Prabowo's efficiency drive takes toll on Jakarta starred hotels
JOSEPH RACHMAN
JAKARTA -- Hotels in the Indonesian capital are taking a hit from President Prabowo Subianto's efficiency drive, losing a big chunk of their regular customers as civil servants are denied one of their job perks: free hotel stays.
Jakarta hotels have long relied not on leisure tourism, but on meetings, incentives, conferences and events, known in the industry as MICE. Among their key customers are civil servants from ministries and other state institutions, who for many years have held events at hotels.
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At the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, he sparked controversy with his proposal to end the war between Russia and Ukraine. Prabowo floated the idea of a demilitarized zone between Russia and Ukraine and a United Nations referendum in what he called disputed territory without consulting or informing his colleagues at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the president. His summit diplomacy as president has drawn praise from some quarters. His state visits to Saudi Arabia, Brazil, and various European countries have been described as highly productive. Indonesia's recent accession to the BRICS grouping of countries and his attendance at the 2025 BRICS Summit in Rio de Janeiro signalled Indonesia's deeper alignment with emerging global powers. A tangible outcome of Prabowo's summit diplomacy was the political agreement with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, which advanced the stalled Indonesia–European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The agreement has since moved into its final negotiation stage. Similarly, Prabowo's direct phone diplomacy with U.S. President Donald Trump led to a breakthrough trade deal: the reduction of U.S. import tariffs on Indonesian goods from 32 percent to 19 percent. As a result, Indonesia now enjoys the lowest tariff rate of any Southeast Asian country trading with the United States. But summit diplomacy is not without its detractors. While it can help build partnerships or resolve crises, there are also instances where it has produced limited or even counterproductive outcomes. One such example is the 2018 meeting between Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un in Singapore. Hailed initially as a diplomatic breakthrough, the summit ended without a formal agreement and failed to halt North Korea's weapons program. Within months, tensions between the two countries had returned. The appeal of summit diplomacy lies in personal contact. When leaders meet face to face, they can cut through bureaucratic inertia and establish rapport that formal channels may struggle to achieve. However, the highly personalized nature of summit diplomacy also brings risk. Diplomacy conducted without sufficient institutional backing or consultation can lead to missteps. In Prabowo's case, his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in November 2024 has generated controversy. The joint development agreement signed between the two leaders in disputed maritime areas was criticized for overlooking the sensitivities of Indonesia's ASEAN neighbors. Analysts warned that the move could heighten tensions in the already volatile South China Sea. Prabowo was also seen as making another blunder with his plan to evacuate 1,000 Palestinians from Gaza. To support his plan, Prabowo travelled to the five key countries on the Palestinian issue: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, Egypt, Qatar, and Jordan. However, the plan did not resonate positively at home. At the same time, the major Arab countries have made it very clear that they reject any relocation plans for Palestinians out of their territories in Gaza and the occupied West Bank. Role of Institutions These two policies illustrate a broader concern: summit diplomacy, while useful for signaling intent and building momentum, often lacks the institutional depth needed for durable policy outcomes. Many high-profile summits conclude with joint declarations but no clear mechanisms for follow-up implementation. To be effective, summit diplomacy needs to be integrated into a broader institutional framework. Institutionalization helps ensure that agreements are not only negotiated but also monitored, executed and evaluated. This is especially true in multilateral settings, where complex coordination is required. Indonesia's hosting of the G20 Summit in 2022 offers a model of institutionalized summit diplomacy. Despite deep global divisions at the time over the war in Ukraine, rising inflation and economic instability, the G20 produced a joint communiqué. Much of the credit went to the preparatory work done by sherpas, the senior government officials who engaged in months of negotiations to craft language acceptable to all sides. Without this groundwork, the summit might have ended in deadlock. As Indonesia under Prabowo pursues a more assertive foreign policy, summit diplomacy will likely remain a key instrument. However, to avoid the pitfalls of over-personalization, it must be supported by sustained institutional engagement, regional coordination and clear implementation strategies. Originally published under Creative Commons by 360info™.
