Sudan air force destroys Emirati aircraft, killing 40 mercenaries
A military source, speaking to AFP on condition of anonymity, said the UAE plane "was bombed and completely destroyed" at Darfur's Nyala airport, which has recently come under repeated air strikes by the Sudanese army, at war with the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023.
There was no immediate comment from the RSF or from the United Arab Emirates.
State TV said the aircraft had taken off from an airbase in the Gulf, carrying dozens of foreign fighters and military equipment intended for the RSF, which controls nearly all of Darfur.
The army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, has long accused the UAE of supplying advanced weaponry, including drones, to the RSF via Nyala airport.
Abu Dhabi has denied the accusations, despite numerous reports from U.N. experts, U.S. political officials and international organizations.
Satellite images released by Yale University's Humanitarian Research Lab have shown multiple Chinese-made long-range drones at the airport of the South Darfur state capital.
In June, three witnesses told AFP that a cargo plane was bombed shortly after landing at Nyala airport.
On Monday, Sudan's army-aligned government accused the UAE of recruiting and funding Colombian mercenaries to fight for the RSF, claiming it has documents proving that.
Reports of Colombian fighters in Darfur date back to late 2024 and have been confirmed by U.N. experts.
This week, the Joint Forces -- a pro-army coalition in the vast western region of Darfur -- reported over 80 Colombian mercenaries fighting on the RSF's side in El-Fasher, the last Darfur state capital still under army control.
Several were reportedly killed in drone and artillery operations during the RSF's latest offensive, the coalition said.
The army also released video footage it said was of "foreign mercenaries believed to be from Colombia".
AFP was not able to verify the videos.
In December, Sudan said Colombia's foreign ministry had expressed regret "for the participation of some of its citizens in the war".
Colombian mercenaries, many former soldiers and guerrillas, have appeared in other global conflicts and were previously hired by the UAE for operations in Yemen and the Gulf.
Sudan's war, now in its third year, has killed tens of thousands, displaced 13 million and plunged the nation into the world's worst hunger and displacement crisis.
© 2025 AFP
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