80 years since Hiroshima, in the wake of Operation Sindoor, the nuclear conversation

Indian Express

10 hours ago

Lost in the thrust and parry of the parliamentary debate on Operation Sindoor were PM Narendra Modi's several references to Pakistan's 'nuclear threats' and 'nuclear blackmail'. They reflected a deliberate articulation of India's more assertive security doctrine, representing a calculated move to redefine the deterrence equation in South Asia. That India is prepared to act against terrorism regardless of Pakistan's 'nuclear bluff' is ostensibly intended to enhance India's deterrent credibility.
The three-way China-India-Pakistan nuclear relationship has created a complex web of interlocking deterrence. All three countries are modernising and expanding their nuclear arsenals and delivery systems. Given the lack of transparency regarding nuclear arsenals and doctrines, and a marked reluctance to engage in a dialogue on measures to mitigate nuclear risk, the ongoing arms race can further destabilise the region, especially in a crisis such as Pahalgam. August 6, the 80th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima, was a reminder of the horrors of a nuclear holocaust. We need to focus on the management of this complex dynamic and on the prevention of accidental or intentional escalation.
China, while officially maintaining principles of both 'credible minimum deterrence' and 'no first use' (NFU), is engaged in rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal — predicted to reach 1,000 warheads by 2030. At the same time, the PLA's Rocket Force (PLARF) is fielding increasingly sophisticated missile systems, such as the 12,000-15,000 km range DF-41 and the hypersonic DF-17. PLARF's inventory consists of both conventionally armed and nuclear-tipped missiles, raising a question about China's posture: Is this 'dual-capability' a deliberate strategic choice or merely an organisational detail?
Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is aimed exclusively at India, and apart from reserving the right to 'first use', it has refrained from declaring an official nuclear doctrine. Pakistan's transition from 'minimum credible deterrence' to 'full spectrum deterrence' (FSD), which envisages the deployment of low-yield or tactical nuclear weapons, has been rationalised as a measure to counter the Indian army's 'Cold Start' doctrine. The latter, it may be recalled, was a conceptual remedy for India's slow general mobilisation during the 2001-2002 Operation Parakram. However, it is only now that this concept of integrated battle groups is seeing daylight in the form of recently announced 'Rudra' brigades.
India's political leadership has stood by its two long-held beliefs: (a) that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack, by holding out a threat of 'massive retaliation' and (b) nuclear weapons were political instruments rather than military warfighting tools. As a status quo power, India's declarations of NFU and its intention of maintaining a 'credible minimum deterrent' made eminent sense. But much has changed since this doctrine was promulgated in 2003. Moreover, emerging technologies have added to the complexity of existing nuclear conundrums.
The 'dual-use' potential of technologies such as AI, advanced computing, and hypersonic delivery systems could blur the traditional distinction between conventional and nuclear. For example, a precise surface-to-surface missile could carry either a conventional or a nuclear warhead, making it difficult to ascertain the nature of an incoming attack and decide an appropriate response.
The development of smaller, 'dial a yield' nuclear warheads permits calibration of a single warhead to be detonated with a range of explosive effects, varying from sub-kiloton to hundreds of kilotons. The availability of such options could make their use more thinkable in a conventional conflict scenario, potentially lowering the nuclear threshold.
Since 1998, the Subcontinent has seen a few sporadic attempts at evolving confidence-building measures and nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRMs), including the 1999 Lahore MoU on measures to prevent accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons, the 2005 Agreement on Pre-Notification of Missile Tests, and the 2007 Agreement to Reduce Nuclear Risks. But these are not enough, and a sustained dialogue is essential.
In the context of NRRMs, serious note needs to be taken of media reports citing open-source intelligence that during Operation Sindoor, some of the Indian missiles that targeted Mushaf air base in Pakistan's Sargodha region and the Nur Khan air base near Rawalpindi had impacted in the close vicinity of either nuclear warhead storages or Pakistan's nuclear command and control nodes. While the IAF's DG Air Operations firmly denied the targeting of any of Pakistan's nuclear installations, mischievous speculation has persisted about India's 'warning strike', implying that it was a demonstration of capability rather than an attempt to destroy the underground facilities.
The planners and custodians of nuclear weapons must note that targeting an adversary's nuclear assets, even inadvertently, with conventional weapons, can be misinterpreted as a 'counter-force' strategy, which is fraught with the risk of rapid escalation to nuclear war. The hazards and doctrinal confusion that would arise from such an action bear consideration.
First, a conventional strike against a nuclear facility would be indistinguishable from a nuclear first strike. Given the extremely short timelines for decision-making in a nuclear crisis, the 'use them or lose them' syndrome may cut in, leading the targeted party to launch its nuclear arsenal before it is destroyed. Desperate options like 'launch on warning' or 'launch under attack' may be considered.
Second, while it may not trigger a nuclear detonation, a conventional attack or 'near-miss' on a nuclear storage facility could cause a massive release of radioactive material, simulating a 'dirty bomb', with devastating humanitarian and environmental consequences.
Finally, conventional attacks aimed at command-and-control nodes could render the adversary deaf and blind, depriving him of the ability to assess the situation accurately, communicate with his forces or issue rational orders.
These are amongst some of the manifold reasons why there is an urgent need for initiation of a sustained nuclear dialogue between India and Pakistan, insulated from the vagaries of politics. Such an interaction, by reducing mutual suspicion and enhancing transparency, might slow down the nuclear arms race and the mindless build-up of arsenals.
The writer is a former Indian Navy chief