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Time Magazine
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Time Magazine
Where Iran's Nuclear Program Goes From Here
Deep beneath the Zagros Mountains in central Iran, in a labyrinth of fortified tunnels outside the city of Natanz, centrifuges spun at speeds too fast for the eye to track. The cascade of machines, arranged in long halls and shielded by concrete and steel, have been central to Iran's most sensitive nuclear work, and, until recently, largely immune to airstrikes. But this month Israeli warplanes penetrated Iranian airspace and struck multiple nuclear sites, including underground facilities thought to be untouchable. While the full extent of the damage remains murky, satellite imagery and initial damage assessments by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) indicate that the strikes on Iran's Natanz nuclear facility were particularly effective, knocking out the electricity to the underground area. The Israeli strikes also blew up the uneasy nuclear status quo that existed in the Middle East for years while raising a daunting question: What happens if Iran decides that the only true deterrent is to build a bomb? For over a decade, Tehran has operated just below the threshold of nuclear breakout capability. But this spring it abandoned that restraint. The IAEA reported in May that Iran had accumulated roughly 120 kg of uranium enriched to 60%—dangerously close to weapons-grade levels of 90%—and enough to build 22 nuclear bombs within five months if further enriched. At the same time, Iran began building a third enrichment hall on top of the two already in use. U.S. officials saw it as a provocation; Israel viewed it as a casus belli. The military strikes Israel launched on June 13 were swift, surgical, and calibrated. Israeli officials described them as a pre-emptive operation to cripple Iran's ability to build a nuclear weapon by targeting its main enrichment sites, nuclear scientists, and military officials. But while the strikes appear to have disrupted Iran's enrichment operations, it retains scientific expertise and stockpiled material, and now possesses a stronger incentive to bury its program even deeper. 'If Iran survives the conflict, they could decide that a nuclear weapon is the only way to have deterrence,' says Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. Iran could attempt a dash for a nuclear weapon at one of its remaining sites. One, at Fordo, is buried so deeply in mountains near the city of Qom that only the U.S.'s most powerful bunker-busting bomb—the 30,000-lb. GBU-57—is believed capable of reaching it. The threat underscores the collapse of diplomatic efforts to constrain Iran's program. 'Trying to get to a deal now is infinitely harder than it used to be,' says Richard Nephew, who worked on Iran sanctions in the Obama Administration. Others are more hopeful about the outcome of the war. Says Matt Kroenig of the Atlantic Council: 'We were on the verge of Iran becoming a nuclear power and it looks like now we've set that threat into the future.'
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First Post
18-06-2025
- Politics
- First Post
Why Iran's Fordow nuclear site that Israel wants to hit may be a big dilemma for Trump
As tensions rise between the US, Israel, and Iran, the GBU-57's real-world capability raises hard questions about whether Fordow is truly vulnerable read more Rescuers work at the site of a damaged building, in the aftermath of Israeli strikes, in Tehran, Iran, June 13, 2025. Reuters While many people imagine a quick, clean military strike — like dropping one powerful bomb to destroy Iran's Fordow nuclear facility — the real situation is much more complicated. The idea of using the GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) to sounds like an easy fix, but in reality, it's full of risks, difficult decisions and serious political consequences. As Richard Nephew noted in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, even if a strike on Fordow worked, it would only be one part of the solution. It wouldn't be enough on its own to stop Iran from developing nuclear weapons. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Strategic significance of Fordow Fordow's relevance within Iran's nuclear architecture stems not just from its capability but from its resilience. Tucked beneath nearly 90 metres of mountainous rock near Qom, the facility houses thousands of centrifuges, including advanced IR-6s, capable of enriching uranium to weapons-grade purity within days. Its clandestine construction, revealed by US intelligence in 2009, and subsequent reactivation after the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, demonstrates Iran's intent to maintain it as a strategic hedge. Nephew remarked that its very existence serves 'as a hedge and secure place' for clandestine weapons support. Fordow's protective depth and redundancy make it not merely a target but a symbol of Iran's nuclear endurance. The MOP: Tactical giant, strategic gamble The GBU-57A/B MOP represents the apex of US conventional bunker-busting capability. As described by the Air and Space Forces Magazine, it is a 30,000-pound bomb designed to burrow through over 60 metres of reinforced concrete or hard rock. This capability positions the MOP as a singular option for targeting hardened sites like Fordow. However, operational deployment remains limited; despite years of development since the early 2000s and several strategic deployments, no combat use of the MOP has ever been confirmed. The logistical requirements for deploying the MOP are severe. Only B-2 Spirit stealth bombers can carry it—each capable of delivering just two such munitions per sortie. These bombers must penetrate heavily defended Iranian airspace, likely relying on electronic warfare and support from refuelling and escort assets. Recent reports confirm the deployment of B-2s to Diego Garcia, with hints of operational readiness but no evidence of MOP usage in current or past campaigns in Yemen, Gaza or Syria. Operational uncertainties: A weapon without precedent Despite its engineering marvel, using the MOP against Fordow is an untested hypothesis. The exact depth and configuration of the facility remain classified, leaving open the possibility that even a successful detonation might not neutralise Iran's centrifuge operations. The use of a smart fuse with void-detection technology allows for timing detonation at optimal depth, yet as Nephew noted, damage assessment post-strike would be difficult—especially if Iran preemptively relocates sensitive equipment within the facility. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD Fordow's compartmentalisation could mitigate the bomb's impact and any mission failing to destroy all centrifuge halls would leave Iran with a viable breakout capability. Moreover, the necessity of precise, real-time intelligence is paramount, given the potential for Iran to conceal, disperse or rapidly reinforce nuclear assets. Geopolitical risk: Striking Fordow is not just military The political ramifications of striking Fordow, particularly with the GBU-57, are manifold. A direct US military strike on Iranian soil would almost certainly provoke retaliatory actions—not only from Tehran but potentially from its network of regional proxies. Gulf states, Israel and US assets across West Asia could become targets in a broader escalation spiral. Internationally, such a move risks undermining fragile alliances and diplomacy. As the JCPOA showed, Iran's nuclear progress can be paused with negotiation. Yet, the Trump administration's prior exit from the deal—and subsequent hardline posture—illustrates a volatile political climate. Nephew warned that 'a diplomatic strategy…contained the threat in 2015.' With the current Israeli military actions and Washington's fluctuating commitment to diplomacy, a unilateral US strike may fracture NATO cohesion and alienate European allies advocating restraint. Political calculus: Trump, optics and the war decision The domestic political calculus in Washington—particularly under Trump's leadership—intertwines with strategic deliberations. Trump's abrupt exit from the June 2025 G7 summit, citing events 'bigger than a ceasefire,' has intensified speculation about impending military action. His rhetoric has leaned toward sabre-rattling with claims of control over Iranian airspace and veiled threats towards Iranian leadership. These remarks align with hawkish voices in his party, such as Senator Lindsey Graham, who advocate for the MOP's use as a means of crippling Iran's nuclear infrastructure. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD However, this approach risks alienating isolationist factions within his base and provoking bipartisan concern in Congress. Proposals to limit presidential authority in launching unapproved military campaigns reflect historical anxieties that strategic strikes may be misused for domestic political gain. Illusion of finality Even if the MOP were to destroy Fordow completely, the assumption that this would eliminate Iran's nuclear threat is overly optimistic. As Nephew emphasised, Fordow is not the only path to a bomb. Iran has dispersed its nuclear infrastructure, possibly building new, hidden sites and maintaining a reserve of centrifuges ready for rapid deployment. In fact, Tehran recently hinted at the unveiling of another 'invulnerable' enrichment facility, following the IAEA's findings of treaty noncompliance. Thus, the destruction of Fordow could represent a tactical victory but a strategic pause at best. Any delay could still allow Iran to resume its programme through alternate channels, particularly if the attack undermines future diplomacy or collapses monitoring agreements with the IAEA. Historical precedents and strategic lessons Past examples offer sobering lessons. In post-Gulf War Iraq, containment and inspections eventually faltered, despite extensive military pressure and diplomatic mechanisms. Similarly, Israel's past sabotage of Iran's Natanz plant—targeting its above-ground infrastructure—slowed progress temporarily but failed to halt the overall trajectory of the program. The potential use of the MOP, therefore, must be viewed through this historical lens. It is not merely an act of destruction, but a signal: one that could rally Iran's domestic support, justify nuclear acceleration and fracture international consensus. Strategy must precede firepower The notion that the GBU-57A/B MOP represents a silver bullet against Iran's nuclear ambitions is strategically seductive but fundamentally needs serious scrutiny. Fordow's destruction, while important, cannot guarantee the elimination of Iran's breakout capability. Worse still, such a strike risks severe geopolitical backlash, undermining the very stability it purports to protect. Nephew's analysis frames this reality succinctly. The destruction of Fordow is a 'necessary—but not sufficient' condition. Without a broader strategy — one that combines coercion with credible diplomacy — the use of the MOP may prove not only insufficient but counterproductive. STORY CONTINUES BELOW THIS AD As tensions escalate, decision-makers must weigh the gravity of initiating a strike with such a singular and potent weapon — one that has never been used in combat — not as an act of cinematic heroism but of sober, calculated statecraft.
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Business Standard
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Standard
Status of Iran's near-bomb grade Uranium stock looms over IAEA meet
The International Atomic Energy Agency's board meets Monday in Vienna, just days after a divisive vote that found Iran in non-compliance with its legal obligations Bloomberg The United Nations atomic watchdog is convening an emergency meeting to assess Israel's attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities, along with their disruption on oversight of the Islamic Republic's stockpile of near-bomb grade uranium. The International Atomic Energy Agency's board meets Monday in Vienna, just days after a divisive vote that found Iran in non-compliance with its legal obligations. Less than 24 hours after the resolution passed, Israel began bombing the Persian Gulf nation's nuclear sites, assassinating scientists linked to the program and striking residential areas of its capital city, Tehran. Iran's 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of highly-enriched uranium could fit in three or four easily-concealed cylinders, according to Robert Kelley, a nuclear-weapons engineer and former IAEA inspector. Even if Israel destroys Iran's enrichment infrastructure, the location of that material will still need to be verified. The IAEA's sudden inability to fully account for Iran's nuclear stockpile has added an additional layer of complexity to the conflict. Now, 'Iran has every incentive to breakout and perhaps the time to produce the material it needs,' wrote Richard Nephew, who helped negotiate the 2015 nuclear deal that capped Iranian enrichment in exchange for sanctions relief. 'If you don't solve for that, I don't know what you're doing,' he wrote on X.
Mint
16-06-2025
- Politics
- Mint
Israel has struck a blow to Iran's nuclear program—but it isn't yet a knockout
Israel has delivered a powerful blow to parts of Iran's nuclear program, but it hasn't yet taken out the most heavily protected of Iran's nuclear sites, leaving Tehran a potential path to the bomb. By Sunday, three days into its campaign, Israel had knocked out centrifuges at Iran's biggest enrichment facility at Natanz, killed up to 10 of the country's top nuclear scientists and destroyed key pieces of the supply chain for building a bomb, according to Israeli and U.N. atomic agency officials. The course of Israel's military campaign will determine whether it can achieve a goal it has sought for decades—neutralizing Iran's nuclear program or setting it back years. Falling short carries great risk, possibly prompting Iran to kick out international inspectors and accelerate its efforts to build an atomic bomb. Israel's biggest challenge remains: taking out Iran's most fortified nuclear facility, Fordow, where Iran produces highly enriched uranium. Many believe Fordow, which is built deep into a mountainside near Iran's holy city of Qom, could only be destroyed with a massive bunker-busting U.S. bomb. 'Israel thus far has targeted important parts of the Iranian nuclear program. But if you are worried about a nuclear breakout, Fordow is the game," said Richard Nephew, who served as a negotiator with Iran during the Biden and Obama administrations. Still, the damage to Iran's nuclear program that Israel has already achieved is considerable. The International Atomic Energy Agency said the sudden loss of power at Natanz may have destroyed some of the roughly 14,000 underground centrifuges. The long cascades of centrifuge machines, which spin to produce uranium, are fragile and can break if they aren't shut down gradually. An Israeli official said there were indications that the underground portion of the Natanz facility may have imploded, though he cautioned that additional assessments were needed. Israel has also struck critical parts of the supply chain for making a bomb. At Iran's Isfahan complex in central Iran, Israel took out four buildings, two of which are must-haves for a nuclear weapon. One is Iran's uranium conversion facility, which turns uranium into the gaseous form needed to feed it into centrifuges. The second was Iran's fuel fabrication plant, which converts enriched uranium into uranium metal, which makes up a large part of a nuclear warhead. Experts said that unless Iran has stashed equipment away, it could take Tehran up to a year to rebuild the fuel enrichment plant. Iran doesn't have stocks of highly enriched uranium metal that it needs for the bomb, according to the IAEA. Israel has also killed up to 10 Iranian nuclear scientists, including veterans who had gained valuable experience building and testing components of a nuclear weapon more than two decades ago. The IAEA says Iran had a broad nuclear weapons-related program until 2003. Iran has denied that it is trying to build nuclear weapons and has said that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said the targeting of the scientists could set Iran back years from making a nuclear weapon. However, some experts and former officials question that. They say Iran has developed a sophisticated network to preserve and pass much of its nuclear expertise to a new generation of scientists. Other uncertainties remain. The fate of Iran's stockpiles of enriched uranium, which were stored in canisters at Natanz, Isfahan and Fordow, is unknown. The Israeli official said that recent Iranian signals that it might disperse those supplies around the country added to Israel's calculation that it was important to strike Iran now. The Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facilities south of Tehran in airstrikes—Isfahan Enrichment Facility in Iran. The stockpile includes enough 60% highly enriched uranium to fuel around 10 nuclear weapons. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, said Iran could use its stockpile to fuel nine nuclear weapons within a month and 13 by the end of a second month if it can continue to enrich at Fordow. Many experts believe it will be difficult for Israel to destroy Fordow's interior, deep in a mountain. It could potentially try to collapse the entrance, said Nephew, but there are a lot of uncertainties. 'Could the Israelis use drones to attack bulldozers if the Iranians tried to dig themselves out? Do the Iranians have a secret escape tunnel? We don't know," he said. Even if Israel could make Fordow inoperable for a significant period, Iran has other possible covert routes to making a nuclear bomb if its stockpile of material is intact. For years, Iran has denied the U.N. atomic agency access to camera footage of its centrifuge production sites. That means there could be large numbers of centrifuges stashed away, which could be installed at a secret underground facility to pursue a bomb. That site wouldn't need to be particularly large. A few hundred more advanced centrifuges could work to produce weapons-grade material from the stockpile in a short period. Still, 'Israel's intelligence is so intrusive that Iran has to worry about early discovery of any such effort and about the exposure and subsequent destruction of key hidden nuclear weapons-related assets," said Albright. Albright says the impact of Israel's attacks have already 'reduced Iran's ability to make a nuclear weapon significantly." But Israel is still likely far from achieving what he thinks it would consider acceptable: keeping Tehran months away from amassing enough weapons-grade material for a bomb and at least a year from building a bomb. For the first goal, Albright says, Fordow and Natanz need to be badly damaged and the enriched uranium stockpile taken out. For the second goal, Israel might need to target more nuclear scientists and take out some of the testing, diagnostic and manufacturing equipment Tehran would need to build a bomb. The success of Israel's military campaign rests in large part on its ability to degrade Israel's nuclear program, and the verdict is still out on that effort, said Sima Shine, former head of the research and evaluation division at Israel's Mossad intelligence agency. She says Israel could yet end up in the worst of situations, where its attack has legitimized and incentivised Tehran to rush into a covert effort to build a bomb. 'I am sure if they are able to do it, they will do it," she said. Write to Laurence Norman at Michael R. Gordon at and Dov Lieber at
