Govt finalises industrial policy
Listen to article
The government on Friday finalised recommendations for a long-term industrial policy, proposing 10-year loans for industrial units with a two-year grace period. Several other measures have also been suggested to boost industrialisation.
To support manufacturing, the policy proposes reducing corporate tax from 29% to 26% over three years. Amendments to the SECP Act, Anti-Money Laundering Act, and Income Tax Ordinance have also been recommended.
A high-level meeting of the Prime Minister's Committee on Industrial Policy was held under the chairmanship of Special Assistant to the Prime Minister (SAPM) on Industries and Production Haroon Akhtar Khan. The meeting reviewed and finalised the recommendations of eight specialised sub-committees. These proposals mark the start of implementing the new industrial policy.
The policy categorises borrowers into four groups for financing. According to State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) guidelines, the first group includes viable units with moderate repayment ability, and the second includes marginally viable ones needing external support.
Interest rates will be adjusted based on the policy rate and revival potential. Loans may be extended for up to 10 years, with an optional two-year grace period. Early repayment will be allowed without penalty for back-ended projects. Fresh working capital of up to 20% of the restructured principal will also be provided.
A haircut policy of up to 60% on the principal will be allowed under board-sanctioned approval. This amount may be recorded as a "shadow entry" for tracking but won't require provisioning or audit qualification. Remaining loan amounts will be listed as "Restructured but Active" in regulatory reports.
Full and final settlements (FFS) will be allowed once, through lump sum or staggered payments over 12-24 months. Banks will record waived amounts separately for tax purposes under the Income Tax Ordinance. Loan write-offs will qualify for tax deduction under Section 29.
Each restructuring case will report to a subcommittee of the bank's board. Government-owned banks must set annual targets for resolving non-performing loans. Incentives such as bonuses or board fees may be tied to target achievement.
For governance and risk control, third-party due diligence will be mandatory for loans up to Rs100 million. Chartered accountancy firms or financial institutions will verify the due diligence. SBP will launch a portal displaying monthly sector and province-wise summaries.
A whistle-blower channel will allow reports of misconduct or non-transparent dealings. Each revived unit will be monitored for at least two years, with quarterly reports submitted to the Ministry of Industries and Production (MoIP).
Khan noted that the industrial sector's share in GDP has declined from 26% in 1996 to 18% in 2025. He stressed the urgency of reviving this sector, increasing exports, and developing import substitutes.
Eight sub-committees were earlier formed to address key challenges. Their proposals include SBP guidelines for reviving sick industries and amending the Corporate Rehabilitation Act 2018. Banks have been asked to use forecasting tools to detect early signs of distress.
To ensure fast execution, SAPM Khan formed 10 new sub-committees and asked them to deliver tangible outcomes within a week. He said the new policy could trigger an industrial revolution and confirmed the recommendations were presented to Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, who appreciated the efforts.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
Express Tribune
6 hours ago
- Express Tribune
Doval Doctrine: India's trail of terror
Over the past decade, India has barely made the effort to conceal its insatiable appetite for destabilising Pakistan. That ambition has pulsated beneath every wave of anti-Pakistan vitriol — a chorus that has only grown more pronounced with time. But its most obvious display surfaced in 2014, shortly after the inauguration of Narendra Modi, when his newly appointed National Security Advisor, Ajit Doval, laid out the cards in a speech at Sastra University that left little to the imagination. 'Pakistan's vulnerability is many, many times higher than (that of India's). Once they know India has shifted to defensive offense, they will find it is unaffordable for them,' he cautioned. 'You can do one Mumbai, you may lose Balochistan.' Doval spoke without mincing words. 'There is no nuclear war involved in that. There is no engagement of troops,' he added, his tone laced with hubris. 'They know the tricks. We know the tricks better.' That speech would come to define what is now known as the Doval Doctrine — India's muscular reimagination of its policy toward its nuclear-armed neighbour, Pakistan. It reclassified terrorism as an existential national security threat and cast Pakistan not just as a rival, but as the epicentre of that threat. The battlefield, however, was no longer confined to traditional war zones. This was the language of covert operations, information warfare, and calibrated destabilisation. What Doval hinted at — almost with disdain — was India's willingness to stir unrest within Pakistan. His reference to Balochistan served as a smoking gun, exposing New Delhi's role in exploiting the fault lines of Pakistan's underbelly through a covert war pursued for strategic ends. For Islamabad, this was an open admission of a clandestine conflict that had long been suspected. In the years that followed, Islamabad compiled a trove of intelligence — some shared publicly, some through backchannels, and some privately with The Express Tribune — tracing a pattern of sabotage, psy-ops, and support for insurgent groups. At the heart of these claims sits India's spy agency RAW. While the Indian government never admitted to any of this officially, behind the scenes the Doval Doctrine had already taken root — a new phase in its hardline agenda against Pakistan was taking shape, waged not with tanks and battalions, but with proxy fighters, digital manipulation, and plausible deniability. What is Doval Doctrine? According to Pakistan's former National Security Adviser Moeed Yusuf — arguably the official most familiar with his Indian counterpart's mindset — the doctrine rests on a false premise -- first, that India has the right to hegemonise the region, and, second, that it has the capacity to do so. 'This doctrine has a deep and dangerous ideological underpinning,' Yusuf warned, adding that both assumptions are flawed. 'As we've seen in the most recent crisis, all of India's neighbours harbour misgivings about how it has sought to impose its ideology — or its vision of what the region should look like.' Initial signs of India's covert maneuvers came to the fore in 2016, following the arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — an Indian spy and serving naval officer — from Mashkel, a remote town in the Washuk district of Balochistan, near the Iran border. Jadhav confessed to being an operative of Delhi's espionage engine, orchestrating sabotage operations inside Pakistan. Operating as 'Hussein Mubarak Patel,' Jadhav was responsible for dozens of terrorist attacks, including the ones on Mehran Naval base and Sui gas pipelines, and assassination of senior counterterrorism police officer SSP Aslam Chaudhary, according to officials. 'Jadhav was assisted by Sub Inspector Rakesh, alias Shaikh Rizwan Hussain, and handled by former RAW joint secretaries Anil Kumar Gupta and Alok Joshi.' China's interests in crosshairs Pakistan's deepening strategic alliance with China has long been a thorn in India's side — economically, geopolitically, and ideologically. If anything, this became even more apparent during a recent briefing by India's deputy army chief, who in May accused China of using Pakistan as a proxy — just as the two nuclear-armed rivals edged dangerously close to the brink. That said, nothing irks New Delhi more than the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a cornerstone of Beijing's massive Belt and Road Initiative. In 2015, RAW set up a covert operations cell with an initial funding of $500 million to sabotage CPEC, according to intelligence sources. The cell, which functions under the direct supervision of the Indian Prime Minister's Office, has been involved in destabilising Pakistan by supporting terrorist activities, particularly in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa. The operation, previously facilitated through Indian diplomatic missions in Afghan in the Afghan cities of Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Mazar-e-Sharif, provided weapons, training, and financial support to insurgents, reveal intelligence sources. The primary objectives of the cell included exploiting political divisions, targeting key CPEC infrastructure such as power plants and economic zones, and disrupting digital networks in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu and Kashmir. Terrorist groups, including Baloch sub-nationalists and the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), were reportedly recruited to carry out attacks. Details gathered by security officials indicate that RAW's support includes providing refuge, financial assistance, and operational coordination to terrorist outfits targeting Pakistani interests. The Indian spy agency has set up several hideouts for Baloch groups in Chasma Garm, Chitral, Kalat, and Jekigor, serving as springboards for attacks. In 2019, RAW intensified ties with separatist leaders, facilitating a merger of key groups like the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), resulting in the creation of the Baloch Raaji Aajoi Sangar (BRAS) — a united front for terrorist and political activities. New Delhi's spy apparatus also mobilised self-exiled Baloch leaders, including Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and Javed Mengal, to orchestrate anti-Pakistan campaigns abroad, supported through Indian funding and logistics. On Jan 29, 2020, BRAS launched 'Operation Aas-Rech' against Pakistani forces. India allocated $60 million to fund a 700-man militia in Balochistan, reveal security officials. A 24-member commission, including 10 RAW operatives, oversaw operations. Separately, $9 million was paid to Baloch groups and Afghan collaborators, with financial transactions reportedly acknowledged by RAW-linked facilitators and the Indian Embassy in Kabul. Aslam, alias Achu, commander of the BLA's deadly Majeed Brigade, masterminded the 2018 attack on the Chinese Consulate in Karachi which was claimed by the group's spokesperson Jeeyand Baloch. The attackers were found to be in direct contact with Aslam Achu and Bashir Zeb from overseas, while Aslam was located in Afghanistan and later treated in India's Max Hospital with RAW's assistance. Moreover, ex-BLA leader Ghulzar Imam Shambay confirmed in his confessional statement the consulate attack was carried out on RAW's instructions. Achu also co-masterminded the 2019 Gwadar PC Hotel attack with BLF leader Dr Allah Nazar, planned by RAW handler Anurag Singh with $0.5 million in funding. Nazar had traveled to India under a fake identity created by RAW. Other BLF leaders, including Khalil Chairman and Muqaddam Marri, alias Jalat, also received medical cover in India while coordinating attacks. Similarly, BRA leader Brahamdagh Bugti visited India on an Afghan passport under a false identity to seek asylum. In 2022, a suicide bombing at Karachi University targeted a van carrying Chinese nationals, killing three Chinese citizens and one Pakistani. The attacker, Shari Baloch, was radicalised by BLA women trainers and her husband, Dr Haibtan, acted as the facilitator, while Bashir Zeb prepared the suicide vest and oversaw the attack with RAW's backing from overseas. Officials say the attack was a coordinated effort by RAW and BLA to drive a wedge between Pakistan and China. 'The loss of lives of Chinese citizens is deeply worrying for Pakistan which continues to take unprecedented measures to ensure their security,' says Hassan Akbar, former Pakistan Fellow at the Wilson Center. However, he adds that the bilateral relationship between both countries is deep, enduring and strategic, insulated from any attempts by adversaries to create disruption in ties. Officials say the hijacking of the Jaffar Express passenger train earlier this year was carried out by Majeed Brigade with RAW's support. 'Prior to the attack, BLA commanders Bashir Zeb and Fazal Sher met two RAW agents in a neighbouring country on Feb 21, followed by another meeting on Feb 26 with Indian officials in a third country, where the plan was finalised,' one official revealed. 'During the operation, the attackers maintained a direct contact with RAW handlers.' After the cinematically staged hijacking, Indian media amplified BLA propaganda by featuring its spokespersons Jeeyand Baloch and Bahot Baloch, who publicly celebrated the terrorist act. Officials also claim to have unearthed BLA-RAW nexus behind the May 21, 2025, deadly suicide car bomb attack on a school bus in Khuzdar. Just two months ago, during the Pakistan-India escalation, the BLA publicly declared its support for India, calling itself a willing 'military arm' in the confrontation. Experts believe this alignment of narratives and escalation of attacks during the standoff reflects a coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at destabilising Pakistan. India's strategic calculus India's use of proxy warfare is neither a recent development nor confined to Pakistan. 'India began employing proxy tactics to advance its strategic objectives as early as the 1970s, by actively creating and supporting groups such as the Mukti Bahini in East Pakistan and the LTTE in Sri Lanka,' says Akbar. Some analysts speculate that Balochistan could be the new East Pakistan in India's strategic calculus. 'I really do not see how a comparison could be drawn between West and East Pakistan and Balochistan, because demographic realities are different and Balochistan doesn't border India,' says Abdul Basit, Pakistan's former ambassador in New Delhi. Akbar echoes that view. 'Comparing Balochistan with East Pakistan would be inaccurate due to differences in geography, demography, and political history. India has been involved in fomenting unrest in Balochistan in one way or another since the 1970s. Their objective is to destabilise Pakistan,' he says. Yusuf agrees that the bottom line is a clear and conscious policy decision led by India's NSA's office, in which destabilising Balochistan is a deliberate strategic objective. RAW-TTP nexus According to security officials, India's spy agency operated joint cells with Afghanistan's former intelligence service, the National Directorate of Security (NDS), coordinating cross-border attacks until the Taliban's takeover in 2021. Former NDS handlers — now either in hiding or rebranded under the Taliban regime — are said to continue collaborating with RAW in supporting TTP factions. A striking example came in Feb 2022, when the BLA launched coordinated attacks on Frontier Corps camps in Panjgur and Noshki. Officials cite the use of Afghan-origin weaponry and encrypted communications as evidence of cross-border involvement. Intelligence reports suggest that India dished out $820,000 to reunite splinter groups of the TTP and arm them via supply routes from Afghanistan's Herat province. This support, officials claim, has fueled a rise in IED attacks and targeted killings, particularly in North Waziristan tribal district. The 2023 assassination of ISI's Brigadier Mustafa Kamal Barki near Angoor Adda in North Waziristan was linked to RAW-enabled TTP elements. Moreover, the TTP's evolving propaganda campaign, including online platforms like Ummat-e-Islamiya, receives technical backing from Indian cyber operatives, according to the findings of the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). A 2025 UN report exposed the growing collaboration between the BLA, TTP, and Islamic State Khorasan (ISK), facilitated by networks operating out of Afghanistan. The report further notes that Afghan territory continues to serve as a coordination hub for TTP and BLA activities, identifying training camps in Spin Boldak and Nimroz allegedly used to prepare operatives in arms and explosives. The hijacking of the Jaffar Express stands out as the most brazen example of this RAW–TTP–BLA nexus. According to Pakistani intelligence, RAW employs a network of smuggling operations, offshore shell companies, and cryptocurrency transactions to fund these groups. The use of Afghan nationals, including people like Hazrat Ali, alias Ramzan, has also been flagged. He was accused of facilitating IED attacks in Quetta. Complicating counter strategy Bolstered by its nexus with RAW, TTP's operational and strategic profile has evolved in recent years. Once largely confined to Pakistan's western border regions, the group's footprint has now expanded into major urban centres, including Peshawar, Karachi, and Quetta, signaling a more coordinated and far-reaching threat landscape. Defence experts describe this evolution as not merely geographic, but also tactical. Where the group once relied on traditional guerrilla warfare, it has now adopted urban terrorism, employing advanced tactics such as drone reconnaissance and coordinated attacks in densely populated areas. Security officials interpret this shift as evidence of increased training, planning, and technological support — facilitated by external actors. TTP's funding stream has also shifted significantly. Earlier reliant on local extortion and informal funding methods, the group now reportedly taps into cryptocurrency channels and receives support from foreign intelligence networks, particularly via Afghan-based operatives allegedly linked to RAW. Another alarming development lies in the group's recruitment strategy. Where the TTP once drew fighters primarily from local tribal populations, it has now turned to digital radicalisation, targeting urban youth through encrypted apps and online propaganda. This shift has broadened its recruitment pool while making detection significantly more difficult. Moreover, the group has adopted a decentralised structure, enhancing its resilience. In contrast to previous years when the leadership was more vulnerable to counterterrorism operations, the current setup allows the TTP to operate from Afghan sanctuaries with greater freedom, making leadership decapitation far less effective. Together, these changes paint a troubling picture of a terror outfit that is not only surviving but adapting — both structurally and operationally — amid an evolving regional security environment. Pakistan's response Pakistan has intensified its counterterrorism efforts across multiple fronts — ranging from cross-border precision operations and internal crackdowns to cyber surveillance and financial disruption — aimed at dismantling RAW's coordinated hybrid warfare campaign. Security forces, in coordination with regional partners, have stepped up offensive measures against terrorist groups operating along the Pak-Iran border. Last year, they carried out targeted strikes on BLA safehouses in Iranian border towns, reportedly serving as logistical hubs. On the domestic front, Operation Green Bolan — launched in the aftermath of the Jaffar Express hijacking — resulted in the killing of 33 BLA terrorists. Simultaneously, a major arms cache was seized in Panjgur, while a media propaganda cell was dismantled in Turbat, disrupting the group's communication and logistics chain. The government has also moved to curtail financial channels allegedly fueling terrorist operations. Investigations revealed that several cryptocurrency wallets traced on Binance were linked to BLA operatives and coordinated from abroad. A massive clampdown on oil smuggling also bore fruit in 2024, when security forces intercepted 2.8 billion litres of smuggled Iranian oil, valued at around $800 million. Intelligence sources claim the proceeds were channeled into financing subversive activities. Following disclosures related to the Jadhav case, Pakistan has urged the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to closely monitor Indian-linked NGOs and shell companies suspected of laundering funds for destabilisation operations. In addition to this, Islamabad has presented fresh dossiers to the United Nations, International Court of Justice, and FATF, detailing evidence of RAW's alleged financing of terror groups and sabotage activities within Pakistan. To bolster border security, Pakistani officials have engaged both the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Iranian authorities in intelligence sharing — particularly between 2024 and 2025 — focused on curbing militant mobility across porous frontiers. On the digital front, officials say that agencies have shut down several media cells and enhanced surveillance on encrypted platforms such as Telegram and Signal. While officials insist these steps are critical to national security, civil liberties groups have criticised the internet blackouts and privacy intrusions. Security along CPEC has also been tightened, with over 15,000 troops now deployed to guard critical infrastructure across restive regions. Meanwhile, officials have launched outreach efforts to engage non-violent Baloch political leaders in a bid to address longstanding grievances. Disinfo campaign Hybrid warfare isn't a distant, abstract strategy anymore — it's here, unfolding on Pakistan's soil in the form of cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, covert assassinations, and steady destabilisation of national institutions. It's a conflict waged and fought without formal declarations, through proxies, pixels, and propaganda. In a speech at PMA Kakul, former army chief Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa cautioned about this emerging reality: 'Our enemies know that they cannot beat us fair and square and have thus subjected us to a cruel, evil and protracted hybrid war. They are trying to weaken our resolve by weakening us from within.' In 2020, EU DisinfoLab exposed India's 15-year-long disinformation campaign involving over 750 fake media outlets and dozens of NGOs, designed to malign Pakistan on international platforms like the UN and EU. The Brussels-based civil‑society watchdog's report revealed that fabricated events, forged identities, and manipulated media were deployed to shape Western narratives, especially around Kashmir and Balochistan. That same year, Pakistan's Foreign Office was targeted in cyberattacks traced to Indian IPs. These weren't isolated incidents. Intelligence officials observed sharp spikes in propaganda ahead of FATF reviews and periods of military tension. India also hired lobbying firms such as Cornerstone Government Affairs to manufacture diplomatic momentum abroad. The campaign points to a deliberate and coordinated hybrid warfare strategy aimed at undermining Pakistan's global standing — diplomatically, economically, and politically. Violation of international law At the heart of this operation is Doval Doctrine — a strategy of pre-emptive and offensive subversion targeting states India perceives as security threats. This posture has led to Indian footprints not just in disinformation, but in terrorist activities in Pakistan and beyond. The 2023 assassination of Sikh activist Hardeep Singh Nijjar in Canada, and a foiled plot to kill Gurpatwant Singh Pannun in the US — both attributed to RAW operatives — have lent further credibility to Pakistan's longstanding claims. According to intelligence sources, RAW's so-called 'death squads' have carried out nearly two dozen extrajudicial assassinations of dissidents, activists, and political opponents, including on Pakistani soil. These targeted killings abroad and support for foreign terrorist groups violate international law and the sovereignty of other states. 'The Indian government's support and financing of terrorist activities constitutes a clear violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,' says international law expert Ahmer Bilal Soofi. 'Post-1945, any unauthorised intervention or support that undermines another country's sovereignty constitutes a serious breach of international law. Respect for territorial integrity, sovereignty, and non-intervention is not just a legal norm — it is a moral imperative,' he adds. According to Soofi, two legal principles flow from Article 2(4): the principle of non-intervention, and the principle of non-interference. India's material and operational support for terrorists and subnational armed groups constitutes a violation of both. The arrest of Kulbhushan Jadhav — a serving Indian naval officer and admitted intelligence operative — represents a direct breach of the principle of non-intervention. Financial trails, intercepted communications, and field evidence linking Indian handlers to acts of terror in Pakistan point to persistent violations of the principle of non-interference, says Soofi, who is also the founding President of the Research Society of International Law. 'Incidents such as the Jaffar Express attack, for which Pakistan has presented concrete and specific evidence of external involvement, constitute a blatant and unacceptable violation of international norms.' According to Soofi, there are several diplomatic and judicial forums available to Pakistan, including the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee and mechanisms under UN Security Council Resolution 1373, which obligates states to prevent and criminalise terrorism financing and support. 'But most important, Pakistan should register FIRs in cases where they have the evidence and they should undertake investigation and use mutual legal assistance framework internationally available and also under their own laws to send requests for taking statements from the Indian officials regarding their involvement and that is how they can make it clearer to the international community,' he says. The footprint of India, Soofi adds, will ultimately be converted into admissible evidence through documented police investigations. Muted global response While Pakistan has submitted multiple dossiers — addressed to the UN Secretary General, the OIC, FATF, and key international allies — laying out detailed evidence of India's support for terrorist activities, its appeals for accountability have largely fallen on deaf ears. Countries like China, Iran, and Turkey have voiced concern, but the West continues to maintain a strategic and telling silence. 'The international community is impervious because, a.) we have not been able to put up our case in a consistent and coherent manner; b.) India's clout is a reason states have [their own] interest [which] they pursue. So, they will not like to embarrass [India] or put their interest at the stake for Pakistan. It is as simple as that,' says Ambassador Basit. Yusuf believes India has banked on the fact that the Western world did not accept Pakistan's position on this issue for the longest period. 'I think Pakistan also got it wrong by not putting out dividends more forcefully for a number of years, even though this has been a concern for well over multiple years,' he says while referring to the 2009 Sharm el-Sheikh joint statement between Pakistan in India in which Balochistan was mentioned. 'This is a very deliberate strategy to keep Pakistan unstable and destabilised. It has managed to continue it because the Western world, because of its own problems with Pakistan, has bought India's position on terrorism, and because of this idea or illusion of India being a counterweight to China, etc,' he adds. Akbar agrees with Yusuf, saying that the international community is increasingly becoming aware of India's malign actions in Pakistan and other countries but because of its economic clout and centrality in Western attempts at containing China, international observers are reluctant to publicly call out India for its destabilising actions. 'This should not dissuade Pakistan, which should continue to call out India's active support for terrorism inside Pakistan and share evidence with global capitals,' he adds. Ambassador Basit stresses the need for a sustained diplomatic campaign. 'The problem with us is that we prepare dossiers, present them to the world, and then forget about them. Perhaps we lack the institutional capacity to sustain any long-term effort — and that, in my view, is the real issue.' Way forward Fault lines are a fact of geopolitics — and adversaries have always tried to exploit them. In Balochistan, those cracks are visible and widening. If Pakistan is to deny India the space to destabilise the region, it must address internal grievances rather than simply shield against external threats. That means rethinking its strategy — one that balances kinetic force with political outreach, governance reform, and a sharper media counter-narrative. The challenge is not just one of territorial control, but of winning hearts and rebuilding trust in a province long scarred by neglect and insurgency. 'Pakistan should never take its eye off the ball and continue to work on whatever can be done to address the issue in Balochistan, [I mean] the political aspect of the issue in Balochistan through dialogue and politically,' notes Yusuf. 'There is definitely a kinetic element to what is happening, but the stronger Balochistan is internally the more difficult it becomes for the enemy to do what it is doing. So, that has to be part of the parallel strategy and we should never overlook that.' Concurring with Yusuf's assessment, Ambassador Basit says: 'Deterrence, in fact, is internal. Deterrence in the sense that we need to focus on socio-economic development and do not allow space to these terrorist groups. We crack hard on them, ensure that more and more people do not join them, expose them to the people of Balochistan, and expose them internationally.' Ironically, BLA and BRA are proscribed terrorist groups, but their leaders have been granted political asylum in European countries where they live comfortably, while their groups perpetrate terrorist violence in Pakistan. 'Their leadership, like Brahamdagh Bugti, Harbiyar Marri, and many others, are sitting in the UK and Switzerland. We can build pressure on these countries to extradite them to Pakistan,' adds Ambassador Basit. 'But for that to happen, we need to build a strong case because these people have taken political asylum in these countries and these countries also use them [as] their assets to promote their interests in Pakistan.' The right time Amid shifting geopolitical currents, New Delhi's position is becoming increasingly tenuous, particularly in the wake of revelations about RAW's global assassination campaign, its ambivalent stance on the Ukraine conflict, and recent military setbacks against Pakistan. This presents a window of opportunity for Islamabad to assert its narrative with strategic precision and diplomatic finesse. By exposing India's hybrid warfare tactics and the broader implications of the dangerous Doval Doctrine, Pakistan has a chance to recalibrate global perceptions. With growing receptivity in the West — including from US President Donald Trump — this moment calls for a consistent, coherent, and deftly executed foreign policy anchored in long-term strategic vision.
Express Tribune
13 hours ago
- Express Tribune
SMEDA, Akhuwat join hands
Listen to article In line with the prime minister's vision of inclusive economic growth through grassroots entrepreneurship, the Small and Medium Enterprises Development Authority (SMEDA) has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Akhuwat Islamic Microfinance (AIM) to improve access to finance, formalisation, and hand-holding of micro enterprises across Pakistan. According to an official statement released on Saturday, the MoU was signed by SMEDA CEO Socrat Aman Rana and Akhuwat Foundation Founder and Chairman Dr Amjad Saqib, in the presence of Federal Secretary for Industries and Production Saif Anjum at the SMEDA head office. Addressing the ceremony, Secretary MOIP Saif Anjum highlighted that micro, small, and medium enterprises (MSMEs), as the backbone of Pakistan's economy, play a critical role in driving resilience, employment, and innovation. He emphasised that micro enterprises are a top priority in the prime minister's economic agenda. He noted that a steering committee, headed by himself, had been constituted to address challenges faced by the MSME sector. As part of its efforts, the committee has also initiated a reorganisation of SMEDA to enhance its effectiveness in serving the SME sector. "Today's MoU between SMEDA and AIM reflects the commitment of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif and SAPM Haroon Akhtar Khan to empower MSMEs," he stated. He expressed hope that the collaboration would strengthen micro-financing and capacity building, helping to create a robust ecosystem for bridging financial gaps and promoting inclusion of micro enterprises in the formal financial landscape. He lauded SMEDA's contributions in training, advisory services, and advocacy, and praised AIM's efforts in promoting financial inclusion. Earlier, SMEDA CEO Socrat Aman Rana welcomed the guests and outlined the objectives of the MoU. "This collaboration with Akhuwat is a concrete step toward realising the prime minister's dream of a robust and equitable entrepreneurial ecosystem," he said. He stressed SMEDA's focus on strengthening micro enterprises through targeted capacity building and streamlined regulatory processes. He acknowledged the role of the SAPM in facilitating the collaboration, citing his ongoing support for SMEDA's mission and advocacy for MSME development. Sharing sector data, the SMEDA chief noted that microfinance now serves nearly 12 million active borrowers, supported by a gross loan portfolio of approximately Rs644 billion, reflecting a strong 13% year-on-year growth. Notably, 46% of borrowers are women, highlighting the sector's inclusive and gender-sensitive impact. He added that the main areas of microfinance. trade and services (Rs144 billion), livestock and poultry (Rs164 billion), and agriculture (Rs138 billion), mirror the core of Pakistan's MSME ecosystem, especially in rural and semi-urban regions. However, he warned that access to formal finance remains a major hurdle for MSMEs, particularly in underserved areas. He termed the MoU a major breakthrough to bridge this financing gap and unlock Pakistan's entrepreneurial potential. Speaking at the event, AIM Chairman Dr Amjad Saqib expressed confidence that the collaboration would enhance micro enterprises' access to finance through AIM's nationwide network. He acknowledged the vital role of micro enterprises in poverty reduction and employment generation, and hoped the partnership would contribute meaningfully to national economic growth.
Business Recorder
15 hours ago
- Business Recorder
A comment on Finance Act 2025—IV
Sales Tax Special Regime for Digitally delivered goods: Concept The supply of digitally ordered taxable goods by online market place, website and software application from within Pakistan during the course of e-commerce, a. the liability to collect and pay tax shall be of payment intermediary including a banking company, a financial institution, licensed exchange company or payment gateway in case the payment is made digitally and of the courier delivering the goods where those are supplied on Cash on Delivery (CoD) basis A comment on Finance Act 2025—I b. Persons supplying digitally ordered goods from within Pakistan through online market place, website, software applications at the rate of 2% of gross value of supplies. This tax shall be the final tax in case of retailers other than Tier 1 retailers and supplies by cottage industry as defined in the law. For others, the remaining tax is to be paid by the supplier. Retailers subject to 2% final sales tax Following retailers who are not treated as Tier 1 retailers will be entitled to reduced rate of sales tax. (a) a retailer not operating as a unit of a national or international chain of stores; (b) a retailer not operating in an air-conditioned shopping mall, plaza or centre, excluding kiosks; (c) a retailer whose cumulative electricity bill during the immediately preceding twelve consecutive months does not exceed Rupees twelve hundred thousand; (d) a person not engaged in wholesaler-cum-retailer, engaged in bulk import and supply of consumer goods on wholesale basis to the retailers as well as on retail basis to the general body of the consumers A comment on Finance Act 2025—II (f) a retailer who has not acquired point of sale for accepting payment through debit or credit cards from banking companies or any other digital payment service provider authorized by State Bank of Pakistan; (g)]a retailer whose deductible withholding tax under sections 236G or 236H of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001(XLIX of 2001) during the immediately preceding twelve consecutive months do not exceed the threshold as may be specified by the Board through notification in the official Gazette; and (h) any other person or class of persons as prescribed by the Board. The definition as prescribed is not correct. A specific criterion may be laid down for people who are to be allowed the final tax regime for sale tax. Cottage industry 'Cottage industry' means a manufacturing concern, which fulfils each of following conditions, namely: (a) does not have an industrial gas or electricity connection; (b) is located in a residential area; (c) does not have a total labour force of more than ten workers; and (d) annual turnover from all supplies does not exceed eight million rupees. Definitions 'Courier' means any entity engaged in the delivery of including logistic and ride-hailing services. A comment on Finance Act 2025—III 'E-commerce' means sale or purchase of goods conducted over computer networks by methods specifically designed for the purpose of receiving or placing of orders either through websites, mobile applications or online marketplace having digital ordering features by using mobile phones, automated computer-to-computer ordering system or any similar device;'; 'Online marketplace' means online interfaces that facilitate, for a fee, the direct interaction between multiple buyers and multiple sellers via digital orders for supply of goods, with or without the platform taking economic ownership of the goods that are being sold; Distortion and disruption This means that the whole regime of taxation for digitally delivered goods has been changed for retailers other than Tier 1 retailers and cottage industry. Now instead of 18% such goods would be subject to 2% sales tax. Although it is a major disruption and distortion, this will add substantially to the documentation of the economy in transactions relating to business to consumers where the charge for sales tax has been substantially reduced from 18% to 2%. Embargo on economic transaction on non-registration Concept The Commissioner, and in certain cases after the approval of a Committee including a member of Trade Bodies, has been given the following powers when there is a supply of goods without seeking registration under the law to: a. direct banking companies, scheduled banks and other financial institutions to intermittently suspend operation of the bank account of such a person for three working days. b. direct the banking companies, scheduled banks and other financial institutions to permanently bar operation of the bank accounts of the person. c. bar on transfer of immovable; d. seal the business premises; e. seize moveable property; or f. appoint a receiver for the management of the taxable activity of a person. The actions as per (d), (e) and (f) will be undertaken after the actions referred to in (a), (b) and (c) and there is an approval of the Committee. Definition of 'Tax Fraud' The scope of the term 'tax fraud' has been enlarged. Now, in addition to other acts prescribed in subsection (37) of Section (2) following acts would specifically be considered as tax fraud: using or preparing false, forged, and fictitious documents, including returns, statements, annexures, and invoices; tampering with or destroying of any material evidence or documents required to be maintained under this Act or the rules made thereunder; generating fake input through manipulation of return filing system of the Board and making fake entries in the sales tax returns or in the annexures; making fictitious compliance of section 73, including routing of payments back to the registered person, or for the benefit of the registered person, through a bank account held by a supplier or a purported supplier; suppression and nonpayment of withholding tax in the prescribed manner beyond a period of three months from due date of payment of tax The main problem which is expected to arise with respect to the action referred to in (1) above on account of introduction of the word 'using' any forged, falsified or fictitious document'. 'Use' means that such documents have been prepared by another person. This is expected to create problems in the business environment as a third party's action may lead to a charge for tax fraud. It would be extremely difficult to prove that the action was intentional or otherwise. An example may be a forged, falsified invoice. Furthermore, the definition has been broadened with regard to 'false claim' of input tax to include all cases. Earlier, it was limited to false claims of input tax on account of fictitious invoices. Again difficulties would arise to prove that the 'false claim' is not intentional or otherwise. An ambiguous provision contained in the definition proposed earlier, in the Finance Bill, has been removed. It was: 'falsification or causing falsification of invoice or substitution of financial records or production of fake accounts or documents or furnishing of any false information through human, mechanical or electronic means with an intention to evade tax due or claim inadmissible refund' In the Finance Bill, 2025, an attempt to cause loss of tax was also included in the definition of tax fraud. It has been rightly omitted in the final version. There is still a need to refine the definition of 'tax fraud' as penal prosecutions on account of tax fraud have been made substantially rigorous. Full definition of 'tax fraud' is as under: '(37). 'tax fraud' means knowingly, intentionally, or dishonestly doing any act or abetting any action to cause loss of tax under this Act, including: (a) using or preparing false, forged, and fictitious documents, including returns, statements, annexures, and invoices; (b) false claim of input tax credit based on fictitious transactions; (c) issuance of any tax invoice without supply of goods; (d) tampering with or destroying of any material evidence or documents required to be maintained under this Act or the rules made thereunder; (e) generating fake input through manipulation of return filing system of the Board and making fake entries in the sales tax returns or in the annexures; (f) making fictitious compliance of section 73, including routing of payments back to the registered person, or for the benefit of the registered person, through a bank account held by a supplier or a purported supplier; (g) suppression of supplies that are chargeable to tax under this Act; (h) making taxable supplies of goods without issuing any tax invoice; (i) suppression and nonpayment of withholding tax in the prescribed manner beyond a period of three months from due date of payment of tax; j) acquisition, possession, transportation, disposal or in any way removing, depositing, keeping, concealing, supplying, or purchasing or in any other manner dealing with, any goods in respect of which there are reasons to believe that these are liable to confiscation under this Act or the rules made thereunder; or (k) making of taxable supplies without getting registration under this Act.' Streamlining the process of prosecution and arrest The provisions have been rewritten. These provisions relate to the arrest of a person accused of tax fraud. It has been specifically stated that powers to arrest and prosecute are notwithstanding the provisions of Section 11E of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 to clarify the position that both the provisions can interact concurrently. It has now been specified that an arrest can only be made if: a. the accused is intentionally or willfully not joining the investigation after three notices; b. the accused is attempting to abscond; or c. there are sufficient grounds that the accused would tamper with the evidence The law now conceives two situations: a. An arrest by a warrant issued by the Commissioner after getting approval from a Committee constituted by the Chairman FBR. This would include the following process: i. Enquiry by the officer; ii. Commissioner approving the investigation on the basis of results of enquiry; iii. Investigation within three months; iv. A Three-Member Committee constituted by the Chairman to approve the action of arrest. b. An arrest without involving Committee by a warrant issued by a Special Judge. To summarise, an arrest can only be made when an alleged person does not cooperate with the authorities. Furthermore, notwithstanding the above an arrest can also be made where the authorities have the apprehension that the accused is attempting to abscond; or there are sufficient grounds that the accused would tamper with the evidence. Where an officer of Inland Revenue arrests a person under Section 37A, he shall immediately intimate the fact of the arrest of that person to the Special Judge, who may direct such Officer to produce that person at such time and place and on such date as the Special Judge considers expedient. Such Officer shall act accordingly. Any person arrested under the Sales Tax Act shall be produced before the Special Judge or, if there is no Special Judge within a reasonable distance, to the nearest Judicial Magistrate, within twenty-four hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the Court of the Special Judge or, as the case may be, of such Magistrate. Provided that in no case shall the period of such custody exceed fourteen days. (Concluded) Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
