Can the Quad Hold the Line on Taiwan?

The Diplomat

16-07-2025

U.S. calls for clearer commitments on Taiwan underscore the growing pressure on the Quad, as the Taiwan issue increasingly tests the group's unity and strategic purpose.
The Quad Foreign Ministers Meeting at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., July 1, 2025. From left, Japanese Foreign Minister Iwaya Takeshi, Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio, and Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong.
Taiwan's 40th Han Kuang military exercise, its most extensive to date, will span ten days and simulate a full-scale Chinese invasion. These drills incorporate amphibious assaults, joint-force coordination, and extensive civilian-military integration across multiple domains. Taiwan also showcased enhanced deterrent capabilities with U.S.-supplied HIMARS rocket systems, F-16V fighter jets, and indigenous Sky Sword II and Sky Bow III missile systems. The activation of 22,000 reservists marked an unprecedented expansion of national defense mobilization, signaling Taiwan's growing commitment to preparing for conflict rather than merely deterring it.
This shift is a direct response to the increasingly aggressive behavior of China's People's Liberation Army (PLA). Gray zone coercion has become routine. PLA aircraft and naval incursions across the Taiwan Strait's median line surged from 565 in 2022 to over 3,070 in 2024, an average of more than eight per day. In January 2025 alone, Taiwan's Air Defense Identification Zone recorded 248 crossings, which represents a 75 percent increase compared to January 2022. These provocations are designed to wear down Taiwan's defenses without crossing the threshold into open conflict, reflecting China's long-term strategy of psychological pressure, strategic normalization, and the gradual erosion of Taiwan's sovereignty through fatigue
Taiwan is no longer waiting passively for external support. It is building an active and layered defense strategy in anticipation of a volatile future. This recalibration has drawn attention from Taiwan's strategic partners, particularly the members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad): Australia, India, Japan, and the United States.
Originally conceived as a maritime security initiative, the Quad has evolved into a broader Indo-Pacific framework committed to ensuring a free, open, and rules-based regional order. Yet the Taiwan question exposes the grouping's limitations.
Unlike NATO, the Quad is not a military alliance. Still, the urgency of Taiwan's situation has sparked debate over whether the group should develop a more coherent strategy for collective deterrence. The United States has called for greater clarity from its allies Australia and Japan regarding their roles in a potential Taiwan conflict. The Pentagon is also actively working to align operational plans with allies through behind-the-scenes consultations and strategic dialogues. However, progress remains slow, hindered by political constraints and divergent national priorities.
Japan has strengthened its defense posture, increasing its budget from 6.8 trillion yen in 2023 to 8.7 trillion yen in 2025, or 1.8 percent of GDP. It has expanded joint drills with the United States and is reassessing its strategic doctrines. However, constitutional limits and public ambivalence remain obstacles. A survey by Asahi Shimbun found that 62 percent of Japanese citizens consider a regional conflict likely, yet a majority prefer that Japan pursue a path of neutrality and global cooperation, with only 18.7 percent supporting closer alignment with the United States.
Australia has also adopted a cautious approach. Prime Minister Anthony Albanese's visit to China this week highlights the dual-track strategy of deepening U.S. defense ties while preserving strong economic relations with China. Amid U.S. calls for clarity on Taiwan, the Australian government stated that 'it would not commit troops in advance to any potential conflict.'
The stakes are significant, as Australia's exports to China reached AU$196 billion (US$$128 billion) last year, exceeding the combined total of Australia's next four largest markets. A report by the Bankwest Curtin Economics Center estimated that Australia's trade with China contributes an additional AU$2,600 to the average household income each year. In contrast, recent tariffs imposed by the United States average around 10 percent, while those under the China-Australia Free Trade Agreement remain at just 1.1 percent. This disparity has strengthened the perception of China as a more stable and economically reliable partner for Australia.
India, the only member of the Quad that is not a U.S. ally, continues to maintain deliberate silence on Taiwan, consistent with its longstanding recognition of the One China policy since 1949. Even amid rising cross-strait tensions, New Delhi has avoided statements in forums such as ASEAN, reflecting a strategic calculation to avoid provoking China, especially given unresolved border disputes in the Himalayas.
At the same time, India has steadily expanded its engagement with Taiwan. Companies like Foxconn and Pegatron are integral to Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat, and bilateral trade has increased sixfold since 2001. Talks on a free trade agreement and semiconductor cooperation are progressing. A conflict in the Taiwan Strait would severely disrupt global supply chains and pose significant economic risks, which India increasingly recognizes.
While the July 2025 Quad Foreign Ministers' meeting expressed 'serious concerns' over rising tensions in the East and South China Seas, it refrained from directly condemning China.
Strategic and economic divergences within the Quad underscore its central dilemma. The alliance was never designed for collective military action and lacks both the institutional structure and legally binding mutual defense commitments that define NATO. However, China's growing assertiveness over Taiwan and its expanding capabilities demand a more coordinated response.
Even as public statements remain measured, the Quad must avoid strategic drift. Coordinated efforts in contingency planning, intelligence sharing, and logistical interoperability need to accelerate. The alliance's credibility, and that of the broader rules-based order, depends on readiness and sustained alignment. China will continue to test the Quad's cohesion, but this also presents an opportunity to forge a more adaptable and politically viable model of deterrence, one rooted in regional awareness, interoperability, and expanding partnerships particularly with ASEAN.
Taiwan is no longer a peripheral concern. It has become the crucible in which the Quad's purpose and unity will be tested. As pressure mounts in the Taiwan Strait, the time for strategic ambiguity is narrowing. The stability of the Indo-Pacific may well depend on the Quad's ability to adapt, align, and act with resolve.