Trump says Zelensky can end war ‘almost immediately' but Crimea, Nato off limits
Ukraine can end the war with Russia almost immediately, if he wants to, or he can continue to fight,' Trump posted on his Truth Social platform late on Sunday.
'No getting back Obama given Crimea (12 years ago, without a shot being fired!), and NO GOING INTO NATO BY UKRAINE. Some things never change!!!' he added.
Trump's post comes as he hosts the Ukrainian president and
European leaders in the White House on Monday.
Upon his arrival in Washington late on Sunday, Zelensky said that he hoped that Ukraine's 'shared strength' with the US and European counterparts would compel Russia to peace.
'I am grateful to the President of the United States for the invitation. We all equally want to end this war swiftly and reliably,' he said on the Telegram messaging app.
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India viewed these agreements as partnerships of equals, expecting to bolster its ability to deter China. In reality, the US used them to tether India to its geopolitical framework, eroding its autonomy while offering minimal strategic benefits. The US employed a multifaceted approach to draw India into its orbit. First, it positioned India as a 'major strategic partner' in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia), framing India as a bulwark against China. Second, it dangled advanced defense technologies– drones, missile systems, and military hardware – as bait. Third, the US promised economic support through trade deals and investment opportunities. Diplomatic gestures, such as inviting Indian leaders to the US and leveraging the influential Indian diaspora, further sweetened the deal. These moves made the partnership appear attractive, but India failed to see the underlying agenda of control. India's strategic missteps began with a misreading of globalization trends since 2014. The net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing nations to the US surpassed US outflows, signaling a reversal of globalization. Yet, India clung to the belief that Western-led globalization persisted during Trump's first term (2017–2021), despite his deglobalization policies, such as high tariffs. The Biden administration (2021–2025) pursued partial re-globalization through subsidies and a 'bring manufacturing back to America' policy, but its 'friendshoring' strategy excluded India, favoring allies like Japan and South Korea. Trump's return in 2025 doubled down on deglobalization, catching India off guard. India expected preferential access to US markets, akin to China's privileges in the 1990s via WTO entry and trade concessions. Instead, the US revoked India's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status in 2019, dealing a blow to Indian exports. 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The Kazan meeting between Modi and Xi appears to have created space for tentative re-engagement and a recalibration of ties. Moves were afoot even before Trump's tariff tantrum toward India. In June, India's defense minister and national security advisor visited China, followed by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar's trip to Beijing in July. That bilateral momentum will build when China hosts and Modi attends the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin this month. Significantly, it will mark the first time Modi has traveled to China since 2018. Still, calling this a full China-India 'reset' might overstate the reality while deep-seated mistrust lingers. What's unfolding is better seen as a cautious inclination toward cooperation in sectors where both nations see mutual benefit — and strategic necessity — in easing tensions amid a turbulent global landscape shaped by Trump's tariff-induced trade frictions and rising geopolitical uncertainty. Wang's inability to meet Modi in March 2022 symbolized the frost between the two sides at the time. But much has changed since. China has recently eased curbs on exports of fertilizers, rare earth minerals, magnets and tunnel-boring machines — all vital inputs for India's manufacturing and infrastructure sectors. India, in turn, has relaxed visa policies for Chinese nationals, reopened limited border trade and begun engaging with select Chinese firms to secure supply chain components needed for its domestic production goals. New Delhi's push for 'Make in India' manufacturing self-reliance depends, in part, on access to Chinese industrial inputs. Beijing, meanwhile, may see an opportunity to leverage tensions in India's ties with the US, aiming to tilt New Delhi away from Washington and reinvigorate the Russia–India–China strategic triangle. This pragmatism reflects mutual recognition of tactical and strategic leverage points. Indian establishment voices in policymaking circles have increasingly urged joint ventures with Chinese firms that hold dominant global positions in manufacturing and supply chains. To be sure, the bilateral thaw is delicate and tentative. Symbolic gestures — resuming direct flights, reopening the Kailash–Mansarovar pilgrimage and loosening investment restrictions — suggest movement toward normalized ties. Yet key irritants persist, including lack of data-sharing on Himalayan rivers, the unresolved issue of the Dalai Lama's reincarnation and, perhaps most crucially, China's strategic axis with Pakistan. While both sides speak of stabilizing borders and how the Xi-Modi meeting last year in Kazan created a 'new environment' for diplomacy, their disputed 3,488-kilometer border means the peace is still fragile and tentative. For India, Modi's Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) vision is a key driver. Unlike past Soviet-style licensed production, India today seeks technology transfers to build its manufacturing base. But Chinese companies, like others, will tightly control how much technology crosses borders — and under what conditions. Some joint initiatives are emerging, but asymmetry in economic and technological power remains. India, for its part, wants to diversify its technology and investment sources without becoming overly dependent on either China or the US. And while Beijing may seek to prevent India from drifting too far into US-led geopolitical and supply chain initiatives, their diplomatic-economic-strategic balancing act remains delicate. India continues to see China's close relationship with Pakistan as a limiting factor in bilateral ties. China supplies more than 80% of Pakistan's defense imports and offered intelligence support, including live inputs, during recent India–Pakistan clashes. Wang's scheduled trip to Islamabad after New Delhi — to co-chair the sixth Pakistan–China Strategic Dialogue and review the status of the Belt and Road Initiative-driven China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)— underscored this reality. New Delhi also recognizes that Beijing may quietly welcome the recent and significant strain in US–India relations. Despite foundational defense agreements and the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET), Washington remains hesitant to share advanced technologies with India. The Trump administration's renewed protectionist measures, not least his 50% punitive tariff on India over its purchase of sanctioned Russian oil, have made top-tier US tech-sharing even less likely. Wang put the dispute in a broader global context, warning that the world faces 'a once-in-a-century transformation at an accelerating pace,' and must resist 'bullying' tactics — a not-so-veiled critique of Washington that aimed to pull India more deeply into the expanding BRICS bloc of middle powers. Jaishankar echoed a shared call for 'reformed multilateralism,' positioning India and China as powers aligned on global governance, even as their bilateral irritants remain unresolved. Wang's meeting with Modi also laid the diplomatic groundwork for the Indian leader's upcoming China visit, marking perhaps the most consequential upshot of the Chinese envoy's visit. Symbolism — resumed flights, pilgrimage access and border calm — may help restore public perceptions of China-India normalcy. Substantive issues — minerals, joint ventures and tech transfer — will likely evolve more cautiously. Still, this week's diplomacy showed that, despite rivalry, both nations are exploring ways to coexist and cooperate in the fractured global order driven by Trump-era tariffs and 'America First' nationalism. It's for now a modest ambition, but in today's world, modesty itself is an achievement.
