Libya clashes point to growing power of Turkey-allied PM Dbeibah
Consolidation of power in Tripoli would strengthen Turkish ally Dbeibah and the GNU after repeated attempts to replace him by force over recent years while bolstering his position in an overarching rivalry with eastern Libya factions.
Late on Monday, after rising tension between armed factions, pictures circulated online showing Kikli's blood-smeared body with a handgun lying by his hand.
Reuters could not verify the circumstances of Kikli's death or confirm the veracity of the pictures showing his body, but his face was widely recognised and fighting erupted across Tripoli soon after they circulated.
Factions under Dbeibah's GNU rapidly seized territory and bases long held by Kikli's Security Stabilisation Apparatus (SSA) group, including the Abu Salim district, its old powerbase.
With Kikli's downfall, factions that come under the Defence Ministry and are aligned with Dbeibah, principally the 444 Brigade under Mahmoud Hamza, the 111 Brigade and the Joint Force from Misrata, may gain a bigger role.
Consolidation by Dbeibah allies could result in Western Libya starting to more closely resemble the east, where commander Khalifa Haftar seized control a decade ago after eliminating rivals and forcing other groups under his sway.
"This paves the way for unprecedented levels of territorial consolidation in Tripoli and an increasingly smaller number of groups," said Emad Badi, a senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. Fragmentation
Libya's energy facilities are mostly located in areas controlled by Haftar and Monday night's clashes seem unlikely to impact output.
Tripoli was calm on Tuesday, witnesses said, while fighters from the 444 and 111 Brigades were visible on Tuesday morning around the city centre and at the SSA's former Abu Salim headquarters, where its insignia had been erased.
Fighters from a group allied to the SSA had meanwhile disappeared from the area around the Central Bank of Libya, which they had controlled security access to since last year.
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