However, the US now appears to be leveraging its position as the world's largest market to boost defence equipment exports to India and reduce Delhi's dependence on Russia. Speaking at the US-India Strategic Partnership Forum (USISPF) in Washington DC, Lutnick said: 'There were certain things that the Indian government did that generally rubbed the United States the wrong way. For instance, they generally buy military gear from Russia. That's a way to kind of get under the skin of America, if you go to buy your armaments from Russia.' He said India is already 'addressing' this issue. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the largest share of India's arms imports between 2020 and 2024 still came from Russia at about 36 per cent. However, this was significantly lower than the 55 per cent recorded in 2015-19 and 72 per cent in 2010-14. SIPRI's report released in March suggested that India has increased domestic manufacturing and is shifting its arms supply relations towards Western suppliers – most notably France, Israel and the US – at a time when Russia is prioritising domestic production amid the ongoing Ukraine war. US arms exports grew by 21 per cent between 2015-19 and 2020-24. The US share of global arms exports rose from 35 per cent to 43 per cent – nearly equal to the combined total of the next eight largest exporters, according to SIPRI. From high tariffs on agricultural imports to restrictions on genetically modified (GM) seeds and products, the US has criticised several Indian trade policies that have limited US exports. Under the new trade agreements, the US is seeking increased market access for its agricultural products, especially soya and corn – two of its top export items to China. Amid the likelihood of a protracted trade tussle with China, the US deal with India is likely to ensure greater market access for these two products. Additionally, the US may also secure improved access for its apples. A NITI Aayog working paper in May stated that India could offer some concessions on 'soybean oil imports' to reduce the trade imbalance, without harming domestic production. India is the largest importer of edible oil globally, and the US has a surplus of soybean exports. 'We should also explore the option of importing soybean seed and using it for extracting oil in coastal areas, then selling the oil in the domestic market and exporting the meal, for which there is adequate overseas demand. This will avoid genetically modified (GM) feed entering the Indian market,' the paper, authored by Senior Adviser at NITI Aayog Raka Saxena and Member Ramesh Chand, said. 'Similarly, corn may be imported for ethanol blending, and its by-products – like Distiller's Dried Grains with Solubles (DDGS) – can be entirely exported to avoid GM feed in the country. US corn is cheaper and can be used to meet India's biofuel targets without disrupting local food and feed markets,' it said. Notably, soybeans and corn are among the top exports of US to China and according to a Reuters report, US soybean exports could drop 20 per cent and prices may plunge if the US-China trade dispute remains unresolved. If the trade agreement with the UK is any indication, India is likely to open its highly protected automobile and alcoholic beverage sectors to the US, its largest trade partner. Even before negotiations with the US began, India slashed duties on bourbon whisky to 50 per cent from the earlier 150 per cent. Bourbon whisky is primarily produced in the US, with about 95 per cent made in Kentucky. Under the UK deal, India cut tariffs on automotive imports from over 100 per cent to 10 per cent – although the reduction is phased over 10 to 15 years. A similar, if not more favourable, deal could be offered to the US. President Donald Trump had previously stated that high tariffs in India made it difficult for companies like Harley-Davidson to operate in the country.

If Sheikh Hasina is Extradited to Bangladesh, Justice Will Not Be Served: Badrul Ahsan
If Sheikh Hasina is Extradited to Bangladesh, Justice Will Not Be Served: Badrul Ahsan

The Hindu

time2 hours ago

  • The Hindu

If Sheikh Hasina is Extradited to Bangladesh, Justice Will Not Be Served: Badrul Ahsan

Published : Jun 04, 2025 15:49 IST - 17 MINS READ On June 1, 2025, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) formally charged former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina with crimes against humanity for ordering police action against student protesters, leading to her ouster on August 5, 2024. The court issued arrest warrants for Hasina, her Home Minister, and the former police chief. The 77-year-old leader currently lives in exile in India. Syed Badrul Ahsan, senior Bangladeshi journalist and commentator, spoke to Frontline about Hasina's indictment. Ahsan, who lives in London, discussed the Awami League's reaction to the indictment, the prospect of Hasina's extradition from India to Bangladesh, the possibility of free and fair elections in the near future, Muhammad Yunus' tenure as Chief Adviser, and the state of India-Bangladesh bilateral relations with both Pakistan and China hovering in the immediate backdrop. Edited excerpts: How is the Awami League reacting to this indictment for ordering police to fire on protesters, resulting in several hundred deaths? Well, first of all, this is a state of irony in Bangladesh. The ICT was set up by the erstwhile Awami League to try collaborators of the 1971 Pakistani military regime. A good number were sentenced to death and executed. Now the tables have been turned, and this tribunal is trying Sheikh Hasina and members of the former government. The Awami League is in a very desperate situation. It's not organised at all, and there's no particular leadership that can give the people or the international community a public statement. This is in contrast to 1971, when Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was arrested, but there was a second tier of leadership which organised the liberation war with India's assistance. Post-1975, after Sheikh Mujib's assassination, the Awami League was divided into three factions, but Sheikh Hasina came back from exile in Delhi in 1981 and took charge. That kind of situation doesn't exist now because of the repression against Awami League leaders, activists, and supporters over the last 10 months. Although there have been some sporadic protests by young Awami League activists—the Chhatra League, the Jubo League—they're all scattered. The media exercises self-censorship because of mob violence. What we have in Bangladesh today is a situation where everything has been hollowed out except the name People's Republic of Bangladesh. There is a deliberate program of eliminating everything that had to do with the 1971 war of liberation. No one argues that there was corruption during the 15-year rule of the Awami League. But the process is what matters. People in the ICT today were never disposed in a friendly way toward the Awami League or democratic secular politics. Is there concern that India might ask Sheikh Hasina to leave and return to Bangladesh for the sake of good relations? That kind of concern is not there because under the Awami League government, good relations existed with India. The feeling is that Modi will not take steps to have Sheikh Hasina extradited. If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. The feeling in Bangladesh is that judgment has already been delivered—student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that Sheikh Hasina will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged. When people look to a judicial killing of a former Prime Minister before a trial, I don't think the Indian government will agree to that. The Awami League, which liberated the country, has been placed under a ban—a huge irony. On the other hand, the Jamaat-e-Islami, which violently opposed Bangladesh's liberation in 1971 and supported the Pakistani army, has come to the forefront. With the Awami League banned, anywhere between 35 to 40 per cent, perhaps more, of voters have been disenfranchised. For the foreseeable future, until things change in Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina will be in India. Is Sheikh Hasina not responsible for the leadership vacuum because she surrounded herself with a tight-knit clique? Should she step back and allow new leadership to rebuild the party? That would be very appreciable—for Sheikh Hasina to step back in view of the indictment, letting the country know she's ready to face justice. If the Awami League doesn't exist or simply withers away, that will be terrible for the country. With the Awami League, Bangladesh's history gets washed away. Over the last 15 years, her leadership style changed. The difference between Sheikh Hasina and her father, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, is that Sheikh Mujib had around him a group of leaders who argued with him, debated issues with him, and collectively reached party decisions. With Sheikh Hasina, they tended to be more sycophantic than being able to debate policy matters with her. She created a clique around her where nobody could argue against her policies. Every time a minister made a statement, he or she began with 'On the advice of the Honourable Prime Minister, the government has decided'. Sheikh Hasina is aged now—she was born in September 1947, so she's almost 78. It's high time for her to hand over leadership to a new generation. If the Awami League simply withers away, it's an entire nation that will suffer, an entire history of Bangladesh that is already under threat might be wiped out altogether. Also Read | India and Bangladesh are destined to work together: Sreeradha Datta Can a case be made that once prosecution begins, the ban on the Awami League becomes legally shaky? The prosecution itself may help a second rung emerge. The ban on the Awami League was not a wise step. That should have been kept separate from cases of corruption and orders to police to fire on protesters. The interim government could have prosecuted individuals but leave the Awami League aside because it is a major party. Historically, every time the Awami League has been under pressure, it always bounced back because it had that set of leaders. As far as the present Awami League is concerned, the party is there but in scattered form. Many Awami League activists and leaders revere Sheikh Hasina largely because she happens to be the daughter of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. But with the indictment, Sheikh Hasina could consult her party leaders and take steps to get in touch with other leaders and give them directives on how to reorganise the party and step away from it until this entire course of investigations comes to an end. People in Bangladesh—30 to 40 per cent—since the banning of the Awami League, citizens who never supported the Awami League are becoming sympathetic to it. If the Awami League is unbanned hypothetically and an election is held today, there's a good chance it will go back to power—maybe not with a vast majority, but in a coalition. The Chief Adviser, Muhammad Yunus, told his advisors last week that the Awami League is destabilising the country. Despite the ban, the interim government feels there is a threat from the Awami League. Is the army going to permit an election without the Awami League? Army chief General Wakar-Uz-Zaman has been saying there has to be an inclusive election before December. Some kind of subtle pressure is there from the army. When General Wakar-Uz-Zaman made it clear about two weeks ago that elections have to be held by December this year, Professor Yunus said he was thinking of resigning. The Yunus government came forth with the idea that elections will be held anywhere between December this year and June next year. The army has been playing a very subtle, very positive game. The army chief has gone on record saying that the values of the liberation war will not be sacrificed, and the rule of law will be maintained. Just the other day in Rangpur, when the former military leader General Hussain Muhammad Ershad's family home was being vandalised, the army moved in. The regional army commander summoned these student leaders in the middle of the night and warned them that this kind of vandalism will not be tolerated. If elections are held without the Awami League, they will not be credible at all—in the same way that elections under the Awami League government, when the BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] did not take part, were never regarded as credible. The army is the only disciplined force in the country now. The army must insist that inclusivity means bringing the Awami League into the election. So the Awami League is looking to the army to bring it back into political life. The three chiefs were appointed by Sheikh Hasina—is there a feeling they owe this to her? I won't say they owe this to her. They owe this to the proper rules of governance under which they were appointed. But they're also loyal to the principles and values of the 1971 war of liberation. That sense of values is still working in them. Now if they see the trajectory the country is taking—the Jamaat-e-Islami has come back, militant Islamist organisations like Hizb ut-Tahrir are there, and there are reports of Pakistani military officials and ISI [Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan's external intelligence agency] officials coming to Bangladesh and trying to establish links with the Bangladesh government—these are very concerning things. The armed forces, I don't think they will take all these things lying down. You mentioned if elections were held today, the Awami League might return to power. But we hear the BNP believes it will sweep the elections—that's why they are eager for December elections. When I talked about the Awami League's prospects, there's a sympathy factor working, although not for its doings in the last government—the corruption is roundly condemned even by supporters. If elections are held, we do not feel the Awami League will win a straight majority, but it just might squeak through. The BNP is very confident it will win, but worried that the Jamaat-e-Islami is getting ahead of it. Since August last year, Jamaat has gone ahead. Jamaat has worked very quietly and softly, asking for local government elections first rather than general elections. The BNP is massively popular because it's been out of power for so many years and because of the repression exercised on it by the Awami League government. All political power in the party rests with Tarique Rahman [party chief Khaleda Zia's son], who has been in exile in the UK since 2007. The question many people ask is why Tarique Rahman has not been going back to Bangladesh. The interim government does not want him to return. An unwritten instruction is there because if he goes back today, that will create a huge wave of support for the BNP that the interim government will not be able to stem. Recently, Jamaat-e-Islami member A.T.M. Azharul Islam was released from prison. The head of Jamaat held a press conference saying the party apologised to the nation, but did not mention 1971 or collaboration with Pakistan Army. How is this being received? The people are not happy with this sort of statement from Jamaat. It is very ambiguous. When a party chief says, 'if we have made any mistake,' the question is not if mistakes were made. The historical record is there. All the old newspapers are there. I was there in 1971. I belong to a generation that was there. We saw what Jamaat did. If Jamaat is actually apologetic about 1971, it should come out with a clear statement saying: 'We made mistakes in 1971, we should not have supported the Pakistani military regime, and we respect the three million people of Bangladesh who died because of the Pakistani military regime and their local collaborators.' Young people who were born 15 or 20 years ago know the history of the country. You have to tell these people you're sorry. Condemning the Awami League for corruption is one thing. But history is something else, and Jamaat has to own up to it clearly and without ambiguity. There was talk of an army takeover. What are you hearing about the differences between the army and interim administration? The army is not happy. The army and the Yunus administration are not happy with each other because Yunus feels pressure from the army. The army feels nationwide pressure for elections and knows that unless there's an elected government, a constitutional government, things cannot go back to normal. I don't think the army is ready to take over. The Bangladesh Army remembers the periods when the army took charge and would not like to go back into that situation. What the army can do is ensure elections are held in good time, are inclusive, and ensure they are free, fair, and credible. This return to constitutional government is absolutely important because the people of Bangladesh have become tired of the kind of politics in the last 25-30 years. No political leader—either Begum Khalida Zia or Sheikh Hasina—has graduated to being a national leader. Not since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman have we had a national leader who could unite all people. 'If Sheikh Hasina is extradited to Bangladesh, justice will not be served. Student supporters of the interim government have made it clear that she will be brought back to Dhaka and hanged.' That is also the fear now: that if the BNP sweeps, there would not be a centrist opposition. It might be Jamaat or other extremist Islamist parties. The ideal situation would be first for the Awami League to be unbanned and permitted to take part. If the BNP sweeps the election, it will be back to square one. If Jamaat becomes the opposition in parliament, that will not be happy for the country. But if the Awami League is there and the BNP is there, and if people vote for either of these parties with the margin of difference very small, that is the kind of election we need. Since 1970, every time we've had an election, it's always been one party claiming the entire parliament for itself. If an election produces a result with no party gaining a majority, that will be extremely good for the country. That will force political parties to get into talks about forming a coalition. About the humanitarian corridor proposal from Bangladesh into Myanmar that reportedly caused army-administration differences: Given over a million Rohingya refugees and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) activity in camps, why has this become such a big issue? This humanitarian corridor idea was sponsored by the interim government, especially by the National Security Advisor, Khalil-ur-Rahman. We have never had a National Security Advisor in Bangladesh. It was done without consultation with the Army. There's no guarantee, given Bangladesh's weak state politically, that elements of ARSA and the Arakan rebels will not take advantage to operate from within Bangladesh. If the humanitarian corridor is allowed, it might become a point where these Myanmar rebels might take advantage and Bangladesh might become a source of supply of arms—not just food and other items for Rohingya, but ammunition and weapons for rebels. When the army chief made it clear that the military will not allow any humanitarian corridor, he felt the pulse of the nation. On the pretext of this humanitarian corridor, it will be a point where militants, Islamic militants, will become even more active in trying to dislodge the administration within Bangladesh. Is there fear that Western foreign troops might use that corridor—for instance, the US military stationing itself there? That's a very valid concern. We are worried about American attention to islands like Saint Martin. American policy will clearly be aimed at helping Myanmar rebels with arms and ammunition routed through Bangladesh—that will impinge on Bangladesh's sovereignty. Secondly, to keep a check on India and China will place Bangladesh in a very difficult geopolitical situation. Also Read | India comments on treatment of Hindus in Bangladesh but must know its treatment of Muslims has repercussions: Debapriya Bhattacharya One theory after Sheikh Hasina's ouster was that the United States had a hand in it. When Sheikh Hasina mentioned that 'a white man' asked her about Saint Martin's Island, this theory got wings. Would India have allowed the US to burn down the house next door where India had so many stakes? It's obvious that elements in the United States, especially in the Democratic Party government, were never truly well disposed toward Sheikh Hasina. Under the Biden administration, there were indications they were not happy with Sheikh Hasina. She came up with the statement about 'a white man's proposal' regarding Saint Martin. We were surprised when she made that statement because she didn't go further. When Professor Yunus went to the UN last year, he met Bill Clinton and talked about the meticulous plan for the removal of Sheikh Hasina's government. That has led to questions—what was that meticulous plan? Whether India would have agreed to that, I don't think so. If the American government intends to intrude into Bangladesh territory on the excuse of helping Myanmar rebels, the Indian government will put its foot down. India will not accept this kind of intrusion by American interests in Bangladesh. The Chief Adviser went to China and made that controversial remark about inviting the Chinese to set up a trading zone with India's north-eastern states. There's now a high-powered Chinese delegation in Dhaka. What's the difference between Sheikh Hasina and Yunus regarding China? Hardly any difference. What the Yunus government has been doing is carrying forward Sheikh Hasina's policies vis-à-vis China. But we should be mindful that no matter how much closer we get to China, our focal point is India. We have traditionally maintained good relations with India in all spheres. As far as India is concerned, the Modi government should have done more in dealing with the crisis that erupted in Bangladesh in August 2024. What we certainly did not expect was the anarchy that would replace the fall of the Awami League government. For now, the Modi government should be able to interact with the Yunus government till the election. Certain measures such as closing land borders should be relaxed. If they are not relaxed, it's the people of Bangladesh who suffer and, to a certain extent, the people of India. At the end of the day, everything depends on how soon we can return Bangladesh to an elected government. If we have a strong government, a national government that reaches out to all people, it will give us an opportunity to forge a foreign policy which would benefit Bangladesh's people and the region. Why has the Yunus administration not been able to take control of the mob violence, the vandalism of Mujib's house, even with the army's support? The expectation was that after taking over from Sheikh Hasina's government, he would clear the accumulated debris and lead the country to elections. But it soon became very clear that the interim administration was anti-Awami League. When the torching of Sheikh Mujib's residence was done, shortly after Yunus went to the United States where he addressed the General Assembly. The anchor asked him why on his watch Sheikh Mujib's house was torched and he had done nothing about it. His answer didn't satisfy anybody. He said it was a meticulous plan, but then he said there was a reset button at work. The question is, what reset button? You don't reset history. Over the last 10 months, it has become very clear that the Yunus government, through all its activities, is against the Awami League—through not allowing Awami League supporters to gather, through letting mobs demolish structures, and attacks on the Hindu minority community. There are still Awami League supporters who can't stay at home for fear they will be targeted by mobs. Everything depends on when we have the election. To have it in good time, we need army pressure to be kept up. We also need a timetable, which the interim government has not yet brought forward. We keep fingers crossed. Nirupama Subramanian is an independent journalist who has worked earlier at The Hindu and at The Indian Express.

Alternative to choke points, IMEC strategic necessity for India in changing world order—MEA
Alternative to choke points, IMEC strategic necessity for India in changing world order—MEA

The Print

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  • The Print

Alternative to choke points, IMEC strategic necessity for India in changing world order—MEA

'Historical choke points like Gibraltar, the Malacca Strait, Panama Canal, and the Red Sea have shown us that disruption is inevitable when access is concentrated [at specific points],' he said, adding that the IMEC offered a necessary alternative in an increasingly uncertain global landscape. Speaking at the Chintan Research Foundation-hosted IMEC conference in New Delhi on Wednesday, Ravi highlighted how global crises, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, had exposed critical vulnerabilities in existing supply chains. New Delhi: The government sees the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a strategic imperative for its future economic and geopolitical ambitions, said Dammu Ravi, Secretary (Economic Relations), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). 'IMEC is the starting point for India. On the western front, it starts from India, [then] UAE, Saudi, Jordan, Israel, Greece [France and Italy]—there are seven important countries here,' he said. 'On the eastern front is the trilateral island, so you have India, Myanmar, Thailand, and connecting to ASEAN. These are very important. Actually, from a strategic point of view, IMEC is very critical for India.' Strategic necessity in a changing world India's economic aspirations, a projected $30 trillion GDP by 2047, require robust external connectivity, said Ravi. The economic secretary also argued that corridors such as IMEC, as well as the Trilateral Highway, would be vital to support India's industrial ambitions. 'We are at just three percent of global manufacturing compared to China's 30 percent. As we scale up, these corridors will become essential platforms for trade and supply chains,' he added. Also Read: IMEC a 'channel of peace' says Greek minister, plays up growing ties with 'inviolable partner' India India's digital & infrastructure advantage Ravi laid his emphasis on India's competitive edge in building low-cost infrastructure, including ports, highways, railways, and airports, alongside its pioneering Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI). 'Digitally connecting IMEC is a first-mover opportunity for India,' he said. 'These are low-cost, scaleable solutions we can lead.' He argued that IMEC would not be just a trade route but a multimodal economic corridor, integrating energy grids, digital systems, and transport infrastructure. 'It is a chance to bring in investment and boost manufacturing along the corridor and expand markets into the hinterland.' While countries such as China have advanced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) through centralised control and $1 trillion investment in deep funds, democracies must navigate a slower, consensus-driven process, Ravi said, noting under-development models like EU's Global Gateway Forum and the US-led Global Partnership for Infrastructure Investment. 'Democracies debate, deliberate, and move slower, but collaboration is our strength,' Ravi said, calling for a multilateral approach to IMEC. He floated the idea of an IMEC Fund to support execution over time and proposed the creation of an IMEC Secretariat to ensure coordination, timelines, and project continuity. Geopolitical hurdles & role of diplomacy Ravi acknowledged the geopolitical headwind facing the project—from sanctioned Russia and Iran to politically unstable Myanmar. 'These are challenges we must engage with diplomatically. Every participating country's foreign office needs to be actively involved,' he said. He also warned against internal economic resistance, urging Indian industries to see the corridor as an opportunity, not a threat. 'We will need to build narratives that reassure domestic players while keeping the long-term benefits in view. Also, you need a Secretariat for the IMEC. You need to have a coordinating mechanism, without which you will not be able to have timelines, and you will not be able to fulfil your objectives with clarity, ' he added. In conclusion, Ravi positioned IMEC not as a competitor to existing trade routes such as the Suez Canal but as a complementary system. 'Multiple routes mean greater resilience. IMEC is not about replacing but expanding global trade possibilities,' he said, adding that one should not see IMEC 'as a competitor to the Suez Canal; rather, it is a complementary trade route'. (Edited by Madhurita Goswami) Also Read: Global trade needs IMEC. Not just India-Europe, it'll boost markets in Middle East too

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