Real reason Prince William and Donald Trump didn't wear black to Pope's funeral
Donald Trump
and Prince William opted out of the customary black attire.
While St Peter's Square was a sea of traditional
black mourning clothes, the few who diverged from this norm were glaringly noticeable.
Social media channel X, previously known as Twitter, has been abuzz with comments from
viewers criticizing Trump for his perceived lack of respect
... and by association, Prince William.
Read More
Related Articles
Joe Biden appears concerned for wife Jill's health as he asks pointed question at Pope's funeral
Read More
Related Articles
Donald Trump's 7-word exchange with Melania at Pope's funeral sparks 'side eye'
One user questioned: "Any reason why Donald Trump is in a blue suit and not wearing traditional black for a funeral?".
Another observed: "I see that Trump's wearing a blue suit to the Pope's funeral so that he stands out."
(Image: AP)
A third remarked: "Watching the funeral on BBC News. Trump is in a blue suit when everyone else is in black. No class."
Yet another pointed out: "Why is Trump wearing a blue suit while everyone else is in black? No respect."
And one more noted: "Looking to be noticed - Trump wears a blue suit while others around him confirm with traditional black."
(Image: AFP via Getty Images)
However, there could be a valid explanation for their sartorial choices - neither Trump nor Prince William are Catholic. The Roman Catholic Church has deep-rooted traditions, including strict guidelines for funeral attire.
Black is the standard color for a Catholic funeral, symbolizing mourning and offering respect to the departed. Other faiths do not mandate black attire as strictly, although it is commonly accepted as appropriate funeral wear.
Trump, a nondenominational Christian, and Wills, from the Church of England, may have decided not to don black attire as a sign of their non-Catholic faith.
(Image: Getty Images)
A user on X platform defended Trump, stating: "You don't understand the protocols. Trump isn't Catholic. Prince William is in a blue suit too."
Despite recent tensions with Trump over informal attire during a White House visit, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, who is Jewish, showed up wearing black. Muhammad Yunus, a chief advisor from Bangladesh and a Muslim, also chose to wear black.
However, giving some benefit of doubt to Trump and Wills, India's President Droupadi Murmu was seen in blue, aligning with her Hindu beliefs.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
EVN Report
2 days ago
- EVN Report
What Does Armenia Stand to Gain? Musings on the Washington Signing
On August 8, 2025, during a meeting at the White House between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, U.S. President Donald Trump, and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, documents were signed that not only have serious significance in the context of resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, but also aspire to fundamentally transform the security architecture formed in the South Caucasus as a result of the Armenian-Russian-Azerbaijani trilateral statement of November 9, 2020 that ended the Nagorno-Karabakh War. The trilateral and bilateral documents signed at the Washington summit became the subject of heated discussions in Armenia, ones that show no signs of abating. This article seeks to advance that conversation by drawing parallels between the political events of spring 2018, known as the 'Velvet Revolution,' and current perceptions of the Washington process. It will also examine the interdependence of the economy, military power, and negotiation dynamics to address a widely asked and legitimate question: What does Armenia stand to gain from this process? Finally, it will outline the political realities and variables of which the Washington process is either a component or a consequence. It is important to note that the primary aim of this article is not to enumerate all the advantages or disadvantages of the signed agreements for Armenia. Its focus lies elsewhere, as outlined below. The analysis draws heavily on the key ideas presented in Paul Kennedy's 'The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers', Thomas Schelling's 'Arms and Influence' and Fred Charles Iklé's 'Every War Must End.' Don't Confuse the Beginning With the End: The Imperative of Effective and Purposeful Work One of the enduring misjudgments following the 2018 Velvet Revolution, including by some members of the incoming administration, was treating those events as an endpoint rather than a beginning. The sense of victory was premature, a moment to celebrate rather than a mandate to act. In reality, 2018 marked a new beginning, an opportunity whose success could only be measured by the effectiveness of the steps and processes that followed. Yet, in hindsight, misreading the moment, misaligning priorities, neglecting the military imbalance and ineffective work in key areas led to serious failures not only in domestic and foreign policy, but also overshadowed the very political achievements of 2018. For many, the 'revolution' they once embraced became a source of caution, and some even came to question their participation. The documents signed in Washington did, indeed, formalize the status quo surrounding Artsakh, enshrining the results recorded on the battlefield. However, the Armenian-Azerbaijani dialogue is far from concluded. This is not an end, not a final reality, but the beginning of a new process, one that, whether we want it or not, is already unfolding. It is no coincidence that Nerses Kopalyan, who directly participated in the negotiations, notes that during meetings with the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council, American officials framed the Washington summit not as 'a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty.' In other words, while some objective developments do not hinge on Armenia, the final outcome of the agreements reached in Washington will depend on the government's subsequent efforts. The ruling party cannot assume that signing the accords guarantees peace or justifies a lighter pace of work. Instead, they must learn from previous mistakes, and try to protect and advance Armenian interests to the fullest within the evolving framework. Without drawing a direct parallel to the May 5, 1994 ceasefire in Bishkek that ended the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, it should be emphasized that Azerbaijan pursued a consistent strategy from that point onward. Baku strengthened its economy, enabling significant investments in its military, particularly acquiring modern weapons, and conducted effective foreign policy that complemented its internal capabilities ( internal balancing ) with strategic alliances ( external balancing ). Subsequently, in line with established political science principles, these efforts were directly reflected on the battlefield, and in subsequent negotiations. Azerbaijan continued to work with this same logic even after the trilateral statement of November 9, 2020. There may be different opinions about whether Armenia gained more than it lost in these accords, with strong arguments on both sides. What is undeniable, however, is that the agreements have given us breathing room, a chance to regain our footing. The existing playing field is complemented by a new, significantly important dimension—with its own challenges and opportunities. The side that acts with greater intelligence and effectiveness will ultimately benefit the most. In Bishkek, Azerbaijan emerged as the losing side, but through sustained effort it transformed that position into a winning one. How Armenia proceeds after Washington depends precisely on us. In his book 'Every War Must End,' prominent American military expert Fred Charles Iklé specifically emphasizes this—no document establishes a final status quo; the outcomes depend on how the parties act afterward. The Three Year Window of Opportunity Negotiation outcomes are not detached from economic, military, and diplomatic realities; they are deeply interconnected. That is, a side that is economically and militarily weaker, and with more limited diplomatic capacity, cannot enter negotiations from a position of strength and secure greater gains than its stronger counterpart. There may be exceptions when, under certain conjunctural conditions, the weaker side benefits beyond what its own resources would allow. Yet, the general pattern of history is clear: economic potential translates into military capability, military capability into influence, and that influence is then leveraged diplomatically to elicit desired behavior from the other party. Parallel to all this, however, one cannot underestimate the impact of geographical position, the development of state institutions, the effectiveness of state governance, and the presence of political will. Economic Strength, Military Power and Peace The launch of the Washington process opens new horizons for Armenia's economic development. Proposed American investments can serve as a powerful catalyst, sparking interest from other countries and attracting additional capital. It is possible that Armenia will become a participant in the creation of major corridors connecting East and West, which in turn can generate additional financial resources . The prospect of deterring the threat of war for at least three years, combined with an official U.S. presence in southern Armenia—with clear economic and business interests, offers not only an additional layer of security, but also the potential to significantly improve Armenia's strategic position. Paul Kennedy, in his seminal work ' The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, ' emphasizes that the triumph and collapse of great powers has often been conditioned not only by the results of wars, but by the economic strength cultivated before and during conflicts. Expanding production capabilities has enabled greater investments in armed forces, while military growth, in turn, has allowed powers not only to defend their own borders, but also expand them. This pattern can be seen in the France of Napoleon Bonaparte, the subsequent century-long hegemony of the British Empire, the German Empire and Nazi Germany before the two World Wars, and later, in the global reach of the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945. In all these cases, the development of economic capabilities led to an increase in military potential, which—alongside other important factors such as effective state governance, political will, and work ethic—contributed to achieving political success. We currently see how China is rapidly transforming accumulated economic power into military power , which in turn dramatically increases its political weight. The same logic operates in the cases of Germany and Japan . Looking at the post–Bishkek ceasefire period, the contrast between Armenia and Azerbaijan is stark. Azerbaijan, by steadily building its economic potential, was able to channel greater resources into its military, an investment that proved decisive in shaping later military-political outcomes. Armenia, by contrast, faced a confluence of debilitating factors: the imposed blockade, entrenched corruption (also present in Azerbaijan), and an inefficient state apparatus. These constraints stifled economic growth and, in turn, left the country without the economic or military capacity needed to meet emerging military-political challenges. Moreover, in the case of Armenia, what is called ' retrenchement ' in international relations occurred. Starting from 1994, Armenia appeared as the main guarantor of Artsakh's security, which meant that Armenia's economic and military potential, as well as alliance capabilities, should have been sufficient to protect not only Armenia's, but also Artsakh's security. However, time showed that Armenia's capabilities, measured relative to Azerbaijan's , were insufficient not only for Artsakh's, but even for Armenia's own security. As a result, we lost not only Artsakh, but also about 200 square kilometers of internationally recognized Armenian territory. We now see the same process in Russia's case: with the ongoing conflict with Ukraine, Russia's influence is weakening or receding in other regions, particularly in Syria and the South Caucasus . Azerbaijan's 'Bargaining Power' and Washington's Soft Deterrence for Armenia Many in Armenia feel that Azerbaijan has benefited more from these agreements than Armenia. While arguments and counterarguments can be made, a key distinction remains: unlike Armenia, Azerbaijan is able to defend its borders with its own forces and, until recently, effectively used the threat of renewed war as leverage in negotiations. Moreover, Azerbaijan's security was not at risk without the Washington agreements, whereas Armenia's was. One of Armenia's main achievements from the Washington agreement has been preventing a possible Azerbaijani offensive in the near term. We often overlook that since November 9, 2020, Armenia has not been able to defend its borders solely with its own forces. After the Jermuk battles of 2022, it finally became clear that Russia would not honor its alliance obligations toward Armenia. In response, at Yerevan's request, the EU monitoring mission was deployed along the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. To be fair, since their arrival, ceasefire violations have significantly decreased , and Armenia has not lost even a single square kilometer of territory due to military actions. Prominent American economist and professor of foreign policy and national security Thomas Schelling, in his book ' Arms and Influence ,' notes that 'bargaining power' in negotiations is conditioned by the ability to cause physical pain to the adversary (power to hurt). Schelling argues that it is precisely this desire to avoid pain that weakens one's negotiation positions and compels them toward concessions. He calls this process 'the diplomacy of violence,' the purpose of which is to extract the desired result under the credible threat of using weapons and causing pain, without getting involved in real war. The Washington process allows Armenia to crack the above-described coercive framework imposed by Azerbaijan since November 9, 2020. The active involvement of the United States in the process of regulating Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, the construction of 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' in southern Armenia, as well as President Trump's personal interest give Armenia a weighty soft deterrence mechanism to deter new Azerbaijani aggression. It is no coincidence that during a press conference, Trump emphasized that the parties can call him in case of problems. These factors, in addition to the presence of the EU monitoring mission, significantly strengthen Armenia's external balancing potential. The success of the process largely depends on whether the Armenian government will be able to use this window of relative stability to strengthen Armenia's military power to such an extent that it becomes as self-sufficient as possible. The question is clear: how many days can Armenia defend its borders with its own forces, and what price must the aggressor pay? It is important to realize that every ceasefire or agreement, including a peace treaty, is more stable when the cost of war outweighs the political gains expected as a result. This is the formula that can make the expected peace more stable. And finally, following the advice of Paul Kennedy and Fred Charles Iklé, the Armenian government should make the most of the three-year window provided by the Washington process. This requires remaining vigilant and resisting the temptation to prioritize highly visible, short-term projects that appeal to daily public needs at the expense of critical defense spending. Restoring military balance must go hand in hand with investments that foster long-term economic growth and strengthen domestic manufacturing capacity. Conclusion Despite heavy losses, Armenia now has an opportunity to significantly strengthen its security system. How we do this depends on us. The government should present a roadmap outlining specific programs, action plans and timelines for implementing the commitments set out in the documents, including for example, Armenia's complete unblocking. Public uncertainty around the Washington process remains high, and it is the duty of state officials to address these doubts with transparency and facts. Opposition forces should closely follow, monitor, and constructively criticize the government's actions, demanding more effective work. It should be realized that criticism devoid of substance does not produce results, and too often creates an environment in which authorities feel less pressure to perform. Armenian civil society also has an important role to play. Not constrained by the struggle for power, civil society organizations, expert groups, and independent analysts can bring impartiality and professionalism to the debate, providing a necessary counterweight between the government's overly optimistic narratives and the opposition's overly pessimistic perspectives.
EVN Report
4 days ago
- EVN Report
Beyond the Ceremony: The Real Test for Armenia–Azerbaijan Peace
Last Friday night many in Armenia and Azerbaijan stayed up late, drawn to the flicker of a live broadcast from Washington. It was a ritual heavy with hope and hesitation: the signing of agreements meant to turn the page on three decades of conflict. For those in Yerevan or Baku, it was clear enough that these papers, signed in one of the world's most powerful offices, were not an ending. Thirty years of enmity, two wars, tens of thousands dead and entire communities driven from their homes cannot be erased with a flourish of ink. The stains run deeper than parchment. And yet, what unfolded was undeniably a moment, perhaps even a turning point. These two nations, born alongside the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conflict itself, now face a harder task than war: learning to live in peace. Their armies have mastered the arts of fortification and offense. But peace—real, lasting peace—is a discipline that may take as long to learn as this conflict once took to wage. Short-term Calm The signing marks a first step toward stability, however fragile. Along much of the Armenia–Azerbaijan border, the frontlines remain alarmingly close. Near the village of Khnatsakh, above Goris in Syunik region, opposing trenches lie so close to each other that soldiers can hear TikTok videos drifting from the other side. Skirmishes could erupt again. But for now, the aim is containment, keeping sparks from catching. Militarily, Azerbaijan continues to hold the advantage. Its forward positions inside Armenian territory could inflict serious damage if fighting resumed. In this light, Washington's agreements serve a practical function: removing a ready-made pretext for renewed escalation, at least for the moment. This conditional calm matters in Armenia, where parliamentary elections loom in less than a year. If tensions ease, the country can finally turn inward, focusing on political debate without the constant threat of a new war. That space could nurture the trust needed for long-term domestic stability. The U.S. Factor Recent media polls with people in Yerevan and Meghri speaking in support of the announced deals suggest cautious optimism. But hope will not sustain itself. Implementation requires action, starting with selecting an international company to facilitate transit between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory. During the ceremony, President Trump declared that his personal involvement and the White House venue were guarantees the agreements would hold. This should certainly be the case at least until his anticipated Nobel Peace Prize nomination later this year. Political self-interest might help in the short term. What's less certain is whether Washington will fully and properly commit to managing even this single transit arrangement. One concern is the uncertainty over who will now drive the Armenian-Azerbaijani file forward within the Trump team. While special envoy Stephen Witkoff was instrumental in bringing Azerbaijan to Washington, much of Armenia's position was safeguarded by the leadership of the State Department, which pushed for measures like initiating the peace treaty—lifting a political 'sword of Damocles' that had hung over Yerevan in talks on transportation routes. Who takes over the portfolio now will help determine whether the effort advances or stalls. Even so, Washington's involvement does not signal a return to long-term 'curation' of the South Caucasus. U.S. interest in the region peaked during George W. Bush's presidency, symbolized by his 2005 visit to Tbilisi, and has since waned. Since then, reluctance to take on new commitments or openly confront Russia has shaped policy for years. This same caution has driven U.S. mediation since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, when Moscow's distraction from the South Caucasus, the collapse of its already fragile peacekeeping role , and the halt of weapon supplies to Armenia undermined the diplomatic efforts it had once maintained, raising fears of a full-scale Azerbaijani advance into Armenia. Trump may alter the tone, but without significant investment the fundamentals will remain unchanged. Turkey's Next Move Perhaps the most significant follow-on could come from Turkey. Its normalization process with Armenia, restarted three years ago, produced agreements to open the border and begin direct trade. Until now these steps were held hostage to the Armenian-Azerbaijani track, which has just taken a fresh turn in Washington. At present all Armenia-Turkey trade travels through third countries. This summer in my native Javakheti region of Georgia, bordering both nations, the constant rumble of trucks moving goods between them was impossible to miss—day and night, seven days a week. Direct routes could shift that flow onto Armenian-Turkish roads. Technically everything is almost ready. In the past, Turkish diplomats admitted that the missing element was Azerbaijan's assent. Initiation of the peace agreement has already triggered it. Several phone calls between Ankara, Baku and Yerevan have followed the Washington event. For Armenia, opening the border would mean access to Turkish ports, expanded trade and reintegration into the region's transit transport network after more than three decades of isolation. For Turkey, the benefits are tangible: reopening its only closed border, extending influence across the South Caucasus and injecting resources into its underdeveloped eastern provinces. In the past officials in Ankara, in their attempts to make Baku move, also noted that an open border would give Turkey more leverage over Armenia, which would be keenly aware that closure could be reinstated. Europe's Role The European Union should not stand aside. Though sidelined when Armenia and Azerbaijan turned to direct talks after the 2023 collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh, Brussels remains the only Western actor with a multi-sector, structural presence in the region. EU enlargement may be stalled, but investment in infrastructure and stability continues. In the near term, European funding could prove decisive in closing the forty-kilometer gap in southern Armenia's railway—a stretch that may require tunneling and complex engineering. Such a project would give Brussels a seat at the table in implementing the agreements while anchoring stability for years to come. The EU should make a move, even if the main event took place not in Brussels but in Washington DC, which does not seem to favor relations with Europe very much nowadays.
EVN Report
08-08-2025
- EVN Report
Pax Americana Comes to the South Caucasus
In early March, U.S. intelligence as well as numerous officials had substantial basis to warn the White House that Azerbaijan was planning on reinitiating hostilities against Armenia, with deep concerns that incursions into Syunik would likely materialize by mid-March. U.S. officials undertook a flurry of activities to curtail Baku's gameplan, and by mid April, a shuttle diplomacy of sorts was initiated by President Trump's Special Envoy Steve Witkoff's team between Yerevan and Baku. In early May, the American team produced a proposal to both sides which would become the foundational basis of normalization between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Washington Summit held on August 8 at the White House between Prime Minister Pashinyan, President Trump, and President Aliyev is the culmination of this normalization proposal and months of negotiations between the three sides. At the heart of the normalization process, from its inception, was the American belief that unless connectivity is established and the transit route issue addressed, Baku will weaponize the so-called 'Zangezur Corridor' precept to relaunch hostilities. Thus, for Washington, normalization began with finding a solution to the transit route conundrum. What followed was a three-month process of complex negotiations on a highly-creative and unique proposal put forth by the United States. For those of us involved in this process, three things were clear: U.S. pressure was fundamental in order to get Aliyev to agree; the secret state of negotiations limited us from sharing details with the public or civil society; and, the complex and innovative nature of the proposal was ripe for pro-Russian proxies, both in Armenia and the Diaspora, to distort and seeks its obstruction through targeted disinformation campaigns. On August 8, three documents were formalized at the Washington Summit. First, a joint declaration by Armenia and Azerbaijan, under the auspices of the United States, seeking full normalization of relations and permanent pathway to peace. Second, the foreign ministers of both countries placed their initials on a document based on the agreed contours of the draft peace agreement, signifying commitment by both sides to the terms of the deal, which, in essence, includes adherence to the 17 articles of the draft agreement. Third, both foreign ministers jointly signed a document formally withdrawing from the OSCE Minsk Group, noting the ineffective and obsolete nature of the format. At the bilateral level, numerous sets of pre-summit meetings were held on August 7, as both sides addressed the growing depth and scope of U.S.-Armenia relations. On August 8, President Trump and Prime Minister Pashinyan signed numerous memorandums of understanding to elevate the U.S.-Armenia partnership, which, in essence, is designed to not only quickly implement the agenda of the U.S.-Armenia Strategic Partnership, but also include initiatives to collaborate on artificial intelligence, energy, mining, semi-conductors, security, and Armenia's Crossroads of Peace initiative. MOUs were also signed between Azerbaijan and the US, though not at the same scope or depth as that between Armenia and US, considering that the latter are formal strategic partners, while formal bilateral relationship does not yet have such an elevated status. Both sides, however, will be given access to America's arms market, and in this context, the Trump Administration is open to offering both parties weapons sales as commensurate with commitment to bilateral agreements. There Will Be No 'Zangezur Corridor,' Only an Armenian-Controlled Transit Route With respect to the very cornerstone of this Summit lies the much-anticipated U.S.-proposed transit route. After months of intense negotiations, all sides have agreed to the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), a joint Armenia-U.S. venture designed as a master development plan to build a commercial route across Syunik. Conceding the fact that the term 'corridor' has been politicized and weaponized by Baku and Russia's proxies in Armenia and the Diaspora, the project will interchangeably use the terms 'road' and 'route,' thus addressing an important Armenian concern. TRIPP is envisioned as a vital and strategic trade artery that will be subjected to and administered by Armenian law, while operated under a joint Armenia-U.S. venture. Thus, TRIPP, as confirmed in discussions with numerous U.S. officials, ensures Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdictional authority. Contrary to the disinformation spread by the likes of former Kocharyan foreign minister Vartan Oskanian, Armenia's illiberal opposition, and pro-Russia organizations in the Diaspora such as the ANCA, Armenian sovereign territory will not be ceded, given, or delegated to any third party actor that constitutes extraterritoriality. Moreover, contrary to the disinformation proliferated by such circles, foreign troops will not be stationed in Armenia, no neighboring country will have a presence in sovereign Armenian territory, and Armenia's link south to Iran will not be obstructed nor have anything to do with this route. In this context, Armenia and the United States will undertake a joint venture, with both Armenian and American companies being granted contracts to build the infrastructure and undertake the development of the route. Considering the immense role the United States will be playing in securing financing for the project, the U.S., in consultation with its Armenian partners, and commensurate with Armenian law, will have the right to delegate or subcontract different parts of the construction project to pertinent companies as deemed appropriate in completing TRIPP. Thus, the United States will partner up with Armenia, with strict adherence to the principle of the inviolability of Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity, and jurisdictional authority, to build and operate a commercial transit route through Southern Armenia, allowing for connectivity between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan. The route is being qualified as an economic and commercial endeavor, not simply a geopolitical or hard power move, and it is for this reason that there is not and will not be talks of its militarization to address the security of the route. Unlike the stipulations put forth in the 2020, November 9 trilateral statement that had sought, based on Russian and Azerbaijani interpretation, the presence of Russian FSB troops controlling an extraterritorial corridor, TRIPP will not have any military presence from any foreign country. Rather, the United States, in agreement with Armenia, will take on the responsibility of ensuring that the route operates and functions safely through the hiring of highly-experienced and qualified companies whose activities, under Armenian law, will ensure the set objectives. While Aliyev had demanded complete unimpeded access of all cargo and goods passing through Armenia, without any inspection of the content included in the shipments, his maximalist demand was not achieved. Rather, only commercial access will be permitted, and in this context, military equipment or non-commercial products will not be permitted. Further, since the control of the route will be under Armenian law, and thus, under Armenian control, cargo entering and passing through the Republic of Armenia will be subjected to inspection prior to entering Armenian territory. The border inspection mechanism will utilize the front-office/back-office model: a third party operator, hired by the U.S.-Armenia joint venture, will work the front office when physically dealing with incoming Azerbaijani cargo, while Armenian officials and border control personnel will be in the back office overlooking all aspects of the process. Through this model, all cargo entering and passing through Armenian territory will be ensured to be commercial, while Armenian law will dictate front-office/back-office operations. The U.S.-Armenia Paradigm and a Growing Security Architecture The Washington Summit is testimony to the highly constructive and methodical role played by the United States in making this initiative a reality. Two important factors stand out in how this came about. First, against much of his strategic self-interest, which is well-designed to maintain his power asymmetry with Armenia and thus obstruct any third-party initiative that allows Armenia agency and potential for development, Aliyev finally agreed to the U.S. proposal, after having sought every diplomatic mechanism of obstructing or prolonging the process. In my extensive engagements with the State Department, National Security Council, and the White House, it was evident that there was a clear understanding in Washington that bringing Aliyev to the table was incumbent upon the United States if Washington had any hopes of its proposed initiative having life. In essence, the Trump Administration's model of working through deadlines, and making certain that involved parties will face punitive action for failing to meet the set deadlines, produced the outcome that many of us, even having access to the process, were skeptical of: that Aliyev will agree to terms that are not commensurate to his maximalist posturing. Second, the U.S. normalization proposal, while having had several iterations since its first draft, is primarily hinged on the following logic: the United States will step in as a constructive economic and geopolitical actor to support the establishment of a transit route through Syunik, giving Azerbaijan commercial connectivity to its exclave of Nakhichevan, with the route being subjected to Armenia's laws and in full compliance with Armenia's sovereignty. In conversations with the leadership in both the State Department and the NSC during the last three months, it was directly shared with me that America's thinking was predicated on three underlying postulates. One, the Washington Summit is not a one-off engagement, but rather a foundational framework for what the United States views as a three year process, from this normalization initiative to signing a final peace treaty. Two, the White House proceeded with a 'peace first' approach, where the conflict is removed from the battlefield space and the use of force is precluded, after which the normalization process proceeds. And three, the U.S. envisions a new South Caucasus, one defined by trade, stability and interconnectivity, which also includes the opening of borders with Turkey in the very near future. In this context, the background leading up to the Summit has been defined by categorically denying Baku the option of using force, offering creative (economic, energy, infrastructure, etc.) incentives to both sides to make certain they adhere to the U.S. plan, and using these developments to formalize a normalization framework that, by 2028, will lead to the signing of a final peace agreement. For Armenia, the U.S. proposal was not only a highly-preferable outcome of its Western pivot and policy of diversification, but more specifically, it has fundamentally altered its security architecture. The joint U.S.-Armenia venture in building TRIPP, for official Yerevan, is not, in and of itself, only an economic or commercial endeavor, but just as, if not more importantly, an important layer of robust deterrence against any future acts of Azerbaijani aggression. Within the domain of security, TRIPP offers Armenia an expansive and multilayered framework of soft deterrence, which exponentially diminishes the threat propensity within its security environment. In essence, whereas the threat of Azerbaijani incursions were a continuous and high-probability threat since 2020, that threat has been exceedingly marginalized by virtue of the U.S.-led normalization initiative and the development of the TRIPP project. Furthermore, the outcome of the Washington Summit, and America's vision of undertaking a multi-year process of finalizing a peace treaty, extensively handicaps Aliyev's capacity to tap into his hybrid warfare toolkit. While Baku, for tactical and strategic reasons, will still seek to utilize certain methods of hybrid warfare, it will, nonetheless, be unable to utilize its wide-ranging toolkit the way it has for the last five years. Within the confluence of such developments, Aliyev's penchant for relying on kinetic and coercive diplomacy will also lose efficacy, since the theater of conflict has been transferred to a normalization format with immense U.S. investment. In no uncertain terms, the normalization process brings Armenia a state of de facto peace, and while a peace treaty, if achieved in the future, will produce a de jure outcome, the more important variable, in the immediate and near future, is that Aliyev's war machine, which had fed off of the power disparity with Armenia, would have go into hibernation. What the U.S. normalization initiative has done for Armenia's security architecture is quite unique: it has given Armenia a transit route that it controls, not the Zangezur Corridor of Aliyev's dreams or the FSB-controlled corridor of Moscow's desires, while at the same time strengthening Armenia's position as a regional actor. Finally, inherent in the normalization initiative is the implicit understanding that Azerbaijan will have to withdraw from the territories it has occupied within Armenia-proper as the TRIPP project comes close to conclusion and reaches the opening stage. More simply put, Azerbaijan will either have to withdraw or act as an obstructionist force against the U.S. project, for the U.S. normalization initiative envisions the operationalization of TRIPP with the de-occupation of Armenian territories. Thus, Azerbaijan's occupation of Armenian sovereign territory will soon become a liability, and what Aliyev had initially deemed an important instrument of leverage against Armenia will now become a source of diplomatic weakness in its relations with the U.S. Quite similar to what will also happen soon with the POWs: as the process develops, the issue of Armenian prisoners of war, a topic of growing importance to the White House, will become a political liability for Baku.
