Morocco Elected Vice-President of Permanent Conference of African & Francophone Consular Chambers
This statutory meeting, held on the sidelines of the 5th edition of the Fez-Meknes Economic Forum, was also marked by the election of Youssouf Moussa Dawaleh, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Djibouti, as the new head of CPCCAF, succeeding Christophe Eken, President of the Chamber of Commerce of Cameroon.
In a statement to MAP, Benabdellah emphasized that this "important" elective assembly led to the formation of a new executive bureau and the election of a new president. He expressed pride in the Fez-Meknes CCIS being elected for the first time to the vice-presidency of CPCCAF, which includes over 80 consular chambers from 24 French-speaking countries.
This election is "a recognition of the work accomplished by the Chamber in developing its international relations in support of active economic diplomacy, particularly with African and Francophone countries," he added, noting that this new responsibility will "enhance the visibility and impact of Fez on the continental and Francophone scale."
For his part, Dawaleh said he was "deeply honored to have been elected President of CPCCAF in such an emblematic city as Fez, known for its historical and cultural heritage, as well as its economic and commercial influence."
The newly elected president expressed his sincere gratitude to the Kingdom of Morocco for the warm hospitality and exemplary organization of the event.
The Permanent Conference of African and Francophone Consular Chambers and Intermediary Organizations (CPCCAF) was created in 1973 with the aim of supporting the development of the African private sector through cooperation among its network's consular chambers and fostering economic exchanges among member countries.
(MAP: 22 June 2025)
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Morocco World
an hour ago
- Morocco World
Geopolitics as an Exact Science
Geopolitics has the potential to be an accurate science. Already in 1971, James N. Rosenau, one of the great theorists of international relations, published a reference book entitled 'The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.' He was not taken seriously despite his fame at the time, which continues to this day. Prior to that, in 1969, he published a book titled 'The Linkage Politics,' a masterpiece about the convergence of national and international systems. He had proven, by writing about forty books and thousands of scientific articles, that dedication and resilience always make a difference. I am referring to Rosenau in an attempt to depict the shift that the international system has been taking over the last ten years. A trend that I had foreseen in three of my last books in French, mainly the one titled 'The International System in Transition, from the Proliferation of Actors to Programmed Disorder,' published in 2017. As a matter of fact, important things are taking place on the geopolitical and diplomatic chessboard. I will be sharing my view on the matter through the latest news, starting with the upcoming summit between President Donald Trump and President Vladimir Putin scheduled to take place in Alaska on August 15, 2025. This meeting comes as no surprise, since during his electoral campaign for the 2024 presidential elections, the American president gave significant importance to the United States' relations with Russia. He had promised that once elected, he would reach out to his Russian counterpart to find the appropriate means to improve relations between the United States and Russia and, hopefully, put an end to the war between Russia and Ukraine. Indeed, political analysis on both sides agrees that the outbreak of the war resulted, among other things, from the dichotomous interpretation by both parties of the provisions of the Minsk I (2014) and Minsk II (2015) agreements. The obsolescence of the agreements was officially announced in 2022. In an article published just before the American presidential elections, I had formulated a number of hypotheses, some of which still hold up. (Hami, H.: US Presidential Elections: Common Sense Should Not Override Analysis, Evidence, in MWN, August 19, 2024. I delved into some scenarios pertaining to the American foreign policy toward Europe, the Middle East, Iran, and, inevitably, the United States' behavior regarding the crisis between Ukraine and Russia. I basically said that if Donald Trump were reelected, he would probably tackle the Ukrainian issue, relations with the Europeans, and the tumultuous relations with Russia and China. But he would be less interventionist, contrary to what some experts may think. Ukraine and Russia would come to terms on the basis of the new reality on the ground. The United States had no interest in seeing Russia collapse. I went on assuming that the pressure on NATO would resume, but without allowing Russia to revamp its strength. However, the European allies would experience some sort of setback. They wouldn't have played well the line they were supposed to with respect to Russia. Flirting with Moscow to a certain extent would have been tolerated. However, the Europeans went a little too far. They harbored the hope of holding the stick in the middle to regain their independence along the way. Bet lost. President Trump holds as his sacred duty to resolve conflicts through diplomacy, even if it means using deterrence and persuasion along the way. The use of force would remain an option, but such an option might be the last resort. Nothing suggests that things would be easy at the Alaska Summit. Two forms of nationalism, sometimes bordering on chauvinism, shown by Presidents Putin and Trump, as some observers see it, may slow down the process, but there is still hope that the realism and pragmatism for which both heads of state are known will eventually prevail. The summit is reminiscent, to some extent, of the conditions under which the Yalta conference was held in 1945. The Alaska summit also reminds us that Western Europe remains a prime battleground, yet the Europeans have few cards to play. They had failed in their task in the aftermath of the USSR's disintegration. The mission was to keep Russia at bay and relieve the pressure on the US as conditional protector. Nothing is taken for granted It was long ago that the mythical song 'Wind of Change' by the German band Scorpions made the crowds of Germans in particular and Europeans in general dance. The victory of the West, which made Francis Fukuyama the official analyst of 'The End of History' and the victory of the 'Free World.' The same song that would have given Vladimir Putin sleepless nights, as it reminded him of his last days in East Berlin where he was the head of the KGB office (currently FSB and SVR). Putin would get his revenge in 2007 at the Munich Security Conference. There he criticized the unipolar fait accompli of the international system and called for the establishment of a multipolar system to end what he saw as an unacceptable American hegemony. President Putin is sketching out a geopolitics in which Russia refuses to be the patsy for changes taking place on the global security chessboard—particularly in its European and Asian neighborhoods. It is also far away, that scene of Boris Yeltsin on a tank in 1991 in which he was seen addressing the crowd and intimidating members of the KGB who were trying to organize the counter-revolution by overthrowing Mikhail Gorbachev. Just as distant is the memory of the latter lamenting being betrayed by the United States and its European allies, precisely by playing Ukraine for the umpteenth time and making the ship, albeit autonomous, which would navigate in the already troubled waters of the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the various strategic straits for global security. The present paper aims to go even further and cast a wide net to refine a reading already done in two other articles dedicated to the changes the international system is undergoing, which highlight a zigzag transition but whose ultimate goal would be to reposition the major state actors and neutralize minor state actors who are overplaying their hand (No Room for Dual-allegiance in Geopolitics, 09/19/2024; et H. Hami : Géopolitique assimilée pour les uns et saut dans l'inconnu pour les autres, MEDIAS 24 du 09/01/2025)The same reading would apply to non-state actors who play the role of troublemakers and refuse to throw in the towel. The reading proposed in the two articles is based on the assumption that the international system in difficult transition can no longer accommodate the proliferation of so-called endemic or frozen conflicts. On the other hand, it highlights the limited, if not obsolete, scope of the 'pivot states' paradigm, the 'creative disorder' paradigm, and the 'non-state actors as intermediaries or proxies' paradigm. It therefore seems that the American president is sticking to a well-crafted roadmap. He adopts a more coherent approach compared to his predecessors. The approach consists of the premise that the security of the United States begins with cleaning up internally and monitoring the game externally. More concretely, this approach involves a reinterpretation of the postulates of isolationism, interventionism, and wait-and-see that have characterized American foreign policy for nearly two centuries. The idea of cleaning house also applies to traditional allies and inveterate adversaries. Within both categories, President Trump would distinguish between reliable allies and intractable adversaries. He would help the former to safeguard their national interest, and he would give the latter a chance to get on board. Security comes through order, far from American national borders. This becomes logical when reading the fallout from the various attempts to reshape strategic chessboards disrupted by conflicts that never seem to end. First of all, the abandonment of the 'regime change' paradigm as a first choice to keep 'entangled' leaders in the grip of acute intranational crises. Next, the neutralization of political opposition actors who have proven their inability to successfully achieve a peaceful transition once in power in pilot democracy countries. These actors were supported directly and indirectly and even invited to take responsibility after the American military intervention or that of the United States' allies. They failed because they traded a cleverly concealed suzerainty for an open suzerainty to the benefit of regional state actors who are now in the sights of major international players. Two striking examples. On the one hand, the failure of political Islam as a driver for the various episodes of the Arab Spring that occurred two decades later. This scenario would have resembled—had it succeeded as expected—the Budapest Spring (1958), the Prague Spring (1968), the mixed Warsaw Spring (1989), the Revolution of Dignity, also known as the Maïdan Revolution in Kyiv (2013-2014), and the upheavals in Tbilisi, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in 2008. It was nothing like that. On the contrary. The countries that were the scene of the Arab Spring are currently at the back of the pack of countries that have relatively come out of it. On the other hand, the promoters of the counter-revolution in the Arab Spring countries haven't gotten off scot-free, either. Their commitments are becoming more and more costly. But they have no choice. However, unlike the actors of the Arab Spring, they know how to adapt and read the direction of the geopolitical compass well. Now, these claims need to be backed up with concrete cases. Logical. I have gotten a few examples. One, in the midst of the war between Iran and Israel, the White House announces the conclusion in June 2025 of an agreement between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda ending four decades of military confrontations involving the M23 non-state army fueled by neighboring countries and mercantile interests due to the wealth this country abounds in. Unnoticed, this agreement, although fragile, confirms the determination of the new American administration to bring order to a rich African continent that continues to fuel the most unbelievable covetousness. Two, the end of Bashar Assad's regime in December 2024. The fact is not insignificant and falls within the framework of a wise reading of the most important parties interested in the conflict: the United States and Russia. There too, as with the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia has shown calculated passivity, and Turkey has taken the lead. Three, the conclusion in August 2025 of a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia under the patronage of the United States. An important event, as it is part of a balancing act that the United States and Russia are playing with regard to Western Europe, the South Caucasus Republics, Central Asia, and Iran. Taming the troublemakers for the sake of getting peace Observers undoubtedly remember how Azerbaijan reconquered a large part of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020-2024, a territory it had lost in 1993-1994 due to the coalition between Armenia and Armenian dissidents with Russia's blessing. The latter, occupied with the war with Ukraine, let it happen and allowed Turkey to take the lead in its own way. The conclusion of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia is a severe blow to the promoters of the various Minsk processes and the trilateral approach to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The beneficiaries of the persistence of instability in various issue areas have already started to make their voices heard. Suffice it to mention a declaration of a high-ranking official of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) who echoes the perception of the Iranian inner decision-makers with respect to the abovementioned peace agreement. He steps into the fray to warn Azerbaijan and Armenia, urging them not to trust President Trump. He stigmatizes the decision the two countries made to create a corridor in Zangezur and to grant the United States a lease for a period of 99 years. Iran, already weakened by the war with Israel and by the intervention of the United States, which partially destroyed its nuclear facilities, feels the vise tightening around it. The senior Iranian official indirectly expresses the hope that a trilateral alliance including India, Iran, and Russia will put an end to the containment-encirclement project of which they are the subject. Iran fears its influence over Armenia will wane after it lost its grip on some countries in the region, notably Syria and Lebanon (Tehran is desperately trying to oppose the demilitarization of Hezbollah in southern Lebanon to thwart the Lebanese government's decision on the matter). Thus, the agreement between the DRC and Rwanda, the regime change in Syria, and the understanding between Azerbaijan and Armenia are part of the dynamic the Trump administration initiated to resolve many endemic problems. Some might object: what about the Palestinian issue and the fate of Gaza? Judicious question that requires a bit of tact on my part. First, a statement: the idea of conquering Gaza and the forced exodus of Palestinians is rejected without delay or biased interpretation. Next, the Knesset's vote on a non-binding motion to annex the West Bank and Jordan Valley in July 2025 and the Israeli security cabinet's approval of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's plan in August 2025 to take control of Gaza cannot be acted on in the current state of affairs and will be doomed to long-term failure. This is a nervous reaction on Israel's part to the increasing recognition of the State of Palestine by European countries, which are known for being unconditional supporters of Israel. The United States, which promoted the idea of securing Gaza and establishing a form of international management of the Palestinian enclave, no longer seems to see it from that angle. This is too risky and could trigger a destabilizing movement among some Gulf Arab allies and receive a cold welcome from other countries sympathetic to Israel in the immediate vicinity. Similarly, such a hypothesis wouldn't promote Israel's security, which some decision-making centers in Tel Aviv wish for or use as an alibi to maintain the state of uncertainty in the country. Nor can it encourage countries in troubled areas to look favorably on the American approach to conflict resolution through economical and developmental means. In all the commotion, one truth emerges: Europe, once a strategic intermittent among the second circle of most influential strategic actors, is becoming a prized target for the United States, Russia, and China. Europe is not invited to the Alaska summit. It is being ordered to pay for the American weapons it is supposed to send to Ukraine. Neither Moscow nor Washington is offended by keeping Europe out of the new geopolitical configurations. The Europeans would jump in eventually. An overlooked fact: Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky congratulates Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev for initiating a promising peace process with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The same goes for Turkish President Tayyeb Recep Erdogan, whose country is very active in seeking a solution to the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. This means that the 'endemic conflict resolution' approach is on the right track. It will be the same for the crisis in Libya, the situation in the Sahel-Saharan strip, and the regional conflict over the Moroccan Sahara. The tour of Masaad Boulos, senior advisor to the American president for the Middle East, notably in Tunisia (July 22, 2025), Libya (July 23, 2025), and Algeria (July 27, 2025), gives an idea of the United States' vision regarding the perception of security and stability in the region. Thawing frozen conflicts Regarding Libya, it must be noted that in the aftermath of Masaad Boulos' visit, the Libyan protagonists have decided to resume dialogue to advance the process of normalizing political life. They are returning to the foundations of a plausible and salutary solution: the conclusions of the Skhirat agreements (2015) and the various rounds of dialog in Bouznika and Tangier (2020, 2024). Already, I had anticipated such a development in an article dedicated to Libya, believing that the resolution of the crisis in Libya would come through what I called 'the building-up through extremes' (H. Hami : Libya: Weak Core, Strong Core, for the End of Disorder in the Maghreb, January 10, 2025). Regarding Tunisia, the path Tunisia has been following over the last four years is a matter of serious concern in some Western decision-making circles. Observers interpret Masaad Boulos' visit to Tunis as a barely concealed warning. The Tunisian decision-makers are kindly requested to review their roadmap with respect to their alliances in the region and the Middle East. As for Algeria, Masaad Boulos' message is even clearer: the need to end duplicity and double-talk. The United States reaffirms its recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over its entire territory, including the so-called Western Sahara. The Algerian military institution is being ordered to calm down and get on board. No mention of the Polisario. No resorting to the outdated refrain of the self-determination referendum leading to independence. Only the autonomy plan Morocco proposed in 2007 is fully taken into account for a just, realistic, and sustainable solution. Naturally, the Polisario is playing with ambivalence. For the past days, information has been disseminated about a meeting that allegedly took place at the Foreign Office in London between its chief diplomat and the British Minister of State for the MENA region. In London, no comment, but seasoned observers do not rule out the idea that if confirmed, the meeting would have no effect on the United Kingdom's recognition of Morocco's sovereignty over the Sahara as affirmed on June 1, 2025, by David Lammy, the British Foreign Secretary. Indeed, he unequivocally stressed his country's support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan, which London considers to be the most credible, viable, and pragmatic basis for a lasting resolution of the dispute. Nevertheless, the British would not be far off, like other European countries, from trying to convince the Polisario leaders to distance themselves from an Algeria that is struggling with its geopolitical contradictions, which would eventually lead the country into an existential tragicomedy. The United Kingdom, in turn, seeks to anticipate the developments that the various Atlantic initiatives will experience and take advantage of them so as not to be forced to make painful concessions in its overseas territories. The United Kingdom is not the only European country to fear a sudden change in this matter; France, Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands, among others, fear that a groundswell will disrupt the apparent calm in the overseas territories. The trend of seeing countries hostile to Morocco return to better dispositions regarding the Sahara issue will increase in the coming months. South Africa would soon provide the demonstration. Indeed, the gestures of certain movements within the African National Congress (ANC) regarding Morocco's sovereignty over its southern provinces resemble blows in the water. South Africa will soon be on board. South African political forces are warning against separatist tendencies in Orania and the Eastern Cape. Furthermore, relations with the United States have not been smooth since the expulsion of Ibrahim Rasool, South African ambassador to Washington, in March 2025. President Cyril Ramaphosa's visit to Washington in May 2025 does not seem to have cooled down the heat of misunderstandings. Experts of African affairs don't rule out seeing Pretoria temper its hostility toward Morocco regarding the Southern provinces. I wrote an article in January 2024 where I shared my perception on that matter (H. Hami, Dépendance stratégique et État-ascenseur: la fin de la lune de miel; Maroc diplomatique, le 17/01/2024). Another article that followed up was supported and published recently to sustain the same argument (H. Hami: Morocco and South Africa, Twisting Toward a Common Ground, MWN, 07/29/2025). Observers sometimes have amnesic memories. They tend to believe that the West makes regime change an ethical, moral, and inevitable priority to help so-called oppressed peoples. For example, they forget that strategic state interventions have often played the role of cleaners without getting anything in return. In this respect, it is worth reminding François Mitterrand's position during his first year as President of France. He adopted a strong discourse toward African countries, calling for the implementation of democracy and human rights in Africa. He became more famous in the eyes of Africans for his speech in La Baule on the occasion of the 16th conference of African and French heads of state in 1990. In the aftermath, democratic elections were organized in Algeria in December 1991-January 1992. The Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) scored a comfortable majority in the first round (December 1991), but the second round was canceled. The process was aborted because Mitterrand would have given the order to the military establishment to do so. It is true that at the time, political planners in France and some European countries wanted to make Algeria the 'Germany of North Africa' in the wake of German reunification in 1990 and the first step aimed at creating the European Union. In doing so, Mitterrand would have no idea that on the other side of the Atlantic, in the United States, a plan was being hatched: the creation of pivotal states under three categories. The first category would involve states that were riding high due to possessing strategic resources in the eyes of the Americans. The second category would involve intermediate actors who had hegemonic ambitions dating back to the history of the 15th-20th centuries. The third category involves minor actors who were operating according to the clock of suzerainty at two speeds. These policy planners cried victory, in the same way as Francis Fukuyama, Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Bernard-Henry-Levy, etc., did. They were caught off guard by the counter-reaction from countries supposedly having thrown in the towel in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the hypothetical end of the Cold War. And it is within the same logic that the dynamics around stability in the Sahel region, the Libyan crisis, the Sudanese civil war, and naturally the issue of the Moroccan Sahara are inscribed. Geopolitics might be considered an exact science or rocket science. As was mentioned in the first lines of this article, James N. Rosenau outstandingly approached the subject in his piece called 'The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy.' I modestly align myself with this perspective. An adherence that I emphasized by referring to an article I modestly wrote on the matter. Yet, an update is always essential and indispensable in order to keep up with changes both on the academic and political chessboard. It is the mission I have assigned myself to enrich a renewed reflection on geopolitics, which, without a doubt, needs to be approached as we approach the exact sciences. Tags: geopoliticsMoroccoopinionRussiaSaharaUS
Morocco World
15 hours ago
- Morocco World
Imad Barrakad: The Engineer Behind Morocco's Tourism Renaissance
Marrakech – Imad Barrakad, Director General of the Moroccan Agency for Tourism Development (SMIT), has secured a prestigious spot in Forbes Middle East's Top 100 Travel and Tourism Leaders. Ranked 28th on the influential list, Barrakad stands among the region's most impactful tourism executives. His placement confirms Morocco's growing prominence – welcoming 17.4 million visitors in 2024 and outpacing Egypt to become Africa's top destination – and he was recognized alongside fellow Moroccans Fatim-Zahra Ammor, Adel El Fakir, and Abdelhamid Addou. This latest Forbes Middle East ranking evaluates leaders across airlines, airports, hospitality, destinations, and the public sector. Selection criteria include business size, sector impact, asset ownership, executive influence, notable achievements during 2024-2025, and professional experience. Barrakad's inclusion reflects his significant contributions to Morocco's tourism investment landscape since taking SMIT's helm in 2011. Established in 2007, the agency serves as the government's dedicated entity for tourism investment and plays a critical role in developing investments and designing tourism products across the country. In April, SMIT strengthened its position through strategic partnerships with Attijariwafa Bank and TAMWILCOM, focusing particularly on supporting the digital transformation of Morocco's tourism sector. Under Barrakad's leadership, SMIT has supported over 800 hotels to accelerate the industry's post-pandemic recovery between 2023 and 2024. From energy to tourism: An unexpected career trajectory Born on December 16, 1969, in Ksar El Kébir, Barrakad's path to tourism leadership was hardly predictable. With an engineering background and a postgraduate diploma in project management, he began his career in 1994 at CDER in renewable energy and energy efficiency services. His professional journey continued at the Ministry of Interior's General Directorate of Local Authorities, where he managed a rural electrification project under French cooperation. After seven years there, Barrakad joined the National Office of Electricity (ONE) in 2000, handling cooperation with utilities and local authorities. At ONE, he managed relationships with various ministerial departments, particularly tourism, and was involved with the Plan Azur and Plan Biladi initiatives. His competence led to promotions, first as Rabat Regional Director in 2006 and later as Commercial and Marketing Director in 2009. In 2011, Barrakad was appointed to lead SMIT, marking the true beginning of his tourism sector adventure. Colleagues in the tourism industry appreciate him for his availability, good humor, and relational ease – qualities essential for successful negotiations in the complex tourism development landscape. Driving Morocco's tourism innovation and investment Under Barrakad's direction, SMIT has been instrumental in implementing Morocco's tourism vision. The agency played a key role in the post-pandemic tourism recovery, supporting businesses to improve service quality and implementing government support measures that saved companies and preserved jobs. SMIT is currently managing support for reconstruction and upgrading of tourism accommodations affected by the Al Haouz earthquake. This assistance enables impacted establishments to complete renovation work and resume operations. The agency's efforts have contributed to Morocco's record-breaking tourism performance. The country has achieved several historic milestones, including hosting 14.5 million tourists in 2023 and 8.9 million visitors in the first half of this year – a 19% increase over the same period in 2024. Barrakad is now focusing on technological innovation as a key driver for tourism investment. In January, SMIT co-organized an international conference on technological innovation and tourism investment in Marrakech, showcasing how digital technologies can identify new investment opportunities in the sector. The agency is particularly interested in empowering innovative startups to establish themselves in the increasingly competitive market. Though startups currently have a limited impact, Barrakad aims to increase their visibility through an approach combining technology and strategic partnerships. To support this initiative, authorities are offering incentives to young startup founders, including SMIT's incubation program with a budget of MAD 180 million ($18 million), Moukawala Siyahia with MAD 600 million ($60 million), and Go Siyaha with MAD 720 million ($72 million). The targeted startups include those specializing in leisure gaming, such as virtual and augmented reality, which can reconstruct the architecture of ruined monuments to enhance visitor experiences. Others focus on electronic payment security platforms that improve travel preparation and visitor stays. Barrakad expects these startups to reach critical mass by 2026, with nationwide implementation by 2030, helping Morocco achieve its goal of 26 million tourist arrivals by the end of the decade. Embracing green tourism as the next frontier SMIT's latest initiative focuses on sustainable tourism development. The agency will host a high-level forum on September 24 in Ifrane, exploring 'Green Tourism' perspectives in Morocco. The event will bring together over 200 Moroccan and international decision-makers, including ministers, investors, institutional representatives, experts, and local operators. The conference aims to showcase successful sustainable tourism experiences, promote investment opportunities in ecotourism, and encourage the emergence of small businesses in this sector. It will also strengthen synergies between tourism investments, environmental preservation, natural space enhancement, and sustainable agriculture initiatives. This green tourism push follows a February agreement between SMIT, the Regional Investment Center of Fès-Meknès, and the National Agency for Water and Forests. The agencies have designed an integrated development program for Ifrane National Park, one of Morocco's richest national parks in terms of natural and tourism potential. The program aims to stimulate tourism investment through public actions that enhance ecosystem attractiveness while positively impacting socioeconomic development. It includes eight tourism clusters focused on rejuvenation, with a total budget of MAD 734 million ($73.4 million), including MAD 641 million ($64.1 million) in public funding. SMIT has launched a call for interest to select candidates wishing to invest in ecotourism projects in Ifrane National Park, offering technical and financial support of up to MAD 500,000 ($50,000) per project to approximately twenty project developers. Tags: Forbes Middle East rankingsImad BarrakadTourism in Morocco
Morocco World
18 hours ago
- Morocco World
Forbes Recognizes Adel El Fakir for His Leadership in Morocco's Tourism, Aviation
Rabat – Adel El Fakir, a Moroccan leader in tourism and aviation, has been named one of Forbes Middle East's Top 100 Travel and Tourism Leaders for 2025. He is currently the Director General of Morocco's National Airports Authority (ONDA) and was previously the head of the Moroccan National Tourism Office (ONMT). Under his leadership, Morocco launched major tourism campaigns, including the award-winning 'Morocco: Kingdom of Light,' and now he is overseeing the expansion and modernization of airports across the country in preparation for events like the 2030 World Cup. El Fakir has a diverse educational background that has shaped his career in business, marketing, and leadership. He earned a Bachelor's in Finance from ISCAE, where he gained hands-on experience and a passion for business and marketing. He then completed a Diplôme d'études supérieures spécialisées (DESS) in marketing at Université Toulouse 1 Capitole, studying alongside Moroccan and French instructors while working full-time, which helped him connect theory with real-world business practice. To broaden his perspective, he pursued an MBA in International Business at École des Ponts ParisTech and École Hassania des Travaux Publics in Casablanca. Later, he completed a Certificate in Corporate Governance at the Institut Marocain des Administrateurs, which gave him deep insight into business ethics, governance, and sustainability. This rich education provided the foundation for his success in both tourism and aviation leadership. Championing the Moroccan tourism brand El Fakir was appointed Director General of the Moroccan National Tourism Office (ONMT) in 2018. It was during this tenure that he launched the 'Morocco: Kingdom of Light' campaign in April 2022, targeting 19 to 20 international markets with multimedia advertising across TV, digital platforms, outdoor signage, cinema, and more. The campaign resonated globally, earning the title Best International Promotional Campaign from France's esteemed media TourMaG, and Best Destination Campaign from Spain's leading daily, La Razon. It also clinched the Travel d'Or in France (2023) as the most beloved marketing campaign by the French public. El Fakir's digital ingenuity was further affirmed when the ONMT campaign 'Moments in Morocco' received Expedia's best digital campaign award for the EMEA region in 2019. In recognition of his leadership, media and tourism peers named him Tourism Personality of the Year in 2024 as part of the first edition of the Morocco Tourism Awards. His impact garnered attention from Forbes Middle East, which ranked him 18th in its 2023 Top 100 Travel & Tourism Leaders in the MENA, a first for a Moroccan leader in the Top 20. Throughout his ONMT leadership, El Fakir orchestrated strategic airline partnerships, steered promotional 'Light Tours' across global capitals, and established the 'Light In Action 2026' plan to sustain Morocco's upward momentum in tourism appeal. A new flight path: leading Morocco's airports In June 2024, King Mohammed VI appointed El Fakir Director General of the National Airports Office (ONDA). During this transition, ONMT's Board of Directors commended his achievements in transforming the tourism office and wished him success in steering ONDA's modernization. 'The Board of Directors thanked M. Adel El Fakir for his work during the last 6 years at the head of the Moroccan National Tourism Office, while praising the positive results and the success of the various programs launched by the Office during his tenure,' ONMT said in a statement. They also expressed confidence in his new responsibilities as CEO of ONDA, where he is now managing strategic projects, restructuring the institution, and modernizing Morocco's airports. Earlier this year, El Fakir unveiled 'Airports 2030,' a bold roadmap aimed at transforming Morocco's airport network. The plan focuses on three main areas: expanding infrastructure, enhancing the passenger experience, and modernizing ONDA's institutional framework. Under the infrastructure expansion pillar, Mohammed V Airport is set to increase its capacity from 14 million to 35 million passengers by 2029, while airports in Marrakech, Agadir, Tangier, and Fez are also slated for capacity doubling. To improve the passenger experience, the plan focuses on digitization, including automated baggage handling, streamlined access, and seamless journeys from check-in to boarding. Institutional transformation is another key focus, with efforts to modernize ONDA's operational structure and strengthen collaboration with agencies such as the DGSN, Customs, Gendarmerie, and the Ministry of Transport, aiming to embed agility and efficiency across the organization. Tangible milestones under El Fakir's leadership also include the March 2025 start of a new terminal at Mohammed V Airport, which will have a 20-million passenger capacity and a $1.6 billion investment, scheduled for completion in 2029 in anticipation of the 2030 World Cup. In 2024, the ONDA network handled 32.7 million passengers, marking a 21% increase year-on-year, with international traffic rising 20% and domestic traffic surging 30%. He also appointed new directors at Nador El Aroui and Agadir Al Massira airports to manage rapid passenger growth, with Agadir handling 3.1 million passengers (up 36%) and Nador exceeding 1.05 million in 2024. Morocco plans MAD 42 billion ($4.2 billion) in airport investments by 2030, with the aim of positioning Mohammed V as a major intercontinental hub, with projections of 60 million passengers by 2030 and 90 million by 2035. Tags: Adel el fakirForbesONDAONMT
