China is world leader in drones, Pakistan a peer. India must prioritise UAS to keep up

The Print

3 days ago

UAS now dominate the air littoral —the new subdomain of airspace between traditional ground forces and fighter aircraft flying at an altitude of several thousand meters. And it is the control and domination of the air littoral, where UAS and counter-UAS (C-UAS) systems battle for supremacy, which will determine the outcome of future wars. Advances in drone technology have been so rapid that even the US, the world leader in military technology, has been left behind. It has recently begun a radical transformation to adopt and adapt to drone warfare.
In fact, for nearly 60 hours , it was the Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) which dominated the conflict. Consequently, some analysts called the conflict the ' first drone war ' of the subcontinent. However, critical evaluation indicates that the effectiveness of the UAS was below their potential, reflecting flawed doctrine and tactics as well as a lack of quality and quantity.
Operation Sindoor is universally acknowledged as the first modern air war with standoff air-to-air/ground missiles between rivals with peer technological capability. However, during the 88-hour conflict , air power was predominant for only a few hours during the Indian Air Force's strikes on terrorist hubs and the air battle that followed on the night of 6-7 May. And on the night of 9-10 May, when it targeted Pakistan's air bases, radars, and command and control infrastructure to deliver the coup de grâce.
The 'affordable by all' UAS should logically be the weapon of choice for India, a developing power. China is universally acknowledged as a world leader in drones, and Pakistan is a peer competitor. Indian military needs to make UAS an intrinsic part of its transformation, and it must do this fast.
Drone warfare in Op Sindoor
While surveillance and reconnaissance UAS have been used by India and Pakistan for 25 years, the exploitation of armed UAS began only five years ago. Surprisingly, and for inexplicable reasons, it still remains at a nascent stage of evolution. Both nations seem to be obsessed with high-cost legacy weapon systems and have failed to appreciate the impact of the most cost-effective technological innovation in modern warfare since the advent of the aircraft and tanks.
Pakistan employed drones en masse but lacked the class or minimum essential quality that makes them effective. During the conflict, it launched about 600 drones in total, on 15 locations on the first night, and on 36 and 26 locations across the western front on the second and third nights, respectively. The enemy drones targeted air defence systems, radars, forward airfields, ammunition dumps, and other defence installations.
As per my assessment, only about 100-125 of these drones were armed short/medium range UAS procured from China and Turkey. The rest were indigenous low-end unarmed rudimentary decoy drones, to locate and saturate air defence systems, and for psychological impact. Over 98 per cent of the drones were neutralised with electronic jammers or destroyed by the air defence/composite anti-UAS system of India's Integrated Air Defence Command and Control System. The two per cent that got through caused minimal damage due to a lack of accuracy. It is clear that most of the drones were using basic technology and could not evade or saturate C-UAS/air defence systems. Meanwhile, India used 1,000 AD gun systems and 750 short and medium-range air defence missile systems. One can only imagine the cost of the expensive ammunition/missiles.
Indian drone strikes had class, but lacked the mass essential for large-scale destruction. As per my assessment, India used approximately 150 drones of various types. According to Pakistan, IAF used approximately 70-80 Israeli Harpy and Harop UAS for the suppression and destruction of enemy air defence. About 60-70 per cent of these drones were intercepted, and the rest were on target. At least one HQ 9 air defence system and two major radars were confirmed as destroyed.
Indian UAS were sophisticated; however, their numbers were inadequate for the scale of the mission. India also used the army's Warmate (Poland), SkyStriker (Israel), and Nagastra (India) tactical drones to target seven out of nine terrorist hubs and some other targets. Drones were also used as decoys and for suppression/destruction of air defence system before the IAF's deep strikes on 10 May. A limited number of indigenous tactical drones were also used on tactical targets, most of which were intercepted by enemy air defence. It is pertinent to mention that each Harop drone costs $ 700,000. With advances in cheap technology, Ukraine and Russia produce similar UAS at 25 percent of the cost.
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Cost-effective mass
Imagine a scenario in which either India or Pakistan had a drone mass with class. Drones would have dominated the air littoral space and saturated/destroyed the air defence systems, while fighter aircraft operating at higher altitudes would have targeted high-value targets and enemy aircraft. Medium/long-range drones would also have been utilised to attack ground targets and even AEW&C aircraft. In fact, 'drones only' operations at tactical/operational/strategic levels are in the realm of reality, as Ukraine has been practising on land and sea the absence of a viable air force and navy. In addition, in standalone mode or in combination with the operations above, special forces or proxies would have been utilised for drone attacks on high-value targets and assassinations in enemy territory. The scope is endless.
The possibilities listed above are not fantasy, but technologically and economically doable. More so, when defence budgets cannot increase exponentially to invest in sophisticated weapon systems. In the first year of the Russia-Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, both sides used drones, which were as expensive as legacy weapon systems. These were effective, but soon became unaffordable as the war prolonged. This led to a technological drone revolution to evolve tactical and long-range drones that cost a fraction of the legacy drones.
The scale of drones being used today is mind-boggling. Russia plans to produce 2 million first-person-view (FPV) drones, while Ukraine is gearing up to purchase 4.5 million. FPV tactical drones, capable of destroying all types of targets in the combat zone with a range of up to 30 km, now cost only $300-500. The cost increases progressively for sophisticated drones to target high-value targets at longer ranges of up to 1,000 km. Priced at $50,000 to $300,000 depending upon the degree of sophistication, they're still quite affordable, costing ten times less than a missile with a similar range. Each side plans to produce 30,000 long-range drones. UAS now account for 70-80 per cent of all casualties to soldiers and destruction of material/weapon system targets in the Russia-Ukraine war.
In comparison, the cost of high-technology legacy weapon systems is outrageous. One 155 mm gun costs $2-4 million and each ordinary shell costs at least $3,000-5,000. A modern tank costs up to $5-10 million and an ICV, $3-4 million. A modern fighter aircraft costs $100-125 million. A shoulder-fired Javelin ATGM control unit costs about $250,000 and each replacement missile, over $200,000. India's 31 HQ 9B Predator deal will cost $3.5-4 billion. An Apache attack helicopter costs at least $100 million.
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India's way forward
There should be no doubt that cheap, precise, ubiquitous, and disposable UAS are dominating the modern battlefield and threatening the supremacy of the ultra-expensive weapon platforms such as tanks, artillery, attack helicopters, and fighter aircraft. However, their effectiveness is fast becoming relative due to an array of passive and active countermeasures and adaptive combined arms tactics. Fully autonomous swarm drones capable of en masse engagement of multiple targets are nowhere on the horizon. At this juncture, their impact on the battlefield is still evolutionary rather than revolutionary.
Keeping this in mind, the Indian Armed Forces need to formalise their doctrine for drone warfare and make it an intrinsic part of their ongoing transformation. At the macro level, serious consideration should be given to the creation of a tri-service integrated command for the strategic employment of relatively costly long-range drones, including operations by special forces/proxies. At the theatre level, integrated organisations for theatre–level employment needs to be created. There would also be a requirement of service–specific tactical organisations. Kinetic and non-kinetic C-UAS organisations must become an intrinsic part of the Integrated Air Defence Command and Control. In the army, a specific drone arm must become part of combined arms.
India already has a viable drone industry, and the technology is evolving every day. The concept-to-combat use time for drones must be reduced to no more than six months. The procurement of high-technology legacy weapon systems must be reviewed. Why spend $200,000 on a Javelin missile to get a tank kill when it can be done using a $300-500 FPV drone? In the era of drones, what use does a $100 million Apache attack helicopter have?
India must earmark a specific annual budget for the development of UAS. A minimum annual drone budget of $2 billion can fill the current void, and $5 billion can make us a major drone power.
The Russia-Ukraine war has given the world a ringside view of the evolution, scale, and scope of drone warfare. Operation Sindoor was only a micro version of it. I predict that India's next conflict with China or Pakistan will be dominated by drone warfare, and the armed forces must not be found wanting.
Lt Gen H S Panag PVSM, AVSM (R) served in the Indian Army for 40 years. He was GOC in C Northern Command and Central Command. Post retirement, he was Member of Armed Forces Tribunal. Views are personal.
(Edited by Prasanna Bachchhav)