
Hard-right candidate secures decisive win in Romania's presidential vote
Mr Simion, the 38-year-old leader of the Alliance for the Unity of Romanians (AUR), was well ahead with 40.5% of the vote after 99% of votes were counted from Sunday's vote.
Bucharest Mayor Nicusor Dan was trailing in second with 20.89%, with the governing coalition's joint candidate, Crin Antonescu, in third with 20.34%.
Mr Antonescu conceded defeat, saying he believes it is an 'irreversible result.'
Eleven candidates vied for the presidency and a runoff will be held on May 18 between the top two candidates.
By the time polls closed, about 9.57 million people — or 53.2% of eligible voters — had cast their ballots, according to the Central Election Bureau, with 973,000 votes cast at polling stations set up in other countries.
The rerun was held after a top court voided the previous election in which the far-right outsider Calin Georgescu topped the first round, following allegations of electoral violations and Russian interference, which Moscow has denied.
In a pre-recorded speech aired after polls closed, Mr Simion said that despite many obstacles, Romanians 'have risen up' and 'we are approaching an exceptional result.'
'I am here to restore constitutional order,' said Mr Simion, who came fourth in last year's race and later backed Mr Georgescu.
'I want democracy, I want normalcy, and I have a single objective: to give back to the Romanian people what was taken from them and to place at the centre of decision-making the ordinary, honest, dignified people.'
Mr Georgescu, who appeared alongside Mr Simion at a polling station on Sunday in the capital Bucharest called the vote rerun 'a fraud orchestrated by those who have made deceit the only state policy,' but said he was there to 'acknowledge the power of democracy, the power of the vote that frightens the system, that terrifies the system'.
The presidential role carries a five-year term and significant decision-making powers in national security and foreign policy.
The decision to annul the election and the ban on Mr Georgescu's candidacy drew criticism from US vice president JD Vance, Elon Musk and Russia, which publicly supported his candidacy in the rerun.
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Spectator
6 minutes ago
- Spectator
How Russia is preparing for Putin's meeting with Trump
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Spectator
36 minutes ago
- Spectator
Could the Arctic be key to ending the Ukraine war?
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Scotsman
2 hours ago
- Scotsman
Nicola Sturgeon says her sexuality is not 'binary' as she addresses gay affair rumours
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