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Dalai Lama at 90: The Succession Battle That Will Shape Tibet's Future

Dalai Lama at 90: The Succession Battle That Will Shape Tibet's Future

The Diplomat12 hours ago

The 14th Dalai Lama looking down at the crowd gathered in the Main Tibetan Temple courtyard as he makes his way to attend Long Life Prayers in Dharamsala, India, June 4, 2025.
With the 14th Dalai Lama set to turn 90 on July 6, the world's attention is focused on the Tibetan spiritual leader. For most who live that long, a 90th birthday is a time for reflection. But for the world's most recognized Buddhist monk, it's a moment of profound consequence, as he might reveal a plan for selecting his successor, an unprecedented move in Tibetan Buddhist tradition.
This issue extends beyond spiritual significance; it has become a complex geopolitical conflict, with Beijing eager to control the centuries-old reincarnation process and the future of Tibet.
Traditionally, the search for the Dalai Lama's reincarnation began only after the present Dalai Lama's death. Senior monks interpret signs, consult oracles, and scour the Tibetan region for a child who exhibits qualities of the previous Dalai Lama. The process can take years, often leaving a spiritual and leadership vacuum.
But this time, the Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, is rewriting the script, indicating that he may name his successor while still alive and that the child may be born outside of Tibet, pledging that his successor will not be born under the control of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 'Since the purpose of a reincarnation is to carry on the work of the predecessor, the new Dalai Lama will be born in the free world,' the Dalai Lama wrote in his recent book, 'Voice of the Voiceless.'
This is a direct rebuke to Beijing, which has long insisted that it alone has the authority to approve reincarnations of Tibetan lamas. China has already installed its own Panchen Lama, the second-highest spiritual leader in Tibetan Buddhism and a key figure in identifying the next Dalai Lama, while detaining the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama and his followers.
Born in 1935 in Amdo, a remote Tibetan region, the Dalai Lama was identified at age two as the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama. By 15, he had assumed full spiritual and temporal authority. But in 1959, after a failed uprising against Chinese rule, he fled to India, where he established the Tibetan government-in-exile in the Himalayan town of Dharamsala.
Over the decades, the Dalai Lama has become a global icon of nonviolence, compassion, and religious tolerance. Awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989, he has tirelessly advocated for Tibetan autonomy through peaceful means. Yet as he enters his tenth decade, the question looms: what happens after him?
Beijing has long accused the Dalai Lama of being a separatist. In recent weeks, Chinese officials have ramped up rhetoric against 'separatism,' with top security leaders touring Tibetan regions and emphasizing the need to 'defeat separatist forces.' Beijing is preparing to assert its claim over the next Dalai Lama, regardless of what the current one decides.
For Beijing, the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama is a simple matter of control. By installing a pliant successor, the Chinese government hopes to neutralize the Tibetan independence movement and cement its authority over the region.
The CCP has long sought to extend its control over Tibetan Buddhism, seeing it as both a threat and a potential political tool. Since the 1990s, Beijing has enforced 'patriotic education' in monasteries, criminalized images of the Dalai Lama, and used surveillance to monitor monks and devotees.
In Dharamsala, the de facto capital of Tibetans in exile, the mood is one of cautious anticipation. Penpa Tsering, the Sikyong (president) of the Central Tibetan Administration, confirmed that a gathering of senior lamas will take place on July 2, ahead of the Dalai Lama's birthday. A video message from His Holiness is expected to outline his vision for succession.
In the words of the Dalai Lama himself: 'Change is part of life. But how we shape that change – that is our responsibility.'
Tibetans in exile, who number around 140,000 worldwide, are bracing for a turbulent transition. Many see the Dalai Lama's plan as their best hope to preserve religious freedom and resist Beijing's interference. For ordinary Tibetans, the succession is deeply personal. Many worry about division if two rival Dalai Lamas emerge – one recognized by the exiles, another by Beijing.
Followers and supporters of the Dalai Lama say China's efforts at influencing the succession are doomed to failure.
'Many of us have never seen Tibet, but the Dalai Lama gives us roots. His choice matters not just for religion, but for who we are as a people,' said Dolma Lhamo, an exiled Tibetan woman who lives in India.
'His Holiness's 90th birthday is not a moment of despair, but one of spiritual resilience, democratic transformation, and cultural continuity,' Tsering Woeser, a Beijing-based Tibetan writer and blogger, wrote on Facebook.
Another exiled Tibetan, Yonten, who now lives in Europe, pointed out, 'This is more than a spiritual question, it's about our freedom to decide our future without fear or foreign control.' He added, 'His Holiness deciding his successor while alive is both brave and wise. It ensures continuity and protects our faith from political manipulation.'
The Dalai Lama's decision comes at a time when experts say that religious freedom is under siege in many parts of the world. His insistence on a successor born in the 'free world' resonates far beyond the Himalayas. It's a call to defend spiritual autonomy against authoritarian interference.
'The Chinese government's harsh words as well as unilateral actions relating to Tibet for the last many years point towards a stalemate once the 14th Dalai Lama is no more,' said Dibyesh Anand, a professor of international relations at London's University of Westminster and the author of 'Geopolitical Exotica: Tibet in Western Imagination.'
'This stalemate will result from the Communist Party asserting its right to control the reincarnation and selecting the next Dalai Lama, while the Tibetans in diaspora reject it and seek reincarnation in exile as per the wishes of the present Dalai Lama,' Anand said.
He pointed out whatever the Dalai Lama decides, one thing is clear: this is not just a spiritual transition. It is a geopolitical inflection point. 'This will be an unprecedented crisis of legitimacy for neither side – Tibetans nor Beijing – will have the possibility of negotiations, let alone compromise, in the future,' he said.
'This stalemate will go beyond China-Tibet relations as Beijing will use the 'one China formula,' where all countries that seek diplomatic relations have to reject Taiwan and recognize only the PRC as the 'real China'; it will demand all states recognize Beijing's candidate as the 'real Dalai Lama.' And the Western states, Japan, India, and some other countries are highly unlikely to give in to this likely pressure from Beijing. Thus, geopolitical tensions and instability in China-controlled Tibet over the reincarnation are the most likely scenario,' he added.
Kalpit A. Mankikar, a research fellow from Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, noted, 'Given that the Dalai Lama is an octogenarian, the issue of succession looms large in the strategic calculus. As a large Tibetan population resides in India, there are apprehensions concerning how the community would be influenced in the future.'
He added, 'China is facing tough headwinds due to the Trump presidency, and other domestic factors like the economy. In such a situation, they are focused on the issue of succession with regard to who will lead the Tibetan community. China will seek to assert itself on the question of succession. In the post-[14th] Dalai Lama period, they will certainly try to foist their nominee and try to gain legitimacy for the entity.'
Many global powers already seemed to be countering Beijing's plan. India, the host nation for most exiled Tibetans, maintains a deliberately cautious and neutral stance, but is likely one of the explicit supporters of the Dalai Lama's right to determine his succession, coupled with a recognition of the broader implications for China-India relations.
The U.S. government has taken a stance on the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama, stating that any interference by the Chinese government in the process will be met with sanctions. This stance is solidified in the Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2020, which includes provisions for holding Chinese officials accountable for such interference. The United States views Beijing's attempts to control the reincarnation as a violation of religious freedom and Tibetan cultural tradition.
A bipartisan resolution was introduced in the U.S. Congress on June 16, proposing to designate July 6, 2025, as 'A Day of Compassion' in the Dalai Lama's honor.
The European Union has not explicitly stated its position in a single, definitive document, but its actions and statements indicate support for the Tibetan Buddhist community's right to determine the Dalai Lama's successor.
In the coming days, as the Dalai Lama prepares to unveil a plan for selecting his successor, the Tibetan religious leader is not just contemplating the future of his spiritual lineage. He is challenging the geopolitical ambitions of one of the world's most powerful nations.

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