Taiwan readying 'carrier killer' missile to thwart China invasion
This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan is developing a long-range subsonic anti-ship cruise missile that defense analysts say could significantly strengthen deterrence against China's growing naval power, citing a defense ministry procurement list.
Under the Defense Industry Development Act, the ministry will spend NT$40 million (US$1.3 million) over two years on 80 frequency-agile coaxial magnetrons, radar components for the new missile and existing models.
Meanwhile, local media said more than NT$800 million (US$26 million) was allocated in 2021–2022 to adapt Hsiung Feng IIE land-attack technology with enhanced stealth. Taiwan's National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST) is believed to have led the weapon's development since 2021.
Analysts, citing the US AGM-158B and C as references, estimate the missile will have a range of 600–1,000 kilometers—enough to reach beyond Chinese carrier-based aircraft and cover large parts of the East and South China Seas.
The new weapon aims to offset the Hsiung Feng III's 400-kilometer limit and the US-made Harpoon's 200-kilometer reach, both requiring risky penetration of the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) layered defenses.
The timing highlights urgency, with two PLA Navy (PLAN) carriers exercising in the Western Pacific amid a years-long escalation since Beijing cut ties in 2016. China claims Taiwan as its territory, while the US remains Taipei's leading arms supplier, shaping the self-governing island's procurement and war planning.
Jonathan Harman mentions in an October 2024 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that domestic production of missile platforms offers Taiwan mainly quicker deployment and reduced costs for weapons that match the performance of US systems. Harman notes that Taiwan aims to replace specific US missile systems with its indigenous variants, although some still require improvements to serve as a more credible deterrent.
In line with that, Taiwan's subsonic Hsiung Feng II is slower, more vulnerable to shipboard defenses and has a short range of only 120 kilometers. Although the Harpoon has a longer range, it remains a subsonic missile.
The supersonic Hsiung Feng III may have a better chance of punching through shipboard defenses but lacks sufficient reach for standoff fires against PLAN surface groups. Together, these limits may explain Taipei's shift toward a stealthier, longer-ranged option.
Taiwan's emphasis on a stealthy, long-range anti-ship missile may also reflect a change of philosophy in defeating shipboard air defenses. The AGM-158, which Taiwan may take as a design reference for its new missile, has a low radar cross-section and minimal infrared signature to evade modern ship defenses.
In contrast, supersonic missiles try to 'outrun' interceptors, but they emit intense heat during flight, increasing detectability and engagement opportunities. The divergence captures two schools of thought about beating increasingly sophisticated naval shields.
Underscoring just how formidable China's carrier defenses are, Daniel Rice notes in a July 2024 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that its carrier battle groups employ three concentric zones. These include: An Outer Defense Zone 185–400 kilometers from the carrier, where J-15 fighters and submarines conduct surveillance and precision anti-air/anti-ship strikes, executing 'offense to enhance defense' A Middle Defense Zone, 45–185 kilometers away, where large surface combatants—Type 052D 'sword-carrying guards' with advanced radars and vertical launch systems (VLS), and Type 054A frigates acting as 'bodyguards'—focus on anti-submarine warfare and area air defense An Inner Defense Zone, 100 meters–45 kilometers from the carrier, where shipborne point defenses ring the flattop, which serves as the command-and-control (C2) hub.
Taiwan's existing anti-ship missiles leave gaps that a new system aims to close. The Hsiung Feng II, Harpoon and Hsiung Feng III cover short to medium ranges. A longer-ranged, harder-to-detect missile would extend its sea-denial envelope.
Further, Craig Koerner mentions in an October 2021 Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) article that Taiwan's asymmetrical defense strategy would leverage its terrain to deploy numerous ground-based anti-ship and anti-air missile units.
According to Koerner, these units, concealed by camouflage and decoys, can target invading forces while avoiding detection. Koerner says this 'porcupine strategy' offers a cost-effective defense, reduces vulnerability to China's strikes and surveillance, and sustains deterrence.
The regional picture trends in the same direction. Taiwan is not alone in pursuing land-based, anti-ship capabilities; US allies are normalizing distributed, road-mobile launchers to complicate PLA planning.
For instance, Japan plans to acquire 1,000 upgraded Type 12 cruise missiles and host the US Navy/Marine Corps Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System (NMESIS), while the Philippines indefinitely hosts the US Typhon and NMESIS systems—moves that toughen the First Island Chain's anti-ship missile wall and create cross-pressures on PLA surface operations.
However, this larger US strategy of containing China faces significant caveats. Eric Gomez argues in a November 2023 Cato Institute report that Taiwan's asymmetric strategy is less flexible than traditional capabilities in peacetime or gray-zone scenarios, but remains essential for deterring and surviving a Chinese invasion.
Suppose the PLA blockades Taiwan with naval and air forces to cut off shipping without storming the island's beaches in an amphibious invasion; then, Taiwan's shore missiles have no clear target unless it escalates to firing the first shot.
While a blockade may seek to force capitulation without fighting, Gomez says that approach often fails to achieve its aims, while pointing out that an invasion carries the highest risk but is the most likely approach to succeed.
Masashi Murano points out in a March 2024 article for the US Studies Centre (USSC) that Japan's long-range strike capability faces critical gaps in support assets, munitions stockpiles, joint operational doctrine and persistent intelligence tracking. He adds that legal constraints and escalation risks further limit its ability to credibly deter nuclear-armed adversaries such as China through conventional counterstrike operations.
Domestic politics can also reroute strategy. Derek Grossman warns in a July 2025 Foreign Policy article that shifting Philippine politics could upend US defense plans: Vice President Sara Duterte—the 2028 presidential frontrunner after midterm gains—could roll back President Ferdinand Marcos Jr's US alliance expansion, invoking the constitution's call for an 'independent' foreign policy and thus implicitly criticizing the US Typhon deployment in northern Luzon that has sparked Beijing's ire.
Grossman notes she might follow her father's precedent by revisiting moves to terminate the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and by curbing the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement's (EDCA) now nine-site access, risking US access, training and surge capacity in the Philippines.
Strategic bandwidth is another constraint. US involvement in overlapping conflicts—support to Ukraine, naval operations against the Houthis in Yemen, backing Israel versus Iran and responding to North Korea's nuclear saber-rattling—could sap political will and overstretch the defense industrial base, making US intervention against China's designs over Taiwan unfeasible if the timelines collide.
Ultimately, Taiwan's deterrence hinges less on one 'carrier killer' than on whether Taipei can outlast a Chinese blockade while allied resolve from the Philippines to Japan—and US bandwidth—holds fast.
Hashtags
Try Our AI Features
Explore what Daily8 AI can do for you:
Comments
No comments yet...
Related Articles
South China Morning Post
13 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
China's high-speed jet drone, Trump shrugs off Latin American moves: SCMP daily highlights
Catch up on some of SCMP's biggest China stories of the day. If you would like to see more of our reporting, please consider subscribing In an aviation tech breakthrough that could change naval warfare, Chinese aerospace engineers have unveiled what could be the world's first high-speed vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) drone powered by a jet engine. After six months of steady improvement, China's economy showed signs of strain in July, with several headline indicators losing momentum amid a weakening of domestic consumption, headwinds from the US trade war and a prolonged property downturn. President Donald Trump said the US was 'doing better than any other country in the world right now'. Photo: EPA US President Donald Trump on Thursday said he was not worried about Brazil, Mexico and other Latin American nations moving closer to China, telling reporters in the Oval Office, 'They can do whatever they want.'
AllAfrica
14 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Taiwan and the limits of American power
As tensions escalate in the Taiwan Strait and Washington's bipartisan consensus coalesces around defending the self-ruling island's democracy, it's worth stepping back from the emotional rhetoric about freedom versus authoritarianism to examine whether America's evolving Taiwan policy serves genuine US national interests—or represents another costly overextension of American power. The current trajectory of US policy toward Taiwan reflects the same strategic hubris that has characterized American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War: the belief that the United States can and should reshape the global order according to its preferences, regardless of the costs or the balance of power realities on the ground. Let's begin with some uncomfortable truths that Washington's foreign policy establishment prefers to ignore. Taiwan sits 100 miles (161 kilometers) off China's coast and 7,000 miles (11,265 kilometers) from the continental United States. For Beijing, Taiwan represents what strategists call a 'core interest'—territory it views as integral to its sovereignty and historical identity. For Washington, Taiwan is what we might generously call a 'peripheral interest'—important perhaps, but hardly vital to America's survival or prosperity. This geographical and strategic asymmetry matters enormously. China can bring overwhelming conventional force to bear in any Taiwan contingency, while the United States would be fighting at the end of extremely long supply lines, with bases in Japan and Guam potentially vulnerable to Chinese missile strikes. Military analysts who engage in honest assessments—rather than Pentagon wish-thinking—increasingly conclude that China would likely prevail in a conventional conflict over Taiwan, especially as Beijing's military modernization continues to narrow the capability gap with US forces. More troubling still is how American policy has steadily moved away from the strategic ambiguity that helped preserve peace across the Taiwan Strait for decades. The incremental steps—high-level official visits, arms sales packages, training programs, and increasingly explicit security guarantees—have created what scholars call an 'escalation trap.' Each step makes it harder for Washington to back down without losing credibility, while simultaneously making it harder for Beijing to ignore what it views as American provocations. This dynamic should sound familiar to students of international relations. It's precisely how great powers stumble into catastrophic wars they never intended to fight—through a series of seemingly reasonable commitments that cumulatively create impossible situations. The question American policymakers should ask themselves is whether they're prepared for their daughters and sons to die in the Taiwan Strait, because that's where this trajectory leads. The economic dimension adds another layer of complexity that ideological hawks prefer to ignore. China is America's largest trading partner, and despite all the talk of 'decoupling,' the two economies remain deeply interconnected. A war over Taiwan would destroy this relationship overnight, triggering a global economic crisis that would make the 2008 financial meltdown look manageable by comparison. Meanwhile, Taiwan's famous semiconductor industry—often cited as justification for American involvement—represents both an asset and a vulnerability. Yes, Taiwan produces many of the world's most advanced chips. But those facilities would likely be destroyed in any military conflict, making them useless to whoever 'wins.' The rational response to semiconductor dependence is to diversify production, not to threaten war with a nuclear power. Proponents of a more confrontational approach toward China frequently invoke America's regional allies as force multipliers in any Taiwan scenario. This reflects another dangerous delusion. Japan and South Korea have their own complex relationships with Beijing and their own domestic political constraints. Australia is even more economically dependent on China than the United States is. None of these countries has shown enthusiasm for actual military confrontation with China over Taiwan—and why should they? European allies are even less likely to support American military action in the Taiwan Strait. They view the Asia-Pacific as outside their sphere of vital interests and are already dealing with the costs of the Ukraine conflict. Expecting them to sacrifice their economic relationships with China for what they see as an American obsession is unrealistic. None of this means abandoning Taiwan to its fate or appeasing Chinese aggression. But it does mean adopting a more realistic approach that acknowledges both American limitations and Chinese motivations. First, Washington should return to genuine strategic ambiguity. This means stopping the incremental steps toward explicit security guarantees while maintaining enough uncertainty to deter Chinese adventurism. Strategic ambiguity worked for 40 years because it gave all parties flexibility to avoid the worst-case scenarios. Second, American policy should focus on making any Chinese military action as costly as possible through defensive arms sales and asymmetric warfare capabilities, while avoiding provocative offensive weapons that Beijing views as preparation for Taiwanese independence. Third, the United States should explore diplomatic solutions that acknowledge Chinese concerns about sovereignty while preserving Taiwan's democratic autonomy. This might involve reviving proposals for confederation or other creative arrangements that satisfy Beijing's need for symbolic unity while maintaining Taiwan's practical independence. Ultimately, the Taiwan question illustrates a broader challenge facing American foreign policy: learning to operate in a multipolar world where the United States cannot simply impose its preferred outcomes through military superiority or economic leverage. China's rise represents a fundamental shift in the global balance of power, and no amount of military posturing or alliance-building will restore the brief unipolar moment that followed the Soviet collapse. The tragedy of American foreign policy since 9/11 has been the repeated failure to recognize these limits, leading to costly interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and elsewhere that achieved little beyond demonstrating American vulnerabilities. Taiwan could represent the ultimate expression of this strategic overreach—a conflict that America cannot win at an acceptable cost, fought over interests that are peripheral to genuine American security. The choice facing Washington is stark: adapt American strategy to the realities of Chinese power and geographical proximity, or risk a catastrophic war that could destroy the global economy and potentially escalate to nuclear exchange. For those who claim to put America first, that should be an easy choice to make. Leon Hadar is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and contributing editor at The American Conservative. He is the author of 'Quagmire: America in the Middle East' and 'Sandstorm: Policy Failure in the Middle East.'
South China Morning Post
15 hours ago
- South China Morning Post
Temasek fine tunes Chinese stock portfolio as PIF exits Alibaba in sovereign fund tweaks
Two of the world's largest sovereign wealth funds have adjusted their stakes in Chinese equities, trimming their exposure to technology stocks while going long on consumer companies as they mirrored Bridgewater Associates in reacting to volatile markets and rising US-China tensions. Singapore's Temasek Holdings cut its stake in Alibaba Group Holding by two-thirds to 1.85 million shares in the quarter that ended in June, according to its 13F disclosure on Thursday. It slashed its holdings by 87 per cent to 589,256 shares, cut NetEase by 38 per cent to 1.45 million shares and pared H World Group by 8 per cent to 6.24 million shares. Temasek went long on PDD Holdings , increasing its stake in the Pinduoduo discount e-commerce platform by 28 per cent. It raised its investments in Yum China , which operates the KFC and Pizza Hut franchises in the country, by 30 per cent. It invested in some companies for the first time, buying 1.23 million shares of the real estate brokerage KE Holdings and 1.19 million shares of the electric vehicle maker Xpeng The tweaks shrank the value of Temasek's portfolio of 12 US-traded Chinese stocks by more than a third, or US$699.3 million, to US$1.32 billion at the end of June, based on the Post's calculations. The value of the Singapore sovereign fund's equity portfolio of 131 stocks grew 4.4 per cent to US$26 billion in June, from the previous quarter. booth at AWE2024 in Shanghai on March 14, 2024. Temasek was not alone in selling the shares of Alibaba, which owns this newspaper. Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF) sold all 1.61 million Alibaba shares that it owns in one of China's largest technology companies at the end of June for US$212 million, according to its 13F disclosure.
