SC refuses to entertain Baghel's plea against nephew's election petition
A Bench comprising Justice Surya Kant and Justice Joymalya Bagchi dismissed the petition as withdrawn while granting Baghel liberty to approach the High Court-cum-Election Tribunal to raise the issue of maintainability as a preliminary issue.
'If such an application is filed, the High Court is requested to decide it after giving an opportunity of being heard to the other side and before proceeding on merits.
Observations made in the said order shall have no bearing on the application sought to be moved,' the Bench clarified.
Baghel had approached the apex court against the Chhattisgarh High Court's dismissal of his application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of Vijay Baghel's election petition.
Appearing for Baghel, Senior Advocate Vivek Tankha, along with Advocate Sumeer Sodhi, argued that breach of silence period norms does not amount to 'corrupt practice' under election law and hence, the election petition was not maintainable.
However, the Bench suggested that the issue be raised before the High Court-cum-Election Tribunal.
In the 2023 Chhattisgarh Assembly elections, Bhupesh Baghel (Indian National Congress) and Vijay Baghel (Bharatiya Janata Party) contested against each other from the Patan constituency, with Bhupesh Baghel emerging victorious.
Subsequently, Vijay Baghel filed an election petition alleging corrupt practices, including violation of the 48-hour silence period mandated under Section 126 of the Representation of the People Act.
It was claimed that Bhupesh Baghel organised a rally or roadshow during the silence period, where slogans were raised in his favour. This was allegedly video-graphed and photographed by Vijay Baghel's election agent.
In his defence, Bhupesh Baghel contended that the election petition was vague and did not disclose any triable cause of action.
Upon dismissal of his application by the High Court, he approached the Supreme Court, which today declined to interfere. UNI SNG SSP
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