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Pakistan makes large US soybean purchase as tensions with India rise

Pakistan makes large US soybean purchase as tensions with India rise

CHICAGO: Pakistan has made its biggest purchase of U.S. soybeans in nearly three years, the U.S. Department of Agriculture said on Thursday, as the nation resumes imports of genetically engineered soy.
The purchases will only partially offset U.S. farmers' lost sales to top soy importer China because of President Donald Trump's trade war with Beijing. More than half of U.S. soybean exports are normally to China, while Pakistan's total imports in 2021 totaled just 1.4% of U.S. shipments abroad, according to U.S. government data.
Pakistan, which is clashing with India after a deadly attack on Indian tourists in the disputed territory of Kashmir, bought 225,000 metric tons of U.S. soybeans for delivery in the crop year that begins on Sept. 1, the USDA said via its daily reporting system. It was the country's largest one-off deal for U.S. soybeans since a 297,000-ton purchase in June 2022, according to agency data.
In retaliation for the April 22 attack, which left 26 people dead, India suspended a water-sharing pact with Pakistan, which denies any link to the Kashmir violence. Farmers in Pakistan who rely on the water for irrigation said crops could fail and people could go hungry.
Pakistan's large soybean purchase surprised market analysts.
Chicago soybeans, wheat rise amid trade deal hopes, US-China talks
'Pakistan is not the buyer that buys that amount of soybeans all in one slug before a new-crop season,' said Dan Basse, president of consultancy AgResource.
Pakistan began approving imports of genetically engineered soybeans in December after banning them in 2022, according to the USDA. The ban, which ruled out most U.S. soy, increased poultry feed prices and chicken meat prices in Pakistan, the agency said.
Pakistan imported 765,388 metric tons of U.S. soy in 2021, before the ban, and 2,644 metric tons last year, USDA data show.
The agency, in an April report, projected Pakistan's total imports will rebound to 2 million metric tons in the crop year that begins on Sept. 1. It said local soybean production is negligible.

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