CSS top scorer says denied group of his choice
In a letter addressed to President Asif Ali Zardari seeking justice, Mithani stated that despite securing the highest position, he was assigned to Pakistan Audit and Accounts Service instead of his first-choice group. He said that topping the exam while representing Larkana district and Sindh the homeland of Shaheed Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Shaheed Benazir Bhutto was a matter of immense pride for him.
Mithani has appealed for fair treatment, urging authorities to rectify what he perceives as an unjust allocation.
Per rule, the high-scorers are allowed to choose the group they want to join, the rest of the successful candidates are assigned groups like Foreign Affairs, Administrative Services, Police, Customs, Accounts and Audit, Railways, and such by the Federal Public Service Commission.
Per available data, in 2023, the regular CSS exam in Pakistan saw 28,024 applications. However, only 13,008 candidates actually took the written exam. Out of these, a mere 401 passed, and ultimately, 210 were recommended for positions, resulting in a 2.96% success rate for those who appeared in the written stage.
Additionally, a Special CSS Examination was held in the same year. This exam received 21,947 applications, with 15,245 candidates participating in the written portion. Following this stage, 519 candidates passed, and after all assessments, 141 were declared successful, yielding an overall success rate of 3.20% .
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