Why Iran's Fordow nuclear site that Israel wants to hit may be a big dilemma for Trump

First Post

18-06-2025

As tensions rise between the US, Israel, and Iran, the GBU-57's real-world capability raises hard questions about whether Fordow is truly vulnerable read more
Rescuers work at the site of a damaged building, in the aftermath of Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Reuters
While many people imagine a quick, clean military strike — like dropping one powerful bomb to destroy Iran's Fordow nuclear facility — the real situation is much more complicated. The idea of using the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to sounds like an easy fix, but in reality, it's full of risks, difficult decisions and serious political consequences.
As Richard Nephew noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, even if a strike on Fordow worked, it would only be one part of the solution. It wouldn't be enough on its own to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
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Strategic significance of Fordow
Fordow's relevance within Iran's nuclear architecture stems not just from its capability but from its resilience. Tucked beneath nearly 90 metres of mountainous rock near Qom, the facility houses thousands of centrifuges, including advanced IR-6s, capable of enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity within days.
Its clandestine construction, revealed by US intelligence in 2009, and subsequent reactivation after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, demonstrates Iran's intent to maintain it as a strategic hedge.
Nephew remarked that its very existence serves 'as a hedge and secure place' for clandestine weapons support. Fordow's protective depth and redundancy make it not merely a target but a symbol of Iran's nuclear endurance.
The MOP: Tactical giant, strategic gamble
The GBU-57A/B MOP represents the apex of US conventional bunker-busting capability. As described by the Air and Space Forces Magazine, it is a 30,000-pound bomb designed to burrow through over 60 metres of reinforced concrete or hard rock. This capability positions the MOP as a singular option for targeting hardened sites like Fordow.
However, operational deployment remains limited; despite years of development since the early 2000s and several strategic deployments, no combat use of the MOP has ever been confirmed.
The logistical requirements for deploying the MOP are severe. Only B-2 Spirit stealth bombers can carry it—each capable of delivering just two such munitions per sortie. These bombers must penetrate heavily defended Iranian airspace, likely relying on electronic warfare and support from refuelling and escort assets.
Recent reports confirm the deployment of B-2s to Diego Garcia, with hints of operational readiness but no evidence of MOP usage in current or past campaigns in Yemen, Gaza or Syria.
Operational uncertainties: A weapon without precedent
Despite its engineering marvel, using the MOP against Fordow is an untested hypothesis. The exact depth and configuration of the facility remain classified, leaving open the possibility that even a successful detonation might not neutralise Iran's centrifuge operations.
The use of a smart fuse with void-detection technology allows for timing detonation at optimal depth, yet as Nephew noted, damage assessment post-strike would be difficult—especially if Iran preemptively relocates sensitive equipment within the facility.
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Fordow's compartmentalisation could mitigate the bomb's impact and any mission failing to destroy all centrifuge halls would leave Iran with a viable breakout capability. Moreover, the necessity of precise, real-time intelligence is paramount, given the potential for Iran to conceal, disperse or rapidly reinforce nuclear assets.
Geopolitical risk: Striking Fordow is not just military
The political ramifications of striking Fordow, particularly with the GBU-57, are manifold. A direct US military strike on Iranian soil would almost certainly provoke retaliatory actions—not only from Tehran but potentially from its network of regional proxies. Gulf states, Israel and US assets across West Asia could become targets in a broader escalation spiral.
Internationally, such a move risks undermining fragile alliances and diplomacy. As the JCPOA showed, Iran's nuclear progress can be paused with negotiation. Yet, the Trump administration's prior exit from the deal—and subsequent hardline posture—illustrates a volatile political climate.
Nephew warned that 'a diplomatic strategy…contained the threat in 2015.' With the current Israeli military actions and Washington's fluctuating commitment to diplomacy, a unilateral US strike may fracture NATO cohesion and alienate European allies advocating restraint.
Political calculus: Trump, optics and the war decision
The domestic political calculus in Washington—particularly under Trump's leadership—intertwines with strategic deliberations. Trump's abrupt exit from the June 2025 G7 summit, citing events 'bigger than a ceasefire,' has intensified speculation about impending military action.
His rhetoric has leaned toward sabre-rattling with claims of control over Iranian airspace and veiled threats towards Iranian leadership. These remarks align with hawkish voices in his party, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who advocate for the MOP's use as a means of crippling Iran's nuclear infrastructure.
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However, this approach risks alienating isolationist factions within his base and provoking bipartisan concern in Congress. Proposals to limit presidential authority in launching unapproved military campaigns reflect historical anxieties that strategic strikes may be misused for domestic political gain.
Illusion of finality
Even if the MOP were to destroy Fordow completely, the assumption that this would eliminate Iran's nuclear threat is overly optimistic. As Nephew emphasised, Fordow is not the only path to a bomb. Iran has dispersed its nuclear infrastructure, possibly building new, hidden sites and maintaining a reserve of centrifuges ready for rapid deployment. In fact, Tehran recently hinted at the unveiling of another 'invulnerable' enrichment facility, following the IAEA's findings of treaty noncompliance.
Thus, the destruction of Fordow could represent a tactical victory but a strategic pause at best. Any delay could still allow Iran to resume its programme through alternate channels, particularly if the attack undermines future diplomacy or collapses monitoring agreements with the IAEA.
Historical precedents and strategic lessons
Past examples offer sobering lessons. In post-Gulf War Iraq, containment and inspections eventually faltered, despite extensive military pressure and diplomatic mechanisms. Similarly, Israel's past sabotage of Iran's Natanz plant—targeting its above-ground infrastructure—slowed progress temporarily but failed to halt the overall trajectory of the program.
The potential use of the MOP, therefore, must be viewed through this historical lens. It is not merely an act of destruction, but a signal: one that could rally Iran's domestic support, justify nuclear acceleration and fracture international consensus.
Strategy must precede firepower
The notion that the GBU-57A/B MOP represents a silver bullet against Iran's nuclear ambitions is strategically seductive but fundamentally needs serious scrutiny. Fordow's destruction, while important, cannot guarantee the elimination of Iran's breakout capability. Worse still, such a strike risks severe geopolitical backlash, undermining the very stability it purports to protect.
Nephew's analysis frames this reality succinctly. The destruction of Fordow is a 'necessary—but not sufficient' condition. Without a broader strategy — one that combines coercion with credible diplomacy — the use of the MOP may prove not only insufficient but counterproductive.
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As tensions escalate, decision-makers must weigh the gravity of initiating a strike with such a singular and potent weapon — one that has never been used in combat — not as an act of cinematic heroism but of sober, calculated statecraft.