India's misreading of America's intent and capacity
Some analysts speculate that Trump's ire stems from Modi's lack of support during the 2024 US presidential election. Others argue that Trump is punishing Modi for publicly dismissing his efforts to avert an India-Pakistan conflict. These are mere symptoms; the root causes lie elsewhere.
India's fundamental misreading of America's intentions and its capacity to constrain India has led to a complex and strained relationship. This article examines the consequences of India's misjudgment, focusing on America's strategic partnerships, agreements and India's flawed assumptions about US motives.
Since the Cold War, India-US relations have been a rollercoaster. After gaining independence in 1947, India was seen by the US as a democratic partner, but its non-aligned stance and proximity to the Soviet Union created a rift.
The 1990s marked a turning point, with a new chapter of strategic partnership emerging in the 2000s. The US sought to position India as a counterweight to China in the Indo-Pacific, but this partnership was not one of equals – it was driven by American interests. India, however, misjudged the US's long-term strategy, viewing it as a benevolent ally rather than a power seeking influence over its autonomy.
A series of agreements solidified the India-US strategic partnership but also revealed America's intent to bind India to its geopolitical agenda. Below is a chronological overview of these agreements and their implications:
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Exemption, 2005: The US facilitated India's exemption from NSG restrictions, enabling access to nuclear technology and fuel. While presenting this as support for India's energy needs, the US expected access for its companies to India's nuclear market.
Impact: India advanced its nuclear energy sector but paid a premium for outdated US technology compared with cheaper, fourth-generation Russian and Chinese alternatives, compromising cost-effectiveness.
India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, 2008: This deal integrated India into global nuclear trade, ostensibly bolstering energy security. However, it allowed US defense and technology firms to penetrate India's market, subtly curbing India's strategic autonomy.
Impact: India gained energy security but became entangled in US commercial and strategic interests.
Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), 2016: This agreement enabled logistical cooperation between the two nations' militaries, positioning India as a key US partner in the Indo-Pacific.
Impact: Indian strategists and politicians thought that India's military capabilities grew, but the US gained leverage over India's defense strategy, with no tangible deterrence against China. For example, the Doklam standoff depicts this fact.
Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), 2018: This provided India access to advanced US defense technology, but with the intent of fostering dependence on American systems.
Impact: Indian planners believed that they acquired cutting-edge technology but at the cost of increased reliance on the US, limiting its independence.
Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), 2020: This facilitated geospatial intelligence sharing, aligning India closer to US anti-China strategies.
Impact: Indian strategists believed it strengthened its ability to counter China, but events like India's Operation Sindoor against Pakistan revealed no strategic gains, only deeper US influence over India's regional policies.
India viewed these agreements as partnerships of equals, expecting to bolster its ability to deter China. In reality, the US used them to tether India to its geopolitical framework, eroding its autonomy while offering minimal strategic benefits.
The US employed a multifaceted approach to draw India into its orbit. First, it positioned India as a 'major strategic partner' in the Indo-Pacific through the Quad (US, India, Japan, Australia), framing India as a bulwark against China.
Second, it dangled advanced defense technologies– drones, missile systems, and military hardware – as bait.
Third, the US promised economic support through trade deals and investment opportunities. Diplomatic gestures, such as inviting Indian leaders to the US and leveraging the influential Indian diaspora, further sweetened the deal.
These moves made the partnership appear attractive, but India failed to see the underlying agenda of control.
India's strategic missteps began with a misreading of globalization trends since 2014.
The net flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) from developing nations to the US surpassed US outflows, signaling a reversal of globalization. Yet, India clung to the belief that Western-led globalization persisted during Trump's first term (2017–2021), despite his deglobalization policies, such as high tariffs.
The Biden administration (2021–2025) pursued partial re-globalization through subsidies and a 'bring manufacturing back to America' policy, but its 'friendshoring' strategy excluded India, favoring allies like Japan and South Korea.
Trump's return in 2025 doubled down on deglobalization, catching India off guard. India expected preferential access to US markets, akin to China's privileges in the 1990s via WTO entry and trade concessions. Instead, the US revoked India's Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) status in 2019, dealing a blow to Indian exports.
This exposed India's naivety in viewing the US as an economic partner rather than a power seeking to subordinate India to its strategic goals. The resulting trade tensions and diplomatic friction underscored India's miscalculation.
Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar once argued that India's 'the West is a bad guy' syndrome needed to change, believing a US partnership served India's interests. This was a delusion.
The US aimed to sever India's cooperation with China, a strategy that gained traction after Jaishankar became Foreign Secretary in 2015. India-China relations deteriorated, escalating from the 2016 Doklam standoff to the 2020 Galwan clash, which pushed bilateral ties to a historic low.
The US used India to counter China in the short and medium term but planned to contain India in the long term.
When the Quad failed to restrain China, the US turned its pressure on India, criticizing its oil purchases and defense deals with Russia. India's failure to recognize this dual strategy left it geopolitically and economically vulnerable, squandering resources on an avoidable confrontation with China.
Unlike China, India has shown a glaring inability to employ strategic deception. China masterfully uses initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative to create economic dependencies while masking its geopolitical ambitions through diplomatic finesse. India, by contrast, has been outmaneuvered, treating US partnerships as equitable while failing to safeguard its autonomy.
China's ability to anticipate and counter US strategies has kept it ahead in the geopolitical game, while India's trust in American goodwill has left it exposed.
India's misjudgments have exacted a heavy toll. Economically, the US offered no concessions, instead imposing trade barriers such as the Generalized System of Preference withdrawal and high tariffs.
Strategically, India's reliance on US defense systems weakened its autonomy without delivering the anticipated deterrence against China. Diplomatically, the souring of India-China relations destabilized the region, diverting India's priority and squandered resources to a futile rivalry.
India's naivety – or outright strategic blunder – in misreading US intentions has left it in a precarious position, used as a pawn in America's Indo-Pacific strategy while facing long-term containment.
India now finds itself in a bind, unable to fully embrace or abandon its US partnership. This relationship resembles an oversized suitcase without a handle – too heavy to carry, too valuable to leave behind.
India's missteps have squandered time and resources, leaving it geopolitically isolated and economically strained. To recover, India must recalibrate its strategy, prioritizing autonomy and a balanced approach to global powers. Only by learning from its past mistakes can India navigate this treacherous landscape and safeguard its national interests in the days to come.
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