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Iraq says Turkey ready to renew, expand oil export deal

Iraq says Turkey ready to renew, expand oil export deal

Rudaw Net22-07-2025
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ERBIL, Kurdistan Region - Iraqi oil ministry said late Monday that the Turkish government has officially expressed its willingness to renew the 1973 oil export agreement with Baghdad and expand it to other fields, a day after Ankara announced the end of the deal.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan will not renew the 1973 Iraq-Turkey oil export agreement and the deal is set to be terminated in 2026, the country's official gazette announced on Monday.
The agreement stipulates that the deal will be considered extended unless a termination note is sent by one of the parties one year before its expiration. The state-run Iraqi News Agency (INA) late Monday cited an official from the Iraqi oil ministry as saying that based on this Ankara has sent a letter to Baghdad 'expressing its desire to renew the agreement and attaching a draft of a new agreement for cooperation in the energy field that is more comprehensive than the previous agreement, as it included cooperation in the fields of oil, gas, petrochemical industries, and electricity in order to expand the horizons of cooperation between the two countries."
The unnamed source added that both sides have been negotiating a new deal since July 2014, noting that the Iraqi oil ministry 'is in the process of reviewing the draft agreement sent by the Turkish side and negotiating with them about it to reach a formula that serves the interests of Iraq and Turkey."
Turkey has confirmed sending the letter to Iraq.
The agreement was first signed between the Turkish and Iraqi governments on August 27, 1973, and has been renewed repeatedly over the years, most recently in 2010.
The Iraq-Turkey crude oil pipeline was built to transport crude oil from Kirkuk and other fields to the Turkish port of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean.
The development comes amid renewed efforts by the Iraqi federal government and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to resume long-stalled oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through the Iraq-Turkey pipeline.
Oil exports from the Kurdistan Region through the pipeline have been halted since March 2023 when a Paris-based arbitration court ruled in favor of Baghdad against Ankara, saying the latter had violated the 1973 pipeline agreement by allowing Erbil to begin exporting oil independently in 2014.
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Druze Documentation Nexus Releases Initial Estimates Following Massacre Of Druze In Swaida: 228,100 People Displaced From Over 40 Cities And Villages
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Memri

time2 hours ago

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Druze Documentation Nexus Releases Initial Estimates Following Massacre Of Druze In Swaida: 228,100 People Displaced From Over 40 Cities And Villages

The following is a report compiled by the Druze Documentation Nexus. It is an initial estimate of the numbers people displaced after the massacre of Druze in the Swaida Governorate, in Southern Syria.[1] On July 14, 2025, the City of Swaida witnessed a brutal campaign of sectarian violence targeting the Druze community. Initially framed as retaliatory operations by Bedouin groups and extremist elements, the events quickly escalated into a coordinated campaign of systematic atrocities. What began as sporadic assaults evolved into a deliberate and sustained onslaught involving state-aligned forces, local militias, and jihadist factions. Contrary to their official mandate, units from the General Security Force of the Interior Ministry and Multiple Syrian Army Divisions operating under the Syrian Defense Ministry not only failed to protect civilians in Swaida but actively collaborated with Bedouin militias and extremist fighters. The result was a multi-day campaign characterized by targeted killings, acts of sexual violence, use of Turkish drones to bomb civilians, mass executions, looting, burning down houses, and widespread desecration of cultural and religious sites. It is worth noting that the Druze Documentation Nexus reported that the preliminary number of deaths caused by the massacre is 1,500, according to official records from the National Hospital of Swaida. The figure is expected to rise due to the presence of corpses not yet recovered in homes and on roads across 31 villages that remain under the control of security forces and Bedouin militias. Massacre in Swaida (Source: Druze Documentation Nexus) Below are estimated statistics of internally displaced persons (IDPs) after the massacre of Swaida, which amount to 228,100 IDPs: 1. City of Swaida Pre-Massacre Population: 125,000 Post-Massacre Population: 50,000 Situation: Infrastructure destroyed, markets stormed, shops looted, homes burned, civilians killed, public executions, women and children kidnapped, elderly abused/shaved, hospitals attacked, services unavailable, security/food threatened, most residents fled east/south. 2. Village of Walga Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 3. Village of Reema Hazem Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 4. Village of Al-Mazraa Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 5. Village of Al-Tayr Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 6. Village of Sama Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 7. Village of Samma Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 8. Village of Al-Dour Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 9. Village of Taara Pre-Massacre Population: 2,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 10. Village of Qarrasa Pre-Massacre Population: 1,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 11. Village of Al-Duwairi Pre-Massacre Population: 2,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 12. Village of Najran Pre-Massacre Population: 8,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 13. Samma Al-Hunaidat Pre-Massacre Population: 1,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 14. Town of Thaala Pre-Massacre Population: 10,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 15. Village of Al-Dara Pre-Massacre Population: 1,950 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 16. Village of Al-Aslehah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Churches burned and vandalized. 17. Village of Kanaker Pre-Massacre Population: 1,100 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 18. Village of Ara Pre-Massacre Population: 11,000 Post-Massacre Population: 6,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 19. Village of Al-Mujaymir Pre-Massacre Population: 5,000 Post-Massacre Population: 2,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 20. Village of Al-Majdal Pre-Massacre Population: 6,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 21. Village of Kafr Al-Lahf Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 22. Village of Reema Al-Fakhour Pre-Massacre Population: Unknown Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 23. Village of Salakhed Pre-Massacre Population: 2,500 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 24. Majadel, Smayd, Al-Kharsa Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 25. City of Shahba Pre-Massacre Population: 20,000 Post-Massacre Population: Unknown Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, homes/property destroyed, militant presence, declared devastated. 26. Village of Umm Al-Zeitoun Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 1,000 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 27. Village of Al-Sweimrah Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 28. Village of Al-Metouneh Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 29. Village of Al-Hayyat Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 1,800 Situation: Partial displacement. The gas station, village entrances and public facilities were vandalized. Currently it's not with HTS. 30. Village of Al-Heett Pre-Massacre Population: 2,450 Post-Massacre Population: 1,200 Situation: Partial displacement, most of the population is Christian. Currently it is not under HTS control. 31. Village of Al-Khalidiyah Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 32. Village of Lahtha Pre-Massacre Population: 8,900 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 33. Village of Radhimah Al-Liwaa Pre-Massacre Population: 3,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 34. Village of Al-Soura Al-Kabir Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 35. Village of Hazm Pre-Massacre Population: 1,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 36. Village of Khalkhala Pre-Massacre Population: 2,700 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 37. Village of Dhakir Pre-Massacre Population: 1,200 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 38. Village of Al-Soura Al-Sagheer Pre-Massacre Population: 1,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 39. Town of Areeqa Pre-Massacre Population: 9,000 Post-Massacre Population: 5,000 Situation: Mortar/missile shelling, under assessment. 40. Village of Dama Pre-Massacre Population: 4,000 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 41. Village of Lebbain Pre-Massacre Population: 3,500 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. 42. Village of Haraan Pre-Massacre Population: 2,800 Post-Massacre Population: 0 Situation: Homes burned, public executions, kidnappings, places of worship/shrines burned, declared devastated. Total Pre-Massacre Population: 295,100 Total Post-Massacre Population: 67,000 Total Number Of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): 228,100

US opposes Iraqi PMF law, warns against 'militia' participation in elections
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US opposes Iraqi PMF law, warns against 'militia' participation in elections

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CF member stresses need for US coordination despite tensions
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Shafaq News

time2 hours ago

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CF member stresses need for US coordination despite tensions

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