Senior Editor Of Indian Daily: 'India Has Reason To Worry As Turkish Intelligence Agencies Are... Extending Financial And Logistical Support To Islamist Factions In Bangladesh'
Sheikh Hasina, who fled to India, had run a secular government that crushed Islamist and jihadi forces, and executed several Jamaat-e-Islami leaders for their role in Pakistan during the 1971 liberation war. Following the ouster of Hasina, who was pro-China, an interim government headed by Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus is expected to hold general elections in late December 2025 or early 2026.
"Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey is said to have ramped up its engagement with Islamist groups in South Asia, gradually broadening Ankara's foothold in the region's religious and political spheres," Jayant Kalita wrote, recognizing the strengthening of Islamist forces in Bangladesh under the Yunus administration.
The senior editor warned New Delhi about Turkey's growing influence in Bangladesh, noting: "India has reason to worry as Turkish intelligence agencies are reportedly extending financial and logistical support to Islamist factions in Bangladesh – most notably the hardline Jamaat-e-Islami." His warning follows Turkey's cooperation with Pakistan during the May 7-10, 2025, war between Pakistan and India.
Following are excerpts from his article:
"The Yunus-Led Administration Is Planning To Set Up Two Defense Industry Complexes – In Chittagong And Narayanganj – In Collaboration With Turkish Companies"
"There are some worrying reports that Turkish intelligence agencies may be covertly supporting Islamist outfits in Bangladesh – most notably the radical group Jamaat-e-Islami – as Dhaka faces a political vacuum. Under President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey is said to have ramped up its engagement with Islamist groups in South Asia, gradually broadening Ankara's foothold in the region's religious and political spheres.
"These developments could pose significant risks to India's national security, especially as jihadi terror groups – suppressed under the Hasina government – are now attempting to regroup and reactivate their sleeper cells.
"What Does Bangladesh Want From Turkey?
"The Yunus-led administration is planning to set up two defense industry complexes – in Chittagong and Narayanganj – in collaboration with Turkish companies... The move follows Bangladesh Investment Development Authority (BIDA) chairman Chowdhury Ashik Mahmud Bin Harun's recent five-day trip to Turkey [in early June 2025].
"In January this year [2025], the two sides had discussed the possibility of cooperation in the defense-industry sector when Turkey's trade minister Ömer Bolat called on chief adviser Muhammad Yunus in Dhaka. 'You are the leader of the technology; you can build your defense industry here. Let's make a beginning...we are available for anything that you need,' Yunus told Bolat, according to Dhaka-based newspaper, The Daily Star.
Under Muhammad Yunus, Islamist forces have gained ground in Bangladesh.
"He urged Turkey to bring its technology to Bangladesh, invest more, relocate factories, and use Bangladesh's large, young population to its advantage. Nearly 40% of Bangladesh's population is below the age of 25.
"This was followed by another round of discussion between Bangladeshi foreign affairs adviser Md. Touhid Hossain and Turkish Aerospace chief Mehmet Demirolu in April [2025], in which the former suggested that Dhaka needed a reliable partner in aerospace technology and it would be a win-win situation for both Bangladesh and Turkey if they cooperated with each other, Dhaka Tribune reported.
"Needless to say, Turkey has long been a major defense supplier for Bangladesh, with Dhaka acquiring a range of Turkish-made weapons and military hardware, including MKE Boran 105mm howitzers, Bayraktar drones, TRG300/230 guided multiple rocket launch system, armoured vehicles, small arms, among others."
"Relations [With Bangladesh] Deteriorated Further On May 12, 2016, When Erdoğan Publicly Condemned The Execution Of Jamaat-e-Islami Leader Motiur Rahman Nizami Who Was Convicted Of Genocide, Rape, And Massacres"
"How Hasina Kept Erdoğan In Line
"Since establishing diplomatic relations in 1974, Turkey and Bangladesh maintained largely cordial ties. However, things changed after 2011, when Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) embraced a more overtly political Islamist agenda, creating tensions with Sheikh Hasina's government in Dhaka.
"The strain became evident in December 2012, when then Turkish President Abdullah Gül sent a letter to his Bangladeshi counterpart, Zillur Rahman, urging clemency for individuals [supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh] who were on trial for war crimes committed during Bangladesh's 1971 liberation war. Dhaka, however, rejected the appeal, unwilling to reopen negotiations on such a sensitive issue.
"Relations deteriorated further on May 12, 2016, when Erdoğan publicly condemned the execution of Jamaat-e-Islami leader Motiur Rahman Nizami, who was convicted of genocide, rape, and massacres. This sparked a diplomatic rift severe enough for both countries to withdraw their ambassadors in protest.
Sheikh Hasina was pro-China and a staunchly secular leader who crushed Islamist forces.
"Despite these political setbacks, Turkey and Bangladesh sustained robust economic and trade engagement. Between 2004 and 2014, Turkey provided approximately $13 million in development aid to Bangladesh, focusing primarily on education, healthcare, and vocational training.
"Over the past decade, bilateral trade between the two nations has consistently hovered around the $1 billion mark annually, underscoring a pragmatic relationship driven by economic interests, despite political friction. However, Hasina's removal [in August 2024] appears to have opened a new avenue for Erdoğan to advance his Islamist agenda under the guise of strengthening trade and defense cooperation with Dhaka."
"[Indian Intelligence Analysts] Further Claim That A Strategic Alliance Appears To Be Taking Shape Between Turkey, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), And Bangladesh's Jamaat, With The Shared Objective Of Destabilizing India"
"Should India Be Worried?
"India has reasons to worry as Turkish intelligence agencies are reportedly extending financial and logistical support to Islamist factions in Bangladesh – most notably, the hardline Jamaat-e-Islami, known for its pro-Pakistan stance.
"According to intelligence sources cited by [Indian media outlet] News18, the renovation of Jamaat's office in Dhaka's Moghbazar was allegedly funded by entities linked to Turkish spy agencies.
"They further claim that a strategic alliance appears to be taking shape between Turkey, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and Bangladesh's Jamaat, with the shared objective of destabilizing India. This trilateral nexus is reportedly coordinating the flow of funds, arms, and radical ideology throughout South Asia, leveraging Bangladesh as a critical hub for orchestrating anti-India activities.
Tayyip Erdoğan seeks to build ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh, targeting India.
"These developments can be seen in the context of the standoff between India and Turkey over the latter's support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor. Notably, in June this year [2025], Bangladesh's Supreme Court lifted the 2013 ban on Jamaat-e-Islami.
"While the Jamaat has remained active organizationally despite the ban, its formal re-entry in electoral politics marks a radical shift in Dhaka's 'zero tolerance approach' to religious extremism and terrorism adopted by the erstwhile Hasina government, a move which also worked in India's favor, given its crackdown on insurgent groups from Northeast [of India] operating from Bangladeshi soil.
"With general elections in Bangladesh months away [expected in late December 2025 or early 2026], Turkish and Pakistani intelligence agencies may seek to exploit the prevailing political uncertainty to influence the outcome and facilitate the rise of an anti-India regime in the country."
Source: TimesofIndia.com (India), July 7, 2025. The original English of the article has been lightly edited for clarity and standardization.
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