After Operation Sindoor, don't delay the stocktaking

Indian Express

03-07-2025

While Pakistani Field Marshal Asim Munir's oration at the Pakistan Naval Academy on June 28 has drawn considerable media focus, there is a need to assess how much attention India should pay to his utterances. The rabble-rousing tone and toxic India-baiting content of his speech, ill-befitting the occasion — a navy passing-out parade — was a clear sign of insecurity in the face of widespread public criticism of the Pakistan army in general and his promotion in particular.
Notwithstanding the banality of his words, we must recognise that since Field Marshals do not retire, Munir, if he so chooses, will be around for a long time — either as Army Chief or as political puppet master. By harping on Hindu-Muslim schisms and framing India as an 'existential threat' to its perpetual 'victim', Pakistan, Munir seeks to gain favour with the public and cement a political niche for himself, sidelining the civilian regime.
Given Munir's continued malevolent presence, India must steel itself to face escalating tensions. In all likelihood, it was his inflammatory rhetoric that triggered Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence and its terror proxies to plan and launch the Pahalgam strike.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in his speech on May 12, unequivocally spelt out four core principles that would govern India's future policy against terrorism. Optimists amongst us are hopeful that this declaration of India's 'red lines' by the PM will cause the Pakistan 'deep state' to pause and perhaps mend its ways. Sceptics, however, believe that it is only a matter of time before the ISI initiates yet another terror strike on India.
In these circumstances, no time must be lost in analysing threadbare Operation Sindoor and disseminating the lessons learnt — at the strategic, operational and tactical levels — before we are faced with a similar crisis once again. In this context, we have the admirable precedent of the Vajpayee government, which constituted the Kargil Review Committee on July 29, 1999 — a mere three days after the cessation of hostilities.
The urgency here is even more marked since this '90-hour war' saw an unimaginable leap in the level of technologies employed in combat and the dizzying pace of kinetic action. While India asserted its success in achieving its objectives of targeting terrorist infrastructure and demonstrating a markedly bolder and more resolute deterrence strategy, there are several aspects that require urgent review and analysis.
First, we were found wanting in strategic communication and narrative-building. While the conflict generated unprecedented levels of hyperbolic distortion and disinformation from media on both sides, India's lag in official narrative-building allowed Pakistan to steal a significant march. Compared to Pakistan's proactive media outreach and timely official briefings, Indian briefings were often reactive, and failed to put across, our notable military successes.
Second, the issue of aircraft losses suffered by India was ineptly handled across the board. Since aircraft attrition is an inevitable consequence in combat, there was little to be gained by concealing or acting coy about Indian Air Force (IAF) losses. The exaggerated Pakistani claims could not be logically countered by the dribbles of information coming first from the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore and then from a seminar in Indonesia. A forthright admission, followed by an account of the next day's devastating Indian response, which claimed six Pakistan Air Force (PAF) fighters and two other aircraft, would have boosted the credibility of our narrative.
Third, the extensive employment of 'beyond visual range' or BVR air-to-air missiles and advanced airborne radars in this conflict has proved a major game-changer in air combat. This demands urgent in-depth study and analysis. The aerial engagements on the night of May 7/8 between the two South Asian air forces, involving over 100 aircraft, were unprecedented and have captured the attention of air power analysts worldwide.
A comprehensive review of what is being termed, 'the largest BVR air combat in history' during Operation Sindoor is best undertaken by the IAF's esteemed Tactics and Combat Development Establishment, particularly against the backdrop of our past experience of 'aerial ambushes' in Kargil and in the post-Balakot encounters. The lacunae in equipment and intelligence as well as lessons learned and changes required in training, tactics and strategies must be addressed post-haste.
Rising above the minutiae of physical conflict, we need to remind our decision-makers that wars, if inevitable, must be waged only to eliminate the casus belli and achieve a stable and enduring peace. This places three responsibilities on the country's political leadership: (a) to lay down, clear aims for which armed action is being initiated; (b) to specify, to the military, the desired 'end-state' to be achieved, before termination of hostilities; and (c) to ensure that adequate resources are provided — in time — for the action contemplated.
There is scant authentic information on these aspects in the public domain. The waters have been further muddied by US President Donald Trump's insistent claims of brokering peace. In the face of incessant commentary by Western observers about the risks of nuclear first use in South Asia, it was reassuring to hear from India's CDS about the 'rationality and maturity', displayed by both sides in avoiding escalation to the nuclear threshold.
The extensive utilisation of cyber warfare and missiles as well as unmanned vehicles enabled both sides to wage 'non-contact warfare'. This calls for a comprehensive doctrinal re-think about the future of manned combat platforms. Moreover, the sheer intensity of this brief eruption and rapid expenditure of (expensive) munitions should lead to reflection about the status of our 'war wastage reserves', and their replenishment.
In essence, the May 2025 conflict served as a stark reminder of the volatile nature of the India-Pakistan relationship and the critical need for robust crisis management mechanisms as well as military preparedness. The intent of Operation Sindoor was 'deterrence by punishment' but as we await its long-term impact, India's national security establishment needs to think long and hard about alternate strategies to address the casus belli.
The writer is a former Indian Navy chief and chairman, Chief of Staff Committee