China discloses chilling details of monstrous DF-5B missiles with nukes 200 times destructive than Hiroshima bomb, capable of striking the entire US
The DF-5B's specifications reveal a potential shift in China's transparency about its military capabilities. By disclosing this information, China may seek to project confidence and deter adversaries while modernizing and expanding its nuclear forces to maintain parity with other major powers.
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In a rare disclosure, China 's state broadcaster, CCTV , has released key specifications of the DF-5B intercontinental ballistic missile ICBM ), a powerful silo-based weapon capable of delivering nuclear strikes across the continental United States.The release comes at a time of geopolitical and economic tensions between China and the West, particularly the US, over issues ranging from Taiwan to military expansion in the South China Sea. With a range of 12,000 kilometers and a warhead yield up to 4 megatons, the DF-5B represents a significant component of China's growing nuclear deterrence posture.The DF-5B is a two-stage, silo-based ICBM developed in the early 1970s and deployed in 1981. It measures 32.6 meters in length, has a diameter of 3.35 meters, and weighs approximately 183 tons.The missile is capable of delivering a single nuclear warhead with an explosive yield between 3 and 4 megatons of TNT, making it roughly 200 times more powerful than the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Its range extends up to 7,460 miles (12,000 kilometers), allowing it to reach targets across the continental United States and Western Europe. Analysts see the disclosure of the DF-5B's capabilities as a strategic move to demonstrate China's nuclear deterrence strength. The missile's range and payload capacity position it as a formidable component of China's nuclear triad, ensuring a credible second-strike capability. This development comes amid rising tensions with the United States, particularly concerning security dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region. Former PLA instructor Song Zhongping stated to the South China Morning Post that the DF-5 was vital in establishing China's intercontinental nuclear capability.'Without the DF-5, China wouldn't be regarded as a nation with credible intercontinental strike capability. It was instrumental in China's emergence as a nuclear power, demonstrating to the world that China must be taken seriously,' he added.He also suggested that the disclosure might be a calculated step towards introducing next-generation, silo-based ICBMs.The public unveiling of the DF-5B's specifications may signal a shift in China's approach to transparency regarding its military capabilities. By disclosing such information, China could aim to project confidence in its defense posture and deter potential adversaries. This move also aligns with broader efforts to modernize and expand its nuclear forces, ensuring parity with other major nuclear powers.On September 25, 2024, the Chinese Ministry of National Defence announced that the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had test-launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) into the South Pacific. Analysts suggested that the missile utilized in this test was likely a modernized version of the DF-31.The Pentagon's assessment indicated that China possesses more than 600 operational nuclear warheads, with expectations that this number will exceed 1,000 by 2030. Furthermore, the US Department of Defense estimated that China has established around 320 missile silos at three major sites.Notably, besides India, China is the only country that adheres to a no-first-use policy regarding nuclear weapons, asserting that it will not engage in their use against non-nuclear states.
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