Beijing tells US firms to blame Washington for ‘tariff tensions', hails China prospects
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Sunday's round-table chat was the latest high-profile assembly in recent weeks between authorities –
as high up as President Xi Jinping – and business leaders, both domestic and international, as China looks to shore up economic growth and ease investor nerves amid an anxiety-inducing trade war that keeps getting worse.
Despite the unusual timing, coming at the end of a
three-day public holiday , the gathering still featured representatives from more than 20 US firms, including medical-device-maker Medtronic.
China's vice-minister of commerce, Ling Ji, chaired Sunday's meeting after US President Donald Trump on Wednesday announced his new 34 per cent 'reciprocal tariff' on Chinese goods.
'China's retaliatory measures defend the interests of all firms – including American companies – while urging US compliance with multilateral trade rules,' said Ling, who is also China's deputy international trade representative.
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'Tariff tensions originate from Washington, and we encourage US businesses to address root causes, advocate reasonably, and act practically to stabilise global supply chains for mutual benefit.'
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AllAfrica
2 hours ago
- AllAfrica
EU bluffing it will protect the Philippines from China
Europe will not defend the Philippines. Not in the first hour, not on day one, not at all. Malacanang can host foreign dignitaries, sign joint declarations and pose for photo-ops, but when pressure escalates in the South China Sea, Brussels will remain where it likes to be: on the margins of force. The reason is simple: the EU lacks means, mandate and will. Recent episodes confirm the reality. Trump pushed Europe into a 5% GDP outlay on American weapons, imposed humiliating tariffs and even instructed Europeans on managing a war at their own doorstep. Against this backdrop, EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas went to Manila proclaiming solidarity and affinity with President Ferdinand Marcos Jr with the familiar homily on values. Yet the contrast was glaring: Europe accepts subordination in its own theater, while preaching resolve in Asia. The question thus arises: Could the actor Manila hopes will help to counter China in the West Philippine Sea ever be Brussels? Kallas used the visit to posture as a China hawk, without any leverage. Headlines proclaimed a new era of European commitment to Philippine security, inflated by 'concern' over China's 'illegal, coercive, aggressive and deceptive' behavior. But adjectives are not strategy. Partnerships rest on capability and intent, and Europe offers neither. If any message from the West carried weight lately, it came from France. President Emmanuel Macron, speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue, cut through the fog: Europe will not fight China. 'If the elephant in the room is the day China decides a big operation against a country, will you intervene day one? I would be very cautious today. Everybody would be very cautious today,' Macron said. France, the EU's only nuclear power, its most globally deployed force and the only member state with Indo-Pacific territories, confirmed Europe's hesitation. The implication is terminal: if France won't act, Europe can't. The evidence is not theoretical. The war in Ukraine remains Europe's test. While Kyiv still pleads for weapons and air cover, Brussels debates gas payments and packages of sanctions to the same regime shelling Ukrainian cities. After 1,300 days of war, Europe has sent billions but not a single combat brigade in a war that its leaders frame as 'existential.' Macron made the linkage explicit: 'If both the USA and the Europeans are unable to fix the Ukrainian situation, I think the credibility of both the US and the Europeans to pretend to fix any crisis in this [Southeast Asian] region will be very low.' Translation: Europe's relevance in Asia is bound to its performance in Europe. And now that performance is collapsing under reluctance, fragmentation, risk aversion and submission to Washington. Another way to put it: What has the Philippines contributed to Ukraine? Nothing. And rightly so. Kyiv is not Manila's fight, just as Palawan won't be Brussels's. Nations act where their interests are threatened and their capabilities count. However, the limits run deeper than military logistics. The EU is not a state. It is a bloc of 27 governments pursuing conflicting China strategies while leaders pretend to speak as one. France defends its own interests. Germany prioritizes export flows to Beijing. Eastern Europe chases Chinese infrastructure deals. Spain seeks Chinese factories. The EU has no collective security, and strategic autonomy remains a slogan. Amid these realities, what was Kallas really pursuing in the Philippines? Her tour through Southeast Asia, capped in Manila, was less about Philippine security than about self-projection—claiming global engagement without facing the only question that matters: would Europe ever fight in Asia? The answer had already come weeks earlier in Singapore, and it was no. The greater danger, accordingly, is miscalculation. Manila could mistake symbolic support for protection—and in a military contingency, that would be catastrophic. The gap between words and power was visible from Kallas's first steps as the EU's top diplomat: 'In my first visit since taking up office, my message is clear: the European Union wants Ukraine to win this war.' A war the EU refused to fight and cannot even negotiate to end became her stage for declarations. If Brussels cannot turn mantras into force there, how could it matter in the Philippines? The High Representative's role is not to set policy, still less to deliver victories, but to echo member-state consensus. Yet some Philippine commentators have excitedly portrayed Kallas's show as proof of security cooperation, as if it somehow promised definitive defense against China—still the EU's major trading partner. And full disclosure: the EU does not even have a trade agreement with the Philippines. Therefore, will it be values or trade? Interests or illusions of protecting 'like-minded allies?' Filipino aircrews over contested waters might not be comforted by Kallas's talk of 'democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.' They need combat integration, air cover and the certainty that escalation will be met with overwhelming force in nearby waters. Europe offers none of that. Currently, when it sends vessels to the region, routes are announced in advance to avoid confrontation—presence without purpose. Political affinities don't intercept warships or deter coercion. And the US no longer pretends these performances matter. In February 2025, Vice President J D Vance dismissed European irrelevance at the Munich Security Conference. Kallas answered with defiance, calling on Europe to lead the 'free world.' Weeks later in Washington, Secretary of State Marco Rubio refused to meet her—the very reason she had flown in. And when Ukraine is discussed, EU leaders are not decision-makers but invitees at the White House, where they are lectured on how to negotiate a war they never managed. For Manila, the ambiguity should be gone. The US, Japan and Australia remain their defense partners. Brussels is useful in trade, regulation and multilateral forums. But expecting military deterrence from Europe versus China is pure fantasy. Philippine policymakers should stop imagining battalions where there are only bureaucrats. At best, Brussels can fund radar stations or back maritime resolutions; but once combat begins, if it ever does, it will be reduced to its specialty—offering 'unwavering support' from afar. So beware when the pageantry resumes. The inaugural Philippines–EU Security Dialogue in late 2025 will spark the usual theatrical outrage from Beijing—just enough for some to feel important. But no one in Zhongnanhai will lose any sleep over a summit without soldiers. Because the South China Sea is not governed by grandiloquent declarations and gatherings. It is shaped by resolve, escalation thresholds and the capacity to act without asking. If and when the next crisis comes, Manila will already know Europe can be counted on for rhetoric but will ultimately do nothing. Sebastian Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a Hong Kong-based geopolitics strategist with a focus on Europe-Asia relations.
AllAfrica
6 hours ago
- AllAfrica
Taiwan's drone surge aims to offset China's edge
Taiwan's plan to procure tens of thousands of domestically built drones signals a deliberate bid for asymmetric leverage vis-à-vis China. However, production delays and training deficiencies raise questions about the effectiveness of stockpiling more drones to shift the strategic balance across the Taiwan Strait. This month, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense plans to acquire nearly 50,000 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) between 2026 and 2027, aiming to strengthen asymmetric capabilities amid increasing military pressure from Beijing. According to a government tender notice, the Armaments Bureau will purchase drones across five categories, from short-endurance multi-rotor platforms to long-range fixed-wing systems with payloads between 2.5 and 10 kilograms, all manufactured domestically and excluding mainland Chinese parts. The initiative aligns with Taiwan's new doctrine to treat drones as expendable munitions, similar to recent US military practice. The announcement followed televised demonstrations of indigenous drone models, including first-person view (FPV) strike drones, bomb-dropping platforms, and reconnaissance systems with electro-optic/infrared sensors. Analysts say the specifications match existing prototypes, indicating synchronized development and procurement. However, experts warn that Taiwan's limited training infrastructure and logistical base may reduce operational effectiveness. A government audit revealed gaps in operator qualifications and night-flight readiness, and strategic scholars have called for tiered licensing and maintenance systems to support deployment. This push occurs as Beijing intensifies military activity around Taiwan, which it considers a renegade province. Washington, though not recognizing Taiwan as a sovereign state, remains legally obliged to supply defensive arms. Taiwan's push for 'precision mass' highlights the ongoing imbalance, with production gaps risking turning ambition into symbolism rather than deterrence. The concept of precision mass underpins Taipei's UAV program. Aaron Barlow and others argue in a January 2025 War Quants article that precision mass marks a shift in modern warfare, where low-cost, 'good-enough' munitions such as FPV drones and loitering munitions are deployed in overwhelming numbers to achieve effects once reserved for high-end systems. Barlow and others note that, unlike surgical strikes, precision mass favors brute volume over exquisite targeting to saturate defenses and degrade adversary capabilities. Ukraine has used FPV drones and loitering munitions to make up for its disadvantage in conventional artillery firepower against Russia, but they could not fully substitute for artillery. Bill Murray stresses in a May 2025 Small Wars Journal (SWJ) article that drones remain hampered by weather, limited payloads, and susceptibility to electronic warfare. In contrast, Murray points out that artillery delivers massed, all-weather firepower with decisive range and destructive effect, making reliance on drones more a reflection of constrained resources than a doctrinal breakthrough. Heavy artillery and saturation missile strikes retain a destructive power that drones cannot match. Drones excel at improving targeting and hitting exposed assets, but their yield is limited and their effects are localized. By contrast, massed artillery can pulverize hardened defenses and blanket large areas with firepower—capabilities Taiwan may need to slow a beach landing or disrupt troop concentrations. Nevertheless, Aadil Brar notes in a report this month for the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) that Taiwan's drone program aims to develop asymmetric capabilities to disrupt the People's Liberation Army (PLA) during an invasion rather than match platforms one-to-one. Brar mentions that Taipei aims for an annual production capacity of 180,000 drones by 2030, but doubts remain about whether it can reach that target in just three years. Even so, he points out that Taiwan has sought to expand output by incentivizing local manufacturers and partnering with foreign players, including the US and Germany, to upgrade systems and secure supply chains. The structural challenges are still significant. According to Hong-Lun Tiunn and others in their June 2025 DSET report, Taiwan's drone manufacturing faces hurdles such as high costs due to dependence on non-China parts, limited procurement opportunities beyond a key Ministry of National Defense contract, and a lack of foreign government orders. Tiunn and others also highlight certification barriers and fragmented interagency planning. They add that more than 4,300 restricted flight zones further hinder testing and market access. They point out that critical technologies—flight-control, positioning, and communications chips, as well as gimbal and thermal cameras—still depend on US imports. In addition, they say supply chains remain exposed to US export controls and, paradoxically, China-sourced battery materials and rare-earth magnets. Harun Ayanoglu notes in a January 2025 Central European Institute of Asian Studies (CEAS) article that Taiwan's inability to export weapons, including combat drones, deprives it of operational testing and battlefield feedback. These weaknesses blunt Taipei's bid for self-reliance. Despite skepticism, Brar adds that these efforts have already drawn limited responses from Beijing, with the PLA intensifying counter-drone training—electronic warfare drills, swarm-jamming exercises, and targeting UAV command centers—while China has also imposed sanctions on US drone firms involved in Taiwan's ecosystem. These reactions show that even Taiwan's modest efforts carry strategic weight, but they also underscore Beijing's capacity to adapt—raising doubts over how long Taipei can stay ahead in the counter-drone contest. Strategic debates highlight a more profound dilemma. Tommy Jamison cites Lee Hsi-ming in a February 2024 War on the Rocks article, who argues that while Taiwan should be thankful for US support, it must also build the ability to resist China alone. Lee criticizes what he calls Taiwan's 'America Complex,' whereby leaders procure high-end, high-visibility assets such as fighter jets, frigates, and amphibious assault ships that have little utility under current conditions. During the Cold War, Taiwan and the US enjoyed a technological edge over the PLA, with the Kuomintang even entertaining plans to retake the mainland. That notion was always infeasible, and the balance has since tilted heavily in Beijing's favor. Drawing from Afghanistan and Ukraine, Lee argues that Taiwan should focus instead on developing capabilities—such as precision mass—that would allow it to defend itself without US support. Lee says Taiwan's task is to frustrate Beijing's political ambitions at forced reunification through credible deterrence. Taiwan's UAV efforts aren't just about the quantity of drones bought, but whether they can be effectively integrated and used in combat situations. Training, resilient supply chains, and wartime production will be crucial in proving their real strategic value. The PLA's expanding counter-drone capabilities mean Taiwan's UAVs will encounter serious obstacles in actual conflict. However, as seen in Ukraine, even limited effectiveness can impose costs on a stronger opponent, buying time and complicating plans. Ultimately, Taiwan's program will be judged less on procurement numbers than on whether its drones can operate as true force multipliers under fire—a verdict that will decide if the UAV surge delivers deterrence or merely symbolism.
The Standard
7 hours ago
- The Standard
Hengan reports 2.6pc drop in profit to 1.37b yuan amid fierce price competition
Pop Mart to launch mini Labubu this week as it expects revenue to hit over 30 bln yuan this year
