Iran, US and the 400-kg enriched Uranium bargaining chip

Indian Express

28-06-2025

Written by R Swaminathan
In the aftermath of the US airstrikes on Iran's nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, the international community found unexpected relief in Tehran's restrained military response. Dubbed 'Besharat al-Fath', Iran's retaliatory strike targeted the Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, CENTCOM's largest hub in the region. It was a carefully calibrated operation: No casualties, no infrastructure damage, and prior notification given to both Qatar and the United States. It was more restrained even compared to Iran's military response during Trump 1.0 following the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the elite Quds Force, in 2020. Tehran opted for symbolism over escalation, signaling a strategic priority — regime survival.
The most striking feature of Iran's response was not what it did, but what it deliberately avoided — it did not withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and refrained from activating its regional proxies or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz. Further, the Supreme National Security Council has not yet endorsed the decision of Iran's Parliament to suspend its cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Iran's restraint, facilitated in part by Qatar's backchannel diplomacy, helped sustain a fragile ceasefire following President Donald Trump's forceful intervention with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Though tentative, the truce has held so far.
As the guns fell silent, attention quickly pivoted to the damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear infrastructure and whether the mission was accomplished. A leaked Pentagon Initial Damage Assessment Report suggested the strikes might have set Iran's nuclear programme back by only a few months, a claim that infuriated President Trump and prompted swift rebuttals from the CIA and Pentagon. They insisted the facilities were 'obliterated' and maintained that Iran had not relocated its 400-kg stockpile of uranium enriched to 60 per cent. Israel's intelligence claimed that Iran's capabilities were degraded significantly, including a 50 per cent reduction in its missile launcher capacity and several years of delay to its nuclear programme.
Yet, at the heart of the post-conflict ambiguity lies a far more critical and unresolved question: The whereabouts of the 400 kg of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) last verified by the IAEA before the Israeli strikes on June 13. The Fordow facility, Iran's primary centre for higher enrichment of uranium, was struck by GBU 57, the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) or the Bunker Buster bombs. Craters at the site confirmed deep penetration, but the IAEA has not been able to physically verify the damage so far.
On June 13, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi informed IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi that Iran would 'adopt special measures to protect our nuclear equipment and materials'. Grossi responded the same day, reminding Tehran of its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement to declare any transfer of nuclear material. However, no formal declaration followed. Subsequent satellite imagery from June 19-20 revealed unusual movement of trucks and bulldozers around Fordow, suggesting that Iran may have relocated sensitive materials, including the HEU stockpile, before the US bombing on June 22.
Although Tehran has issued no official confirmation of such a move, unnamed senior Iranian officials told Reuters on June 23 that a preemptive transfer of the uranium had taken place. This claim, however, remains unverifiable. The IAEA's post-strike assessments noted localised radioactive and chemical releases inside the damaged facilities, yet no off-site radiation levels were detected. This led observers to speculate that either Fordow's containment systems withstood the MOP bombardment, or the enriched uranium had indeed been moved. European intelligence reports suggest that Iran's HEU reserves were distributed across multiple, undisclosed facilities rather than being stored solely at Fordow. If true, this dispersal strategy not only safeguarded Iran's nuclear assets but also complicates verification efforts. It may take months for the IAEA to inspect the Fordow site, especially if structural integrity has been compromised.
This uncertainty grants Tehran diplomatic leverage. By neither confirming nor denying the relocation of the uranium, Iran preserves ambiguity, which can be tactically used in future negotiations. This is particularly important as Trump, speaking at the NATO Summit in The Hague, signaled potential talks with Iran next week, albeit in his characteristic manner: 'We may sign an agreement. I don't know. To me, I don't think it's that necessary.' Meanwhile, Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei delivered a fiery speech on June 26, reinforcing Iran's posture of defiance. He declared that Iran had delivered a 'hard slap' to the US by striking Al Udeid and warned of further retaliation if provoked. 'The nuclear facilities may be damaged, but our will and our capabilities are intact,' he said, dismissing any possibility of surrender.
While military confrontation has paused for now, the geopolitical stakes remain high. Iran still retains a significant portion of its long-range missile arsenal, and airstrikes alone cannot permanently dismantle a nuclear programme. But Iran is under pressure to have a deal, as otherwise all the UN sanctions that were imposed on it from 2006 to 2010 and suspended under the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action endorsed by the UNSC in July 2015) will 'snap back'.
As the ceasefire endures and oil prices stabilise, the immediate crisis appears contained. Yet, without a return to JCPOA-style negotiations, the world remains trapped in a cycle of brinkmanship.
At the center of this unfolding drama is the still-unresolved mystery of the 400 kg of HEU. Whether hidden, destroyed, or dispersed, its status will shape the contours of diplomacy in the coming weeks. Until inspectors return to Fordow and other sites, this enriched uranium serves both as a potential flashpoint and a bargaining chip.
The writer is a former Governor of India to the IAEA, Vienna, former Ambassador to Egypt, Austria, and Montenegro, and former Permanent Representative to the Arab League