Rabi Lamichhane, Nepal's Anti-system Star, Meets the System
In the early 2000s, after dabbling in various radio and television roles in Nepal, he left the country in his early 20s to pursue higher studies in the United States. While in the U.S., he was reportedly involved in financial misconduct like tax evasion.
Lamichhane returned to Nepal later that decade and joined a television network. In 2013, the ever-ambitious Lamichhane entered the Guinness Book of World Records by hosting the longest-broadcast talk show (his record has since been broken). After that, in 2016, he started a combative current affairs TV program that made him wildly popular, as he quickly mastered the art of dressing down senior politicians and bureaucrats live on camera.
Then Lamichhane entered politics. Since founding his party, not a day has gone by without him being linked to this or that controversy – and now, he is in jail.
Lamichhane founded the RSP just over three months before the November 2022 national elections. At its heart, the party is a one-man show, with populist slogans of anti-corruption and good governance as its central planks. Using his celebrity, Lamichhane tried to tap into the growing public antipathy toward Nepal's three major parties: the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the CPN Maoist Center.
For a party with no ideology or organizational structure, the RSP did remarkably well in its electoral debut, winning 20 seats in the 275-member national parliament in 2022. Its candidates, relatively young and picked from across the professions, came as a breath of fresh air against the old parties and their tried-and-tested leaders.
Then, in December 2022, the RSP got into the government and Lamichhane became the deputy prime minister and home minister. But he soon had to give up the post after he was found to be neck-deep in a controversy over dual citizenship. The court stripped him of his parliamentarian status. Yet he bounced back to be re-elected from the same constituency in a by-election, this time with an even bigger mandate, and in March 2024 again became the deputy prime minister and home minister.
There was more drama to follow. He lost his ministerial berth when the Pushpa Kamal Dahal government collapsed in July 2024, soon after which he was taken into custody.
Lamichhane has been implicated in the embezzlement of millions of rupees from various cooperatives and pumping the money into a television station where he once served as the managing director.
To his critics, the legal evidence against him is overwhelming, enough to end his compromised political career. To his supporters, this beacon of hope for the new generation is being framed so that the traditional parties can continue to rule. In their reckoning, even the judiciary is biased and serves the old guard.
Lamichhane himself admits to making some errors of judgment but maintains that he was not involved in any organized effort to transfer cooperative funds into his media company's accounts.
The public is divided as five courts have charged him across as many districts, and the Supreme Court has upheld his custody. His supporters point out how those who have committed similar crimes in big parties have not been prosecuted. They argue that Lamichhane's real crime was that, as the home minister, he dared to investigate the financial conduct of powerful politicians from old parties.
Most notably, there were rumors that the home minister was looking into the possible involvement of Arzu Rana Deuba, wife of five-time Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, in a scam involving the sending of Nepali citizens to the U.S. in the guise of Bhutanese refugees.
With Lamichhane in jail since April, the RSP is now in the middle of a signature campaign to build public pressure for his release. The party claims to have collected over 2.5 million signatures to date.
The RSP appears determined to make the most of the jailing of Lamichhane, perhaps using the same controversy to rally voters in future elections. As with most populist forces around the world, Lamichhane's legal troubles do not seem to have decreased his support among his core voters, especially among the millions of Nepali migrant workers.
Disillusioned with old parties, many Nepalis also reject regressive forces like the now-abolished monarchy, which also partly explains the RSP's support. The question is: Can this party, centered on a personality cult and without a binding ideology, survive their leader's prolonged stint behind bars? (There are no signs that Lamichhane will be released anytime soon.)
The old parties and their old leaders face unprecedented scrutiny as people's yearning for change continues to grow. For their continued relevance, these parties must revitalize themselves by electing fresh leaders and come up with ideas that resonate with younger Nepalis. Otherwise they may be outmaneuvered even by a compromised populist like Rabi Lamichhane. He may be in jail, but the political vacuum that enabled his rise remains intact.
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The Diplomat
25-07-2025
- The Diplomat
Rabi Lamichhane, Nepal's Anti-system Star, Meets the System
Even by the colorful standards of Nepali politics, Rastriya Swatantra Party (RSP) Chair Rabi Lamichhane, 50, has led an eventful life. In the early 2000s, after dabbling in various radio and television roles in Nepal, he left the country in his early 20s to pursue higher studies in the United States. While in the U.S., he was reportedly involved in financial misconduct like tax evasion. Lamichhane returned to Nepal later that decade and joined a television network. In 2013, the ever-ambitious Lamichhane entered the Guinness Book of World Records by hosting the longest-broadcast talk show (his record has since been broken). After that, in 2016, he started a combative current affairs TV program that made him wildly popular, as he quickly mastered the art of dressing down senior politicians and bureaucrats live on camera. Then Lamichhane entered politics. Since founding his party, not a day has gone by without him being linked to this or that controversy – and now, he is in jail. Lamichhane founded the RSP just over three months before the November 2022 national elections. At its heart, the party is a one-man show, with populist slogans of anti-corruption and good governance as its central planks. Using his celebrity, Lamichhane tried to tap into the growing public antipathy toward Nepal's three major parties: the Nepali Congress, the Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist-Leninist (CPN-UML) and the CPN Maoist Center. For a party with no ideology or organizational structure, the RSP did remarkably well in its electoral debut, winning 20 seats in the 275-member national parliament in 2022. Its candidates, relatively young and picked from across the professions, came as a breath of fresh air against the old parties and their tried-and-tested leaders. Then, in December 2022, the RSP got into the government and Lamichhane became the deputy prime minister and home minister. But he soon had to give up the post after he was found to be neck-deep in a controversy over dual citizenship. The court stripped him of his parliamentarian status. Yet he bounced back to be re-elected from the same constituency in a by-election, this time with an even bigger mandate, and in March 2024 again became the deputy prime minister and home minister. There was more drama to follow. He lost his ministerial berth when the Pushpa Kamal Dahal government collapsed in July 2024, soon after which he was taken into custody. Lamichhane has been implicated in the embezzlement of millions of rupees from various cooperatives and pumping the money into a television station where he once served as the managing director. To his critics, the legal evidence against him is overwhelming, enough to end his compromised political career. To his supporters, this beacon of hope for the new generation is being framed so that the traditional parties can continue to rule. In their reckoning, even the judiciary is biased and serves the old guard. Lamichhane himself admits to making some errors of judgment but maintains that he was not involved in any organized effort to transfer cooperative funds into his media company's accounts. The public is divided as five courts have charged him across as many districts, and the Supreme Court has upheld his custody. His supporters point out how those who have committed similar crimes in big parties have not been prosecuted. They argue that Lamichhane's real crime was that, as the home minister, he dared to investigate the financial conduct of powerful politicians from old parties. Most notably, there were rumors that the home minister was looking into the possible involvement of Arzu Rana Deuba, wife of five-time Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba, in a scam involving the sending of Nepali citizens to the U.S. in the guise of Bhutanese refugees. With Lamichhane in jail since April, the RSP is now in the middle of a signature campaign to build public pressure for his release. The party claims to have collected over 2.5 million signatures to date. The RSP appears determined to make the most of the jailing of Lamichhane, perhaps using the same controversy to rally voters in future elections. As with most populist forces around the world, Lamichhane's legal troubles do not seem to have decreased his support among his core voters, especially among the millions of Nepali migrant workers. Disillusioned with old parties, many Nepalis also reject regressive forces like the now-abolished monarchy, which also partly explains the RSP's support. The question is: Can this party, centered on a personality cult and without a binding ideology, survive their leader's prolonged stint behind bars? (There are no signs that Lamichhane will be released anytime soon.) The old parties and their old leaders face unprecedented scrutiny as people's yearning for change continues to grow. For their continued relevance, these parties must revitalize themselves by electing fresh leaders and come up with ideas that resonate with younger Nepalis. Otherwise they may be outmaneuvered even by a compromised populist like Rabi Lamichhane. He may be in jail, but the political vacuum that enabled his rise remains intact.
The Diplomat
14-07-2025
- The Diplomat
Revival of Hindu Politics in Nepal: An Interview with Biswas Baral
This is the transcript of an interview conducted for the July episode of 'Beyond the Indus,' The Diplomat's South Asia-focused podcast. Tushar (Interviewer): Today, we're happy to be joined by Biswas Baral, the editor of the Kathmandu Post, Nepal's most widely read English daily. With over two decades of experience in Nepali journalism, Biswas frequently writes articles on Nepali politics and foreign policy for several international outlets, including The Diplomat. He also has a fascinating YouTube series called 'Idea of Nepal,' where he has wide-ranging discussions on Nepal's history, politics, economy, and foreign policy. He's perhaps the best person to talk to about the rise, or perhaps the revival, of Hindu politics in Nepal. Biswas, welcome to Beyond the Indus, and thank you so much for joining the podcast. Biswas Baral: Thank you so much, Tushar. It's lovely to be here. Tushar: Nepal was once the world's only official Hindu state, ruled over by a semi-divine monarch since, I suspect, the mid-18th century. That state of affairs lasted, not without change, but it did last until 2008 when a popular revolution ousted the last king, Gyanendra* Shah. Just to begin with, could you give our listeners a brief outline of the politics of Nepal under the monarchy and the transition and circumstances that led to its fall in 2008? Biswas Baral: When we talk about monarchy, its history begins in the mid-18th century when Prithvi Narayan* Shah founded modern-day Nepal. The kings were the main rulers under the Shahs* for nearly 100 years, and then they were not ousted but made secondary rulers by the Ranas*, who were a family of courtiers who took over executive powers. This happened in the mid-19th century, and this rule of a single family lasted for 104 years until it was overthrown in 1951. When the Rana rule ended in 1951, the king came back into the picture as the head of state and as a constitutional monarch. In 1951, when the king was restored and the Rana rule ended, he was restored with the promise that he would hold constituent assembly elections and hand over power to a democratic government. However, this could not happen for the next eight years until Nepal had its first parliamentary elections in 1959, whereupon a democratic government was brought in. But it lasted maybe a year and a half before the monarch took over again and started a one-party rule, which lasted until 1990. In 1990, there was a popular protest, and again, the era of active kingship ended and constitutional monarchy was restored. After that, in 1996, the Maoist insurgency started. The Maoists aimed to overthrow the democratically elected government and wanted to establish a dictatorship of the proletariat. Then you come to 2001, while the war against the Maoists was at its peak. The entire royal family was massacred. This is a very crucial point in the history of Nepali monarchy because when the royal family was massacred in 2001, the earlier king was much more popular and well-liked. The new king who came in his place, Gyanendra*, was always unpopular. He was known for his dubious ways. His son was involved in various crimes, including running over a popular Nepalese singer. They were extremely unpopular. When King Gyanendra* came to power in 2001, I think many people lost their faith in monarchy. That was the first big blow to the institution of monarchy in Nepal. Tushar: I just wonder if you could go into the detail of what exactly happened there, because was it someone from the royal family who did the massacre? Biswas Baral: Yes, the official version is that the Crown Prince gunned down his entire family. He was intoxicated and shot his entire family. Many Nepalis don't believe that version. They somehow think that Gyanendra* had something to do with it. But the official version is that the Crown Prince shot the entire family when he was intoxicated, supposedly because his family would not let him marry the woman of his choice. Tushar: I was wondering if you could give us an overview of the political transition from monarchy to secular democracy and the subsequent post-2008 politics of Nepal. Who are the major parties, which communities formed the base of support, and how has their performance been in terms of governance and stability? In your view, has the current political arrangement and the current parties lived up to their social contract that the Nepali people expected of them? Biswas Baral: Before I go to post-2008 politics, it's very important to cover the period between 2001 and 2008. Gyanendra* came to power and subsequently took over executive powers, dismissing the elected government. On one hand, the Maoist war was raging. On the other hand, he had alienated all the political parties. What happened is that the Maoists and these political parties came together and jointly launched a movement to remove the monarchy. By this time, the king had become extremely unpopular because he had suspended democratic rights and had jailed leaders and civil society members. The earliest suspicions people had about him were heightened. By the time he was removed in 2008, a major section of Nepalese believed that he was unfit for the role and somehow supported his removal. Now, there can be an argument that many people supported the removal of just King Gyanendra*, not the monarchy, but that's a debate which continues to this day. In 2006, the seven main political parties at the time and the Maoists signed an agreement in New Delhi whereby they agreed to elect a Constituent Assembly and whereby the Maoists would come back into mainstream politics. Kingship and monarchy were kept in deep freeze in 2006. After the Constituent Assembly election in 2008, when the Maoists and all the anti-monarchy forces came to the Constituent Assembly, they formally removed monarchy. The institution of monarchy was formally abolished in 2008. Since 2008, and actually since 1990 after the first political change, the two main political parties in Nepal are the Nepali Congress and the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), or CPN-UML*. After 2008, the Maoists also entered the scene. So right now, there are three main parties: the Nepali Congress, the CPN-UML*, and the Maoist Unified Center*. These three are the main political actors. Tushar: Where do they draw their basis of support? Is it similar to India, where you have certain castes and communities that tend to drift towards parties, or is there a different setup in Nepal? Biswas Baral: Right now, if you look at the support base of Nepali Congress, it's generally more liberal and believes in liberal values. The CPN-UML* is a Communist Party by name, but there's nothing communist about it. They have absolutely diluted whatever programs they had adopted. Even in the case of Maoists, the agendas they waged war with, they have step-by-step abandoned all those agendas. Initially, at least, the left parties like CPN-UML* and Maoists were the parties of the proletariat—the farmers, laborers, and low-wage earners—while Nepali Congress attracted those who didn't believe in communist values and thought the country could only be run by modern liberal values. But right now, I would say it's a mixed bag. I don't think there's a strict distinction, particularly between Nepali Congress and CPN-UML*. They have nationwide networks and do well throughout the country. In terms of Maoists, during the civil war, their main support came from the marginalized Hill communities. But even now, since they came into mainstream politics—it's been nearly two decades—they are indistinguishable from the other two political parties. People say there's absolutely no difference between these parties. They look similar, they sound similar, their leaders sound similar, and the same three leaders of these parties take turns as government head. There's no material or significant difference in their ideology or what they do. Maybe there's a big difference in what they espouse, but in terms of their practice, there's absolutely no difference between these three main political parties. Tushar: How would you evaluate their performance since 2008 in terms of delivering what the Nepali people expected of them? When the Constitution was formed, there were three founding principles: federalism, republicanism, and secularism. Was there an economic promise, or a promise to deliver certain growth? To what extent are the Nepali people satisfied that these three parties, in their different alliances and times in power, have delivered on those promises? Biswas Baral: I think Nepali people have been not at all satisfied. What we see post-2008 is that the monarchy was removed, but there's a popular saying that we removed one monarchy and now we have produced ten monarchs. All the political parties and political leaders are acting as owners. What happened is that the Nepali Congress, CPN-UML*, and the Maoists have basically come to power, and their leaders have become prime ministers by turn. It's purely person-centric politics. The government doesn't change because of ideology or because certain ideology wins in the elections. It's purely person-centric politics: How do I get to power? How do I monopolize it? How do I get to power and make enough money, develop enough resources, so that I can do even better in the next election? How do I distribute important government portfolios so that I can form a base which supports me at all times? Corruption is very high at all levels among the bureaucracy, in politics, and in political parties. When people see this, they question why they overthrew the monarchy because they thought the king was acting entitled and was jailing leaders. How are these leaders any different from him? Some are wondering if they made a mistake by throwing out the monarchy. This has given rise to some new political parties, for instance, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*, which emerged in the 2022 election with around 21-22 seats. Largely, the votes they got were a reflection of the unpopularity of the three main political parties. That said, the vast majority of parliament, both national and federal, are occupied by members from the two largest parties, with some filled by the Maoists. Other parties are still distant to these three parties, including the new ones. Tushar: I asked this question to establish context for our next question about the rise of Hindu politics, because I wonder to what extent this dissatisfaction with the current state of affairs is leading to this revival of Hindu politics. To what extent does the former king continue to have political support and influence in Nepal – are there sections of the population that want the monarchy restored? Is the rise of Hindu politics solely linked to the idea of restoration of the monarchy, or are there other factors behind this phenomenon? Biswas Baral: Like I said, people do not want the same three leaders. It's not even the three parties, but the three leaders who take turns to become Prime Minister. They are sick and tired of seeing the same faces come to power again and again, and they want change. Some opted for the new political party, the Rastriya Swatantra Party*. Some opted for independent candidates. But it's very curious and interesting because if you look at the two most recent general elections, first in 2017 and then in 2022, nearly 95% of the seats in the most recent election went to pro-republican forces or those who don't support monarchy. In the election, just 5% of the votes went to avowedly pro-monarchy parties. If that is the barometer, then monarchy still has very little support. Another thing is that even if you look at the most recent pro-monarchy protests, there are not that many people—2,000, 3,000, maximum 5,000. Whereas at the height of the anti-monarchy protests in 2006, which removed monarchy, there were easily up to a million people coming out in the streets. You don't see that level of support. It seems that monarchy has a lot of support on social media or online to international observers, but when it comes to people coming out on the ground, you don't see that kind of support. There's a mismatch between what we're seeing. This year, there were student elections, and the pro-monarchy parties were absolutely nowhere in the scene. So where is the support for monarchy? How do we calculate the support? Is it the number of people coming out in the streets? Not many people are coming out. Is it the votes they're getting? They're just getting 5% of the votes. It seems that people are dissatisfied with the current political setup and current political parties, but they don't trust the monarchy as yet. They don't think the future of the country lies with monarchy. There is some nostalgia about monarchy among youngsters, particularly those who came of age after it was removed, but this nostalgia is not translated into support in terms of protesting or voting in favor of monarchy. To international observers, it looks like monarchy is on the brink of coming back, but that's not happening. Tushar: I'm reminded of the rise of the BJP in the 1980s in India and how they piggybacked on an issue—the Ram Janmabhoomi* issue and eventually the Babri Masjid* destruction—that catapulted them to power in the 1990s. What issues do Hindu political parties in Nepal campaign on – are there specific social or economic issues? Is the king involved in this at all – has he become a rallying figure of sorts? Biswas Baral: The king's involvement could clearly be seen in the most recent pro-monarchy protests, which unfortunately turned violent. In one protest, two people were killed. The problem was that if the king has new supporters and his support base is growing, then he should have relied on new faces to lead the movement. But who's leading the pro-monarchy movement this time? It's all old faces. The commander of the movement was about 80 years old. These are all old faces at the forefront of recent pro-monarchy protests. When you talk about the factors fuelling the rise of pro-monarchy parties, there's just one pro-monarchy party that has any kind of presence in Nepal. It's the fifth-largest force in parliament, but even that is small—like I said, 5% of the total votes. When you're saying 'rise of pro-monarchy parties,' what does that actually mean? You don't see that in the elections. I don't know what will happen in the next election, but even in by-elections after 2022, no pro-monarchy party is anywhere in the scene. Again, my question is: How do you judge the popularity of monarchy? How do you say that monarchy is gaining more and more support? Yes, you see that on social media, but is that translated on the street? No. Is that translated in the ballot box? No, at least not until now. Right now, this campaign for the restoration of monarchy, even in the last month, is dying down. It's not picking up steam at all. Tushar: Maybe we can broaden from the pro-monarchy specifically to Hindu politics generally. To what extent is a rise in Hindu politics influenced or linked to the rise in Hindutva* ideas and the BJP that we're seeing on the other side of the border in India? Biswas Baral: When we talk about Hindu politics, it's very interesting because two of our three big parties are communist parties. Their leaders are supposedly atheists who don't believe in any religion. But what has happened is that since the rise of the BJP in India, when the political parties and political leaders here saw the allure of Hinduism and a Hindu agenda in India, they suddenly started visiting temples—even communist parties, even the leader of the Maoist party who went to war to establish a secular republic. Nearly 17,000 people died in the process to establish a secular republic, and now they want to be seen as not atheist. They want to be seen by India, particularly, that they believe in Hindu religion. This happens because it's very difficult, given our geopolitics and our precarious situation whereby we are surrounded on three sides by India, and given our large dependence on India trade-wise, for a Nepali Prime Minister to operate and continue in office for any length of time without some support from New Delhi. New Delhi has a lot of leverage in Kathmandu*. Even for that purpose, even the supposedly atheist leaders show off by going to Pashupatinath* or even Indian temples. Even Prachanda*, the leader of the Maoists, when he goes to India, visits temples there. In a way, they have all adopted this approach. The Nepali Congress, the biggest political party, has always had a very ambivalent stand on Hinduism. There's a strong pro-Hindu voice inside the party, and there's a strong Hindu voice in all the major political parties. The support for the restoration of a Hindu state is much bigger than the support for the restoration of monarchy. Those two are not synonymous because support for one is clearly more than support for the other. Coming back to the BJP, I don't think the BJP is directly involved in what's happening. It's more the RSS itself, which has branches in Nepal and supports various pro-monarchy activities in Nepal. That is much more active. Another thing is that we have an open border, so whatever politics is happening in Bihar* or Uttar Pradesh* easily spills over into Nepal. What we see, at least in the Tarai* Belt adjoining India, which is nearly a third of Nepal's territory, is that there has been a shift in terms of visibility of religion. The Hindus suddenly feel they need to show off their religion. They need to go out on streets and organize big rallies. Earlier, you didn't see that. Earlier, the kind of Hinduism practiced in Nepal was done inside the puja ghar*, the small room in your house. They didn't feel the need to go out and assert themselves. That is a very troubling sign because, for the first time in our history, there have been reports of Hindu-Muslim clashes from some of the areas bordering India. We find this extremely troubling. Our political leaders especially make a show of being religious, being Hindu, to please certain constituencies in India. There is a level of support for a Hindu state because many people believe that Nepal was declared a secular republic at the behest of Westerners because they wanted to spread Christianity. Christianity has spread very rapidly in the past, and that only adds to the argument. There is some influence from what's happening in India, and I also see the possibility of this Hindu state agenda gaining ground among the mainstream political parties. They somehow feel that the pro-monarchy party, like the Rastriya Prajatantra Party*, is bidding for public support through their pro-Hindu agenda—not just pro-monarchy, but also pro-Hindu state. Many in the mainstream political parties are thinking they need to attract this sizable conservative constituency, or if it gets out of hand, they'll suffer electorally. So there's a debate in all the political parties about whether they should embrace a Hindu state. One very curious thing I must add is that Nepal is a secular republic right now, but we have a very curious definition of secularism. Even our constitution states that Nepal is a secular republic, but all the ancient cultures and all the religions that have been practiced from ancient times, Sanatan Dharma*, will be preserved. Many people say we are already a de facto Hindu state because conversion is prohibited. Our constitution prohibits conversion, so it's a criminal offense. Many people are saying we are already a de facto Hindu state, so what's the harm in now officially adopting a Hindu state? On the other hand, critics say we are already giving priority to our traditions and cultures, we are protecting Sanatan Dharma*, so what's the need to now declare a Hindu state? Many people are not aware that our definition of secularism is very qualified. Tushar: It's interesting how secularism as it manifests in South Asia differs from the traditional Western conception, or the French conception of laïcité*, where the state separates itself completely from all religions. I do want to ask about the foreign policy implications of this, starting from Nepal's largest trading partner and big neighbour, India. India and Nepal have had a mixed relationship at best. In 2015, we saw the devastating blockade that happened in the Tarai* region of Nepal, and I think India cooperated in blockading Nepal, which strained relations considerably. I wonder how this rise of Hindu politics interacts with nationalistic sentiments within Nepal that perhaps may be directed against India. Are we seeing a more positive relationship or feeling towards India because of this rise of Hindu politics? Biswas Baral: I would say the general perception of Nepalese towards India is not influenced by Hinduism or any other religion. Historically, Nepalese think of themselves as the only state in South Asia that has never been colonized, unlike India. So we are a very proud people. Another thing is that, being surrounded by India on three sides and being so dependent on India for everything, we feel this need to assert ourselves, otherwise we'll be lost. A sense of this Nepaliness, at least among the people of the Hills especially, comes from being not Indian. Even our founder, Prithvi Narayan Shah*, defined Nepal as the Asli Hindustan*—the real home of Hindus—by which he meant that India is not the real Hindustan*. Even in religious matters and cultural matters, the Nepali psyche and mentality is to differentiate ourselves from India. For instance, the current Prime Minister claims that Lord Ram* was not born in India but was born in Nepal. They are looking to appropriate Indian religion because they want to show that we are the true cradle of Hinduism, not India. Another thing is that in 2015, one big reason for the blockade was that India did not want Nepal to become a secular state, which has been borne out by later books and scholarly works of various organizations and individuals who were active at the time. After Nepal became a secular state, I don't think the BJP as a political party itself is so interested in turning Nepal back into a Hindu state. It's much more organizations like the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh* (RSS), which is very active here. This rise of Hindu politics would not have much effect on our relations with India and similarly would not have much effect on our relations with China. Many Nepalese, practicing Hindus and devout Hindus, are perfectly happy with the idea of cultivating the Chinese as a counterweight to India. Even if we have similar religion, similar traditions and cultures, there's this need to assert the Nepali identity—a very strong need to assert the Nepali identity. Historical factors and cultural factors that go much beyond religion are responsible for Nepal-India ties. For instance, we have an open border, people marry across the border. It's a very multifaceted relationship, and I don't think Hindu politics will have very limited impact, even when it comes to pro-monarchy politics. No political party in Nepal can come to power and be anti-Indian. That's just not possible because India will find a way to punish it. We have seen that historically too. A government that is overtly anti-India—for instance, the first government of Prachanda* when he came above ground and his political party emerged the biggest in the 2008 election—he had formed the government, but he took such a strong anti-India line that India played an instrumental role in removing him from power. There were other secondary issues, but without India's backing, he would not have been removed. Even the current political leader, for instance, K.P. Sharma Oli*, is known as China's man in New Delhi, but even he has been trying very hard in the last few years to reach out to India. He has been trying very hard to get an official invite to India, which has not been possible to date, but I hear that he could be visiting India soon. Tushar: That's fascinating, and I was particularly interested in the part where the RSS is influencing cultural activities. Could you maybe just explain very briefly how the RSS is doing this? Biswas Baral: The RSS has branches in Nepal, especially in the Tarai*. It supports religious activities here and has also played some role in making Hinduism, the brand of Hinduism, more like what Hindutva* is doing in India. Given our cultural similarities, the RSS finds it very easy to operate in Nepal, especially in the Tarai* Belt, which adjoins India. It continues to play a very subtle, very behind-the-scenes, but very important role in the so-called preservation of Hindu culture and tradition and in opposing proselytization and Christianization in Nepal. Tushar: Biswas, thank you so much. That was a very interesting interview. Biswas Baral: Amazing talking to you. Thank you for having me. Note: Names and terms marked with asterisks have been corrected from the original transcript based on context and standard spellings.*
The Diplomat
08-07-2025
- The Diplomat
Why the MCC's Continuation is in the Interest of Nepal — and the US
After putting MCC projects on hold in January this year, the Trump administration recently said that its projects in Nepal would go ahead. The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an American bilateral foreign aid agency, has been mired in controversy in Nepal since the get-go. It signed a $500 million compact with Nepal in September 2017. Proposed projects aimed to maintain road quality, increase the availability and reliability of electricity, and facilitate cross-border electricity trade between Nepal and India, which in turn would 'spur investments, accelerate economic growth, and reduce poverty.' As part of the deal, besides the $500 million the Americans were giving, Nepal would pitch in $197 million for the completion of the MCC projects. The projects ran into controversy after senior American officials started linking them to the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), an American military construct designed to curtail China's rise. The common sentiment was that Nepal should not be a part of any military or strategic pact, especially one that harms its relations with China, the large neighbor to the north. Early in 2022, senior American officials like the MCC's then-Vice President Fatema Z. Sumar and the then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Donald Lu threatened Nepal's political leadership that the failure to ratify the MCC on time could lead to a 'review' of America's ties with Nepal. The compact's stipulation that future disputes in the projects would be settled in line with the compact's provisions — and not Nepal's domestic laws — also irked Nepalis. At the height of the MCC disputes in 2022, Nepali political leaders, especially senior hands in the country's largest party, the Nepali Congress, strongly backed the MCC projects, even when it was not a popular thing to do. Many left-leaning leaders, too, lent their tacit support to the compact — provided it was amended before parliamentary ratification. Eventually, a middle way was found: Nepal's parliament would ratify the compact while also passing an accompanying 'interpretative declaration.' Among other things, the declaration clarified that the compact's endorsement did not mean Nepal will be 'a part of any United States' strategy, military or security alliance including the Indo-Pacific Strategy.' And in case of disputes, the Constitution of Nepal would prevail over the compact. The ratification came at the end of 2022, and the Americans accepted the interpretative declaration, clearing the way for project implementation. Nepal's interests had been secured and the country had locked in an advantageous deal. First, the MCC projects would be built on grants, thus creating no additional liability on the Nepali state. Second, its time-bound nature would be a breath of fresh air in a country where vital infrastructure projects tend to be delayed by years or even decades. Third, as the power lines being built with American money would be used to take Nepal's excess energy to India, it would help Nepal realize its old dream of prospering through the export of its electricity. Then, Donald Trump came to power in January 2025 and declared that all American aid projects, including the MCC, had been put on hold. This created confusion in Nepal as it was unclear whether the funds for Nepal would be exempted. In fact, the common belief was that the Nepal compact was dead and buried — even though it had been signed during Trump's first term as U.S. president. Nepal's liberal-minded politicians had staked their careers and credibility to push for the compact's ratification—and now the Americans were seemingly backing out. Pulling the plug on the compact would thus have made it difficult for the Nepali political class to endorse any future American project or funding. Amid this uncertainty, in the middle of June, the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu announced that Nepal had been exempted from budget cuts and the MCC projects were still scheduled for completion by their original August 2028 deadline. The announcement was timely. The projects' cancellation would have damaged bilateral ties and harmed Nepal's interests. The U.S. helps balance the oft-overwhelming influence of India and China, Nepal's two big (and only) neighbors, which is why the U.S. is often called Nepal's 'sky' or 'third' neighbor. When India blockaded landlocked Nepal in 2015-16, the United States consistently highlighted the resulting hardships of Nepali people, helping build international pressure on India to quickly lift the embargo. Even for the United States, reneging on the compact would have backfired. (It still could if Trump changes his mind again.) If their goal is to check China's rise in the region, it can only be done by winning the confidence of smaller countries like Nepal and helping them in their development endeavors. The lofty democratic ideals American officials like to emphasize tend to grate when not backed by such solid support. Of late, the U.S. has taken some dubious decisions like the suspension of visa interviews for Nepali students wanting to study in the U.S., and shutting down the USAID that was supporting key health initiatives in Nepal. But the continuity of the MCC projects suggests the Americans are not 'abandoning' Nepal. Even more importantly for Nepalis, the MCC's presence in Nepal undercuts the 'foreign policy myth' that the U.S. views Nepal through Indian lens.
