Evergrande to delist from Hong Kong stock market
Evergrande says the city's stock exchange has decided to delist its shares per listing rules. File photo: AFP
China Evergrande Group has announced its shares will be delisted from the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, as court-appointed liquidators warned of the real estate firm's debt load was far bigger than earlier estimated.
In a filing on Tuesday, the company said the stock exchange has decided to cancel its listing from August 25 – as trading had not resumed by July 28 – and it would not apply for a review of the decision.
"The last day of the listing of the shares will be on August 22, 2025 and the listing of the Shares will be cancelled with effect from 9am on August 25, 2025," the filing read.
"All shareholders, investors and potential investors of the company should note that after the last listing date, whilst the share certificates of the shares will remain valid, the shares will not be listed on, and will not be tradeable on the stock exchange."
Hong Kong's High Court issued a winding-up order for Evergrande in January 2024, ruling that the debt-laden company had failed to come up with a viable restructuring plan. Trading of its shares has since been suspended.
In an attached progress report, liquidators Edward Middleton and Tiffany Wong said a "holistic" restructuring is out of reach.
They also said Evergrande's debt load exceeded the US$27.5 billion of liabilities disclosed in its financial statement in December 2022.
"As at July 31, 2025, this claims' discovery exercise had resulted in 187 proofs of debt being submitted, by which claims of approximately HK$350 billion (US$45 billion) in aggregate have been made," the document read.
But the latest figure was not to be taken as final, the liquidators added.
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
South China Morning Post
2 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
HKMA, HSBC allay concerns about Hong Kong's property glut, assure city of banks' safety
Hong Kong's de facto central bank and the city's largest lender have issued separate statements to assuage concerns about a glut in the commercial property market, saying that the local banking system remained robust and well-capitalised. Advertisement Risks associated with commercial real estate (CRE) loans were 'manageable', as the classified loan ratio – a measure of borrowings deemed substandard, doubtful, or at loss – shrank slightly to 1.97 per cent in the second quarter, from 1.98 per cent at the end of March, said Eddie Yue Wai-man, the chief executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). 'Hong Kong's banking system is well-capitalised and has sufficient provisions and good financial strength to withstand market volatilities,' Yue said in a blog post on the HKMA's website on Wednesday. Hong Kong's property slump, currently in its sixth year, has entered a new normal , as a confluence of factors from high interest rates and macroeconomic pressure to low demand amid a supply glut has weighed on the market. As prices and rents fell in residential flats, shops and offices, the value of loan collateral declined. Eddie Yue Wai-man, the Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA), on July 9, 2025. Photo: Elson Li Almost three-quarters of HSBC's Hong Kong commercial property loan book was flashing warning signs by the end of June, while the amount of loans bearing increased credit risk had almost tripled, according to a media report on Tuesday based on its own calculation.
AllAfrica
7 hours ago
- AllAfrica
China's property woes worsen while Trump tightens trade screws
TOKYO — Xi Jinping's inner circle in Beijing has had a busy couple of months popping the champagne corks. Along with China growing 5%-plus as the US economy hits a rough patch, President Xi's team just scored yet another extension on trade talks from Donald Trump. That means another 90 days of stringing along a US leader who's increasingly anxious for a deal, any deal at all, with Asia's biggest economy. Only a 'grand bargain' with Xi's Communist Party could give Trump scope to convince his supporters that the tariff-driven inflation, market chaos and extreme uncertainty his tariffs have unleashed are all worth it. Xi knows this desperation will likely enable China to give Trump World very little in the end — just like Japan. 'China believes momentum is on its side because Trump has a stronger desire to sign a deal with Beijing so that he can claim victory and secure a summit with Xi in the fall,' says analyst William Yang at the International Crisis Group. Yet domestic events are catching up with Beijing, suggesting Xi's inner circle might want to keep the champagne on ice for a while. China's 5.3% growth rate in the first half of 2025 masks signs that the nation's property crisis continues to fester below the surface. In June, prices of new homes fell 0.27% from May, the most in eight months. It suggests Beijing's stimulus efforts back in September have run out of steam. What's more, China's 100 biggest developers saw new-home sales plunge by more than 20% for two consecutive months now, according to China Real Estate Information Corp. And from an economic confidence standpoint, it's never good when China Evergrande Group returns to the news. The developer that came to symbolize China's deflation-causing real estate bust announced that its Hong Kong stock will be delisted this month. An optimistic take might be that it marks the end of an era China wants to forget. Evergrande's stumble, after all, had Lehman Brothers overtones. Along with distress among builders, the turmoil Evergrande represented had many worrying that China might be headed for a Japan-like malaise. It's hardly comforting that one of the first major economists to see the crisis coming back in 2021 is waving a warning flag about China's next several months. UBS Group's John Lam tells Bloomberg that 'the sales momentum has become tepid in recent months. If that continues, a recovery will occur later than expected.' Lam notes that home inventory turnover in tier-one cities across China had dropped to an average of 14 months. That's the same level as 2015. The headwinds from Trump's trade war are making things even tougher for China, amplifying the effects of its pre-existing conditions. These include the property crisis, high youth unemployment, local governments struggling under the weight of crushing debt burdens and demographic decline. In China, the real estate sector plays a pivotal role in shaping domestic sentiment due to significant household exposure to this asset class, notes Carlos Casanova, an economist at Union Bancaire Privée. The sharp decline in real estate activity from May to July, he notes, may have dampened consumer confidence, potentially weighing on retail sales and other sectors. In July, China's official gauge for manufacturing activity saw a worse-than-expected contraction amid slower domestic growth and increased uncertainty over US trade tensions. The Manufacturing Purchasing Managers' Index came in at 49.3 in July, below the 50 mark signaling expansion. Poor weather may have been a partial factor, some economists argue. But there's little doubt Beijing's 'anti-involution' efforts to battle cut-throat price competition and address overcapacity are hurting the economy. 'The manufacturing PMI featured lower output, lower inventory but higher price sub-indices, whereas the construction PMI fell notably on high temperatures and heavy rainfalls,' Goldman Sachs analysts write in a note. Chi Lo, senior market strategist at BNP Paribas Asset Management, notes that supply-side reforms alongside demand-side stimulus can pull the economy out of deflation. 'Creative destruction,' he says, 'is inherently contractionary because the old sectors decline more quickly than new ones are created and develop.' Lo argues that the 'anti-involution campaign focuses on measures and regulations to cut production capacity and curb disorderly pricing schemes. These policies could be self-defeating, hurting employment and the economy in general, and overwhelming any positive impact on pricing power and profitability.' And with China's 'economy stuck in a liquidity trap, fiscal policy must do the heavy lifting and revive public confidence and demand,' Lo says. 'Monetary easing is a facilitating tool. The recent recovery of the credit impulse marks a start on the road to recovery.' But a shift toward a more vibrant domestic demand-led economic model continues to be slow-going. The need for a recalibration from over-investment to consumption was well known even before Xi rose to power in 2012 and 2013. So is the need to create broader safety nets across sectors. A robust network of safety nets is becoming more important as the property crisis drags on. Why would the average mainland household have the confidence to consume or invest after losing their shirts in the property market, and with no recovery in sight? Building a bigger network of stable and trusted safety nets would pay the biggest dividends. As Boston University economist Laurence Kotlikoff argues, the key is crafting a 'modern version of Social Security' that's 'fully-funded, transparent, efficient, fair, and progressive' and 'features personal accounts that are collectively invested by the government at zero cost to workers.' The goal, Kotlikoff says, is to devise a social safety net that's not 'incomprehensible, inefficient, inequitable, and, most important, insolvent.' Economists at the International Monetary Fund argue that the 'prioritization of the spending of households over investment would also deliver larger stabilization benefits. For example, means-tested transfers to households would boost aggregate demand 50% more than an equivalent amount of public investment. To ensure consistency across policies, fiscal policy should be undertaken within a medium-term fiscal framework.' Failure could mean that China won't escape the dreaded middle-income trap after all. In China's case, it could be more of an upper-middle-income funk, but still a painful one. Yet as New York University economist Nouriel Roubini points out, if a shock like Trump ratcheting up tariffs against China happened, 'China will indeed find itself in the middle-income trap.' China's problems, Roubini argues, 'are structural, rather than cyclical. Among other factors, its slowdown is due to rapid aging, a busted real-estate bubble, a massive overhang of private and public debt (now close to 300% of GDP), and a shift from market-oriented reforms back toward state capitalism.' In general, Roubini says, credit-fueled investment has grown excessive as state-owned banks lend to state-owned enterprises and local governments. At the same time, Xi's government has spent too much time over the last five years 'bashing the tech sector and other private enterprises, eroding business confidence and private investment. In this new period of deglobalization and protectionism, China appears to have hit the limits to export-led growth.' That's particularly so as Trump's tariffs continue to do economic damage everywhere and sow distrust in Beijing and beyond. Take the White House's latest chips gambit, which puts Nvidia, the globe's most valuable company, in the role of pawn as Trump and Xi jockey for advantage. Both Nvidia and AMD have agreed to give Trump's government a 15% share of revenues from semiconductor sales to China. The tax is the price for US licenses to export their technology to the second-biggest economy. Nivida seems to be taking an ends-justify-the-means approach to the tax. As analysts at Melius Research note: 'Now Nvidia can better compete with Huawei — not only in the China market, but globally, making sure more Chinese artificial intelligence developers can create applications on a US-friendly Nvidia AI stack.' Yet as Ian Bremmer, CEO of Eurasia Group, notes, Xi's government is already demanding Chinese tech firms, including Tencent, Alibaba and ByteDance, justify purchases of Nvidia's H20 AI chips. China would prefer that the firms buy domestically. Now, Bremmer adds, the Chinese scrutiny is prompting some companies to scale back orders, potentially cutting Nvidia's China market share to 55% this year from 66% in 2024, amid ongoing US-China tech tensions. China, of course, is in no hurry to agree to a trade pact with Trump, particularly given the haggling going on about earlier ones. The ways in which Washington and Tokyo and Washington and Brussels are at odds about what exactly they agreed to might have Xi looking to extend talks well into 2026 – or beyond. In the meantime, though, the cracks in China's underlying economy are festering at best and deepening at worst. As these pre-existing conditions collide with more Trumpian volatility to come, Team Xi will have to act more boldly and nimbly than ever before to keep incomes from stagnating and the property market from collapsing. Follow William Pesek on X at @WilliamPesek
AllAfrica
11 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion
Betting on stealth over speed, Taiwan is forging a long-range 'carrier killer' to push back China's carriers and toughen the First Island Chain—even as layered Chinese defenses and shaky allied politics cloud the gambit. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defense analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China's growing naval power, citing a defense ministry procurement list. Under the Defense Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models. Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon's development since 2021. Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometers—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas. The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III's 400-kilometer limit and the US-made Harpoon's 200-kilometer reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) layered defenses. The timing highlights urgency, with two PLA Navy (PLAN) carriers exercising in the Western Pacific amid a years-long escalation since Beijing cut ties in 2016. China claims Taiwan as its territory, while the US remains Taipei's leading arms supplier, shaping the self-governing island's procurement and war planning. Jonathan Harman mentions in an October 2024 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that domestic production of missile platforms offers Taiwan mainly quicker deployment and reduced costs for weapons that match the performance of US systems. Harman notes that Taiwan aims to replace specific US missile systems with its indigenous variants, although some still require improvements to serve as a more credible deterrent. In line with that, Taiwan's subsonic Hsiung Feng II is slower, more vulnerable to shipboard defenses and has a short range of only 120 kilometers. Although the Harpoon has a longer range, it remains a subsonic missile. The supersonic Hsiung Feng III may have a better chance of punching through shipboard defenses but lacks sufficient reach for standoff fires against PLAN surface groups. Together, these limits may explain Taipei's shift toward a stealthier, longer-ranged option. Taiwan's emphasis on a stealthy, long-range anti-ship missile may also reflect a change of philosophy in defeating shipboard air defenses. The AGM-158, which Taiwan may take as a design reference for its new missile, has a low radar cross-section and minimal infrared signature to evade modern ship defenses. In contrast, supersonic missiles try to 'outrun' interceptors, but they emit intense heat during flight, increasing detectability and engagement opportunities. The divergence captures two schools of thought about beating increasingly sophisticated naval shields. Underscoring just how formidable China's carrier defenses are, Daniel Rice notes in a July 2024 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that its carrier battle groups employ three concentric zones. These include: An Outer Defense Zone 185–400 kilometers from the carrier, where J-15 fighters and submarines conduct surveillance and precision anti-air/anti-ship strikes, executing 'offense to enhance defense' A Middle Defense Zone, 45–185 kilometers away, where large surface combatants—Type 052D 'sword-carrying guards' with advanced radars and vertical launch systems (VLS), and Type 054A frigates acting as 'bodyguards'—focus on anti-submarine warfare and area air defense An Inner Defense Zone, 100 meters–45 kilometers from the carrier, where shipborne point defenses ring the flattop, which serves as the command-and-control (C2) hub. Taiwan's existing anti-ship missiles leave gaps that a new system aims to close. The Hsiung Feng II, Harpoon and Hsiung Feng III cover short to medium ranges. A longer-ranged, harder-to-detect missile would extend its sea-denial envelope. Further, Craig Koerner mentions in an October 2021 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that Taiwan's asymmetrical defense strategy would leverage its terrain to deploy numerous ground-based anti-ship and anti-air missile units. According to Koerner, these units, concealed by camouflage and decoys, can target invading forces while avoiding detection. Koerner says this 'porcupine strategy' offers a cost-effective defense, reduces vulnerability to China's strikes and surveillance, and sustains deterrence. The regional picture trends in the same direction. Taiwan is not alone in pursuing land-based, anti-ship capabilities; US allies are normalizing distributed, road-mobile launchers to complicate PLA planning. For instance, Japan plans to acquire 1,000 upgraded Type 12 cruise missiles and host the US Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), while the Philippines indefinitely hosts the US Typhon and NMESIS systems—moves that toughen the First Island Chain's anti-ship missile wall and create cross-pressures on PLA surface operations. However, this larger US strategy of containing China faces significant caveats. Eric Gomez argues in a November 2023 Cato Institute report that Taiwan's asymmetric strategy is less flexible than traditional capabilities in peacetime or gray-zone scenarios, but remains essential for deterring and surviving a Chinese invasion. Suppose the PLA blockades Taiwan with naval and air forces to cut off shipping without storming the island's beaches in an amphibious invasion; then, Taiwan's shore missiles have no clear target unless it escalates to firing the first shot. While a blockade may seek to force capitulation without fighting, Gomez says that approach often fails to achieve its aims, while pointing out that an invasion carries the highest risk but is the most likely approach to succeed. Masashi Murano points out in a March 2024 article for the US Studies Centre (USSC) that Japan's long-range strike capability faces critical gaps in support assets, munitions stockpiles, joint operational doctrine and persistent intelligence tracking. He adds that legal constraints and escalation risks further limit its ability to credibly deter nuclear-armed adversaries such as China through conventional counterstrike operations. Domestic politics can also reroute strategy. Derek Grossman warns in a July 2025 Foreign Policy article that shifting Philippine politics could upend US defense plans: Vice President Sara Duterte—the 2028 presidential frontrunner after midterm gains—could roll back President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's US alliance expansion, invoking the constitution's call for an 'independent' foreign policy and thus implicitly criticizing the US Typhon deployment in northern Luzon that has sparked Beijing's ire. Grossman notes she might follow her father's precedent by revisiting moves to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and by curbing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement's (EDCA) now nine-site access, risking US access, training and surge capacity in the Philippines. Strategic bandwidth is another constraint. US involvement in overlapping conflicts—support to Ukraine, naval operations against the Houthis in Yemen, backing Israel versus Iran and responding to North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling—could sap political will and overstretch the defense industrial base, making US intervention against China's designs over Taiwan unfeasible if the timelines collide. Ultimately, Taiwan's deterrence hinges less on one 'carrier killer' than on whether Taipei can outlast a Chinese blockade while allied resolve from the Philippines to Japan—and US bandwidth—holds fast.
