What Does the Decline of Agriculture Really Mean for Central Asia's Stability?
As global supply chains break down and climate shocks spread across borders, food systems have quietly become a key part of strategic planning. For Central Asia – a region historically known for its hydrocarbons, transit routes, and post-imperial balancing acts – the agricultural and food sector might seem minor. However, a closer examination reveals a region in transition, where agriculture is neither disappearing nor static, but going through a contested transformation. Whether this transformation results in resilience or regression will shape the region's economic future.
Between 2020 and 2024, the share of agriculture, forestry, and fishing in GDP declined across all five Central Asian republics. However, the pattern of change masks as much as it reveals.
Kazakhstan, the region's industrial leader, saw a drop in agriculture's share from 5.4 percent to 3.9 percent. This decline reflects a steady shift toward energy, logistics, and digital services – signs of structural development. Despite this, Kazakhstan remains the region's top wheat exporter, with 60 percent of its grain going to Uzbekistan, and the rest divided among Tajikistan (18 percent), Kyrgyzstan (14 percent), and Turkmenistan (6 percent). While its agricultural contribution to GDP decreased, its influence through food exports has increased.
Uzbekistan, on the other hand, experienced the most significant change – a 4.2 percentage-point fall from 22.5 percent to 18.3 percent, marking a 20 percent decline in agriculture's share of GDP. This reflects a deliberate diversification approach, where agriculture is no longer the primary driver but rather part of a broader reform effort that emphasizes services, industry, and construction. Still, agriculture and food processing continue to employ about 25 percent of the workforce, indicating that diversification is a matter of evolution, not abandonment.
Kyrgyzstan's situation is more complicated. The country reduced its agricultural share from 12.2 percent to 8.6 percent in just four years. On the surface, this might indicate sectoral change. However, it could also suggest stagnation – driven by ongoing water shortages, rural-urban migration, and limited government capacity. Without concurrent growth in high-value services or tech sectors, this decline risks becoming a hollowing out rather than a healthy rebalancing.
In Turkmenistan, the agricultural sector's share slightly declined from 11.5 percent to 11.1 percent, resulting in a minor change to the overall structure. The government's near-exclusive focus on natural gas and large public projects has left the agro-food system underdeveloped and marginalized. Services remain weak, while rural production operates with little policy support.
Tajikistan's case is unique. Its share of agricultural GDP has remained almost unchanged, at 22.7 percent in 2020 and 22.5 percent in 2024. While this stability may seem reassuring, it actually highlights the country's limited economic change. Agriculture leads, not because it is thriving, but because other sectors have not gained ground.
These trends reveal a broader truth: a falling agricultural share does not automatically signify economic progress. In some cases, it may signal strategic modernization, as in Uzbekistan. In others, it may indicate systemic neglect, as in Kyrgyzstan or Turkmenistan. And where no change occurs, as in Tajikistan, the risk is entrenchment – trapping a country into low productivity and climate vulnerability.
Agriculture's strategic importance in Central Asia goes beyond just GDP share. The region has been facing a worsening water crisis, with irrigated land per person decreasing by over 25 percent in the past 15 years. Glaciers supplying the Syr Darya and Amu Darya are melting quickly, endangering more than 10 million hectares of farmland. At the same time, population growth and urbanization are increasing the need for food, water, and employment.
Despite these overlapping threats, regional food systems remain fragile. Most nations rely on imported fertilizer, food logistics are underdeveloped, and export opportunities are constrained by regulatory fragmentation and phytosanitary gaps. Additionally, job creation in the agrifood sector is primarily informal and low-wage, particularly for women, raising questions about whether it can support inclusive growth.
Innovation – often seen as a universal solution – remains largely driven by donors or limited to pilot projects. Technologies like precision agriculture, digital irrigation, and crop diversification are available, but scaling them up is rare. Without increased public investment and reforms in governance, innovation risks becoming just a buzzword rather than an effective answer.
If Central Asia is to build a resilient, inclusive, and adaptive economy, it must not retreat from agriculture – it must reimagine it. This means upgrading policy institutions to treat agrifood not as a residual rural concern but as a strategic system that links labor, trade, water, and climate adaptation. Agriculture ministries need to evolve into inter-ministerial platforms for agrifood governance, coordinating across various sectors, including transport, energy, environment, and education.
Rural capability also needs rebuilding. This includes vocational training, access to credit, land rights (especially women's land rights), and rural infrastructure – from cold storage facilities to innovative irrigation systems. For example, Uzbekistan's horticulture development project presents a promising case, featuring over $300 million in concessional loans, 34,500 permanent jobs (40 percent of which are held by women), and the revitalization of agribusinesses. These are not just statistics; they signal what is possible when agricultural reform is integrated into economic planning.
Finally, regional cooperation must go beyond rhetoric. Food security cannot be achieved solely within national borders. Shared seed banks, regional certification regimes, water diplomacy mechanisms, and joint investments in agrilogistics corridors are essential. As climate stress increases, Central Asia must develop what might be called 'cooperative sovereignty' – not dependence but deliberate interdependence.
To sum up, the agrifood transition underway in Central Asia is not guaranteed to succeed. It could stall, become polarized, or unravel under the weight of climate shocks and institutional inertia. However, if the region can align reform, resilience, and regionalism, it may yet carve out a future in which food is not just sustenance or trade, but a strategic asset.
The farm may no longer be a dominant contributor to the GDP of Central Asian states, but in the coming decades, it may once again determine the stability of the state.
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JAMnews
a day ago
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Could Azerbaijan join the Abraham Accords?
Azerbaijan and the Abraham Accords The diplomatic initiative known as the Abraham Accords, launched by the United States in 2020, has not yet been signed by Azerbaijan, despite its close ties with Israel. Ilham Aliyev and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, 13 December 2016 | Photo: The Abraham Accords, a diplomatic initiative launched by the United States in 2020, were framed by the Trump administration as a historic peace effort. Donald Trump emphasised that the inclusion of more Middle Eastern and Central Asian countries would bring greater peace and stability to the region. One of the administration's key goals was to ease tensions in the Middle East (or Western Asia) by promoting the normalisation of relations between Israel and what it called 'moderate' Arab states. As part of the initiative, countries that join are promised access to advanced technologies and new trade opportunities. The main factor bringing the sides together is their shared perception of Iran as a common threat in the region. In this context, Trump's initiative aimed to bring Israel and Arab countries closer together through common interests — primarily countering Iran — and to reshape the regional balance of power. Although Azerbaijan is one of the few Muslim-majority countries with strong ties to Israel, it has so far stayed out of the Abraham Accords. So why does official Baku remain on the sidelines? What political and strategic considerations are behind this decision? It's these questions that Azerbaijani political analyst and head of the Atlas Research Centre, Elkhan Shahinoglu, seeks to answer. Shahinoglu breaks down why Azerbaijan hasn't joined the Abraham Accords and what's really driving that decision. Azerbaijan's position and Shahinoglu's analysis Azerbaijan has pursued an independent foreign policy for years, maintaining a strategic partnership with Israel while also keeping strong ties with the Islamic world. Its cooperation with Israel spans defence, energy, and security, but at the same time, Baku has remained an active member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and consistently backs Palestinian rights. Relations with neighbouring Iran, rooted in historical and cultural ties, also remain a priority. Within this delicate diplomatic balance, the question of joining the Abraham Accords requires careful consideration. When the accords were signed in 2020, there was speculation that Azerbaijan might be next. Reports suggested that US officials held talks with Baku at the time, but the government avoided public commitments and stayed cautious. So why this reluctance? Elkhan Shahinoglu | Photo: Teleqraf According to Elkhan Shahinoglu, Azerbaijan currently sees no practical need or political advantage in joining the accords. According to Shahinoglu, Azerbaijan already has extensive ties with Israel, so signing up to a separate agreement would be little more than a symbolic step. 'Azerbaijan has diplomatic relations with Israel. And beyond that, there are deep connections across multiple areas,' he says. 'In this context, does Azerbaijan really need the Abraham Accords?' In fact, Azerbaijan recognised Israel back in 1992, and official ties have only grown stronger since. In 2023, Baku opened an embassy in Tel Aviv. The two countries trade billions of dollars' worth of goods each year — mainly oil exports from Azerbaijan to Israel — and Baku purchases advanced weaponry from Israel for its defence sector. Senior officials from both sides regularly exchange visits. In practical terms, Azerbaijan is already benefiting from everything the Abraham Accords offer, on a bilateral basis. Shahinoglu underlines this point, arguing that with such a close partnership already in place, joining a broader framework agreement would be largely symbolic. What are the Abraham Accords? The term refers to a series of diplomatic agreements signed in 2020. On 15 September that year, at a formal ceremony in Washington, Israel signed official normalisation deals with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain. These Gulf states became the first Arab countries since Egypt and Jordan to recognise Israel and establish diplomatic ties. The name 'Abraham Accords' refers to the prophet Abraham, a shared patriarch in Judaism, Islam and Christianity, symbolising peace and common heritage. At the heart of the agreements is the establishment of official diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between Israel and the signatory Muslim-majority countries, marking an end to decades of hostile rhetoric. Under the accords: Israel and the Arab signatories recognise each other and agree to open embassies; deals are signed to expand cooperation in trade, investment, tourism, aviation, security and technology; the US acts as a mediator, offering incentives such as lifting sanctions on Sudan or recognising Morocco's sovereignty over Western Sahara. The accords signalled a shift in the region, with some Islamic countries effectively recognising Israel and opening a new chapter in regional diplomacy. The move was widely seen as a landmark achievement. The Trump administration described it as a 'new dawn' for the Middle East (or West Asia) and framed it as a major step towards peace. Since mid-2025, the US has been pushing to expand the scope of the Abraham Accords. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are now being floated as potential next participants. But joining is not straightforward — each country has its own political landscape and strategic interests to consider. Trump's initiative and goals US president Donald Trump, the architect of the Abraham Accords, introduced a new approach to the Middle East during his first term in office (2017–2021), breaking from traditional peace negotiation models. His son-in-law and adviser, Jared Kushner, led the development of an economic plan called Peace to Prosperity, which was presented at an international conference in Bahrain in 2019. The plan was built on the idea that geopolitical conflicts could be eased through geo-economic incentives. In other words, even with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict at a stalemate, countries in the region could still normalise ties with Israel in exchange for economic benefits. Trump argued that the more countries in the Middle East (or West Asia) establish official relations with Israel, the better the chances of lasting peace in the region. He went further, calling on all Muslim-majority countries to join the initiative. In a 2025 statement, Trump declared that the Iranian nuclear threat had been eliminated and said: 'It's very important to me right now that all countries in the Middle East join the Abraham Accords.' He claimed this would be the key to lasting peace in the region. By mid-2025, Trump had renewed his push, aiming to bring more Muslim-majority states, including Saudi Arabia, into the fold. But there are also key factors making it harder for Azerbaijan to sign up. Elkhan Shahinoglu points to several geopolitical issues Baku needs to weigh carefully. The Turkey factor 'Azerbaijan's strategic ally, Turkey, isn't likely to join the Abraham Accords under current conditions,' says Shahinoglu. 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'As long as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza continues and Israel refuses to recognise Palestinian statehood, it will be difficult for Azerbaijan to join the accords,' he explains. The 2023 war in Gaza, which killed thousands of civilians and devastated local infrastructure, sparked strong reactions around the world — including in Azerbaijan. While some in the country voiced support for Israel, many were deeply angered by the scale of the destruction. Officially, Baku condemned attacks on civilians and reaffirmed its support for resolving the Palestinian issue through a two-state solution based on UN resolutions. In this climate, forming a formal alliance with Israel — especially under US sponsorship — risks provoking domestic backlash and damaging Azerbaijan's standing in the broader Islamic world. Shahinoglu argues that Baku is right to be cautious. Taking such a step without progress on Palestinian statehood or an end to the crisis in Gaza could be widely misinterpreted and harm the country's image. Azerbaijan has also consistently emphasised Islamic solidarity — partly due to longstanding support from the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation over the Khojaly tragedy. As a result, the Palestinian question remains especially sensitive, making it politically difficult for Baku to sign a new multilateral deal with Israel while the conflict remains unresolved. The Iran factor While Shahinoglu doesn't mention Iran directly, it's clear from the context that Tehran is a major geopolitical consideration for Azerbaijan. The two countries share more than 700 kilometres of border and deep historical and cultural ties. Although tensions have flared in recent years — particularly between 2021 and 2022 — Baku has tried to avoid open confrontation with Iran. At the same time, the Abraham Accords are widely seen as forming the basis for a regional bloc aimed at containing Iran. Both the US and Israel have made no secret of their intention to isolate Tehran through these agreements. Against this backdrop, any move by Azerbaijan to join the accords would almost certainly trigger a hostile response from Iran. Even now, Iranian officials and state media regularly criticise Azerbaijan's close ties with Israel, accusing Baku of cooperating with the 'Zionist regime.' If Azerbaijan were to formally sign on, tensions with Tehran could escalate sharply, with the risk of retaliation. This uneasy neighbourhood makes Iran a major factor in Baku's cautious approach. Shahinoglu also points out that while Washington is keen to bring Azerbaijan into the fold, joining simply to please the US would be a mistake — especially if the potential fallout outweighs the benefits. 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The current bilateral arrangement works well for both sides, and that cooperation is valued. Shahinoglu echoes this view: 'Azerbaijan and Israel don't need anything more than continued bilateral partnership.' In other words, even without joining the Abraham Accords, the relationship is already strong — and doesn't require an additional framework. At the same time, Shahinoglu suggests that Azerbaijan isn't closing the door completely. If circumstances change — for example, if there's real progress in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process or if key allies like Turkey shift their position — Baku may reassess. In fact, it appears Azerbaijan is even trying to play a quiet role in facilitating reconciliation between Tel Aviv and Ankara, which could help lower regional tensions. For now, though, a cautious wait-and-see approach remains the most pragmatic option. Azerbaijan continues to send friendly signals to both Washington and Tel Aviv while maintaining a delicate regional balance. This strategy allows Baku to sustain its strategic partnership with Israel while preserving its credibility in the Islamic world.
The Diplomat
2 days ago
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Assessing Religious Freedoms in Central Asia, USCIRF Delegations Visit Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan
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In its 2025 report, released in March, USCIRF recommended that Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, among others, be designated as CPCs and subject to sanctions, and Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan be listed on the special watch list (SWL), which entails no immediate punishments, but indicates concern. The Diplomat interviewed USCIRF Chair Hartzler about her recent visits to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, the reasons USCIRF is concerned about religious freedoms in these countries, and the commission's encouraging the Trump administration to consider lifting the national security waiver typically paired with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan's CPC designations. You recently led a USCIRF delegation to Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to assess religious freedoms in these states. Can you tell us about what kinds of people you meet with on these sorts of trips? Whose voices are you taking into consideration? We met with a wide range of stakeholders, including leaders and members of majority and minority religious communities, human rights activists, non-governmental organizations, and relevant government officials. To understand the religious freedom situation in any country, it is essential to speak with a wide range of individuals and, in particular, representatives of diverse religious communities. This is particularly true for Central Asian countries, where broad and vague laws restrict freedom of religion or belief. Officials enforce such legislation arbitrarily, resulting in some individuals being unable to freely practice their religion. In USCIRF's most recent annual report (2025), the Commission recommended that the U.S. State Department include Kyrgyzstan in the Special Watch List for 'engaging in or tolerating severe violations of religious freedom.' USCIRF first recommended that Kyrgyzstan be included in the SWL in 2024. What changed in Kyrgyzstan that triggered its inclusion in USCIRF's recommendations? In its 2024 and 2025 Annual Reports, USCIRF recommended Kyrgyzstan's inclusion on the State Department's Special Watch List due to the government's ongoing and systematic violations of freedom of religion or belief. Over the past few years, the Kyrgyz government increasingly enforced long-existing restrictive legislation regulating religion. Authorities rigorously penalized religious practices, including online religious expression, collective religious worship and studies, and the possession of unauthorized religious materials, through raids, forced renunciations of faith, administrative fines, and prison sentences. In January 2025, a new religion law was passed, further restricting religious activities, including requiring religious groups to obtain registration from 500 people and places of worship to obtain registration, as well as continuing to ban the distribution of religious literature, among other things. Kazakhstan has also been recommended for the SWL for several years, though the State Department has never designated it as such. Can you discuss some of the conditions that led to USCIRF recommending Kazakhstan's inclusion in the SWL again? Since 2013, and most recently in our 2025 Annual Report, USCIRF has recommended Kazakhstan for inclusion on the State Department's Special Watch List due to the government's ongoing and systematic violations of freedom of religion or belief. The Kazakh government restricts the religious activities of all groups, including Muslims who deviate from the state's preferred interpretation of Hanafi Sunni Islam. For example, the government continues to target activities such as peaceful religious expression through observing religious holidays or gathering for religious services, and distributing religious materials with fines, detainments, and, in some cases, prison sentences. The 2011 religion law includes broad and vague provisions that authorities arbitrarily enforce. The law requires government approval to engage in virtually any religious activity and includes administrative burdens that allow officials ample opportunities to deny permission. This essentially permits the government to use the same law to approve the religious activities of those groups it finds favorable, while preventing or penalizing the activities of 'unfavorable' groups. How can vague or broadly applied definitions of 'extremist' harm religious communities? And do you think that this has an adverse effect on security as well? Each Central Asia government applies a broad and vague definition of 'extremism' under its extremism law. Within such legislation, 'extremist' acts are not limited to those that involve violence or calls to violence. This gives authorities broad discretion to investigate and prosecute individuals for a range of peaceful religious activities. There are several individuals imprisoned under 'extremism' charges for peaceful religious activities. In Kazakhstan, there are at least three Muslim men who are imprisoned related to their peaceful, online religious activities: Anatoli Zernichenko, Beket Mynbasov, and Ernar Samatov. In Kyrgyzstan, USCIRF monitors two religious prisoners of conscience, a Muslim man named Asadullo Madraimov, who criticized an official religious policy, and a Christian man named Pavel Schreider. The outgoing Biden administration did not make Countries of Particular Concern (CPC) or SWL designations by the end of 2024, leaving in place the 2023 designations. Do you expect the Trump administration to make designations? Have you had any productive interactions with the Trump administration on religious freedom issues? USCIRF is an independent, bipartisan legislative branch agency tasked under the 1998 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) to monitor freedom of religion or belief globally and make policy recommendations to the U.S. government, including the president. Since its creation, USCIRF has consistently held meetings with the Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom. We look forward to working with the next Ambassador-at-Large once confirmed. Currently, former Congressman Mark Walker has been nominated and is waiting for Senate confirmation. Under IRFA, the President is required to make designations 90 days after the State Department submits its annual International Religious Report. However, Secretary Blinken failed to make the required designations before the change in administration. In January 2025, USCIRF welcomed Marco Rubio's confirmation as Secretary of State and called for him to review USCIRF's recommendations for designations, most recently updated in the 2025 Annual Report. To reiterate USCIRF's recommendations in Central Asia, USCIRF recommends Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for inclusion on the Special Watch List, recommendations that the State Department has not traditionally implemented. In addition, USCIRF recommended that Turkmenistan and Tajikistan be designated as CPCs. While we applaud the State Department for implementing these recommendations, USCIRF encourages the Trump administration to lift the national security waiver paired with these CPC designations not only to reinforce that religious freedom is a priority for U.S. foreign policy, but also to emphasize the severity of religious freedom violations in these countries. Under IRFA, the administration may waive any presidential action typically paired with a CPC designation if it furthers U.S. policy on religious freedom or if it is in the important national interest of the United States.
Vancouver Sun
2 days ago
- Vancouver Sun
Turkmenistan's methane-spewing 'Gateway to Hell' loses its anger
DARVAZA, Turkmenistan — People go to the 'Gateway to Hell' gas crater in the middle of the Turkmenistan desert expecting an angry cauldron but are now coming away unimpressed. Once a giant uncontrollable pit of red flames and glowing red embers, the 70-metre (230 feet) wide hole is now just a charred cauldron with only a few pockets of small fires. After letting it burn for 50 years, authorities in the reclusive Central Asian state have finally moved to put out the fire, which spews huge quantities of methane into the atmosphere. 'I'm a little disappointed,' said Irina, 35, who travelled five hours north from the capital Ashgabat to get to see what she thought would be an inferno in the Karakum desert. Plan your next getaway with Travel Time, featuring travel deals, destinations and gear. By signing up you consent to receive the above newsletter from Postmedia Network Inc. A welcome email is on its way. If you don't see it, please check your junk folder. The next issue of Travel Time will soon be in your inbox. Please try again Interested in more newsletters? Browse here. 'On the internet we saw impressive pictures of burning flames. Now we realise they were old photos and videos. The reality is different,' she told AFP. Reducing the fire is an important step for Turkmenistan's climate ambitions. The world's biggest methane emitter through gas leaks, according to the International Energy Agency, it has committed to cutting greenhouse gas emissions. But putting out the fire means killing off the Darvaza gas crater as the country's top tourist attraction. Several nearby wells have been drilled to reduce the flow of gas. 'Whereas before a huge glow from the blaze was visible from several kilometres away, hence the name 'Gateway to Hell', today only a faint source of combustion remains,' Irina Luryeva, a director at state-owned energy company Turkmengaz, told a conference in June. The road from Ashgabat to the crater is covered with cracks and potholes, making the journey for would-be tourists treacherous. 'You have to swerve round the potholes and sand dunes, risking your life,' driver Aman, 28, told AFP at a gas station on the way. The desert covers some 80 percent of the country and sees temperatures soar to more than 50C in summer and plunge to minus 20C in the winter. It is also home to vast natural resources, with Turkmenistan estimated to have the world's fourth largest gas reserves. It was Soviet scientists, exploring the region's potential, who set the crater on fire after they accidentally drilled into an underground pocket of gas in 1971. 'There was a danger of poisoning the local population and farm animals, so the geologists decided to set it on fire, hoping that it would soon burn out,' said Turkmen geologist Anatoly Bushmakin. 'However, the crater is still burning,' he added. Under long-time president, now 'father-of-the-nation', Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, Turkmenistan had flipped between wanting to tame the crater or use it to boost tourism to the isolated country. In 2022, Berdymukhamedov finally ordered it be extinguished completely — citing both environmental and economic concerns. It 'has a negative impact on both the environment and the health of people living nearby,' he said. 'Valuable natural resources are being lost, the export of which could generate significant profits and be used to improve the well-being of our people,' he added. Turkmenistan has also signed up to the Global Methane Pledge, which aims for a 30-percent global reduction in methane emissions by 2030. But not everybody is on board with the plan. Locals that relied on the the draw of the pit's spectacular appearance for their income are worried. 'If Darvaza stops burning completely, many tourist companies will lose income,' said Ovez Muradov, 43, who works in a tour agency in Ashgabat. The Gateway to Hell was one of the only tourist attractions in Turkmenistan, one of the most closed and repressive countries in the world, according to rights groups. The country sees hardly any foreign visitors, though leaders have talked up the prospects of boosting numbers. Muradov said extinguishing the fire would douse those ambitions. 'I'm no expert, but I don't think the extinguished crater will have much impact on the environment, but the tourism industry will lose a significant chunk of income.'
